|
|
Philippines
Abu Sayyaf Group - The Heat is On
The death of two of the
three remaining hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in what
is widely being described as a ‘botched operation’ by the Philippines
Army has once again brought this troubled South East Asian nation –
already the target of the second phase of the US ‘war against global
terror’ – into renewed international focus. The tragedy of the deaths
of Martin Burnham, an American Christian missionary, and Filipina nurse
Deborah Yap, is that they had suffered enormously in extended captivity
over the past year, and that the end came so close to freedom.
Martin Burnham and his
wife Gracia (who was injured, but freed in the June 7, 2002, operation),
had been abducted with 21 others on May 27, 2001, at the Dos Palmas
resort in Palawan. Three of the hostages were released immediately,
but six days later, the ASG defied a massive military operation launched
against them, to take an indeterminate number of hostages – including
nurse Yap – at the Lamitan hospital in Basilan. Another 15 hostages
were taken over the succeeding days in a raid at a rubber plantation
in Tairan, Lantawan town, Basilan. On June 12, 2001, ASG spokesman Abu
Sabaya announced the execution of American hostage Guillermo Sobero
as an ‘independence day gift to the Arroyo government.’ Over the following
days, at least four hostages were released, raising suspicion of ransom
payments by their families. Others were not so lucky, with a succession
of brutal executions carried out over the following weeks. Relentless
military pressure gradually resulted in several escapes, rescues and
releases, eventually bringing down the number to the final three – the
Burnhams and nurse Yap.
The ASG is the smallest,
but most radical of Islamist separatist orgnanisations operating in
the Southern Philippines. Established in the mid-1980s, with the objective
of creating a separate ‘pure Islamic Bangsamoro homeland’, a large number
of its cadres trained and fought along with the mujahiddeen in
Afghanistan. It was in Afghanistan that Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani –
the founder of the ASG – first came in contact with Osama bin Laden.
Abdurajak and his younger brother Khaddaffy Janjalani were trained at
the camp near Khost in the late 1980s where Ramzi Yousef was training
and teaching at that time. Janjalani’s developed close relations with
both bin Laden and Yousef, and when bin Laden sought to expand his terror
network after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he supported Janjalani
to establish a cell in the Philippines. In 1991, Yousef travelled to
the Philippines, and over the years, the country emerged as "a
major operational hub" of the Al Qaeda, and the ASG as one of its
"franchise" operations. Some of the worst terrorist plans
in recent times have been hatched in the Philippines, including Ramzi
Yousef’s abortive plot to bring down 11 American jetliners in ’48 hours
of terror.’ The Philippines Al Qaeda network, which comprehended both
the ASG and the largest Islamist extremist grouping in the country,
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), was painstakingly put together
over a period of nine years, commencing 1988, by bin Laden’s brother-in-law,
Mohammad Jamal Khalifa.
The ASG was immensely effective
through the 1990s, initially consolidating its hold the Basilan and
Sulu islands, a relatively small area, and later extending its activities
to other Island groups in Mindanao, and eventually into the urban centres
of the country, such as Manila and Cebu, as well. Its first operation
outside the Southern Philippines was the abduction of 21 persons – including
10 foreigners – from the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan in April
2000. These and other hostages were subsequently released after payment
of substantial ransoms – allegedly totalling an estimated US $ 25 million.
It is for its Christian hostages that the ASG ordinarily reserves its
most brutal treatment.
By year-end 2001, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in an intensive crackdown ordered by
President Gloria Marcapagal-Aroyyo herself, had initiated a total of
196 operations against the ASG. Another thirty armed incidents had been
initiated by the ASG against government forces in the year, and three
terrorist actions targeted the civilian population. ASG related incidents
in the year resulted in 82 killed and 229 wounded government troops.
Civilian casualties included 77 dead and 104 injured. There were 249
fatalaties among ASG cadres, with another 67 active members captured.
It was primarily the Al
Qaeda linkages, and the increasing use of Philippines as a ‘country
of convenience’ by various Islamist terrorist groupings that made it
such an urgent priority in America’s ‘global war against terror. Since
US special forces landed in the country to train and assist the Philippines
government to target the ASG – formally commencing the scheduled six-month
‘Balikatan’ (shoulder to shoulder) Exercise on January 31, 2002, a bloody
duel has been in progress. The US Forces do not actually engage in combat,
since the Philippine Constitution bans the use of foreign combat troops
in the absence of a formal treaty to this effect, but they do accompany
Philippine troops on anti-terrorist operations, and are armed and authorized
to fire in self-defense.
The US also gave a package
of over US $ 100 million worth of sophisticated equipment, including
a C-130 transport, eight helicopters, night vision devices, and 30,000
M 16 rifles, to the Philippines Army. A backup of US air reconnaissance
resources, heat sensing and electronic monitoring equipment has also
been extended to track and locate ASG cadres and camps, and a new measure
of efficiency has been brought into the extended counter-terrorism campaign
that the Philippines Forces had been engaged in. The result has been
much more focused operations that have inflicted over 188 fatalities
on the ASG cadres till the end of May, with 48 security men killed as
well. 65 civilians have also been killed by the extremists over this
period.
While the ASG remains a
serious threat, its present reality is, perhaps, not as daunting as
may be imagined. The organisation has undergone a continuos decline
since its leader-ideologue, Abdurajak Janjalani, was killed in a shootout
with the police in December 1998, and his main lieutenant, Edwin Angeles
was arrested in January 1999. The ASG is now nominally headed by Abdurajak’s
brother Khaddaffy, but has, in fact, split into several autonomous factions.
The largest extant faction is headed by Ahmad Salayudi alias Abu Sabaya,
and another faction is headed by Galib Andang. The ASG has, moreover,
substantially degenerated into a criminal abduction-for-ransom operation,
though its fractious leadership continues to maintain an Islamist and
political pretence.
Despite a continuous weakening
of the group, it was, in essence, the difficulty of terrain across the
1,700 square kilometres mountain jungles of the Basilan Islands, that
had undermined the effectiveness of the earlier efforts to track down
and neutralise the ASG. The limitations have been substantially overcome
with the hi-tech US backup, and a range of other variables have also
come into play. The US has, for instance, jacked up rewards for each
of the five top leaders of the ASG to US $ 5 million each, as against
the $ 20,000 that the Philippines government offered earlier, and information
on ASG movements has now increased manifold. ASG cadres and collaborators
had also been moving freely across Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,
but recent improvements in passport and immigration control procedures
have resulted in the arrest of at least a hundred international fugitives
accused of terrorism ,who were trying to enter the country.
There is now substantial
support for the continuance of the Balikatan Exercises beyond the scheduled
six months that would end on July 31. The US is also reported to have
asked the Philippines government to allow the deployment of the Japan-based
USS Kitty Hawk to the Sulu Sea, which would put Basilan within striking
distance of the ship’s 70 combat aircraft.
The danger that is currently
being addressed is substantially the threat of the ASG. The Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), and the MILF, both of which have a history
of association with the Al Qaeda, as well as with the ASG, are largely
being ignored in the present campaign. The MILF is engaged in peace
negotiations with the government, and many of its cadres are surrendering,
though ‘rogue elements’ (which in at least one case included the chief
MILF peace negotiator) continue to engage in widespread abduction for
ransom. While these movements, like the ASG, have all currently assumed
a deeply degraded form, they do constitute a core of radicalized and
criminalized elements that can be mobilized for a major Islamist jehad
under regional conditions that may, again, begin to appear favorable
to the success of such an enterprise.
(Edited version
published in Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, June 13, 2002.)
|