I was Indias Ambassador and Permanent Representative
to the UN Offices in Geneva at a time when the issue of militants and
known terrorists utilising the UN as a platform to gain some kind of
legitimacy came into sharp focus. It was this personal experience that
forms the basis of what I write here.
I
Human rights issues in the UN are handled not just
at the level of the annual meetings of the UN General Assembly in New
York, but more specifically, through the Economic and Social Council
of the UN (ECOSOC), by the Commission on Human Rights which meets annually
in Geneva, by the Centre for Human Rights which has its headquarters
in Geneva and operates under the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
and by the various instruments and mechanisms set up by these bodies.
The Sub-Commission for the Protection of Minorities has also legally
evolved a role for itself. It is a subsidiary body of the Commission,
composed of independent experts, who are supposed to advise the inter-governmental
forum and to bring to its attention patterns of gross violations of
human rights anywhere in the world. Since, however, the experts are
elected by the Member States of the Commission, the politicisation which
rules the Commission has crept into the Sub-Commission as well. It has
developed an agenda of its own and its own mechanisms. Its studies and
reports are rarely considered by the inter-governmental fora. The main
characteristic of the Sub-Commission is the interaction between its
members and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who use this opportunity
to bring their complaints to the attention of the experts and of the
international community.
In addition to these bodies there are the Treaty Bodies.
The Human Rights Committee oversees the implementation by States of
the obligations they have undertaken under the International Covenants
on Human Rights. Other expert bodies have also been set up to monitor
the implementation, again by States, of the different Conventions to
which they are party. These include the Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD), The Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), The Convention against Torture
(CAT), among others. Members of these various expert bodies are elected
by the States. All these bodies and mechanisms, such as Working Groups
and Special Rapporteurs (both country specific and issue specific),
give the idea of an impressive network at the international level, even
of activity at the global level, against the violation of human rights
anywhere in the world. This would, however, in my view, not be an accurate
picture and before I turn to the specifics of the actual practice regarding
debates and interventions on human rights issues at the international
level, I would like to make at least three general comments.
-
Firstly, since the treatment of human rights issues is handled
in the UN by Member States, there is a high degree of politicisation
of the subject. The usual pattern of the meetings that I have observed
consists of accusations or charges made by countries of the North
the European Union, the US, Canada et al against
violations of human rights by States of the South. The North-South
divide is fairly evident in the discussions. Rarely have I heard
a country of the North criticising another country from Europe or
the US for violations of human rights. Rarely do Governments get
together to deal with a human rights issue in a non-politicised
way. Part of the problem lies, of course, in the fact that, in almost
all western countries, human rights at the international level are
handled as a foreign policy issue rather than an issue which affects
all society.
-
Secondly, flowing from this, the focus is on violation of human
rights by the State and its agents. Though some countries regularly
raise the issue of terrorism, the role of non-State
actors is rarely, if ever, acknowledged. India has frequently raised
the issue of militant groups sponsored by Pakistan, but this is
seen as a part of the ongoing, perennial and to many countries rather
boring Indo-Pak exchanges on Kashmir and human rights violations
in others territories.
-
Thirdly, and perhaps, most important is the role of NGOs in the
Human Rights field. There is a veritable industry of human rights
organisations not even the Centre for Human Rights is aware
of the antecedents of the thousands who participate in the meetings
of the Commission, the Sub-Commission and the Working Groups. These
NGOs are powerful, as they are given almost equal speaking time
on any subject on the agenda and there appears to be no dearth of
funding for these organisations. There are, of course, some who
are seriously concerned with human rights violations if only
by States and base their charge on well documented or well
researched situations. But such NGOs are few and far between. There
are NGOs that are funded, directly or indirectly, by governments
to project their own governments point of view. There are
NGOs who regularly brief their government representatives, before
and during meetings and who sometimes act as domestic pressure groups
on the government concerned to raise a particular issue about a
particular country.
Most pernicious is what I came to learn was a general practice of
many NGOs accredited by ECOSOC after having been vetted by the UN
Committee on NGOs, lending and sometimes even letting
their banner to individuals and groups who have not been accepted
by ECOSOC. Since the Centre itself has no control on the applications
for participation, any person put forward by an accredited NGO
be he a genuine human rights activist, an expert in a particular
field of human rights, or a brutal militant guilty of heinous crimes
in his home country is permitted to gain some form of international
recognition with the UN offering an international platform for their
complaints against the State. My observation of the human rights
meetings has led me to the conclusion that the State, especially
a State from the South, is automatically held less credible, less
truthful, and less reliable than individuals or NGOs who make charges
against them.
My own feelings were initially ambivalent. There are
legitimate cases the pro-democracy movement in Burma, Kurds in
Turkish Kurdistan, the Tibetans, as also many States that are dominated
by settlers (often white and of European extraction), such as in Australia,
Canada, the US and much of Latin America genuine indigenous peoples
whose lives and cultures have been all but wiped out by the State. But
my ambivalence was quickly corrected, when I found the effort and money
put into deflecting these criticisms. Indeed I found it extremely rare
that any country from the so-called North would admit to human rights
violations in their home States. These nations were now even willing
to share with the other members of the international community information
regarding how they dealt with issues such as police brutality, custodial
deaths, discrimination on the basis of colour etc.
What could, therefore, have been a forum to help States
rectify and ameliorate situations of human rights violation in all societies
is, I believe, in danger of becoming a sterile forum of North-South
confrontation. Even, perhaps, a forum where bilateral quarrels are fought
through the use of propaganda and exchanges of charges and counter-charges
for example between India and Pakistan. Not very productive,
particularly if one recalls the individuals whose human rights are
being violated, and who may look forward with some hope to the more
than 50 mechanisms of international institutional appeal and relief
created by the human rights industry and the NGOs.
Perhaps one should go back a little in history to try
and trace how this degeneration occurred. How the primary human rights
forum in the UN system became the politicised and rather ineffective
organ it is today. And how, at the high level of elected member-States
of the UN, the Human Rights Commission has become a convenient platform
for known terrorists and criminals not only to air their views, but
also to gain international recognition.
It was the Member States, particularly those of the
Non-Aligned Movement, who took both apartheid in South Africa and Israeli
practices in the occupied Arab lands to the human rights fora. Not that
the activities in these fora were directly effective, but they kept
the pressure on South Africa and Israel and on racial discrimination
focused. This, I believe, established the so-called "country
approach" as individual member States, with the help of the NGOs,
found the fora convenient to attack the behaviour and practices of their
adversaries. Human rights were introduced in the East-West talks during
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE] in 1972-73,
and human rights have, since then, become an effective foreign policy
tool in the hands of the Western powers. The initial objective was to
introduce the idea and standards of human rights beginning with
the freer movement of peoples, information and ideas into interstate
relations. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which became the CSCEs
first constitution, codified and established inter alia the principle
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. But in recognising
"respect" for these rights as "an essential factor"
in the "development of friendly relations and co-operation"
among the States, it directly linked progress in human rights to the
political and military dimension of international relations.1
Eventually, at the Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension
at Moscow in 1991, interference in internal affairs became
a legitimate action in defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The successor to the CSCE, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe), today has as one of its priority tasks, the monitoring of
"the human dimension record of OSCE States in close co-operation
with NGOs. The aim is to persuade a State with problems in this
area to follow the OSCEs advice and remedy the situation"2
(Emphasis mine). Enforcement, it was recognised by the OSCE, was with
the UN Security Council.
Given the success of the CSCE process, efforts were
immediately set afoot to replicate this pattern globally within UN fora.
But the global arena had many other players, and the impact of Western
powers trying to introduce the methodologies of the CSCE process in,
for example, the Commission for Human Rights had unexpected and unforeseen
consequences.
Using both experiences, the "country approach"
and the CSCE approach, and often depending on NGOs to bring instances
of human rights violations to the international level, the focus of
debate in the commission shifted.
II
On July 4, 1997, my nephew, Sanjoy Ghose, a development
worker who was fairly well known in developmental circles in India was
abducted by a militant group, the United Liberation Front of Asom [ULFA],
from his base in Majuli, an island in the State of Assam in Indias
North-East. The ULFA, through its Commander-in-Chief Paresh
Barua, claimed that Sanjoy had been "arrested" and would be
"tried" according to ULFA "laws". This same Paresh
Barua spoke on the telephone to Sanjoys wife, promising to release
Sanjoy to a representative of the International Committee of the Red
Cross [ICRC] if the NGO Sanjoy was heading AVARD-NE moved out
of Assam.
These contacts led to a farrago of lies from ULFA,
not only to the family, but also to genuine human rights NGOs concerned
with Sanjoys fate and the ICRC. I was in Delhi for most of July,
trying to work out arrangements for Sanjoys release with the ICRC,
as instructed by ULFA. The ICRCs own contacts seemed slim, they
appeared to be relying on the BBC correspondent in Calcutta as a go-between
with ULFA. The entire effort came to naught, when the Indian Army intercepted
a message between ULFA cadres, which claimed that Sanjoy had been killed
while trying to escape, by falling off a cliff somewhere in Arunachal
Pradesh. The family has heard nothing directly from either Sanjoy or
ULFA since.
I was, at that time, Indias Ambassador at Geneva.
I was aware that ULFA representatives had been attending various human
rights meetings, including meetings of the Commission on Human Rights.
In fact, Anup Chetia, the General Secretary and Sasha Chowdhury,
the Foreign Secretary of ULFA made statements to the 53rd
(1997) session of the commission, under banners provided to them by
ECOSOC accredited NGOs the Society for Threatened People,
a Germany-based organisation which works in close collaboration with
the German Government, and a UK-based NGO called Liberation.
It is interesting to note that the so-called authorised representatives
of Liberation frequently included representatives of various
Khalistani separatist groups and of the Liberation Tigers for Tamil
Eelam (LTTE).
I was also aware that an unaccredited NGO called the
Unrepresented People Organisation (UNPO), a Dutch-based organisation,
had been in contact with ULFA leaders, who according to UNPO, wished
to join that organisation. It was never clear to me where these ULFA
representatives got their funding; staying in Geneva, one of the most
expensive cities in the world, would have required considerable finance
to sustain the presence of the ULFA representatives for such prolonged
periods. Even Arabinda Rajkhowa, the Chairman of ULFA, stayed for several
days in Geneva in July 1997, when Sanjoy had already been kidnapped,
participating in a meeting of the Sub-Commissions Working Group
on Indigenous People, purporting, no doubt, to represent the indigenous
people of Assam.
I approached the diplomatic representations of those
countries whose NGOs had given their banner and sponsorship
to ULFA. It soon became evident that these accredited NGOs accepted
any person as a representative, provided he was from a Third
World country, without checking the antecedents of the individual or
the group and frequently with no knowledge of the context in which the
group operated. It appeared to be enough that an individual or a group
was protesting against the policies of the government of their home
countries with charges, however wild, being accepted at face value.
The role and responsibility of many Western governments and their NGOs
in permitting the gross abuse of the system by sponsoring criminals,
even from a democratic State that runs on the basis of the rule of law,
is enormous.
On my return to Geneva on 13th August 1997 I found
the Sub Commission on Human Rights in session, and Anup Chetia, the
so called General Secretary of ULFA slated to speak at the
meeting on atrocities allegedly committed by the Indian Army in Assam.
By this time, Delhi Interpol had issued a red corner alert for the ULFA
leaders, including Anup Chetia, on charges of murder and extortion.
Yet I found Chetia had not only free access to the UN building and the
sub-commission meetings, but on one occasion was sitting at ease in
the delegates coffee lounge, apparently quite confident of his
immunity and security within the UN premises.
The matter was immediately taken up at several levels
not because I was personally involved, but because instructions
had been received by the Indian Embassy in Berne to take up the matter
with the Swiss Interpol for Chetias arrest and repatriation. The
Interpol apparently does not have the powers of arrest, and they approached
the Geneva Police [the cantonal system in Switzerland requires that
the cantonal police make the arrest]. The Geneva police approached the
Swiss Mission in Geneva for advice and, according to the Swiss Ambassador,
some church NGO as well. In the meantime, I had approached the Director
of the UN offices in Geneva and the UN security immediately swung into
action. On questioning Chetia, however, they found that he had a perfectly
valid Bangladeshi passport under the name of John David Salomar and
a perfectly valid Swiss visa to enter Switzerland. It might be noted
that the British-based NGO Liberation had sponsored both names
Anup Chetia and John David Salomar.4
It was, however, common knowledge in the NGO community milling around
the corridors of the UN, that the person in question was Anup Chetia,
since he was introducing himself as such. After questioning by the UN
Security [the Geneva police cannot enter premises unless specifically
requested by the UN] Anup Chetia vanished. Not only did he not speak
at the sub-commission, he stopped coming to the UN building altogether.
(It is learnt that he was in Switzerland, in the outskirts of Geneva,
at least till October 1997).
The legal wrangle then began between the Swiss authorities
and the UN legal office and the Centre for Human Rights. The relations
between the host country [to the UN] and the UN are finalised
by an agreement. According to the Centre for Human Rights, the agreement
between Switzerland and the UN contained no reference to treatment of
NGOs. The UN legal adviser in Geneva referred the matter to UN headquarters
in New York. The latters reply was somewhat ambiguous, in that
it drew on the host country agreement between the UN and the US, in
which it was stated that the host country cannot stop any representative
of an NGO from attending a UN meeting. A caveat was added, however,
that this did not convey immunity of any sort on crimes which may have
been committed by the individual concerned, The Swiss Permanent Mission
chose to interpret this letter as giving all NGO representatives immunity
from arrest and refused to take any action against Chetia. In spite
of interventions from the Swiss Foreign Office and Swiss Interpol, in
addition to pressure from Government of India offices, Chetia remained
free in Switzerland, albeit in hiding, till he himself decided to leave.
Apart from the personal distress and overtones, this
incident brought to light the anomalies that had crept into the UN human
rights system. While there was sympathy and co-operation from most quarters,
there appeared to be little the UN or the Governments could do to prevent
a named criminal from attending a UN meeting with impunity. As I have
mentioned earlier, representatives of the LTTE, the Khalistanis and
other violent armed groups gained repeated access to this international
platform, sometimes through the active encouragement of some ECOSOC-accredited
NGOs but more often through ignorance, lack of interest in the context
in which these groups operate, and the stereotyped image of Third World
Governments as uniformly repressive and guilty of human rights violations.
For some time now, there have been discussions in the
UN on the issue of terrorism. However, as some NGOs point out President
Mandela and President Arafat have been called "terrorists"
at one time. There is also ambivalence in the NGO human rights community
towards armed groups who abuse human rights norms. There appears to
be a cautious recognition that the violent activities of armed groups,
particularly against civilians and for political ends, have placed genuine
human rights groups in a quandary. To quote from a statements made by
a leading human rights activist in India, Ravi Nair: "Even without
arguing for a general condemnation of violence as a political strategy,
or passing judgements on the merits and demerits
of the ideologies of the armed opposition groups, it bears recognition
that in the main such activities do not enjoy widespread support and
legitimacy..... the apparent silence of some human rights
groups on the abuses by armed opposition groups is met with a hostile
reception. The activities of the human rights groups can then be construed
as partisan and unfair, if not fundamentally misplaced, leading to an
increasing loss of credibility and further marginalisation, even with
the victim groups.... Should abuses by armed opposition groups be classified
as abuses or violations, the latter being used in the case of governments?
The difference is not merely semantic but needs to be maintained
in the light of the effort of the government to have the international
community pay greater attention to the acts of armed opposition groups
"
[Emphasis mine].
The statement continues, "Simultaneously there
is a need to discuss the nature of the response by the human rights
community to abuses by armed opposition groups
We must not underestimate
the legitimisation function of human rights activity". Nair, after
debating the possible dilution of the mandate of human rights groups
by covering abuses by armed groups talks cautiously of "working
out a graded response to armed opposition group abuses". He concludes
that "the expansion of the mandate of human rights activity to
include abuses by armed opposition groups" might overload their
mandate to the point of complete ineffectively. "If,
however, the overall rationale of human rights activity is seen not
just as bringing the government in line with constitutional norms and
international human rights standards but contributing to a wider political
discourse... then a continuous engagement with these issues is inescapable."5
This cautious response is possibly common
to the international human rights community as a whole, which would
explain how, inadvertently, the UN human rights system is being used
by armed groups as an international platform, in an attempt to gain
legitimacy.
However, some lone voices have been raised not
in the highly politicised Commission, but in the Sub-Commission. Asbjorn
Eide the Norwegian expert on the Sub-Commission called for "second
generation human rights organisations... which (should seek) to bring
to an end the violations carried out by non-governmental entities".
He refers to "a direct cult of violence as a way of political participation...
and in some cases direct support from the outside to militant groups."
Eide sees the danger in not speaking out against these groups in undoing
"the human rights edifice" which has been built up over the
years.6 However, even Eide was not prepared
to admit that some of these groups found space for themselves, and a
form of legitimacy, by participating in UN human rights fora under the
banner of accredited NGOs, until the events relating to Chetias
participation in August 1997.
The situation is not under control, though efforts
are being made by member States to ensure that NGOs are held accountable
for their actions in these fora. There is still a long way to go before
the NGOs, particularly the ones based in the West, can understand the
dangers to which their actions in sponsoring militant groups in the
UN can undermine the very fabric of the norms of human rights behaviour
they are trying to build.
NOTES & REFERENCES