De-escalation Plan proposed by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna Peninsula, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, to Enable Re-settlement of Civilians in High Security Zones, December 20, 2002

PREAMBLE

1. GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka] and security forces appreciate the most important humanitarian need to resettle people back in the houses in areas affected by the war. In this sense expansion of HSZ [High Security Zone] from time to time has caused displacement of people in the Jaffna peninsula thus creating & humanitarian problem. Therefore GOSL and Security Forces has realized the need to expedite the resettling of displaced people and are keen to find a workable solution to solve this issue.
2. It is also understood resettling civilians in HSZ can bring about a big political success to the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and any other interested parties. Therefore it can have a direct impact on political situation in Jaffna which may be most probably go in favour of LTTE under present political situation. While appreciating this situation it should also be born in mind that when talking in term of political situation, political criticism in the south of Sri Lanka also cannot be ignored. Therefore any adjustment or variations in Security Zones should not create a political turmoil in the south and should be considered as critical.
3. While appreciating the humanitarian achievements, consequences which will affect the Sri Lankan security forces and military gains the LTTE will achieve due to resettling civilian in HSZ should be also taken in to consideration. Therefore resettling civilians in the HSZ should go hand in glove with a de-escalation process agreed by both GOSL and LTTE. While appreciating the urgent need to resettle people in HSZ it is imperative that political mileage which the GOSL has to maintain through out the peace process should not be hindered by creating a weak security environment in the North.

NEED FOR SECURITY

4. As existence and strength of HSZ is utmost vital for success of defences' and security of Jaffna peninsula and islands, no risks or chances should be taken, to weaken security by making HSZ vulnerable.
5. As the present dimensions of HSZ are meant to face the present threat weakening HSZs should be done in relation to reduction of LTTE military options ranging from major conventional attacks to asymmetric attacks.
6. Any normalizing plan which affects the sy [system] of HSZ should go hand in glove with reducing military options available to LTTE.
7. Armed groups having the ability to get cover behind civilians should not be ignored and leave terrorist to take maximum advantage.
8. Armed groups if mixed up with civilians to enter HSZ or get Int about HSZ will find it easier to launch physical attacks rather than firing long range wpns as presence of civilians in HSZ may hinder the freedom to fire long range wpns [weapons].

9. Any armed groups attacking HSZ will want to physically capture or destroy command elements and resources within HSZ rather than trying attack to with long range weapons.
10. If attacked from near benefited due to the increased ability to close in by mixing up with civilians while facing any attack from front, SF defences in HSZ will fall and face disastrous effects losing lot of life and resources.

11. If the civilians are allowed to enter, threat on survivability of all HSZ are equally increased including the once facing uncleared areas.
12. As peace or development will never come without security it is not advisable to weaken security of Jaffna peninsula and also aim at peace and development.
13. As SF presently does not have 100 % superiority over the LTTE military capability, it is not advisable to take risks unless SF capabilities are developed to be able to remain 100 % superiority over LTTE thus any short term drawbacks can be overcome and regain initiative to avoid disasters

14. If there is a threat for HSZ from immediate front/close proximity, rear or within due to resettling in HSZ to cater for such a situations, additional troops deployments will be required.

FACTORS AFFECTING RESETTLEMENT

15. Humanitarian Requirement. Resettlement in HSZ deserves serious concern as per the Humanitarian angle and the whole issue should be seen from following perspectives.

1. There are about 10000 houses affected due to existence of HSZ.
2. Due to prolonged displacement education of Jaffna students have been hampered.
3. Due to displacement cultural values and tradition are been disturbed.
4. Due to displacement civilian have become more vulnerable to the activities undemocratic forces.
5. Displaced people have been socially handicapped and virtually face discrimination.
6. Displaced people will be deprived of the service and infrastructure facilities afforded to normal civilians.
7. Having displaced people will have a direct adverse impact on the economy of the region.

1. Political agenda of the government. As the government is committed to the peace process to bring about lasting peace for Sri Lanka it is of paramount importance for the government to be concerned about the plight of the displaced people. Government should take all possible measures in this regard without disturbing the security requirements in order to retain its initiative to achieve long term success. Fol [following] areas should be included in the political agenda of the GOSL.

1. Take sufficient interest on resettlement followed up with rehabilitation.
2. Request for foreign donor assistance for development of affected areas and people.
3. Take necessary steps to win hearts and minds of people affected.
4. Mobilize all government ministries and departments etc for the purpose of successful resettlement of people by solving infrastructure facility problems.
5. Provide an environment which encourages and assist in practicing democratic politics.

1. Security. This is given the highest consideration as resettlements are going to take place within the areas declared as HSZs where most of the key installations are situated. Following factors needs to be given due consideration in order to ensure security is not compromised.

1. Resettlement of civilians should be arranged in a such a way that SF should not compromise its security at any stage.
2. Security can be relaxed only in stages in relation to de-escalation of LTTE. ie disarming of cadres and decommission of LTTE long range weapons.
3. Effective and accurate system of activities has to be planned out for both LTTE and GOSL in coordination with SLMM [Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission] to ensure security will not be hampered and because of the resettlement of troops the defence layout should not be exposed to the civilians.
4. Security of command and logistic elements to be ensured. Vulnerable and sensitive defenses, air and sea communication agencies should not be sacrificed.
5. Security of IDP [Internally Displaced persons] also to be considered as equally important because, they may be vulnerable to terr [terrorist] activities, mines/IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] which are available in HSZs.
6. Govt [Government] infrastructure-facilities transport agencies are vulnerable.
7. Security of law enforcement agencies had to be considered for smooth functioning of the govt authority.

1. Infrastructure Facilities. It is important that following facilities are required to be provided before the resettlement proper takes place in the HSZs.

1. Electricity
2. Transport
3. Housing
4. Medical
5. Repairs to the road network
6. Communication systems
7. Education

1. Finance and rehabilitation. This requirement will go hand in glove as civilians will require financial assistance to reconstruct their dwellings and also arrangements to be made regarding dry rations. Financial assistance will also be required to develop infrastructure facilities to readjust SF deployment. Assistance may be sought from NGOs.
2. SLMM representatives. It is required to make an understanding between the SLA [Sri Lanka Army] and LITE in many areas. Following requirements to be looked into.

1. Expansion of the monitoring mission by additional numbers.
2. Enhance the mandate to cover more security issues.
3. Since the LTTE is indirectly interfering with the deployment of security forces, SLMM assistance is required to minimize the security threat. For this purpose SLMM mandate should be amended to give more authority/power.

1. Neutral body to supervise de-escalation. It is essential to have a neutral organization with sufficient number of staff to make a formidable force to monitor the implementation of the de-escalation process. This neutral body should be in a position to act as mediators with the respective theatres during the implementation of the de-escalation process. This body should work in liaison with the govt, Norwegian facilitators and LTTE regarding the progress of the implementation of de-escalation. SLMM may perform this task better.

DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs

2. De-escalation proposals in relation to resettlement in HSZs are given at annex 'A'.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

3. Implementation plans for resettlement has to be worked out in relation to de-escalation proposals given in this proposal under following headings. It is also required to come to an agreement by the govt with the LTTE under SLMM supervision to work out the implementation.

1. Areas to be resettled including boundaries to be identified.
2. Clearing of mines.
3. Demarcation of prohibited areas/No Go areas.
4. Enumerate the legitimate ownership.
5. Financial support and rehabilitation.
6. Providing infrastructure facilities.
7. Essential services.
8. Working out of a detail security system which will be revised from time to time as per deployments oh ground.
9. Action plan for de-escalation in relation to resettlement.

1. Following hotels and houses can be vacated for intended use/resettlement as early as possible as follows.

1. Subash Hotel - By Mid June 2003.
2. Gnanam Hotel - By End March 2003.
3. Houses around above two hotels in Jaffna Town - About 80 in numbers - By Mid July 2003
4. Private houses in Chavakachcheri - By End 2003.*
5. Private houses in other areas - By Mid 2004.*

1. As recommended by the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation on 14 December 2002, it is expected financial requirements are provided by the government to SLA, commencing mid January 2003. Further, as stated in Oslo during the last negotiations, the SLA does not anticipate any objections from the LTTE on new relocation sites, as such responses would cause further delay.
2. Following areas can be considered for early resettlement provided De-escalation proposals have been finalized and agreed as per the security requirements stated in the annex 'A'.

1. Area west of Keerimalai. (Annex A)
2. Kovilakkandy. (Annex B)

1. This report/proposals will have to be studied and approved by the higher authorities.

Date: 20 December 2002

GSC FONSEKA RWP RSP rcds psc
Major General
Commander
Security Forces (Jaffna)

Copies:
Secretary of Defence
Comd of the Army
Comd of the Navy
Comd of the Air Force

ANNEX A

SRL NO	HOW TO ELIMINATE SECURITY THREATS	IDENTIFIED THREATS	RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN HSZS	REMARKS
1	Resettling of displaced persons to be carried out only for those families lived in the area before 1991 in Palaly HSZ and before 1995 in Nagarkovil, Muhamalai Thanankilappu, Ariyalai and beach road Jaffna.	Resettlement of Armed groups aid sympathizers in close proximity to camps.	Possible only in selected areas.	Restriction on visitors into resettled areas is required.
2	Enforcing deterrent Police action against violence.	Provoke people against SF to discharge violence.	Restriction on unlawful assemblies	Explore legality of imposing restrictions over areas outside HSZ and within HSZ.
3	SLMM mandate to be enhanced to check suspected safe houses of armed groups org [organisations] in cleared areas and create a system to monitor availability/distribution of arms ammo [ammunition] found in uncleared areas too.	Availability of LTTE military hardware including missiles in the cleared areas and uncleared areas.	SLMM/neutral observers to guarantee the removal of the threat before resettlement.
4	Conducting of counter insurgency operations	Develop military capability in HSZ	No resettlement.	Nil
5	Declaration of permanently abandoning of suicide missions and remove of such personnels with assistance of Police/SLMM intentions are identified.	Suicide cadres threat on SF movements and VIPs/VVIPs.	Will differ resettlement	Detrimental effect on confidence buildings
6	SLMM to prevent terrorist taking control over selected areas and ensure safe passage of SF. Conduct sporadic checks of safe houses and offices by SLMM to monitor above.	Hinder the mobility of SF confined to a restricted area by armed groups activities.	Resettlement to commence if the threat is eliminated.	SLMM mandate to be enhanced
7	Take all measures to prevent armed groups achieving the capability mentioned in identified threat. SLMM to continue spot checks on SF request for arms and ammo. Withdraw of LTTE weapons in forward lines and dumping them in rear/storage south of Kilinochchi under SLMM supervision.	Create situation within cleared areas. Tie down available troops in the belly thus depriving assistance to FDLs.	No resettlement unless the preventive measures are successful.	Nil
8	Police to be geared to take actions against hostile elements.	Hostile behaviour of people IDPs not yet resettled.	Expedite the resettlement process/ relocate where resettlement not possible.	Requirement of housing projects.
9	Ensure present security systems are effectively practiced and SLMM to keep checks on fishermen and sea tigers going to sea from uncleared areas.	Fishermen resettled in coastal areas sympathetic to armed groups movements.	Resettlement must not hinder the defence potential.	More applicable to defences facing Lagoons.
10	SLMM to remove such facilities available with LTTE. Also decommissioning of indirect weapon systems to be arranged.	Capability of passing accurate information to bring down accurate indirect fire by the people resettled.	Restrict the area of resettlement as there should not be radio communication from close proximity of HSZs.	Amend SLMM mandate.

ANNEX B

Source: Tamil Guardian, London, December 25, 2002