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Only a fair investigation can expose
murky realities behind the attack on CRPF in Sukma
(We cannot put an end to 'sacrifices'
by 'our martyrs' without addressing the political and administrative
defalcations in the highest offices of government.)
A great deal has been written in the
wake of the latest tragedy in Sukma, about the delay in appointing a
Director General of the Central Reserve Police Force, and the government
appears to have been stung by this criticism and has, with belated alacrity,
appointed an officer to this post within 48 hours of the Burkapal attack,
after dithering for nearly two months. Delays in such critical appointments
are certainly unfortunate, and are an index of the incoherence, indifference,
contestations of power, and misplaced priorities on Raisina Hill. It
must, however, be understood that this has nothing to do with the circumstances
that led to the failures of the CRPF at Burkapal. Whether or not there
is a director general is of no consequence to the functioning of a battalion
in deployment, each of which is a self-sufficient unit. No aspect of
the daily and operational functioning of a battalion is in any way compromised
by the presence of an acting director general, as opposed to a permanent
incumbent.
Frank inquiry
Information I have received regarding
the incident at Burkapal suggests grave irregularities and lapses on
the part of the unit, which led to the eventual tragedy. But this is
the subject of an official inquiry, and any analysis of hearsay and
derivative accounts would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, it is abundantly
clear, even from what is publicly known, that flagging discipline, poor
training and bad leadership will have contributed directly to the debacle.
Suffice it to say that even the most rudimentary imperatives of self-preservation
appear to have been ignored by the targeted unit.
However, the Court of Inquiry process
is unlikely to be useful, and will only result in the active distortion
of facts, as various individuals and institutions seek to protect themselves
from blame. A punitive approach serves little constructive purpose in
such cases. In Punjab, during the years of terrorism, and in Andhra
Pradesh through the successful phase of counter-Maoist operations, the
model followed was a frank inquiry into major incidents to define the
specific circumstances in which a particular outcome resulted, with
the objective of ensuring that identifiable lapses did not recur, or
that any structural vulnerabilities that existed were removed. It is
only such an approach that can help ensure that another such tragedy
will not be repeated in Sukma - or elsewhere - a month or two down the
line, something the Maoists will certainly try to orchestrate.
Challenging terrain?
Much has been said and written about
the difficulties of operating in Bastar, its "challenging terrain" and
"dense forests". Most such commentary is ill-informed. Indian counter-insurgency
campaigns have been carried out in much more difficult terrain, certainly
in many of the far more densely forested and hilly tracts of the North
East, and the mountainous terrain of Jammu & Kashmir; the swamplands
of the Mand in the Punjab had their own unique challenges. The Burkapal
area in which the latest attack occurred is largely scrubland, with
limited tree cover.
In any event, the challenge of terrain
and of Maoist tactics is far from insurmountable. I had written in 2003
about a unit of the Punjab Police, under the command of then Deputy
Inspector General HS Dhillon, that had been deployed in the Bastar region
for the Assembly Elections there. While this is a long time ago, their
experience bears recounting:
"A contingent of the Punjab Police (PP)
was deployed in Chattisgarh for 22 days on polling duties, with a large
proportion of these in the Bastar area, including four of the areas
worst affected by Naxalite violence: Jagdalpur, Kanker, Bijapur and
Dantewada. One party of 50 PP personnel, accompanied by one local policeman,
started from Bijapur to go through forests to reach a place called Sundra,
to prepare a helipad so that electoral officials and materials could
be brought in. This short journey was to be completed in two stages,
with an overnight stop at Sagmeta. They moved from Bijapur at 07:00,
and by 10:00, they were in the thick of the forest. They were greeted
by as many as 19 landmine blasts, coupled with heavy firing. The commandos
retaliated and used area weapons - 2-inch mortars, GF rifles (grenade
launchers), Light Machine Guns and ALRs (sniper rifles). They found
that all the existing forest trails were mined, so they marched cross
country, cutting a path through the forest and reached Sagmeta, just
15 kilometres from Bijapur, at 17:00, completing the journey in over
10 hours.
At Sagmeta, from 23:00 to 05:00 the
next morning, there was a pitched battle between the police party and
the Naxalites who were surrounding them from all sides. They then received
information that the route to Sundra was heavily mined. The party consequently
stayed on at Sagmeta for another day. Firing on the party started again
at 2200 and continued till 0500 the next morning. A helicopter was eventually
pressed into service, and lifted one party - about half a platoon -
who secured the ground at Sundra. The remaining policemen were then
airlifted to create and secure the helipad. They came under heavy fire
from the Naxalites through the night at Sundra as well. For those who
have not faced fire, it is difficult to understand the enormous courage
and character that it would have taken this small contingent, as they
confronted a faceless enemy, although unused to the terrain, being in
the area for the first time… despite the fact that they took casualties,
they managed to set up the polling station, and polling did take place…
After polling was over, the party returned, once again under heavy fire
throughout the night…"
While exemplary, this is not a unique
experience. In my tenure with the CRPF in Jammu and Kashmir, I have
seen a CRPF contingent going through an ambush that was sustained across
15 kilometres, without losing any men. The fact is, a well-trained,
well-led force would prevail in this area, as in any other, and it is
deficiencies of training, leadership, orientation and motivation that
are contributing to the repeated and large fatalities that the Police
and Paramilitaries are suffering in some Maoist areas.
K.P.S. Gill
"The writer, former DGP, Punjab, is president, Institute for
Conflict Management, and publisher, 'South Asia Intelligence
Review'"
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