|
|
Terrorism, Institutional Collapse
& Emergency Response Protocols
K.P.S. Gill*
"Complacency
is the true friend of the terrorist."1
The past year has been particularly harrowing for those
who are concerned with Indias internal security, as a series of
terrorist acts and patterns of covert aggression, including the massive
incursion of Pakistani troops and state-backed mercenaries into Kargil,
destabilised existing internal security equations. A recurring feature
of the strategic and tactical shifts visible in the patterns of terrorism
and Pakistans widening proxy war, particularly those centred around
the conflict in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), is their unending ability
to take Indian forces, their command structures, and the nations
political leadership by surprise. Even where sufficient tactical intelligence
and indices of rational risk projection existed, the forces of aggression
and terrorism were and continue to be able to strike with
apparent impunity. The most dramatic case in point is the complex series
of intelligence warnings relating to activities in and around Kargil,
which preceded the eventual engagement in late May 1999, and which failed
to generate any kind of effective response from the defence apparatus.2
This, of course, is not to suggest that all terrorist
actions should or can be predicted and prevented. While intelligence
operations do help thwart some terrorist strikes, it would be unrealistic
to expect that all such events can be foreseen, irrespective of our
levels of penetration into subversive networks. This is not only a consequence
of the highly dispersed character of the organisation of terrorist activities,
as well as of their conception and planning on, and launching from,
foreign soil, but also of the simple physical and financial limits on
intelligence structures and operations. The real failure, however, is
not in the intelligence gathering mechanism, but in our inability to
utilise large and discrete flows of intelligence to assess and evaluate
the scale and direction of emerging threats, to maintain sustained vigilance
in response to extended or diffuse threat perceptions, and to respond
effectively when these are realised.
None of this reflects on our actual capabilities to
frustrate Pakistans proxy warriors from realising their objectives.
Kargil was ample demonstration that the Indian forces, once aroused
and mobilised, are more than adequate to put Pakistan in place. If separate
evidence was needed regarding our abilities to confront internal security
challenges with equal efficacy, it was provided in the nation-wide Republic
Day celebrations and parades this year. There was ample evidence that
disruption of these celebrations was a primary and major tactical and
propaganda objective for the terrorists, and at least six suicide squads
are known to have been sent into the Jammu region alone over the month
preceding January 26, 2000. A significant increase in terrorist movements
was detected in the days before the parades, including the arrest of
a group of terrorists in possession of RDX and detonators in Delhi on
January 16. But not a single incident of significance marred the celebrations
at the hundreds of venues at which they were held right across the country.3
And yet, terrorists have been able to carry out as
many as 13 attacks against heavily guarded security forces establishments
and camps since Pakistans Kargil strategy collapsed in July-August
1999. These include the attack on the Badamibagh headquarters of the
15 Corps (September 12), the attack on the Army Headquarters at Srinagar
in which the Defence PRO was killed (November 3), Army Headquarters,
Baramulla (December 2), the J&K Police Special Operations Group
(SOG) Headquarters at Srinagar, in which a DSP was among the 12 SOG
personnel killed (December 27), and the attack on the Rashtriya Rifles
Brigade Headquarters at Khannabal in Anantnag (January 12, 2000). In
each case, the most alarming security lapses and inconceivable levels
of carelessness and neglect heralded the terrorist attacks. At the SOG
headquarters, for instance, the terrorists were simply allowed to drive
unhindered into the heavily guarded campus since they were wearing Army
uniforms. Evidently, basic security protocols were being ignored, since
an attack on such a heavily guarded establishment was thought to be
inconceivable even after 11 such attacks had already taken place
on other "secure" targets. The lesson, it appears, is that
while we can mobilise our forces for well-defined or clearly predicted
short term emergencies, our responses to the unexpected, or to unspecified
threats, remain less than adequate.
IC 814 The Paradigm of Failure
The critical failure of response to the hijacking of
the Indian Airlines flight IC 814 occurred at the Raja Sansi Airport
in Amritsar. Of course, the eventual and humiliating dénouement
at Kandahar can also be faulted on a number of grounds, the most obvious
being the manifest loss of nerve on the part of the governments
negotiators. However, little is still publicly known about the actual
circumstances, negotiations and transactions at Kandahar, and it would,
perhaps, be both unfair and unwise to judge the governments crisis
responses on the basis of the fitful and often inaccurate information
that is currently available. The debacle at Amritsar, however, is an
entirely different kettle of fish, and although government sources have
sought to project the "decision" to allow the hijacked plane
to leave Raja Sansi Airport as a reasoned option the best of
a bad bargain that could easily have ended in a bloodbath for the hostages
this is far from the case. I had, at the time of the hijack crisis,
repeatedly described the events at Amritsar as an unforgivable blunder
that divested us of all effective options, and I have seen no evidence
till date to force a revision of this opinion.
The fact is, the failures at Amritsar and a
majority of these emanated from New Delhi were entirely avoidable
and exemplify in extraordinary measure the institutional collapse that
encounters each sudden or unforeseen crisis of internal security (indeed,
perhaps, of governance at large) in India. In the absence of a credible
or detailed public disclosure by the government, consequently, it is
useful to trace out the sequence of events, on that fateful Christmas
Eve, as we know them.4
- 4:52 p.m.: Delhi Air Traffic Control (ATC) receives a message from
ATC Varanasi that the Airbus-300 plying on the Indian Airlines flight
IC-814 has been hijacked.
- 4:56 p.m.: confirmation is received when the pilot flashes the hijack
code to the Delhi ATC. At this point of time radar information placed
the plane over Lucknow. The Captain, D. Sharan, then makes radio contact
and informs ATC that the hijackers are armed and their destination
is Lahore. The information is communicated to the Crisis Management
Group (CMG) comprising senior officials including the Cabinet Secretary,
the Home Secretary and the Civil Aviation Secretary. Reports suggest
that there was some delay in informing the CMG because telephone
numbers had not been updated at the Delhi airport. The officials
were also apparently unclear about what to do once they were contacted.
What the CMG actually did for the next hour is uncertain
and crucial to any analysis of the response. The Prime Minster who
was flying back from Patna to Delhi was informed only at 5:20 p.m.,
after he landed. He reached his residence at 5:35 p.m. and summoned
a meeting of his Cabinet colleagues. The CMG had still not assembled
its meeting reportedly convened shortly before 6:00 p.m. An
hour had already been wasted without any action taken by the Government
or any of its agencies.
- 5:40 p.m.: the plane approaches Delhi. Reports indicate that though
the pilot had said that he was heading for Lahore, he was already
trying to ensure that he landed at Amritsar. He brought the Airbus
speed down to 360-390 knots, well below the normal speed of around
460 knots. There is a certain point on the flight plan, point Ansari,
where a pilot has to commit himself to heading either for Lahore or
Amritsar. A Lahore bound flight veers left while the Amritsar bound
flight must head right. The pilot, it was evident at this point, was
trying to delay this decision.
A crucial fact in this context is that, from the
time it was hijacked barely 20 minutes into the flight, till it landed
in Amritsar, the plane was tracked closely on radar, its speed was
known and a fair estimation of the amount of fuel remaining at the
time it landed in Amritsar should have been available to the CMG,
and should have been communicated to the authorities at Amritsar.
The apparent failure to make these basic calculations available to
decision makers at various levels had a crucial bearing on the subsequent
response of the authorities.
- 6:15 p.m.: The plane reaches point Ansari and the pilot chooses
to turn towards Amritsar.
- 6:18 p.m.: ATC Amritsar is first contacted by the pilot, "We
are in contact with Opla (Lahore). Opla is not allowing us to land
and we have only 40 minutes fuel. They are insisting us to go to Opla
(sic) and they are not allowing us to land in Indian soil."
- 6:26 p.m.: Pilot informs ATC again, "We have fuel only for
half-an-hour. Please coordinate with Opla. Please get us permission
to land at Opla. They are very silly and they will kill us one by
one."
- 6:31 p.m.: Pilot says that they have selected ten people to kill.
- 6:32 p.m.: Pilot says, "There is only 15 minutes of fuel left
over. With this we can remain 15 minutes in the air. After that we
don't have fuel. Make sure we land in Opla as they want to land in
Opla and otherwise not anywhere in India."
Clearly, the pilot was doing all he could to make
sure the plane landed at Amritsar. He had made a choice that the ATC
could interpret by observing the radar, even as he played along with
the hijackers. From the transcript it is clear that more attention
should have been paid to the accuracy of the information he was giving
to decipher any subtext or signals he was sending, particularly with
regard to the fuel remaining in the plane. Certainly, it should have
been clear that what the pilot was mouthing was not to be taken at
face value.
Specifically, at 6:18 p.m. he said he had 40 minutes
of fuel left, at 6:31 p.m. he claimed to have only 15 minutes of fuel
left. In 13 minutes he had supposedly lost 25 minutes of fuel. The
plane finally landed at 7:01 p.m., half-an-hour after the pilot
said he had only 15 minutes of fuel left. It should have been
clear that his words were not reflecting, and were not intended to
reflect, the true picture regarding the amount of fuel in the plane.
- 6:35 p.m.: The aircraft is now hovering over the Raja Sansi Airport,
Amritsar, a full one hour and forty three minutes after the first
report of the hijack was received by ATC Delhi. But even now,
no clear response systems have been activated. It bears mentioning,
here, that Amritsar had been the final or transitional destination
of a majority of the twelve Indian commercial aircraft hijacked in
the past, and should have been the most obvious and probable destination
in the present case. While all airports within the flight capabilities
of the hijacked aircraft should have been alerted for possible landing
and response, Amritsar should have been in a state of high alert,
with a clear Emergency Command and Communications system in place.
As will be evident from the sequence of events below, this was far
from the case.
By this time, the Prime Minister's personal secretary
Brajesh Mishra had finally joined the deliberations of the CMG at
Delhi. Throughout this period, and the next hour or so, it is unclear
what the PM and the Cabinet were doing.
- 7:01 p.m.: The plane landed and contact was established on the ground
with the pilot. At this point the Senior Superintendent of Police
(SSP), the districts Deputy Commissioner (DC), officials from
the Border Security Force (BSF) as well as Inspector General of Police
J.P. Birdi had reached the control tower. Airport Director V.S. Mulekar
and senior aerodrome officer, Tarlok Singh, were already present there
and Mulekar was the man who subsequently handled most of the communications
with the aircraft. Two hours and nine minutes had passed since
the authorities in Delhi were first informed of the hijacking. Clear
indications had also been available for 45 minutes that the pilot
was aiming to land the plane at Amritsar.
The plane landed on Tarmac 34 and came to a halt
mid-way on the runway. The area is not well lit and is very far from
the floodlit apron area of the airport. Visibility from the cockpit,
officials confirm, would have been no more than 150 metres at best.
The pilot conveyed the demand that the plane should be refuelled immediately,
else the hijackers would start killing passengers. He also sent a
coded message informing ATC that there were 5 hijackers on board.
A message was also sent to Delhi asking for instructions. Reporters
spotted Tarlok Singh outside the airport building, making preparations
for refuelling.
To answer the question regarding what went wrong
at Amritsar, we must begin with an inquiry on who was in charge. The
State Crisis Management Committee (CMC), which included DGP Sarabjit
Singh and IGP (Intelligence) M.P.S. Aulakh, was communicating with
IG Commandos, J.P. Birdi who, in the absence of the zonal IG was asked
to take charge. The Deputy Commissioner, is in the normal course of
such a crisis, the man responsible for dealing with and authorising
any action. He seems to have played virtually no role from here on.
In addition to the SSP, the DIG Amritsar was also present.
- 7:05 p.m.: A man claiming to be G.Lal from the "Home Department"
called up and asked about the situation at Amritsar. This man called
once again with the same question. Who this person was is still to
be established. However, contrary to some newspaper reports, airport
officials confirm that he gave no instructions regarding how the officials
at the spot should tackle the problem.
- 7: 10 pm: The first contact between Amritsar and Delhi takes place,
when the Cabinet Secretary calls up and speaks to the SSP. No specific
instructions are issued, but the SSP is told to delay refuelling and
ensure the plane does not take-off without the CMG's instructions.
A short while later, Brajesh Mishra also speaks to the DIG and tells
him that an all out efforts should be made to prevent the aircraft
from taking-off.
- At this point, however, it is already clear that no one person was
in charge at the ATC, Amritsar. The Cabinet Secretary was instructing
the SSP, the PM's Principal Secretary was speaking to the DIG, the
State DGP to the IG. The man actually talking to the pilots was the
Airport Director V.S. Mulekar.
One source of confusion was certainly the lack of
proper communication facilities at the airport. The ATC had no STD
line to contact Delhi, and the mobile phones belonging to police officials
were used to contact Delhi. Delhi may well have responded through
the same channel. This is a confusion that could, and should, have
been easily sorted out. It was not cleared up to the very end of the
crisis. An official present at the ATC tower throughout the time when
the plane was approaching and present at Amritsar clearly admitted
that no one person was in charge. Specifically asked whether Birdi
was handling things, he said, "He was present there, I wouldnt
say that he was in-charge."
It should also be stressed that while subsequently
defending their failure to prevent the plane from taking-off, the
CMG and the State authorities cited various reasons all of
which had been conjured up after the event. Officials present at the
ATC confirmed that, during the 48 minutes that the plane was at the
Airport, no option to prevent its take-off was discussed by the officials
at the ATC, and no specific directions were received from the superior
authorities specifically, the State CMC or the CMG at Delhi.
At this point it is also necessary to examine the
rationale for delaying refuelling. All subsequent indications show
that once the Indian Oil bowser had actually approached the plane,
far more options would have been available to the ATC. The first was
simply because of a fact that emerged in the media several days after
the hijack, but which was known immediately to the authorities
that the airport lacked the proper ladder for refuelling an Airbus
as no plane of this make currently lands at Amritsar. This in itself
would have been sufficient reason in dallying over refuelling and
there is no way the plane could have taken-off with the bowser connected
to the plane.
The second is that the very mechanism that allows
for the refuelling of a plane also allows its "de-fuelling",
that is, the extraction of fuel from the tank. Once the bowser was
in place, it could simply have dried out, and consequently immobilised,
the plane.
In the aftermath, with the local and State authorities
blaming the CMG, and the CMG returning the favour, it is also clear
that once the Cabinet Secretary and the PM's Principal Secretary contacted
officials in the control room, the local authorities immediately assumed
a passive role. They were passing on information and awaiting instructions.
In fact, just before the Cabinet Secretary called, the authorities
were making preparations for refuelling the only active decision
they took during these 48 minutes. Existing evidence suggests a total
lack of co-ordination between the State CMC at Chandigarh, the CMG
at Delhi, and the officers present in the ATC the last of whom
were at the cutting edge of whatever action plan was devised. There
is also some evidence that different officers at the ATC were separately
receiving instructions from the CMG and the State CMC, and that there
was no co-ordination of this information with the officers actually
negotiating with the hijackers.
- 6:45 p.m.: Pilot first informs the ATC that the hijackers are armed
with revolvers, AK-47 and grenades.
- 7:07 p.m.: Pilot repeats this claim, and, at around this time, manages
to convey a coded message to the ATC indicating that the hijackers
are five in number.
- 7:11 p.m.: The panic is rising. Pilot says, "Now guns are on
our head. Everyone will be shot down in another three to five minutes.
Kindly please come refuel
."
- 7:15 p.m.: Pilot speaks again: "Why are you taking that much
time. Guns are on our heads now."
The transcript over the next several minutes again
requires close examination.
- 7:23 pm: "They are going to kill us any time. Please send the
bowser. They have started killing now. Where is Oh.....! Where is
the bowser now? Please tell us."
- 7:25 pm: "Where is the bowser? Where is the bowser (crying
voice), yaar. He has started killing the passenger. Why don't
you understand our problem. Where is the bowser yaar?
He
has already killed a passenger now. Why don't you understand. Now
we have stopped. Send the bowser fast. Please. Where is the bowser?"
- 7:42 pm: "Four passengers have been killed now. Why have not
you responded. The bowser is not coming here. What is the problem?"
According to one of the district authorities present
at the ATC, the impression conveyed by the pilot was that the hijackers
were loosing their balance. These messages created an atmosphere of
panic at the ATC. Contact was established with Delhi again but no
clear instructions were received, the earlier instructions were repeated.
Even as some of the officers rushed off to quietly brief the Press
on the "four killings" on the plane, other officers present
at the scene had doubts about the veracity of the claim. IG Birdi,
in his Press briefing shortly after the plane took-off, stressed,
among other things, that no shots had been heard by the policemen
stationed within hearing distance from the plane.
His statement also provided confirmation of the fact
that Punjab Police personnel had, indeed, moved on to the tarmac to
within 300 metres of the plane.
Strangely, the authorities, while trying to justify
their inaction had this to say, "One false move could have gravely
endangered the lives of nearly 200 persons." They defended the
lack of any active steps by saying that it was impossible to gauge
the reaction of the hijackers, what they were armed with and how well
trained they were. But from the above transcript it seems reasonably
clear that the fact of four people apparently having been killed did
not spur them to any urgency regarding refuelling.
They were obviously willing to waste four lives through
delay and indecision (in retrospect they actually lost one life) over
the refuelling, but were not willing to take direct action that would
risk the lives of the passengers. This does not ring true. What it
suggests is that they were working under certain (erroneous) assumptions.
These would include the presumption that, with Lahore having refused
permission and the plane left with barely any fuel, it could not go
anywhere. The only way the plane could have taken-off, they felt,
was if they went ahead with refuelling. The analysis of facts here
was clearly incompetent, and was based primarily on the record of
claims which should have been seen to be inconsistent and deliberately
misleading made by the pilot at various stages before the landing.
Clearly, moreover, they were willing
to risk lives, and they did, by trying to delay refuelling till the
National Security Guard (NSG) arrived. Their second assumption also
eventually proved to be miserably wrong. Indeed, they should have
foreseen, or at least taken into account the possibility, that Lahore
would, at some point of time, grant permission for the plane to land
there. To place unqualified faith in Pakistan in such a situation
is certainly less than wise.
Moreover, the inability to work out the actual amount
of fuel remaining in the plane was just plain unprofessional. The
amount should have been calculated to the last drop. In any case,
since it is clear that they were willing to, and did, risk lives,
there was nothing preventing action such as blocking the runway, or
otherwise disabling the plane. The fact that the plane was taxiing
on the runway for much of (though by no accounts all) the time does
nothing to undermine possibilities of disabling or blocking the plane.
Taxiing speeds were low, and the plane comes to a virtual standstill
on each turn. There were more than ample opportunities to act, if
the will and the clarity of vision and command had been there.
- 7:30 p.m.: The plane suddenly takes a half-turn and faces the North-South
direction.
- 7:35 p.m.: Message from Delhi to the ATC that an NSG team had been
dispatched. Specific instructions are repeated that the plane should
be prevented from taking off. However, it is not clarified as to how
this was to be done. A message is also sent to the DIG (BSF) in Amritsar
with the same instructions. Three companies of the BSF are moved to
the airport. Punjab Police personnel also enter the airfield and approach
within 300 metres of the plane.
- 7:40 p.m.: Shortly before take-off, the plane takes a 180 degrees
turn to face South. While passenger reports suggest that there is
some truth in the CMG's claim that the plane was constantly turning
on the tarmac, according to a very reliable source present at the
ATC, the plane just made these two turns.
- 7:49 p.m.: The plane took-off surprising everyone at the Control
Tower.
According to an observer present there, "No
one anticipated that the plane would take-off like that. We all knew
the plane had hardly any fuel left, and certainly did not expect such
a suicidal step." The plane had a near miss with the oil tanker,
which had been stationed on the runway for refuelling. Sources make
it clear that the tanker had been stationary at that point for at
least the preceding ten minutes. No police official has yet confirmed
the fact being now "leaked out" that trained policemen had
been put on the bowser, and its movement towards the plane scared
the hijackers.
- 8:15 p.m.: The NSG team lands at Amritsar 26 minutes after
IC 814 had flown out, one hour and fourteen minutes after it had landed
at Amritsar, and a full three hours and twenty three minutes after
the first information of the hijack had been received at ATC Delhi.
The team is headed by a Brigadier from the 52 Special Action Group
and comprises 130 commandos.
According to sources, the commandos received information
of the hijack at 6:10 p.m. at Manesar. It took them almost an hour
to assemble at Delhi Airport, and they were ready for take-off on
an Indian Air Force plane, at around 7:05 pm. Newspaper reports suggest
that the failure of trained negotiators from intelligence agencies
to reach the airport on time further delayed take-off by another half-hour.
This is more than amazing in a situation of extreme emergency
a rapid response team sits waiting for a psychologist to arrive for
half an hour, and it does not strike the decision makers that the
latter could follow on another plane later, if needed. This is not
an administrative failure, but an abject collapse of basic common
sense. In any case, the one-hour delay between being informed and
being ready to take-off itself speaks poorly of the efficiency of
the NSG. Not to factor the distance to the Airport and the traffic
on Delhis roads into a rapid response plan displays an unacceptable
level of incompetence.
These, of course, are mere details. The intention of
the exercise of listing them here is not to fix individual responsibility
on, or to blame, particular officials; this is not the objective of
this paper, and would, in any event, be a futile exercise, since the
same failures would only be repeated by someone else the next time round,
when another similar or dissimilar crisis arises. It is
at the level of a paradigm of response that the failures at Amritsar
are important, and it is at this level that they need to be analysed
if any effective structures of crisis management are to be forged out
of our experience.
Shorn of detail, what were the generic failures at
Amritsar?
- The first and most significant failure was the inability to establish
an unambiguous and unique centre of command within reasonable time
and "reasonable time" in such a crisis, is to be
measured in minutes, not hours. The failure here is institutional.
A long and slow process of decay has undermined, disabled and, in
many cases, destroyed the emergency response systems that were in
place at various levels of governance, replacing them, by and large,
by an anarchic system of charismatic leadership, where extraordinary
individual initiative sometimes produces dramatic results. Charismatic
and competent leaders, however, cannot be present for every one of
the innumerable emergencies that arise with unfailing regularity in
India. Consequently, most crises produce a conflicting reaction: on
the one hand, an undignified jockeying for the centre position and
for media projection, and, on the other, an abdication of responsibility
by the majority of those who are required to act. One of the most
effective institutions and processes of this abdication is the "committee"
or sets of committees that "take over" as they did
in the present case and play out a great charade of discussion,
communication and management, while simply refusing to take decisive
action. At the end of the day, even if the consequences are entirely
disastrous as they were in the present case no one is
responsible, since the decisions, or their lack, were "collective".
At worst, some low level official at the site of the crisis can be
sacrificed as the scapegoat of the hour. The situation is worsened
infinitely by a long history of punishing officers who actually take
action, while no penalties ever attach to "sins of omission"
and acts of outright dereliction.
- The second critical failure is that, even those who "took charge"
in the sense of arriving at the communication centres of the
crisis management system that came into being out of the dynamics
of the hijacking, and the moribund structures of systems past, i.e.,
the Raja Sansi Airport, the CMG at Delhi, and the CMC at Chandigarh
simply did not know what was to be done. Each began de novo,
effectively trying to reinvent the wheel, with no guidelines, no reference
to a historical context, and no structured system of emergency response.
- The third critical failure was the inability to install or activate
a clear line of communication with and between the various actors
in the task. Conflicting and contradictory instructions were consequently
being received through random and informal modes of communication
including personal cell phones by various authorities
at the Raja Sansi Airport, emanating in each case from sources that
far outranked the officers in the field. Within the context of the
existing political and administrative system, these circumstances
would ordinarily divest local authorities of the will to initiate
any action on their own initiative though this should certainly
not be the case. Moreover, the ATC official who was actually communicating
with the pilot of the plane, and through him, with the hijackers,
had no clear idea of the various information flows. Of course, the
fact that even among those who were at the command centres of this
management system, no one knew what was to be done, only compounded
the problem further.
- No system for providing adequate technical backup to decision makers
was apparently in place till the end of the crisis. Simple but critical
calculations such as the available fuel in the plane
had clearly not been made. Nor were the technical and military options
for immobilising the plane adequately clarified or explored. Individuals
from non-technical backgrounds, with limited or no prior experience
either of a crisis of this kind, or of other aviation or military
emergencies, were evidently wracking their brains to figure out some
sort of solution through the standard bureaucratic process of unending
and ill-informed discussion.
- There was no context of a national policy on hostage or hijacking
situations, or, for that matter, on terrorism in general, that could
provide any kind of hint or guideline on the broad parameters of the
resolution that was to be sought. The various decision makers were
as stated before required to reinvent the wheel entirely
on their own, right from the CMG at Delhi down to the officers struggling
with the situation at the Raja Sansi Airport.
- Rapid Deployment Forces located at Delhi failed to reach the focal
point of the crisis in time. Had they done so, their very presence
would have created a new dimension, multiplying available options
manifold. Needless to say, the forces available at the Airport and
in Amritsar lacked the capabilities necessary for the kind of operation
that the NSG could have launched, and, despite their substantial presence
fairly close to the plane, could not influence the equation
on the ground.
There were, furthermore, several aspects of the
management of the adventitious or subsidiary crises that were ignored
or bungled by the government. Some of these secondary crises established
themselves within the first hours of the event, but persisted to the
great detriment of the national interest throughout the crisis, and
have survived into the aftermath. These related, in large part, to
problems of co-ordinating media, public and international relations.
- The first of these was a complete absence of a co-ordinated media
response. From the very beginning of the crisis, the Government and
its officials spoke in a hundred conflicting voices, bringing its
deliberations and decisions into the sphere of public debate at a
time when restraint and sagacity and not recrimination and
the confused cacophony of ill-informed advice were most needed.
There was no system of media management, of the projection of a single,
dignified and well-informed voice, reflecting a national governments
sense of command and stability. Indeed, some of the highest offices
of the land lent their authority and credibility to unconfirmed information
that eventually proved false. If anything, the hijacking crisis underlined
the fact that we have far too many amateurs in government and
that it is time that they were, at the very least, told to shut up.
In any crisis of this nature, it is imperative that
an effective system be established to sift through the frenetic and
contradictory flows of information, and that only what is confirmed
should be released. This is not only a question of the governments
credibility. Public perceptions are an integral input into the dynamics
of decision making in these emergencies. And if these are distorted
by disinformation and by deliberate falsehood, the possibilities of
arriving at optimal decisions recede.
Take an example: the hijackers claim, articulated
through the pilot of IC 814, that they were armed with AK 47s, grenades
and RDX was accepted as gospel and hastily communicated to every journalist
in the vicinity. It was quoted as unqualified fact in every television
channel even while the events of the hijacking were still unfolding,
and was printed in every newspaper the next morning.
This perception had a powerful impact, not only on
those who were charged with decision-making in this crisis, but also
on our relations with a friendly country, which brings us to another
aspect of subsidiary crisis management the containment of unintended
consequences in international relations. India heaped ignominy on
Nepal and arbitrarily suspended flights to that country without even
bothering to wait for the processes of an objective inquiry. Senior
officials of the government pilloried the security arrangements at
Tribhuvan International Airport without ascertaining the magnitude
of the actual breach that had occurred. A breach had, of course, occurred
but the response was certainly disproportionate, and was based
exclusively on the first aggregation of disinformation, sourced from
the hijackers themselves. I cannot conceive of a less diplomatically
sound course of action than what was adopted by India towards Nepal.
Worse still, each element of this disgracing of Nepal was carried
out in public, communicated to the media even as, if not before, it
was communicated to that countrys government.
- A similar ineptitude characterised the handling of the relatives
of the hijacked passengers. Part of the problem was, again, media
management, as contradictory and exaggerated official and quasi-official
statements fed the hysteria of the relatives. Of course, the conduct
of a section of the relatives themselves was nothing less than disgraceful,
but that cannot absolve the government of its own incompetence. A
single, authentic and well informed source of the official position
should have immediately been established to liase with the relatives,
as also to provide an immediate channel of relief, so that they did
not believe themselves to be abandoned, for hours at end, in the waiting
lounges of the Airport. Suffice it to say, even to the very end of
the crisis, an adequate and efficient system of information and relief
for the relatives had not been established.
- All the preceding factors combined into a single and devastating
image of loss of control, of confusion and impotence that has continued
to magnify in the aftermath of the crisis through the proliferation
of manifestly puerile statements and suggestions in official quarters,
and of empty political rhetoric posturing as policy.5
These, indeed, have conceded to the hijackers a victory far greater
than was merited by the release of three terrorists. The sheer confusion,
the sense of visible frustration, and the direct and manifestly unsuccessful
engagement of the highest offices in the country, both in the management
and the aftermath of the hijacking, are the unintended consequences
that are still to be fully evaluated, or even realised. Put yourself
in the hijackers place, and that of their sponsors, and try
to imagine the sense of empowerment and satisfaction, not just of
securing the release of three militants, but of having discomfited,
and even humiliated, so many senior Indian leaders including
ministers and perhaps the Prime Minister himself. Imagine the sheer
gratification of having inspired such a deep sense of failure and
as the pronouncements of the leaders of some political formations
suggest6 even self-loathing, in
the political leadership and the public at large. And consider the
propaganda and recruitment potential of having created a feeling of
bafflement and frustration in the Indian security forces to an extent
far greater than ever before, greater even than the despondency or
demoralisation that all the body bags over the past year had been
able to instil in our fighting men. This, in fact, is what the terrorists
actually achieved at the end of the hijacking not just the
release of three militants.
Proactivity: From a Slogan to a Policy
No nation and no army can win every battle even
against an inferior adversary. The constellation of local events and
forces, the element of tactical initiative and surprise, sometimes combine
with fortune to shift advantages in favour even of a weaker side. To
this extent, the specific reverses that India suffered as a consequence
of the blunder at Amritsar, and the subsequent and sub-optimal resolution
of the hijacking crisis at Kandahar, have limited significance. To the
extent, however, that a nation fails to correct the lapses of the past,
the basic flaws in its strategic perspectives and institutions, however,
it is condemned to repeat its mistakes at incremental costs to the national
interest. At some point of time, the processes of attrition will carry
it beyond the point of return or recovery, and the cumulative consequences,
then, would be disastrous.
The evidence available suggests that we are currently
set upon this course to catastrophe and lack the will and the vision
to institute satisfactory correctives. In the month succeeding the hijack
crisis, the spectacle of impotence and confusion was sustained at a
high pitch by the Government, with a number of ponderous declarations
entirely lacking in substantive content and originality
of a variety of "counter-terrorism initiative and policies".
These included measures to improve aviation security, including
the hasty, ill-advised and entirely ad hoc announcement of the
decision to post commandos on commercial flights;7
the announcement by the Prime Minister of a Rs. 102.71 billion Central
"agenda" for the Northeast, and an additional Rs. 14.2 billion
towards reimbursements to the States of this region for expenditures
on security;8 and the announcement by the
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of a "new policy" for J&K.9
An analysis of the specific measures that comprise
these various "policy initiatives" discloses nothing that
is new. The Aviation security measures have largely been ad hoc
announcements, and a policy is currently being formulated. It would,
consequently, be premature to comment on proposed measures. These, in
any event, have only limited bearing on the specific probabilities of
future attempts to hijack Indian commercial aircraft and do not, by
and large, affect our arguments here.10
As regards the announcement of a development
package for the Northeast, this has become a routine reassurance
ritual for every visiting Prime Minister to the region. As one commentator
expressed it with some irony, "It is not yet a constitutional obligation
but enjoys the force of convention."11
In 1997, the then Prime Minister Deve Gowdas visit to the Northeast
had also been accompanied by grand plans of economic reconstruction
and the announcement of a Rs. 60 billion "package". I.K. Gujral,
who succeeded Gowda shortly thereafter, also made a quick trip to the
region, and announced another "package" worth Rs. 70 billion.
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has now clearly outbid his predecessors.
It is a different matter that such "financial
grants" contain a substantial measure of financial jugglery, and
that all the "developmental expenditure" of the past has only
left the region poorer, with per capita incomes and other economic indicators
registering steady declines. I have often stated that the only people
who are enthused by the prospect of "developmental expenditure"
in terrorism affected states are political leaders, bureaucrats and
their favoured contractors, since a bulk of these funds end up in their
private coffers. Some of these funds also flow, through a complex chain
of collusion, compliance and extortion, to various terrorist groups
and eventually end up funding militancy. Their impact on the
target groups of the poor in the region remains negligible.
However, the dogma of developmental funding as a "solution"
to terrorism has never been challenged despite the complete absence
of supporting evidence since it keeps most of the prominent players
in the existing conflicts flush with funds.
The "new policy" on J&K is particularly
significant in the present context. It constitutes a direct response
at least in part to the hijacking, and is part of the
effort to demonstrate the governments "will" to confront
the mounting threat of the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist movement in
the mountain State. According to reports, the main features of the new
policy included:12
- Specialised battalions of Central paramilitary forces to be raised
for counter-insurgency operations.
- Counter-insurgency grids have been divided into 49 sectors as a
part of a three-tiered control structure under the unified headquarters.
- An additional unified headquarter is to be set up at Zojila.
- Security in Srinagar city to be further beefed up.
- Security forces have been asked to carry out round-the-clock operations.
- Special operations are being launched with the help of retired soldiers
and members of Village Defence Committees (VDCs). These would be integrated
with the counter-insurgency grid for protection of civilians.
- Sophisticated arms and modern communications equipment would be
provided to the VDCs.
- Special funds would be provided for border roads.
- New job-generation projects will be put in operation in order to
effectively deal with the problem of unemployment.
Every single one of these "new" measures
has been the stock in trade of the governments "response
to terrorism" in the wake of each new emergency, crisis, or major
terrorist strike, and many of the measures mentioned are already part
of existing policy. Only two of the decisions have the appearance of
novelty or a shift in policy but here again, the appearances
are deceptive.13 The first of these is
the decision to substantially augment the number of sectors in the counter-insurgency
grid by a process of vivisection. This is, at best, a tactical response,
and certainly does not deserve the title either of a strategic shift
or a policy initiative. The second is the decision to ask the SFs to
carry out round-the-clock operations. Does this imply that the SFs have
been functioning on a 9-to-5 workday over the past years of bloodshed
in the State? Evidently not. Why then the fanfare that surrounded this
"new policy"?
The fact is that the government was clearly suffering
a crisis of credibility since the hijacking of IC 814. As the Minister
for Home Affairs candidly, if inaccurately, asserted the ruling
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) perceives itself to have suffered as a
consequence far more than the nation has.14
It was, therefore, necessary to project a posture of aggressive determination
and great activity in order to recover face even if this was
nothing more than a posture lacking all substance.
Unfortunately, these domestic compulsions notwithstanding,
this was the worst possible course of action that could be adopted.
The language in which the threat perceptions of the government were
expressed as the context of the "new policy", and as these
were interpreted by various leaders and commentators, not only increased
the general perception of a loss of control by the government, but had
the power to contribute directly to the demoralisation of the SFs. Worse
still, the exaggerated projection of the "new policy" automatically
raised unrealistic expectations of immediate results both among the
general public and among the rank and file of the SFs and these
expectations will certainly not be fulfilled, given the very nature
of the proposals. Inevitably, there would be another couple of dramatic
strikes by the terrorists no security force, policy or strategy
can obviate this possibility under prevailing circumstances and
this entire house of cards will collapse on itself, creating a general
sense of disappointment, betrayal and further demoralisation. In any
event, the rubbishing of the new policy in innumerable editorials and
articles had reinforced the general sense of confusion and vulnerability
within days of the governments announcements.
What was needed in the aftermath of the hijacking,
in the face of the rising tide of terrorist violence, the increasing
incidence of attacks on the security forces, and the incontrovertible
evidence of the Inter Services Intelligences (ISI) involvement
in terrorism and a wide range of criminal activities including
the massive injection of counterfeit currency into the Indian market
was not dramatic public declarations and postures in advance
of the event, but unadvertised and critical policy shifts and a little
imaginative action in the field. These would have created the successes
that were needed, and the grounds for justifiable and lasting credit
to the government. I have said this before, and will repeat it again:
There is absolutely no substitute for success in the field. And this
is where India appears to be, and is perceived to be, faltering.
I would be the last person to underestimate or understate
the threat in J&K, or to deny that the situation has worsened significantly
over the past months. Several grave dangers exist and have been augmented
by new threats. The Indian SFs have suffered enormously under a barrage
of direct and audacious assaults. This said, let me add that the situation
is far from out of hand. Indias fighting men have faced much worse
in the past and have emerged victorious. The difference, however, is
that, to do so, they must be allowed to operate under clear mandates,
well-defined and internally coherent policies, and a leadership that
exudes a sense of confidence and resolve. These, precisely, are the
factors that have remained entirely elusive, despite decades of terrorism
in an increasing number of theatres within the country, and despite
a succession of governments reflecting a fairly wide ideological spectrum.
The greatest weapon in war is the human mind. Vast
armies, "unbeatable" technologies and entire nations have
been defeated by demoralisation. And this is the first step at which
India is losing the present war. Better counter-terrorist strategies,
improved systems of co-ordination, command and control, superior weapons,
surveillance and communications technologies are all, certainly, needed.
But the first element that must precede these, and that must be sustained
throughout the conflict thereafter, must be a clearer understanding
of public perceptions, projections and a coherent media policy. Feeding
the prevailing sense of terror, helplessness and public distress does
not strengthen the government or create a greater mandate for strong
measures against the terrorists. That mandate already exists in adequate
measure and has, in fact, been frittered away by the government at least
on some occasions in the recent past.
This does not, of course, mean that a stoic and unyielding
silence must be maintained by the government on all matters pertaining
to terrorism. On the contrary, there is urgent need for the articulation
of an authoritative and clearly defined position on the subject, and
for convincing action to realise this position on the ground. Before
turning attention to the character and content of such a position, and
the actions consequent upon it, it may be useful to look at a few examples
of the responses of some other nations to the challenges of a major
terrorist strike or movement.
In 1974, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, Israel
was victim to a major terrorist onslaught that commenced in the spring
that year. In addition to a number of smaller operations, these included
at least a dozen major attacks including the ones at Nahariyah, Beit
Shean, Shamir, Kiryat Shmoneh and Maalot. The last
two, involving the slaughter of women and children, were the worst shocks
to the national conscience. In the Kiryat Shmoneh incident on
April 11, 1974, three Arab terrorists first shot Eshter Cohen, a 40
year old woman, her 17 year old son, David, and her daughter, aged 14
in their apartment. They then moved through several other apartments
in the building, lobbing hand grenades into some, and shooting indiscriminately
at occupants in others. By the time Israeli soldiers caught up with
them and shot them, they had killed 14 more Israeli civilians, including
six children between the ages of two-and-a-half and 11. 16 men, women
and children were wounded but survived, and some Israeli soldiers lost
their lives as well.
Exactly a month later, however, the terrorists
were to perpetrate an even greater outrage at the village of Maalot.
At 3:00 in the morning, they first entered an apartment and shot a couple
and their two children, a boy aged four and a girl aged five. The girl
was the only survivor in this initial attack. The terrorists then went
on to enter a schoolhouse where over a hundred high school students
were sleeping. The children and their teachers were then herded into
a hallway. Some of the children and one of the teachers managed to escape
by jumping out of a window. The rest were held for over 14 hours. The
terrorists, armed with Kalashnikovs and explosives, had issued a deadline
that they would blow up the building if their demands including
the release of some 23 terrorists were not met. The Israelis
tried to negotiate the release of the hostages, but some confusion over
a password and the terrorists designated mediator brought the
negotiations dangerously close to the deadline. Confronted with the
possibility of all the hostages losing their lives, Israeli soldiers
stormed the building. At this point, the terrorists opened fire into
the crowd of children, hitting 84 of them. 22 of these were killed,
and another three adults lost their lives. Prime Minister Golda Meirs
statement before the Knesset five days after the outrage, is a model
of dignity, of authority, of solemn even noble grieving,
and of determination:
The long list of victims of terrorsm has now
been swollen by our fine and innocent children
The blood of our
children, the martyrs of Maalot, cries out to us, exhorting us
to intensify our war against terrorism, to perfect our methods of operation,
to concentrate our talents and resourcefulness, to persevere in the
daring in seeking out the very heart of the terrorist nests wherever
they may be
. The blood of the Maalot slain calls out to
the world to desist from displaying any lenient attitude towards the
terrorist organisations, their bases and their masters: to realise,
while there is time, the peril stemming from the ideology and actions
of
terrorism.15
In the months that followed, a counter-terrorism policy
crystallised, a process that continued without interruption, alteration
or any shift in emphasis or commitment, despite the fact that, less
than a month later, a new government was sworn in under the leadership
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In his very first address to the Knesset,
Rabin was to declare the identity of interests and intent with his predecessor
government on the issue of terrorism, and to define the fundamental
principle that became the foundation of Israels policy thereafter:
"The Government of Israel will not conduct negotiations with terrorist
organisations whose declared goal is the destruction of the State of
Israel."16
It is significant that this principle was articulated
at a time when the memory of the Maalot incident, in which children
were held hostage to secure the terrorists demands, was fresh
in the minds of the leaders of Israel. Yet, the government announced
a policy of "no negotiations". "We prefer peace to new
military victories," Prime Minister Rabin had said, "a stable
peace, a just peace, an honourable peace, but not peace at any price."17
The price Israel paid at Maalot was, indeed, terrible. But in
the war against terror, the price of capitulation is even greater.
Out of these unequivocal declarations of intent, Israel
forged the details of the structures and processes that would protect
civilian lives, as well as inflict harsh deterrent punishment and reprisals
on acts and sponsors of terrorism. Acts of terror targeting Israel continued,
of course. But their intensity and their centrality to the Arab-Palestinian
strategy waned, forcing a shift towards a negotiated settlement in which
Israel engaged from a position of unwavering strength. The details of
the specific measures adopted to force this shift merit a separate study
and need not detain us here. What is significant in the present context
is the fact that the underpinnings of these measures were a clear and
utterly unambiguous statement of a national policy perspective on terrorism.
The threat perception with regard to terrorism in the
United States of America is extraordinarily high, despite a relatively
low incidence of terrorist incidents and casualties. A process of selective
definitions, intentional blindness, and statistical inventions have
allowed the US to perceive and seek to project themselves as the nation
most at risk from this scourge, and one commentator goes so far as to
assert that, "Historically, the United States has been the target
of 32 per cent of all terrorist attacks worldwide, second only to Israel."18
Speaking at the United Nations, President Clinton endorsed this perception
of a nation under threat: "Because we are blessed to be a wealthy
nation with a powerful military and a worldwide presence active in promoting
peace and security, we are often a target
we know that many people
see us as a symbol of a system and values they reject, and often they
find it expedient to blame us for problems with deep roots elsewhere."19
He generously conceded, nevertheless, that "it is a grave misconception
to see terrorism as only, or even mostly, an American problem."20
The American part of the problem, however, is resolved
through a pattern of harsh legislation and relentless reprisals that
have made the US, at once, perhaps the most hated society among terrorist
communities, and, equally, one of the safest among their potential targets.
Thus, in the wake of the terrorist bombings of US embassy buildings
in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1988, President Clinton ordered cruise
missile strikes against alleged terrorist training camps in Afghanistan
and a supposed chemical weapons plant in Sudan. It is a different matter
that no judicial processes or open evaluation of evidence preceded these
attacks. It was, moreover, not even the US case that the perpetrators
of the embassy bombings were actually present in the "terrorist
training camps" in Afghanistan. And the international media eventually
discovered the "chemical weapons plant" in Sudan to be an
innocent pharmaceutical company.
US action in this case did not end here. The bombing
suspects were identified by an international investigation, apprehended
in record time, and brought to America for trial though the "chief
conspirator," Osama Bin Laden, remains elusive. However, the international
pressure, diplomatic, economic and covert, currently being exerted to
bring this "fugitive" to American justice is a critical input
in all US policy in Central and South Asia.
This is virtually a paradigm case of the application
of the US Counter-terrorism Policy, defined succinctly and explicitly
in the following principles:
First,
make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals;
Second, bring terrorists
to justice for their crimes;
Third, isolate and apply pressure on states
that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behaviour; and
Fourth, bolster the counter-terrorism
capabilities of those countries that work with the US and require assistancce.21
In addition, the Clinton Administration has defined
the principles that would determine the objectives of US diplomatic
efforts to secure the co-operation of all nations to:
Deny terrorists safe haven and financial support,
and pressure states that do;
Co-operate in the extradition and prosecution
of terrorists;
Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
and enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention;
Increase airport security and control the
manufacture and export of explosives.22
Another essential feature of the US counter-terrorism
response is the degree of institutional consensus that prevails. The
judiciary has ordinarily handed out maximum sentences, and even waived
substantive provisions of US law to punish what is designated as terrorist
crime. Thus, in the case of Aimal Kansi, the alleged killer of two CIA
agents was virtually kidnapped in Pakistan, bundled onto a plane and
brought to the US to face trial in violation of all the very stringent
procedural constraints on wrongful arrest. In other cases, US Courts
have been extraordinarily rigid, even pedantic, in their interpretation
of civil rights and procedural protection against improper arrest
allowing some of the worst domestic crimes to go unpunished in cases
where the police did not follow the stringent procedures prescribed
for arrest or securing of evidence. All this, in the Kansi case, was
simply brushed aside, and the perpetrator sentenced to death. The US,
today, also has some of the harshest and most comprehensive anti-terrorist
legislation in the world.23 The Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, for instance, prescribes the
death penalty, or imprisonment of not less than 40 years even
for conduct which directly or proximately causes personal injury or
substantial risk of injury to any person, including any public safety
officer performing duties. If a conduct results in death, the offender
faces the death penalty, or imprisonment for not less than 20 years
or life.24 Minimum mandatory sentences
are prescribed for most terrorist offences, leaving no room for equivocation
or misplaced liberal and human rights posturing
by the judiciary. There has, of course, been little attempt in the American
judiciary to seek these escape routes when confronted by terorist crimes.
The World Trade Centre bombing in New York City resulted in the death
of six persons. Each of the four perpetrators and the chief conspirator
was sentenced to 240 years of imprisonment with the last
receiving an additional life sentence. None of them will again experience
freedom in this lifetime.
It is, of course, a different matter that the US
applies criteria that are entirely at variance with its own practices
when terrorist activities are carried out in theatres far from its soil
and when their victims are not US citizens. That, however, is not the
issue here. Our present concern is with the measures that nations adopt
to protect themselves against the scourge of terror, and in this, the
US is a veritable pioneer, and recognises no constraints of morality
or of international law and opinion. Indeed, the extent to which unconstrained
use of force is sanctioned by society and the institutions of governance
once a certain group of activities is designated a terrorist, or even
an "un-American" activity, can be estimated by the massacre
at Waco, Texas, in 1993. Here the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
brought in tanks and initiated a violent and dangerous CS gas assault
on a barricaded group of a millenneal religious sect, the Branch Davidians,
resulting in the death of 74 people, including women and children.25
The US approach is rightly premised on the assumption
that every unpunished terrorist attack diminishes its prestige and power
in the international arena, and inflicts critical damage on US
interests abroad.
Whenever a terrorist attacks a US target (be it civilian or
military) Americas reputation suffers in the eyes of many around
the world. The implication is that the United States is not as strong,
or as skilful, as America wants the rest of the world to believe it
is. This is specially the case in cultures where reputation and the
appearance of power count for much
As a result, terrorism can
weaken relations with allies by intimidating or blackmailing a particular
country into distancing itself from the United States or denying the
US access to particular facilities.26
The approach also recognises an important distinction
between antiterrorism and counter-terrorism. The former comprehends
the defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals
and property to terrorism, and recognises the limitations of such initiatives
in combating terrorism since it would be physically and financially
impossible to protect all potential terrorist targets through such defensive
measures. Counter-terrorism, on the other hand, comprehends a wide range
of offensive measures to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.
With these perspectives, it is unsurprising that
a counter-terrorism perspective is read into the institutional strategy
of all related branches of government, not only the State, Justice and
Defence Departments, but also other agencies that may be connected with
the management of the consequences of a terrorist strike, such as the
Health, Fire and Civil Administration. Moreover, an apex body, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), prioritises and co-ordinates all
aspects of crisis management, including the identification of emerging
threats, definition of response protocols, training and institutional
structures.
Contours of a Counter-terrorism Policy for India
In the absence of a coherent vision of a nations
larger strategy, specific initiatives, especially where they are fire-fighting
responses to current crises, tend to cancel each other out and often,
in fact, prove counterproductive. To take a parallel, if one were to
create a large number of random and unstructured defences on a battlefield,
with no clear idea of the emerging pattern of engagement, of the imperatives
of the terrain, of the relative strength of forces, and of the defined
objectives of battle, we would find that these defences eventually become
a hindrance to our own manoeuvres, rather than a shield against enemy
attack. This is precisely the case that has arisen out of the innumerable,
ad hoc, entirely unstructured and often contradictory actions
and policy initiatives with regard to terrorism in India, and many of
these actions and initiatives have now become the most significant obstacle
to any coherent strategy of resolution.
The very first imperative of an effective policy
on counter-terrorism, consequently, requires the definition of the basic
principles on which all counter-terrorist action and policy are to be
constructed. No such principles are reflected in our present policies,
and I have no reason to believe that they exist. Once defined, these
principles must be strictly adhered to, circumscribing the range and
content of actions and negotiations that any government or official
may engage in with regard to terrorists, or in situations of crisis
generated by the actions of terrorists.
Several models exist for the identification of
these basic principles,27 but it is not
sufficient simply to imitate these, or to adopt them verbatim from some
other country. They would have to be based on a specific and objective
evaluation of the character and magnitude of the threat of low intensity
war and terrorism in this country. This may appear to be too obvious
a point to require separate statement, but on closer scrutiny this is
not the case. There is, in fact, a great deal of ambivalence that characterises
the attitudes and perceptions of policy makers and those who shape opinions
in this country, with regard to terrorism, and there exists a vast body
of pseudo-sociological, political and economic analysis that seeks to
justify terrorism or to underplay its enormity and impact. This stream
of thought actually an uncritical acceptance of politically fashionable
postures has influential supporters in various branches of government.
It is, consequently, crucial that the objective dimensions of terrorism
be explicitly and transparently evaluated, its dangers defined and documented,
and an unequivocal national consensus be forged on the character and
magnitude of this scourge, and the measures that are necessary and justified
in order to confront it before we succumb to it.
This, however, is only the beginning of a long
and relentless process. The Indian state, I have remarked in the past,
must start educating itself on how it is to tackle individuals and groups
trying to destroy the state. And it must learn how to arm and protect
those who put their lives at stake in the defence of Indias unity
and integrity.28 This will require a radical
reformation of internal security forces and institutions, creating the
skills, knowledge, attitudes and infrastructure necessary to confront
the threat posed by terrorism and covert warfare. The parameters within
which each agency of government must respond to such challenges will
also have to be defined, specifically and in great detail. This would
include the powers, the range of extraordinary actions permitted in
these situations, and the applicable legal criteria and context of evaluation
of these actions whether these are the same as those applicable
in peacetime or are to be akin to articles of war, or are to be redefined
in terms of the new category of low intensity wars
should be clearly determined and suitably legislated.29
These are only the preliminary conditions for an
effective response to the challenge of terrorism yet they demand
a massive and unprecedented effort; an effort, moreover, which has to
be exerted within a timeframe that grows shorter by the day if it is
to have any hopes of success.
These time frames of response are well illustrated
by the US apprehensions of a biological weapons attack "within
the next five to ten years". US officials concede, "We are
a long way from being even modestly prepared," but simultaneously
assert, "were doing a lot more now than we did 12 months
or even six months ago".30 This is
the urgency that attends a response to a threat that is expected to
emerge years in the future. The legislative response to cases of terrorism
on US soil are also a case in point. Till 1996, the US had experienced
only two major incidents of terrorism: the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in April 1995, where over 100 were
killed; and the World Trade Centre Bombing at New York, in which five
persons were killed and over a thousand injured. Yet, by 1996, the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act and a wide variety of other legislation
had been passed, making the most comprehensive provisions not only for
the effective prosecution and punishment of terrorist acts, but also
for activities that helped finance, support or otherwise facilitate
such actions.
By comparison, we are yet to set up systematic
defences against the far greater threats that have already been realised
and are currently undermining the rule or law, and even the possibility
of civil governance, in a number of theatres of conflict in India. Fifty
years after the first major terrorist movement in the country began,
we are yet to have even a basic legislation to deal with the problem
the ill-drafted, and equally ill-fated Terrorism and Disruptive
Activities Act, 1987, which was allowed to lapse in May 1995 without
a whimper, being the only experiment in this direction. Thus, after
tens of thousands of casualties inflicted by terrorists, and billions
of rupees of property destroyed, as far as laws presently in existence
in this country are concerned, there is no phenomenon that can be uniquely
and legally identified as "terrorism", or be punished as such.
For well over two years now, we have been speaking just speaking
of a "proactive policy" on terrorism; yet the initiative
remains squarely in the hands of the terrorists and their sponsors in
Pakistan, and there is no evidence of even the basic framework of a
policy in sight.
Even if institutions of governance succeed in shaking
themselves out of their present torpor, they may find existing structures
severely inadequate to deal with the problem. The first element of this
structural failure is the co-ordination of efforts of the large number
of institutions and forces that are pressed into service or need
to be so tasked to tackle terrorism. I have recently drawn attention
to the failure to effectively utilise even the available technological
infrastructure, manpower and resources to fight terrorism.31
This is only one aspect of the problem. The fact is, the efforts even
of the SFs directly involved in the fight against terrorism are not
adequately co-ordinated, and systemic and internecine conflicts undermine
even cancel out a great deal of what is being done by
different military, police and paramilitary organisations. The challenge
of co-ordination, however, extends much further, to a wide variety of
institutions and organisations that comprehend virtually every department
of governance, but most prominently, the health, transport, communications,
and emergency management services, science, technology and research
institutions, the judiciary, the legislature, and civil administrations
in terrorism affected areas. Evidently, no existing institution has
the mandate or the capabilities to undertake such a task.
There is, consequently, an urgent need to set up a
central agency for the co-ordination of all counter-terrorism efforts,
initiatives and policies, so that the national interest and policy are
realised through the vast multiplicity of discrete and apparently unrelated
actions of the numerous divisions, departments and jurisdictions that
currently exist.
Such an agency would also be tasked to carry out a
continuous assessment and analysis of existing and emerging threats,
to co-ordinate flows and maximise utilisation of available intelligence
from a multiplicity of sources, and to continuously define policies
and protocols for response to each new area or pattern of terrorist
activity, and to ensure that these are translated into action by the
appropriate division and department of government. This agency should
also be statutorily required to periodically apprise both the government
and Parliament of prevailing threat perceptions, and the actions required
to meet these.
It should be clear, in this context, that this central
agency would not be the executive agency for counter-terrorism response,
nor would it have the authority to intervene at the tactical and operational
level. It would, however, define the strategic framework of counter-terrorism
operations, devise protocols for response to a wide variety of possible
threat situations, produce the training materials and structures for
the creation of requisite proficiency in the execution of these protocols
in concerned agencies and personnel, and generally put into place the
systems that are required to safeguard the nation and its people against
terrorism. The agency would also act as a clearing house for a great
deal of inter-departmental and inter-agency dissemination of information,
and as a pressure group to bring the policies and practices of various
branches and departments of government into conformity with national
counter-terrorism perspectives and policy.
Crucially, this agency must not be constituted along
the pattern of existing "security advisory" fora, which have
the essential character of government-sponsored debating societies,
with no power of independent access to information, intelligence, or
other resources for effective action.
Specifically, the central agency for counter-terrorism
would be required to address the following tasks:
- Project and continuously evaluate the essential elements of national
counter-terrorism policy: This function assumes that a national
policy has already been defined by the national political executive
a task that can no longer wait for the constitution of a new
institutional arrangement.
- Establish and continuously revise threat assessment criteria
for all major threats: This involves the definition and clarification
of the analytic procedures to determine the threat of terrorism in
various areas and regions, as also to specific installations, including
defence and infrastructure installations and establishments. This
would involve the analysis of inputs beyond conventional intelligence
flows within government, and would reconcile these with information
received from media and research resources, as well as from strategic
and geopolitical analyses of the situation beyond the immediate theatre
of conflict. This process is critical because it would define certain
objective parameters which would automatically mandate the activation
of response protocols at various levels and in all concerned institutions
and departments, with intervening discretionary or executive decisions
that is to say, without a judgement call having
to be made.
- Creation of standard emergency response protocols for all potential
terrorist threats and actions: This is a gigantic task that would,
first, involve the identification of all such potential threats and
their possible impact and crisis management requirements. Here, it
is not only necessary to make provisions for existing threats, but
also to continuously evaluate emerging technological and tactical
shifts in order to ensure that the emergency response systems are
geared to tackle these. For instance, I have already made this point
specifically in connection with the possibility of a chemical or biological
weapons (CBW) terrorist strike, or for the introduction of any
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) into the terrorist arsenal
for which we are completely and visibly unprepared.32
The actual contents of such response protocols would, of course, vary
from situation to situation, but they would all have certain minimal
features in common, and these would include at least the following:
- Establishing crisis command and a clear chain of accountability:
As was amply clear from the confusion that followed the hijack of
IC 814, this must be the first priority in any given situation of
terrorist action or threat. The authority who is charged with commanding
the emergency response must be clearly defined in the standard procedures
with an equally clear identification of a substitute in case
of absence, death, inaccessibility or immobility on any grounds. The
crisis command must be headed by a single individual, who would then
be unequivocally accountable for the handling of all aspects of the
situation.
- Definition of graded minimal responses: Each emergency or
level of threat perception must automatically generate certain minimal
and clearly defined responses by all agents on first information received,
even if the crisis command centre is not yet fully activated or in
contact. This refers not only to the activities of those who are directly
connected to the security response aspects generated by the crisis,
but to all support wings as well such as media management,
human relations management, emergency medical, fire, technical or
other associated services, and, very crucially, the agencies charged
with collecting and preserving evidence. This last is an aspect that
is often neglected in the wake of major terrorist incidents, and in
the process the possibility of building a body of evidence for the
successful identification, apprehension and prosecution of culprits
is diminished, and much crucial evidence, or many opportunities of
generating such evidence, destroyed. It must be realised that the
successful prosecution of terrorists is one of the critical elements
in the successful war against terrorism, and in this regard the Indian
record has been worse than disgraceful though not entirely
as a result of the failure of the apparatus for investigation and
prosecution.
The idea of a mandatory "graded minimal response"
is to ensure that local authorities are not directionless, paralysed,
or constantly seeking the intervention of elusive higher authorities,
in the face of a terrorist challenge, and that they are also accountable
for having met or for failing to meet the requirements
of a pre-defined and unambiguous protocol of responses. In addition,
the existence of such unambiguous codes or protocols, protects subordinate
officials from the process of scapegoating that inevitably
follows each botched operation. The present system is biased in favour
of non-performance those who refuse to act are protected, but
those who take an initiative, inevitably with the accompanying risks
of failure, are humiliated and penalised. Once emergency response
protocols are established for a particular genre of situations, however,
a failure to respond in accordance with set codes would attract penalties.
As with every solution, there is a potential problem
here. Rigid protocols can easily be reduced to a formalism that would
protect officials without securing the intended results. If protocols
are not to be transformed into avenues of escape by incompetent, under-motivated
or corrupt officials, they would need to be constantly reviewed for
weaknesses that lend themselves to such exploitation. Such continuous
reviews are mandated also because of continuous technological and
tactical developments, both within the national security community,
and among the terrorists. Indeed, a measure of improvisation and flexibility
will have to be built into the codes and protocols that are developed,
even as is a guarantee of a minimum response. It is significant to
note here that everything is expressed or implemented within a context,
and the prevailing administrative and political atmosphere can undermine
the impact and efficacy of any system that may be put in place. Every
system needs to be backed by integrity and an honesty of purpose,
and these are often lacking. Nevertheless, even with these qualifications,
the impact of such systems would be salutary, to the extent that they
would impose a degree of accountability even on the lowest common
denominator in the crisis response and counter-terrorism apparatus.
- Emergency communications systems: Once a terrorist action
has taken place, or is believed to be imminent, exclusive and pre-designated
systems of communications should automatically be activated between
the command centre and all agents involved in the management of the
emergency. No unauthorised lines of communication, or channels that
are not mediated by the command centre, should have any role whatsoever,
in crisis management.
- Definition of incident priorities: within the context of
the emergency response protocols, each genre of incident should contain
a clear definition of the various priorities that must command the
actions of the various agents. These priorities may include safeguarding
the lives of SF personnel and civilians, protecting critical systems,
stabilising the context of the incident, pursuit and apprehension
of perpetrators, human impact and media management, estimation and
containment of direct and secondary damage, etc. A clear definition
of these priorities would facilitate the most efficient and rapid
deployment of available resources.33
- Definition of strategic goals and tactical objectives in the
wake of an incident: In addition to actions mandated by the minimal
response protocol, the actions of local agents must be activated by
clearly defined tactical and strategic objectives. These, in fact,
provide the context of flexibility and human initiative that are integral
to any effective response to a terrorist threat or strike. Once again,
while these must be defined without dissimulation or vagueness, they
would require continuous revaluation and adaptation in view of emerging
situations.
- Protocols for notification and co-ordination: The responses
of those agencies that make first contact with, or receive first information
on, the terrorist act must include the issue of notifications and
warnings, and an alert on all resources that may be required to deal
with the emergency. Each level of threat, or character and magnitude
of terrorist act must, consequently, be met with notification to all
connected agencies and authorities at an appropriate level of the
government hierarchy.
- Definition and inspection of physical security standards:
A comprehensive exercise needs to be carried out to define the required
physical security standards and protocols for various civilian, government
and security establishments, and thereafter, to ensure adherence to
these standards. These standards, once again, would constitute minimal
prescriptions, and institutions and establishments would have the
discretion to exceed these, but not to fall short on their provisions.
Subsidiary agencies may be required to inspect adherence to these
standards on a regular basis. The central co-ordinating agency would,
of course, be required to continuously review these standards in view
of technological, strategic and tactical changes. Part of the task
of defining physical security standards would also involve the identification
of basic norms for the location, planning and security architecture
of particular kinds of security and other potential target installations
and establishments. The vulnerability of many security and critical
infrastructural facilities is often structural and has to be tackled
at the earliest stages of the development of these projects
commencing with the identification of their location. This has been
a persistent failure, as has been borne out particularly by the vulnerability
of a large number of security establishments that have been extraordinarily
vulnerable to terrorist attack.
- Definition of systems for co-ordination of forces and optimal
sharing of intelligence between agencies and departments: Many
of the critical intelligence failures of the recent past
have been failures, not of the availability of intelligence, but of
sharing, processing, or accessing the appropriate information at appropriate
levels. Similarly, the continuous controversy over command and control
systems in terrorism affected areas, and the unceasing jockeying for
power and credit between the various arms of the SFs dedicated to
the tasks of counter-terrorism, have been the cause of many of our
recent reverses.
Evidently, the evolution of appropriate systems for
the co-ordination of forces and the sharing of intelligence would
need to be one of the most urgent priorities of the central co-ordinating
agency on terrorism.
- Establishing training standards and providing curricula for all
emergency response agencies: Priority here would naturally go
to appropriate training and curricula for the SFs engaged in counter-terrorism.
A comprehensive review of current methods and practices is required
to give our fighting men a clear understanding of the methods, motives
and character of terrorist activities, and to create in them the ability
to look at the situation from the perspective of the attacker. A better
understanding of the weapons and technologies available to the terrorists
and continuous improvements in counter-terrorism methodologies is
also necessary. Irrespective of the costs of dissemination of this
information, and the costs of training and re-training, these programmes
must be undertaken. They would help save lives in our forces, create
a decisive edge in the battle, and, in the long run, prove to be far
more economical than prevailing practices that simply push in increasing
numbers of poorly trained and motivated manpower into areas of conflict.
- Identification, co-ordination and management of legal, legislative
and administrative issues arising out of counter-terrorism operations
and challenges: Counter-terrorism must be conceptualised not as
a problem of the use of the SFs alone, but as a problem that concerns
us all not just the various institutions of governance, but
the citizenry at large. A wide spectrum of constituent actions would
be needed to create a comprehensive and effective response to this
challenge, and the central agency would also have to accept responsibility
for the identification and co-ordination of these elements.
- Development and revision of training curricula and programmes:
The creation of a wide range of emergency operational plans, protocols
and security standards would, quite naturally, create corresponding
demands for training and curricula in a wide variety of institutions.
And the central co-ordinating agency would need both the resources
and the infrastructure to produce these, or catalyse their production,
as also to ensure their widest requisite distribution.
This listing is by no means exhaustive, nor can the
elements within it be considered final. A wide variety of opinions would,
quite naturally, be elicited by each of the proposals, and there are
certainly new facets to the problem that will be exposed, and, indeed,
that will be brought into being with each shift in terrorist strategy
and tactics.
Nevertheless, the intention of the exercise here is
to emphasise that it is now imperative that Indias future responses
to terrorism are far more scientific, systematic and consistent than
they have been in the past, and that comprehensive and radical institutional
and procedural changes are needed if this is to be achieved. The importance,
indeed, criticality, of the personalised responses and charismatic leadership
that have dominated our systems of crisis management in the past, needs
to be minimised. Such responses and leadership have, of course, on occasion,
contributed to the resolution of problems. But even where they succeed,
they do great damage to the general systems of the institutional response,
undermining the initiative and confidence of the large majority of officers,
who then feel that a systemic solution is not possible, and that all
crises demand the intervention of higher authorities or
high profile leaders. To the extent that such higher intervention
is usually not available in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, the
states responses are inevitably delayed, and necessarily inefficient.
More often than not, however, such higher interventions,
ordinarily exercised from a safe and comfortable distance from the actual
crisis, and on the basis of severely inadequate and inaccurate information
streams, have lead to enormous failures, causing significant damage
to the nation, and generating destructive processes of scapegoating
and inane political rationalisation in their wake. It is now clearly
time that a meaningful, flexible and effective institutional response
is devised to the mounting challenge of terrorism in India.
- K.P.S. Gill is the publisher and
editor of Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution, the founding
President of the Institute for Conflict Management, and was also a
member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). An officer
of the Assam cadre of the Indian Police Service, he served in a number
of theatres of civil strife and low intensity warfare, and as Director
General of the Punjab Police, led the successful campaign against
terrorism in that State. He resolved two earlier hijacking crises
(March 27 and April 24, 1993) when the hijacked planes landed at Amritsar,
and was awarded the Conway Safe Skies Award in 1994 by the World Development
Council for his role in the second of these incidents. Among other
activities since his retirement from the Police, he writes on internal
security, political and developmental issues for a number of newspapers
and magazines.
-
GOSS, Kay C., "America
Preparing for the Consequences of Terrorism", a presentation
at the NATO Civil Emergency Preparedness Symposium at Moscow, April
22, 1997.
-
Cf. SWAMI, Praveen,
"The Kargil War: Preliminary Explorations", Faultlines:
Writings on Conflict & Resolution, Volume 2, ICM-Bulwark, 1999,
esp. pp. 29-40.
-
A bomb was detected
opposite the Red Fort at Delhi just half an hour before the beginning
of the parade. Four rockets were also fired, without any casualties,
in the Jammu region. The only fatalities that occurred as a result
of terrorist action on January 26, 2000 were in Assam, where militants
reportedly shot dead three people in Bongaigaon District during
an 18 hour general strike called by eight terrorist groups opposing
the Republic Day functions. Cf. "Another bomb defused at Red
Fort", The Pioneer, January, 27, 2000; "Some hiccups on
peaceful R-Day", Times of India, January 27, 2000.
-
The following sequence
has been reconstructed from briefs by Hartosh Singh Bal, The Indian
Express, Jalandhar, and informal disclosures by a variety of sources
who were connected with the management of the crisis.
-
Cf. for instance, Gill,
K.P.S., "Government Demands Steel in the Soul", The Pioneer,
January 22, 2000.
-
"Freeing militants
to get hostages shows Hindu cowardice: RSS", The Indian Express,
January 6, 2000.
-
"Sky marshals
aboard all flights now", The Indian Express, January 6, 2000;
"Aviation force by year-end", The Tribune, January 8,
2000;
-
"PM announces
Rs. 10,271 cr. Package for North-East", The Hindu, January
23, 2000; "Centre okays Rs. 1,420 cr to check N-E insurgency",
The Indian Express, January 22, 2000.
-
"Special Units
to tackle J&K militancy", The Times of India, January 18,
2000; "Govt draws up ‘war’ plan for post-Kargil Kashmir",
The Indian Express, January 18, 2000; also see "Countering
Terror", The Pioneer, January 19, 2000; Manoj Joshi, "Kashmir
policy: old wine in new bottle", The Times of India, January
19, 2000; and Gill, K.P.S., "Governance demands steel in the
soul", The Pioneer, January 22, 2000.
-
Significantly, even
as measures for improving airport security were being announced,
there were reports that suggested that these had no bearing on the
situation on the ground. Cf. Brajesh Upadhyay, "Alert yes,
but airport security is lax", The Times of India, January 5,
2000.
-
"Third N-E package",
The Tribune, January 24, 2000.
-
"Special units
to tackle J&K militancy", The Times of India, January 18,
2000.
-
This analysis of the
"new policy" on Kashmir is based substantially on my article,
"Governance demands steel in the soul", The Pioneer, January
22, 2000.
-
"Hijack deal
hurt BJP, not India: Advani", The Times of India, January 4,
2000.
-
Statement to the Knesset
by Prime Minister Meir, May, 20, 1974. Source: www.israel-mfa.gov.il
-
Address in the Knesset
by Prime Minister Rabin on the presentation of his government, 3
June 1974. Source: www.israel-mfa.gov.il
-
Ibid.
-
Intelligence Threat
Handbook, May 1996, Section 4, reprinted by the Terrorism Research
Centre, www.terrorism.com/terrorism/InterOperations.html. The absurdity
of this evaluation is evident in the fact that it dates back to
1996. By this time, more than 11, 709 civilians and 1,781 security
force personnel in Punjab (1981-1996), and over 5,411 civilians
and 1,311 security personnel in Kashmir (1990-1996), had been killed
by terrorists in just these two Indian provinces. Nevertheless,
these exaggerated perceptions are integral to the US response to
terrorism and help create the psyche of a society besieged, and
the mandate for harsh counter-terrorism action.
-
Remarks by President
Clinton to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General
Assembly at New York on September 21, 1998.
-
Ibid.
-
US State Department,
www.state.gov/global/terrorism
-
"President Clinton:
A World Leader in the Fight Against Global Terrorism", The
White House at Work, September 21, 1998, www.whitehouse.gov
-
This includes the
very comprehensive Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
1996.
-
And "life"
it must be noted, means life. Not the maximum of 14 years and as
little as eight and a half that it has been reduced to by a licentious
penal regime in India.
-
See, WRIGHT, Stuart
A., "Anatomy of a Government Massacre: Abuses of Hostage-Barricade
Protocols during the Waco Standoff", Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. II, No 2 (Summer 1999), Frank Cass, London, pp. 39-68.
-
"Flashpoints
and Force Structures", Strategic Assessment, 1997, www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97ch15.html
-
For instance, the
US Counter-terrorism Policy outlined above.
-
"Statement on
the Death of Mr. A.S. Sandhu", Press Release, Chandigarh, May
24, 1997. Reported in all major Indian Newspapers on May 25, 1997.
-
I have been repeatedly
raising these and other issues with successive governments, starting
with the Inder Kumar Gujral Government, vide my letter dated May
30, 1997, to the present dispensation – evidently without any quantifiable
impact on policy or action.
-
HENDERSON, D.A., Director
of the John Hopkins Centre for Civilian Biodefence Studies, quoted
in "Bio-terrorism attack inevitable: US expert", The Asian
Age, February 6, 2000.
-
"Technology,
Terror & a Thoughtless State," Faultlines: Writings in
Conflict & Resolution, Volume 3, ICM-Bulwark Books, 1999, pp.
1-38.
-
GILL, K.P.S., "
Technology, Terror & a Thoughtless State", op.cit., esp.
pp. 26-34.
-
And would obviate
the ludicrous prospect of a rapid response force such as the National
Security Guard sitting on a tarmac ready for take-off for over half-an-hour,
waiting for a psychologist-negotiator to arrive, while a full-blown
hijack endangered the lives of over 180 passengers and vital national
security interests. Cf. the sequence of events relating to the hijack
of IC 814 above.
|