Mizoram
|
Section |
1972-74 1974-79 (2 years) |
1979-80 1980-85 (1 year) |
1984-85 (1 year) |
||
Agriculture |
20 |
106.4 |
40.8 |
305.2 |
104 |
Industry |
3.1 |
10.8 |
5.3 |
40.5 |
20 |
Energy |
10.1 |
40.4 |
20.1 |
108 |
60 |
Communication |
30.4 |
102.8 |
40.6 |
302.5 |
100 |
Education |
20.2 |
100.4 |
50.2 |
306.3 |
80 |
Total |
90.3 |
40.6 |
107.7 |
1300 |
400 |
Per
Capita Plan Expenditure in Select States
(in
millions of rupees) [13]
State |
4th Plan (1969-74) |
5th Plan (1974-79) |
6th Plan (1980-85) |
Arunachal |
449 |
1199 |
3333 |
Mizoram |
282 |
1249 |
2795 |
Nagaland |
741 |
1565 |
2723 |
All India |
145 |
333 |
706 |
As against the 6th Plan outlay
of 1300 million rupees for Mizoram, the 7th Plan (1985-90) outlay
was 2600 million rupees, which further and dramatically raised the
percentage as compared to the All India average.
The
Centre had thus gone all-out to reduce the economic imbalances between
the more developed parts of the country, and the hill tribal areas
of the Northeast. This decidedly took the wind out of the secessionists
main grievance and propaganda. But internally, within these States, all was
not well with the way this windfall of money was utilised. With a burgeoning bureaucracy, public employment
in 1985 stood at 20,000 in Mizoram, with a population of less than
half a million people. With
easy money got in the form of relief, subsidies and loans,
Mizoram suddenly became one of the best markets for electronic and
other consumer goods in the country.
[14]
This was, however, expected to
be nothing more than a temporary bonanza, which created conditions
for peace but kept the economy stagnant. As Lalmachhuana appropriately
points out:
Quite
a large proportion of the money incomes thus generated...has been
grasped by a few rich (inclusive of big contractors) and spent on
luxuries. This has had something of a demonstration
effect and now many people are in a great hurry to get easy
money and are less willing to do manual work.
This has brought about a change in social values, which tends
to create and perpetuate economic and social injustice in society.
It is no wonder that in spite of huge expenditure incurred in monetary
terms after the formation of the Union Territory in 1972, the economy
remains more or less stagnant.
[15]
The politician-bureaucrat-contractor
nexus, which converted the highest per capita public expenditure in
the country into an item of consumption, may have long-term economic
repercussions. In the short-term, however, it created, among a very
large number of people, an aversion for the hard life of the insurgency
period and a strong motivation for the continuance of the paid
holiday. It made integration with India an overwhelming
vested interest for the most vocal and influential segment of society.
An IAS officer could build a house with a large government loan at
low rate of interest, and then rent it out to a government department
at the rate fixed by a colleague. [16]
A fifty per cent advance could be given to a
supplier just having a semblance of access to the articles intended
to be supplied [17]
or to a contractor for constructing a building
that would take five years to build.
Fake subsidies in thousands of rupees for minor irrigation,
contour terracing and plantations were distributed rampantly.
However, measures such as the reimbursement of three-fourths of the
expenditure and the cost of air travel for anybody going 2000 miles
to the Christian Medical College Hospital in Vellore in south India
for treatment, brought about tremendous social good, individual happiness,
and goodwill for India.
[18]
Indira Gandhi's Electoral Intervention
There
was another development in Mizoram with more far-reaching consequences.
Although an insignificant Congress following had existed in Mizoram
from 1947 onwards, the national parties had, by and large, remained
outside the pale of the hill tribal politics, particularly in Nagaland
and Mizoram. The national parties had avoided serious political infiltration
and involvement in these areas, partly because of the apprehension
that any such step would lead to more resentment and accusations of
cultural domination, and partly because of the caution the national
parties exercised in treading in these violent and insurgent areas.
To a generation of workers in the various national parties in the
Northeast, the likely electoral gains in these areas were too marginal
in comparison with the risks to personal security that were involved. Nobody among the national leaders seemed to
have quite realised, right up to the late 1960s, that the direct involvement
of national political parties in such geographically peripheral areas
would have more than mere electoral implications. No one quite realised
the integrative force of national parties in a democratic set-up.
What motivated Indira Gandhi
to make a serious political infiltration of Mizoram and Nagaland in
the 1970s and 1980s is a matter of conjecture. It is, however, evident
from her speeches and statements in Parliament and elsewhere, that
using electoral politics as a vehicle for ethnic accommodation became
her avowed policy in the Northeast immediately after the successful
secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh
was recognised as a clear indication that ethnic disparities could
be aggravated to the point of no return if the electoral game was
not played deftly. Her rejection
of the Pataskar Commission Report also demonstrated that she had taken
the demand for tribal autonomy more seriously than her predecessors
had, and the idea of the so-called balkanisation of the Northeast
had taken roots in her psyche much before the 1971 war with Pakistan.
The work on the North-Eastern (Reorganisation) Act had started in
New Delhi at least two years before its actual enactment in 1971.
The subsequent involvement in the electoral politics of Mizoram and
Nagaland was a veritable political incentive structure in one package.
It was seen by Indira Gandhi as the only way she and her party
could directly influence the course of events in these geo-politically
sensitive States which had been allowed to remain restive for over
two decades. [19]
Her timing was perfect. The
acknowledged military superiority of India in the region in early
1972 was the right moment to play the card of devolution and electoral
politics to counter separatism.
In this respect, therefore,
the merger of the Mizo Union with the Indian National Congress in
1974 had serious implications. First,
it meant that a national party, which had been traditionally, and
largely because of the British indoctrination, regarded as the party
of the dominant Hindus, was now acceptable to the Christian Mizos.
This multi-ethnic political coalition was the greatest achievement
in an area riven by secessionist internal war. The old fears of the
tribal leaders were either found to be untenable, or they had dissolved
under the weight of the new political exigencies imposed by Indias
emergence as a credible and prestigious regional power, and the corresponding
and severe reduction of the power, prestige and delivery capacity
of their erstwhile foreign supporter, Pakistan.
The Congress party also became
the rallying ground for all those who had deserted the Mizo National
Front and had either surrendered in response to the amnesty offer
or had recently come out of prisons after terms of detention or imprisonment.
Thus a national party fragmented the support the MNF had enjoyed so
far, and effectively prevented it from achieving political domination
again. For most people with MNF antecedents, it was worthwhile to
pitch in with a national party which was perceived as large-hearted
enough to accept ex-rebels within its fold and resourceful enough
to give them a new respectability.
It was perhaps the last time
in the impressive history of the Indian National Congress that the
integrative ethos of the party was deliberately activated to buttress
the unity of India.
Brigadier
Sailo
But the road to that more acquiescent
decade was hazardous. In January
1974, Brigadier Thenphunga Sailo, a decorated officer of the Indian
Army with a distinguished service medal (AVSM), retired and came back
to his home in Mizoram. He first started a Human Rights Committee
with the objective of rendering help in legal measures against the
grouping of villages, to uphold civil rights of the oppressed
civilian population, and to educate the public in upholding their
legal rights against the SFs. These
were populist slogans and attracted a large following immediately.
For a while the sway of the ex-MNF people towards the Congress party
was effectively stopped. On April 17, 1974 Brigadier Sailo formed
a political party known as the People's Conference. Two years later
he was detained under the infamous Mintenance of Internal Security
Act of the Emergency era. Seven months after the Chhunga ministry
resigned on May 9, 1977, elections to the Mizoram legislature returned
the Peoples Conference to victory, and Brigadier Sailo became
the Chief Minister in May 1978.
His party won again in the
mid-term elections of 1979 when he became the Chief Minister of Mizoram
for the second time. Superficially, the defeat of the Congress was
blamed on factors that had brought about the rout of the Congress
and Indira Gandhi in the immediate post-Emergency phase. But Mizoram
politics did not yet reflect the national sentiments and mood, and
Sailo apparently rode the crest of popularity because of his anti-SFs
stance, the promise his success held out for a negotiated MNF settlement
with the Government of India, and the return of the prodigals from
their self-imposed exile in the jungles abroad.
[20]
A total of 500 MNF personnel
surrendered in 1972, mostly without arms. There was no regular army
in Mizo Hills between December 1971 and March 1973 due to the Bangladesh
war and internal security was looked after by the para-military forces.
A number of grouped villages were permitted de-group by
Chhungas, and later Sailos, Union Territory Governments.
The dusk-to-dawn curfew, which had been a permanent feature
of Mizo life for the past thirteen years, was lifted, and the movement-by-permit
system was also abolished. These
relaxations allowed free movement of people, including the insurgents.
The hardcore part of the MNF in Arakan and those who had been trickling
back into India from December 1971, now organised a second, and more
virulent, phase of terrorism in Mizoram. Four groups of 80 men infiltrated from Arakan
and carried out many acts of sabotage, including the blowing up of
the Aizawl Power House. Their chief hitman, Lalhleia,
and his bands indulged in large-scale kidnappings, extortion, assassinations,
murders, looting, arson, sniping and ambushes during 1972-74. Their
first victims were those who had deserted Laldenga. Lalnunmawia, the
ex-Vice-President of MNF who had fallen out with Laldenga and had
since come overground and surrendered, was killed in the Aizawl civil
hospital.
During 1973, there were 40
such killings and 19 ambushes against the SFs. It was discovered that
during the confusion prevailing in East Pakistan in 1971, the Mizo
National Army (MNA) had looted some armouries and acquired more arms.
Their effective strength, which had come down to about 500 in 1971,
had again increased to about 1,000 by the end of 1972.
The Chinese
Connection and Disillusionment
In November 1972, the first
MNF gang of 47 went from Arakan Hills in Burma to China under the
leadership of MNF Major Demokhseik Gangte. They carried a compass
but no maps and, taking the bearing from Arakan to China as 10 degrees
North and confirming directions from the local people, reached their
destination after 13 months. They passed through the Kachin area in
Burma where the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) first mistook them for
agents of the Burmese army and dispossessed them of all the weapons
they were carrying. The KIA, however, provided them with clothing,
food, escort and guides upto the Chinese border after they were convinced
of their bona fides. This
was on condition that the MNA would give them 50 per cent of the arms
and ammunition they would receive from China, as the Nagas had done
before them. The MNA entered Yunnan (Tinsum county) on December 28
1973 and stayed in China for three months and ten days.
The Chinese gave them 3 radio
transmitters/receivers, 32 light machine guns, 12 pistols, 4 rocket-launchers
(M 40) and 78 rockets, 28,614 rounds of ammunition, 32,000 US dollars,
62,000 Burmese Kyats, 69 gold chains of over ten ounces of gold each.
In addition, each person received two pairs of olive-green uniforms,
two pairs of boots, one cap, and one mosquito net, as well as a total
of ten inflatable life-boats for crossing rivers, and some books by
Mao-Tse-Tung.
[21]
The Mizos started on their
return journey in April 1974 and crossed the river Chindwin in Burma
in January 1975. The KIA took only some ammunition and a few gold
chains for their assistance. The MNA had left 3 persons behind in
the Kachin area due to sickness. After two of their men were killed
in an ambush laid by the Burmese army, they tarried in Burma for a
while, after which 27 of them surrendered to the Indian army in Imphal
on June 30, 1975. They obviously were not very happy with their first
encounter with the Chinese and were in fact so disillusioned that
they did not make any serious attempts to return to Mizoram. The Chinese
had correctly assessed the total involvement of the Mizos with Christianity,
which rendered the Communist ideology unacceptable and, beyond treating
this as a goodwill visit and offering some gifts with a view to keeping
the contacts alive, did not make any long-term commitments. In fact,
so disillusioned was this group with the Chinese that its leader,
Demkhosheik, suggested peace talks with the Government of India in
a letter sent from his camp in Burma to Chhunga, the then Chief Minister
of Mizoram.
Meanwhile, on April 23 1975,
another group of twenty Mizos led by MNA Colonel Biakvela arrived
in the Kachin area on the way to China.
They had contacted members of the earlier group while passing
through the Burmese areas adjoining Manipur and discussed with them
both the treatment they could expect in China as well as the possibility
of opening up negotiations with the Government of India.
After hearing about Laldengas visit to New Delhi, they
camped for sometime in a place called Hengmat in Burma and later surrendered
to the Indian Army. In an interesting twist to the situation, they
even requested the Indian Army to provide tents for their encampment
in Burma.
The Last
Great Surge of Terror
On January 10, 1974, the MNF
ambushed S. P. Mukerjee, the Lieutenant Governor of Mizoram. Although
the LG survived the bullet injuries, this incident created a sensation
and prompted re-induction of the regular army in Mizoram. Militarily,
the SFs were back to square one. The killings, sabotage and extortion
continued unabated throughout the year, and there were reports that
some insurgents had been provided with shelter in the houses of the
members of the legislative assembly, civil servants, and police officers.
It was not possible for the SFs to search these houses, as it would
have offended those who had at least outwardly aligned themselves
politically with India.
On January 13, 1975, MNA Captain
Lalhleia along with three others carried out the most daring assassinations.
They drove in a jeep into the police headquarters in broad day-light,
shot dead G. S. Ayra, Inspector General of Police, L. B. Sewa, Deputy
Inspector General of Police and Panchapagesan, Superintendent of Police
while they were in a meeting, and escaped. Although Lahleia, his comrades
and a number of other desperados were soon eliminated by the SFs in
the operations that were launched in the wake of the killings, this
incident improved the sagging image of the MNA almost overnight and
tremendously boosted their morale.
While this was certainly not
the high point in the trajectory of insurgency, its timing was most
unsuitable from the government's point of view. The democratic process
had restarted in Mizoram after formation of the Union Territory. The
masses had apparently had enough of trouble and harassment on account
of the unending guerrilla warfare and most people earnestly desired
peace and development. The cry for independence still struck a responsive
chord in some Mizo hearts, but everybody realised that it was an impossible
dream. There was substantial erosion of support for the MNF, and most
people co-operated with them out of fear rather than as an act of
faith. Despite the serious setback, however, the Government of India
decided not to deviate from the policy it had been pursuing so consistently
for some time. It was hoped that, in the absence of substantial foreign
assistance, [22]
this phase of terrorism would
also become counter-productive sooner or later.
The Counter-gangs
G. S. Randhawa, a retired Brigadier
of the Indian Army, was appointed as the new Inspector General of
Police of Mizoram after the assassination of G. S. Arya. The new police
chief adopted the strategy of impersonating the enemy to hunt down
the MNA and its volunteer force in remote and relatively inaccessible
areas. He achieved a remarkable degree of success,
and is often credited with breaking the backbone of insurgency
in Mizoram.
This idea is as old as warfare
itself, but in recent times had been revived by Brigadier (later General
Sir Frank) Kitson, who used his pseudo-gangs of surrendered
Mau Mau warriors to hunt down their erstwhile colleagues in the Kenyan
jungles during 1953-55. According to Kitson, a soldier cannot use
the normal methods of warfare when engaged in operations against Bandits'
and must adapt the system to the peculiar circumstances of the game. [23]
He first used surrendered Mau
Mau men to get information, and was able to get useful advance intelligence
about the movement of enemy gangs, which was much better than merely
analysing past events. Later, he began to use his pseudo-gangs most
effectively for offensive purposes when some exceptional prize was
to be gained, such as the elimination of an important gangster. Securing
the loyalty of former enemies to fight against their own erstwhile
comrades was no easy task, and Kitson wrote with extraordinary perspicacity
about the methods that would yield this result:
I
was gradually arriving at a conclusion that I have found to hold good
in various different places. Briefly it is that three separate factors
have to be brought into play in order to make a man shift his allegiance.
First, he must be given an incentive that is strong enough to make
him want to do so. This is the carrot. Then he must be made to realise
that failure will result in something very unpleasant happening to
him. This is the stick. Third, he must be given a reasonable opportunity
of proving both to himself and to his friends that there is nothing
fundamentally dishonourable about his action. Some people consider
that the carrot and stick provide all that is necessary, but I am
sure that many people will refuse the one and face the other if by
doing otherwise they lose their self-respect... [24]
This
is a sinister kind of warfare. After the Kenya experiment, the strategy
was employed by the British Army and mercenaries against the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman in 1957-59.
A similar force called Selous Scouts were employed by the Smith
regime in Rhodesia against the national liberation movement. This
role was later fulfilled by the SAS in Northern Ireland as the British
Army found it impossible to recruit Irish Catholics who would not
find anything fundamentally dishonourable in killing their
own kith and kin for material benefits.
In counter-insurgency warfare,
professional soldiers trained for conventional combat often follow
a vicious logic of escalation, which derives from acute frustration
over an elusive war that seriously undermines not only their effectiveness,
but the very validity of their training and organisation. Hence the
compulsion to accept any strategy that gives their activity a semblance
of direction or purpose anything but helplessness! The Kitson
doctrine had certainly fired the imagination of Brigadier Randhawa.
He sought out the fathers, brothers, sons, and other close relatives
of people killed by the MNF and enthused and motivated them to carry
out ruthless acts of vendetta. There were, of course, considerable
material rewards and incentives. He trained these volunteers
in the use of arms and sent them out into the jungle in small groups
of commandos resembling the insurgents in dress and mien to surprise
the MNA in their hideouts. [25]
In a period of about four months, at least
100 men were killed by these pseudo-gangs. Just one national daily
newspaper mentioned the presence of these gangs in a report which
appeared only after the Indian Emergency was over, and
the Press was free to publish such reports.
These operations were, however,
suspended by October 1975, when Laldenga started sending feelers to
the Government of India from his sanctuary in Pakistan, and let Indian
intelligence know that he was willing to negotiate within the framework
of the Indian Constitution.
Towards Peace and Settlement
After the loss of East Pakistan,
the Government and the Army of Pakistan had no use for Laldenga. They
reluctantly allowed him sanctuary in Rawalpindi out of a sense of
obligation for his past deeds against India. In fact, however, Laldengas
continued presence in Pakistan constituted an embarrassment at a time
when its government was all set for developing more cordial relations
with India. Not the least of Laldengas problems was that his
request for a sanctuary in Western countries drew a blank, and his
assertion that he represented the government-in-exile of a Christian
state fighting for its survival met with no sympathy. The Christian
churches and other altruistic organisations were in no mood to embroil
themselves in a controversy with India after their experience of the
Naga case in the 1950s-60s. Moreover, Laldengas alienation from
the Church leaders in Mizoram and his friendly overtures to China
had taken away whatever credibility he may otherwise have had with
the Christians in the West. He was, therefore, in a quandary: if he
was going to be unwelcome in Pakistan before long, was mending his
fences with India the only alternative he had?
In
November 1973, he sent his aides, Zoramthanga and Zal Sangliana, to
contact the Indian mission at Kabul. This could not have been done
without Pakistans approval, as well as their desire to get rid
of Laldenga. Zoramthanga was sent again to Kabul a year later as no
Indian response to the earlier visit seemed to be forthcoming
this time to impress upon the officers at the Indian mission that
Laldenga most sincerely desired peace and was willing to return to
India. It was now arranged
that he should fly to Geneva to meet an Indian official, which he
did on August 20, 1974, on a passport issued by Pakistan in the name
of Peter Lee. He confirmed his willingness to return to India
for talks in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi:
I
have already written a letter to you... As I had mentioned, I have
no doubt in my mind that the solution of the Mizoram political problem
will have to be achieved within the Constitution of India.... In order
that I could contact my underground colleagues for injecting into
them my belief and convictions so that they come round to my line
of thinking, I would request for the facility of my coming over to
India.... For obvious reasons, I cannot tell them straight away that
I have agreed to discuss the solution of the problem within the Constitution
of India. Those people do not
have the opportunity to appreciate the problem in the wider context
of political developments all over the world.
[26]
For the Government of India,
however, it was important that Laldenga should come for talks only
if he enjoyed the confidence of the rank and file of the MNF; a merely
chastened Laldenga, without the authority to agree to Indias
terms, would not do. A lot of work by the intelligence agencies and
the Mizo Church leaders went into the processes through which a consensus
of sorts was reached in the Mizo rebel leadership. On a signal from
New Delhi, the top MNF brass in the Arakan hills in Burma were given
safe conduct through India. Tlangchhuaka, the new MNF Vice-President,
MNA chief Biakchhunga, and the MNF Party President, K. Chawngzuala,
were allowed to fly to Delhi on way to Rome. They joined Laldenga
in Cologne in November 1975, where he had already held several rounds
of talks with an Indian intelligence officer. However, serious differences
emerged between Laldenga and his colleagues during the nine days they
spent in Cologne discussing the possible modalities of settlement
with the Centre, and it was arranged that Laldenga would meet a MNF
convention in Arakan to obtain their concurrence to his plans.
Laldenga arrived in New Delhi
on January 24, 1976 and a few days later he and his three colleagues
went into five days of secret negotiations with Home Secretary S.L.
Khurana, Mizoram Lieutenant Governor S.K. Chibber and Joint Secretary
(Home) M.L. Kampani. The MNF leaders acknowledged that Mizoram was
an integral part of India, agreed to lay down arms and to seek the
solution of all existing problems within the framework of the Indian
Constitution. Laldengas intention was to extract as much personal
gain out of this agreement as possible, and he had repeatedly asked
that the agreement should include a clause whereby he would automatically
head a provisional government before calling for fresh elections. His contention was that no real peace would
come to Mizoram unless the terms of agreement were implemented by
both sides under his personal supervision. This was, however, not
acceptable to the Government of India, who insisted that the rebels
must first lay down arms without pre-conditions. An agreement was,
nevertheless, drafted in February 1976, and signed in July that year. [27]
The Janata
Government of 1977-79
Shortly thereafter, in the
general election held in March 1977, Indira Gandhis Congress
Party was defeated and the Janata Party came to power at New Delhi.
The new government resumed talks on May 18 to find ways to implement
the July 1976 accord signed by the previous government. But the failure
of these talks led the government to ask Laldenga to leave the country
by June 6, 1977. On June 9, 1977, a group of 62 MNF and MNA personnel,
led by MNF General Sawmvela, ex-Chief of the MNA, surrendered their
arms to the Lieutenant Governor of Mizoram and declared that it was
immoral to continue the armed insurgency after the New Delhi accord
of July, 1976. Laldenga tried to save face by pleading for resumption
of talks with the government, but he was again asked to leave India
by November 21. He, however, managed to stay on in Delhi and pursued
further dialogue with the then Home Minister, Charan Singh. However,
these informal talks also broke down finally and irretrievably in
March 1978, after Laldenga refused to give up his demand for an interim
government to be headed by him and his party.
Laldenga nevertheless continued
to stay on in Delhi in the hope of either succeeding in getting his
friends to eschew their immediate political ambitions or in inducing
the New Delhi liberals to greater sympathy for his cause. On the other
hand, he asked the MNA to step up their subversive activities. This
led to fresh attacks on the SFs, but the worst sufferers were the
non-Mizo civilian officers, traders, domestic servants and labourers
who were ordered by the MNF to leave Mizoram by July 1979. The new
reign of terror led to Bengali reprisals against the Mizos in the
neighbouring Cachar district of Assam, and many innocent people on
both sides lost their lives before peace could be re-established between
the two communities.
Meanwhile, Brigadier Sailo
and his Peoples Conference Party won the Mizoram elections in
May 1978 and formed the new government. A month later, Sailo helped
cause a split in the MNF. This led to Laldenga being ousted as its
President by Biakchhunga. Sailo also successfully persuaded New Delhi
to place Laldenga under arrest in July 8, 1979.
Subsequently, Biakchhunga and his followers also came back
to India and laid down their arms.
The Return of Indira Gandhi
When
Indira Gandhi came back to power in January 1980, the leaders of her
Congress Party from Mizoram requested her to resume talks with Laldenga. Laldenga was released from prison and all charges
against him were withdrawn on June 30 1980. The government also suspended
counter-insurgency operations in Mizoram. The veteran journalist and
diplomat, G. Parathasarthy, was entrusted with the responsibility
of negotiating a peace with Laldenga. But the talks failed again because
Laldenga made what the government regarded as totally unacceptable
demands. These included the constitution of Mizoram as a State on
the Jammu & Kashmir model, unification of the Mizo-Kuki areas
in Manipur and Tripura with Mizoram, delinking of Mizoram from the
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, incorporation of the Inner Line
as a constitutional guarantee, ouster of Sailo as the Chief Minister
and installation of Laldenga in his place as the head of an interim
government. The Government of India was willing to elevate Mizoram
to a full-fledged State and make Laldenga the interim Chief Minister,
but the other conditions were unacceptable.
Acceptance
by the government of these two conditions alone would, in all probability,
have led to an accord, but Brigadier Sailo refused to hand over power
to Laldenga. Further talks
at this stage were considered futile, particularly in view of the
renewed violence that, according to the intelligence reports, was
triggered on a command from Laldenga, who sought to blackmail the
government through escalation.
The Psychological
Pressure
The government responded to
the renewed MNF armed activity by inducting an unprecedentedly large
body of force in Mizoram. By the middle of 1982, there were four brigades
with 12 infantry, 6 Assam Rifles, 2 Border Security Force, and 6 Central
Reserve Police Battalions a total of 26 battalions operating
in the State. In fact, every road, town, group centre and village
was saturated with troops. By a notification issued on January 20
1982 under the Unlawful Activities Act, the government again banned
the MNF and the MNA. Laldenga was asked to leave the country and he
left for London on April 21, 1982.
Such a large concentration
of force, the renewal of restrictions on movement and dusk-to-dawn
curfews were a grim reminder of the early days of the war. With many
rounds of cease-fire and suspension of operations during the preceding
five years, people had become used to a normal tenor of life. The
renewed restrictions and curtailment of liberties constituted a great
psychological pressure on the population. The level of violence did
not justify the number of troops in Mizoram, but it had the desired
effect. Very soon, nothing was in greater demand than normalcy and
a life without security restrictions, and people clamoured for an
agreement with the government. The Baptist and Presbyterian Churches
made daily appeals for peace and harmony. The Mizo Pradesh Congress
Committee, the local branch of the Indian National Congress (I), embarked
on a campaign for the ouster of Brigadier Sailo and his government,
who were held responsible for both the failure of the MNF-Government
talks and the current suffering of the people. Sailo was openly charged
with sabotaging the peace process because of his personal ambition
and love for power.
Congress Alignment with Former Insurgents
The
next two years saw the development of secret links between the Indian
National Congress (I) and the MNF, evidently with the full backing
of Indira Gandhi. The Congress Party in Mizoram was largely a party
of ex-MNF operatives and sympathisers. Lalthanhawla, who headed the
Congress in Mizoram, was a young, suave and sincere politician who
enjoyed an enviable degree of trust and respect in the Prime Ministers
inner circle. He was able to persuade the Prime Minister that, with
her support, he and his ex-MNF colleagues in the party would be able
to achieve what she herself desired most: a settlement in Mizoram
leading to an end to insurgency and ouster of Sailo and his Peoples
Conference from power. Sailo had openly aligned himself with the Janata
Party, which had ousted Indira Gandhi in 1977, and it was not long
before there was a convergence of interests between Lalthanhawla and
the grand political and nationalistic design Indira Gandhi had for
Mizoram.
The results of the 1984 election
in Mizoram were, therefore, more or less a foregone conclusion. Congress
party fought the elections on the platform of peace and won with an
overwhelming majority. Lalthanhawla became the first Congress Chief
Minister of Mizoram in May 1984. In accordance with their election
pledge, the first major action taken by the new government was to
formally appeal to the Prime Minister to resume talks with the MNF.
The SFs operations against the MNF were suspended. Unfortunately,
Laldenga returned to New Delhi from London on October 29, 1984, a
day before the assassination of Indira Gandhi, and the talks could
not be resumed for many months.
The insurgency in Punjab came so sharply into focus during Rajiv Gandhis
first year as Prime Minister, that the Mizo insurgency was inevitably
accorded a relatively low priority. For Lalthanhawla and his Congress
Party in Mizoram, however, any delay in the resumption of negotiations
meant a serious embarrassment with his electorate. He and his party
men kept in constant touch with Laldenga in New Delhi and jointly
worked out a scheme of settlement that would be acceptable to the
Government of India. He was most ably assisted by his Chief Secretary,
Lalkhama, an officer of the Indian Admministrative Service. The talks
were resumed in the middle of 1985, and a Memorandum of Settlement
was signed by Laldenga, Lalkhama, and the Indian Home Secretary, R.D.
Pradhan, on June 30, 1986. [28]
For the purpose of implementing
the terms and conditions of this Memorandum, an agreement specifying
the sequence of events that were to follow was also signed the same
day.
This Agreement finally brought the insurgency in Mizoram to an end after
almost 20 years of strife. A wide variety of initiatives, military,
political and economic, forged this eventual settlement. But if there
were a single element that was to be identified as the most significant
factor in the resolution of the conflict in this State, it would certainly
be Indira Gandhis, integrative vision despite the fact
that the settlement eventually took place almost two years after her
death. It may surprise many that Indira Gandhi sought to bring peace
to Mizoram at a time when she was widely accused of destabilising
settled governments in a number of other States particularly
Punjab and Assam. Whatever the reasons, this is, nevertheless, true,
and with nearly five decades of insurgency and terrorism in various
theatres, it remains a fact that Mizoram, with Punjab, is still among
the rare examples of a terrorist movement on Indian soil being brought
to a satisfactory end.
APPENDIX 1
Text of the July 1976 Accord
between the Government of India and the Mizo national Front:
1.
A
delegation of underground MNF party led by Shri Laldenga and comprising
of Shri Tlangchhuaka, Shri Chawngzuala and Shri Biakchhunga held discussions
with Shri S.L. Khurana, Home Secretary, Shri S.K. Chibber, Lieutenant
Governor of Mizoram, and Shri M.L. Kampani, Joint Secretary (North
East) representing the Government of India at New Delhi on 11th, 13th,
16th, 17th and 18th February, 1976.
2.
The
delegation acknowledged that Mizoram is an integral part of India
and conveyed to the Government of India their decision to accept the
settlement of the problem in Mizoram within the framework of the Contitution
of India. For the purpose of enabling the delegation to
obtain a clear mandate and to get full authority to make an early
and final settlement, the Government of India agreed to give facilities
to the members of the delegation to hold a meeting with the 25 persons
from Mizoram, whose names have been given by the delegation, at Calcutta
during the second week of March, 1976.
3.
On
behalf of the Government of India it was also agreed to make arrangements
for consultation with five underground persons, presently under custody,
out of a list of seven given by the delegation.
4.
In
order to avoid any untoward incidents and to bring about peaceful
conditions in Mizoram at the earliest, the delegation agreed to take
the following steps forthwith:
(a)
To
issue instructions and secure stoppage of all activities by their
followers.
(b)
Collection
of all underground personnel with their arms and ammunition inside
mutually agreed camps and to ensure the safe custody of arms and ammunition
at a suitable place within each camp.
(c)
Thereafter
no underground personnel would leave the camps without permission
and/or with arms.
(d)
The
arms and ammunition so collected would be handed over to the Government
within one month of the meeting at Calcutta referred to in para 2
above.
5.
On
behalf of the Government of India it was agreed to extend necessary
facilities for collection of all underground personnel at the selected
camps and also give suitable subsidy to help maintain these camps.
Suitable amenities in the form of medical aid and recreation
will be provided. Adequate
arrangements will be made by the Mizoram Government to look after
these camps and provide liaison machinery.
6.
On
behalf of the Government of India it was agreed to continue suspension
of operations by the Security Forces.
Suspension of operations will, however, not apply to operations
in coming against outgoing underground personnel to/from Mizoram or
those attempting to cross the International border, and the maintenance
of normal law and order will continue.
It was also agreed that formal announcement regarding the suspension
of operations would be made after the underground have taken suitable
measures to stop all activities on their side.
7.
The
delegation undertook to establish contact with the group of underground
personnel led by Biakvela and bring them along with arms and ammunition
held by them, in consultation with the Mizoram Government, to a camp
to be set up for them.
8.
Further
talks will be held during the third week of March, 1976.
APPENDIX 2
Text of the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Government of India and the Mizo National
Front signed at New Delhi on June 30,1986:
PREAMBLE
1.
Government
of India have all along been making earnest efforts to bring about
an end to the disturbed conditions in Mizoram and to restore peace
and harmony.
2.
Toward
this end, initiative was taken by the late Prime Minister, Smt. Indira
Gandhi. On the acceptance by Shri Laldenga of behalf of the Mizo National
Front (MNF) of the two conditions, namely, cessation of violence by
MNF and holding of talks within the framework of the Constitution
of India, a series of discussions were held with Shri Laldenga.
Settlement on various issues reached during the course of the
talks is incorporated in the following paragraphs.
RESTORATION OF NORMALCY
3.1
With
a view to restoring peace and normalcy in Mizoram, the MNF party,
on their part, undertake within the agreed time-frame, to take all
necessary steps to end all underground activities, to bring out all
underground personnel of the MNF with their arms, ammunition and equipment
to ensure their return to civil life, to abjure violence and generally
to help in the process of retoration of normalcy.
The modalities of bringing out all underground personnel and
the deposit of arms, ammunition and equipment will be as worked out.
The implementation of the foregoing will be under the supervision
of the Central Government.
3.2
The
MNF party will take immediate steps to amend its Articles of Association
so as to make them conform to the provisions of law.
3.3
The
Central Government will take steps for the resettlement and rehabilitation
of underground MNF personnel coming overground after considering the
schemes proposed in this regard by the Government of Mizoram.
3.4
The
MNF undertakes not to extend any support to Tripura Tribal National
Volunteers (TNV), People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) and any
other such groups, by way of training, supply of arms or providing
protection or in any other manner.
LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND
OTHER STEPS
4.1
With
a view to satisfy the desires and aspirations of all sections of the
people of Mizoram, the Government will initiate measures to confer
Statehood on the Union Territory of Mizoram, subject to the other
stipulations contained in this Memorandum of Settlement.
4.2
To
give effect to the above, the necessary legislative and administrative
measures will be undertaken, including those for the enactment of
Bills for the amendment of the Constitution and other laws for the
confernment of Statehood as aforesaid, to come into effect on a date
to be notified by the Central Government.
4.3
The
amendments aforesaid shall provide, among other things, for the following:-
(I)
The
territory of Mizoram shall consist of the territory specified in Section
6 of the North Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971.
(II)
Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Constitution, no Act of Parliament in respect
to
(a)
religious
or social practices of the Mizos,
(b)
Mizo
customary law or procedure,
(c)
administration
of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to the
Mizo customary law,
(d)
ownership
and transfer of land,
shall
apply to the State of Mizoram unless the Legislative Assembly of Mizoram
by a resolution so decides;
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any
Central Act in force in Mizoram immediately before the appointed day.
(III)
Article
170 Clause (1) of the Constitution shall, in relation to the Legislative
Assembly of Mizoram, have effect as if for the word sixty,
the word forty has been substituted.
5.
Soon after the Bill for confernment of Statehood becomes law, and
when the President is satisfied that normalcy has returned and conditions
conducive to the holding of free and fair elections exist, the process
of holding elections to the Legislative Assembly will be initiated.
6
(a)
The Centre will transfer
resources to the new government keeping in view the change in status
from a Union Territory to a State and this will include resources
to cover the revenue gap for the year.
(b)
Central
assistance for Plan will be fixed taking note of any residuary gap
in resources so as to sustain the approved Plan outlay and the pattern
of assistance will be as in the case of special category States.
7.
Border
trade in locally produced or grown agricultural commodities could
be allowed under a scheme to be formulated by the Central Government,
subject to international arrangements with neighbouring countries.
8.
The
Inner Line Regulations, as now in force in Mizoram, will not be amended
or repealed without consulting the State Government.
OTHER MATTERS
9. The rights and
privileges of the minorities in Mizoram, as envisaged in the constitution,
shall continue to be preserved and protected and their social and
economic advancement shall be ensured.
10. Steps will be
taken by the Government of Mizoram at the earliest to review and codify
the existing customs, practices, laws or other usages relating to
the matters specifies in clauses (a) to (d) of para 4.3 (II) of the
Memorandum, keeping in view that an individual Mizo may prefer to
be governed by Acts of Parliament dealing with such matters and which
are of general application.
11.
The
question of the unification of Mizo inhabited areas of other States
to form one administrative unit was raised by the MNF delegation. It was pointed out to them, on behalf of the
Government of India, that Article 3 of the Constitution of India prescribes
the procedure in this regard but that the government cannot make any
commitment in this regard.
12.
It
was also pointed out on behalf of the Government that as soon as Mizoram
becomes a State,
(I)
the
provisions of part XVII of the Constitution will apply and the State
will be at liberty to adopt any one or more of the languages in use
in the State as the language to be used for all or any of the official
purposes of the State;
(II)
it
is open to the State to move for the establishment of a separate university
in the State in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(III)
in
the light of the Prime Minister's statement at the Joint Conference
of the Chief Justices, Chief Ministers, and Law Ministers held at
New Delhi on 31st August, 1985, Mizoram will be entitled to have a
High Court of its own, if it so wishes.
13. (a) It was noted that there is already a scheme
in force for payment of ex-gratia amount to heirs/dependents or persons
who were killed during the disturbances in 1966 and thereafter in
the Union Territory of Mizoram. Arrangements
will be made to expeditously disburse payment to those eligible persons
who had already applied but who had not been made such payments so
far.
(b) It was noted that consequent on verification done by a joint team
of officers, the Government of India verification done by a joint
team of officers, the Government of India had already made arrangements
for payment of compensation in respect of damage to crops, buildings
destroyed/damaged during the action in Mizoram; and rental charges
of buildings and lands occupied by the Security Forces.
There may, however, be some claims which were preferred and
verified by the verification done by a joint team of officers, the
Government of India had already made arrangements for payment of compensation
in respect of damage to crops, buildings destroyed/damaged during
the action in Mizoram; and rental charges of buildings and lands occupied
by the Security Forces. These
pending claims will be settled expeditiously.
Arrangements will also be made for payment of pending claims
of rental charges for land/buildings occupied by the Security Forces.
* V.S. Jafa serves in the Indian Administrative
Service (IAS) and is a former Chief Secretary of Assam. He studied
the Northern Ireland conflict as a Visiting Fellow at the University
of Oxford (1986‑87); as John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Fellow and a Visiting Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(1988‑89), he researched the revolutionary, ethnic and religious
roots of violence, counter‑insurgency and counter‑terrorism
in the context of the theory and practice of conflict resolution.
He is also a Consulting Editor with FAULTLINES.
[1]
Jafa,
V.S., Counter-insurgency Warfare: The Use and Abuse of Military
Force, Faultlines, Volume 3, ICM-Bulwark Books,
pp. 79-129.
[2]
The points treated in
my previous paper will not be repeated here, and a comprehensive
view can be had by reading the present analysis in the context of
what has already been stated there. Ibid.
[3]
R.N. Prasad, Government and Politics in Mizoram (New Delhi: Northern Book Center,
1987), p. 195.
[4]
John Vanlal Hluna, Church and Political Upheaval in Mizoram
(Aizawl: Mizo History Association, 1985), pp. 111-121.
[5]
R. N. Prasad, Government and Politics in Mizoram, Ibid. pp. 209-210.
[6]
Ibid.
p. 208-209.
[7]
Letter from Christian
Peace Committee addressed to B.C. Carriappa, March 1, 1969. Quoted
by John Vanlal Hluna, Ibid., p. 122.
[8]
Ibid.
p. 122.
[9]
See Donald L. Horowitz,
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University
of California Press), pp. 563-652 for a detailed discussion on the
relevance and efficacy of these approaches.
[10]
One British ICS officer,
who served in the northeast in the 1940s, told me in 1986 that Indians
had themselves created the conditions for insurgency in the
Northeastern hill areas by educating the Nagas and and the Lushais.
The truth is that the British were not inclined to spend too much
on social development in areas that did not generate revenues. Reacting
adversely to a demand for a high school in Lungleh in 1946, MacDonald,
the Superintendent of Lushai Hills, wrote to Saprawnga that I
am not at all convinced that the institution of a high school at
Lungleh at the expense of the plainsmen would be a good thing. I am more inclined to believe that the time
has come for the Lushais to enter the adult world where you pay
for what you get. (Aizawl Records: No. 5353 G. of February
8, 1946).
[11]
As
against three hospitals (two run by the missionaries and one by
the government with six doctors and 50 beds), two post offices and
no telephones, and no private motor cars in 1947, there were 12
hospitals with 1,000 beds and 120 doctors, 7 telephone exchanges
with 1200 telephone subscribers, 285 post offices and 4,200 motor
vehicles registered in the State in 1986.
[12]
Government of Mizoram
Annual Report cited in K.K. Upadhyaya, Development
Problems and Prospects of Mizoram, New Delhi: Inter-India Publications,
1986, p. 23; and Annual Reports of the Mizoram Government and North
Eastern Council.
[13]
North Eastern Region at
a Glance, 1987, published by the North Eastern Council, Shillong.
[14]
Ibid.
pp. 23-24.
[15]
Lalmachhuana, "Some
Aspects of Mizoram Economy and Prospects of Development" in
T. Mathew (Ed.), Tribal Economy of Northeastern Region,
Gauhati: Spectrum Publications, 1981, p. 176.
[16]
K.K. Upadhyaya, op.cit., p. 10.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
See Donald L. Horowitz,
Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1985, p. 632 for five uses to which electoral
system could be used in such situations: (1) Fragment the support
of one or more ethnic groups, especially a majority group, to prevent
it from achieving permenent domination; (2) Induce an ethnic group,
especially a majority, to behave moderately toward another group
and engage in inter-ethnic bargaining; (3) Encourage the formation
of multi-ethnic coalitions; (4) Preserve a measure of fluidity or
multipolar balance among several groups to prevent bifurcation and
the permanent exclusion of the resulting minority; and (5) Reduce
the disparity between votes won and seats won, so as to reduce the
possibility that a minority or plurality ethnic group can, by itself,
gain a majority of seats.
[20]
Brigadier Sailo's son
was a member of the Mizo National Front and served on the personal
staff of Laldenga in East Pakistan for a while.
[21]
The MNA had no ideological
use for the books of Mao-Tse-Tung.
They were not even reverential towards them.
The good covers of the books were used by them for binding
their diaries, and the pages as toilet paper on their return jouney.
[22]
The Pakistan factor had
disappeared with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and the MNF
visits to China meant more of disillusionment with only marginal,
if any, material and diplomatic assistance from that country.
[23]
Frank Kitson, Gangs and Countergangs, London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960, p. 192.
[24]
Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 147.
[25]
I heard the story of Hrangis brother
Chhuanga. In late 1975, in Rotlang near Lungsen village, the Randhawa
outfit hailed a group of six insurgents as their brethren and fired
and killed five of them when they came to shake hands.
One important man of the special task force,
as it was called, was Vanngura whose father, Lalduhchhuanga, a Central
intelligence officer, was killed by the MNA. Vanngura was rewarded
with the post of an inspector of police for his gallantry and success
against the hostiles.
[26]
Nirmal Nibedon, Mizoram: The Dagger Brigade, New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1980,
pp. 208-9.
[27]
The text of the February
1976 Agreement is given in Appendix 1 of this paper.
[28]
The Text of the Memorandum
of Settlement is given in Appendix 2.
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