Is
the enterprise of terrorism finally in a retreat? In South Asia,
at least, there are some indications that this may be so. With
the exception of the apparently indiscriminate slaughters in Nepal
since the breakdown of the ‘peace process’ with the Maoist rebels
in August 2003, fatality rates have registered a decline in almost
all theatres in the region. More significantly, the rhetoric emanating
from the region’s primary state sponsor of terrorism, Pakistan,
has veered sharply away from the patterns of the past. In his
recent pronouncements the country’s military dictator, General
Pervez Musharraf, has abandoned the ambivalent idiom of ‘legitimate
jehad’ against the ‘oppression of Muslims’ in different
parts of the world, and the ‘indigenous freedom struggle’ in Kashmir.
In his address to a convention of Ulema in Islamabad on
February 18, 2004, Musharraf blamed "a small minority"
of terrorists and extremists for giving the country and Islam
a "bad name". He put terrorist formations in the country,
including "foreign militants," on notice, declaring
that they should "surrender or return to their own countries,"
threatening them with "the full might of the Pakistani Army
if they resisted."
While Musharraf is certainly being
disingenuous in absolving himself, the Pakistani Army and its
covert agencies, for their role in nurturing terrorism – both
regional and international – there is evidence that there now
is, in fact, a growing determination to break with the past. The
two attempts on Musharraf’s life in December 2003, and the danger,
as Musharraf himself expressed it, that "the day was not
far away when the world would turn on Pakistan militarily and
bombs rained down on the country", are the obvious triggers
to this turnaround. While these are the visible proximate causes,
the broader context of these transformations is clearly a realization
that terrorism was no longer paying the dividends of the past,
and continuing with covert military adventures could prove suicidal
to Pakistan.
But is this the prelude to a final
winding down of terror, or a tactical hibernation? Until conclusive
evidence emerges to the contrary, it is prudent to be sceptical,
and to recognize the possibility of a terrorist resurgence. The
course of the war in Iraq assumes unprecedented importance in
this context. The magnitude and fullest consequences of the US
failure to ‘manage the peace’ in Iraq remain uncertain, but it
is clear that the outcome of events in this theatre will have
critical impact on the future of terrorism, in general. The steady
loss of American lives in Iraq, the inability of the US Forces
to impose order and project a sense of control, and the visible
and growing consternation among the US Forces, media, political
establishment and general public, are being taken as proof by
Islamist extremist forces that the world’s ‘sole superpower’ is
vulnerable to this methods of sub-conventional warfare. If these
trends continue, or worse, if there is a progressive ‘Vietnamization’
of the situation in Iraq, culminating in a scenario where the
US may be tempted to ‘declare victory and run’, the consequences
would be disastrous. Such an eventuality would be seen as a defeat
for the superpower by the forces of Islamist extremism, and would
immensely widen the opportunities and operational space for terrorism
of all forms by demonstrating the weaknesses and vulnerability
of the democratic world and its wealthiest and most militarised
leader.
It is in Iraq, then, and that
the future of terrorism is presently being shaped. Even a qualified
victory for terrorism in this theatre would encourage terrorist
movements in other theatres – and not just Islamist terrorists
– to revive or intensify their fury against the structures of
freedom and civilization.
Ajai Sahni
New Delhi, February 19, 2004
1. "General
in mufti blasts terror before ulema," The Times of India, New
Delhi, February 19, 2004.
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