Cross-Border Human Traffic in South
Asia
|
Year |
Population |
Growth rate |
||
Total |
Tribal |
Total |
Tribal |
|
1951 |
639,929 |
237,953 |
24.6 |
36.8 |
1961 |
1,142,005 |
360,070 |
78.7 |
31.5 |
1971 |
1,556,342 |
450,544 |
36.3 |
25.0 |
1981 |
2,053,058 |
583,920 |
32.0 |
30.0 |
1991 |
2,757,205 |
853,345 |
34.0 |
46.0 |
Source: ANNEXURE-I of the Memorandum Submitted by the
Tripura Upajati Juba Samity to Union Home Minister L.K. Advani, Agartala,
March 27, 2000.
Today, violence is the order of the day in this State. From April 10, 1993 to December 31, 1999, a total of 1,018 persons (656 non-tribals and 362 tribals) have been killed and 2,001 (1,663 non-tribals and 338 tribals) kidnapped in the state. [42]
The situation is one of a bitter ethnic feud between the tribals and the settlers from the plains. The tribals are clearly on a fight-back mode, both politically and through an unlawful armed struggle. Union Minister for Home Affairs, Lal Krishna Advani, visited Tripura over March 27-28, 2000, to make an on-the-spot assessment of the situation. Tribal leaders representing the TUJS presented a memorandum to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the burden of which was the protection of tribals rights. The TUJS articulated the following major demands:
Ø More power to the TTAADC.
Ø Barbed-wire fence along the States 856 kilometre long border with Bangladesh to check the influx of aliens.
Ø Implementation of the Indira-Mujib Pact (the agreement between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladeshs main architect Sheikh Mujibur Rehman) in terms of which the post 1971 migrants from that country are to be pushed back.
Ø And the introduction of an Inner-Line Permit system to check the entry of plainsmen to the Tribal Council area. [43]
Simply put, the tribals in Tripura today are bent on ensuring that their population in the Tribal Council area does not come below the existing 70 per cent (as already mentioned, the overall tribal population in the State is as low as 28 per cent).
Sandwiched between three foreign neighbours (China on the North, Myanmar on the East and Bhutan on the West), Arunachal Pradesh is by far the remotest of the Indian States. Arunachals recent history of administration dates back to 1838 when the British extended their administration to the frontiers that now form this province. The area was inhabited exclusively by tribal communities, with diverse cultures, values and socio-religious norms. The British made sincere efforts to preserve these tribal societies in their pristine form and to protect them from any outside interference.
Later, the Constituent Assembly of India, while preparing Indias Constitution, considered the aspect of immigration vis-à-vis what is now Arunachal Pradesh. The members of the Constituent Assembly noted that the hill people were extremely nervous about outsiders, and felt they were greatly in need of protection against encroachment (of land) and exploitation. They attached considerable importance to existing regulations, such as the Chin Hills Regulation. The Constituent Assembly considered that the fears of the hill people regarding unrestrained liberty to outsiders was not without justification, and recognised the depth of their feelings. [44]
The Constitution of India too, which came into force on January 26, 1950, recognised the exclusivity of the area and the need for special protection of its indigenous people. From the status of a Union Territory directly under Central rule (through a federal representative), Arunachal Pradesh was conferred full Statehood on February 20, 1987. Until then, what is known as the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, was in force in the area. This Regulation provided that no person other than local natives shall pass through the tracts without a pass and that no person who is not a native of the district (later Union Territory) shall acquire any interest in land or the produce of land. When Arunachal Pradesh became a State in 1987, the Inner Line Permit system was retained, keeping in view the sensitivity of the area. The employees of the State Government, Central Government, public enterprises, business community and labourers, all Indian citizens, were given Inner Line Permits by virtue of their service within the State, but have to leave the area when the contractual work is over, in view of the fact that they cannot reside or settle as per the laws applicable to the area. [45] These provisions give a clear indication of the exclusivity of the area and the protective cover devised by the government for its people.
Otherwise an island of peace in the insurgency-hit Northeast region, Arunachal Pradesh, too, has been gripped by a xenophobic fervour over the past three decades. It all started with the arrival in India of the Buddhist Chakma and the Hajong refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the Mymensingh districts of erstwhile East Pakistan. These refugees came to Tripura and Mizoram over the period 1964-1969, partly to escape the alleged religious persecution in East Pakistan and partly due to their forced displacement as a result of the construction of the Kaptai Dam in that country. Verghese Notes:
It was not possible to hold these refugees in Tripura in the aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and the Mizo insurgency which had had a fallout in the CHT and Tripura. The central government accordingly decided to relocate the Chakmas elsewhere and probably thought of Arunachal in view of its relative low density of population (8,64,558 people according to the 1991 Census in an 83,743 square kilometre area) and the proximity of other Buddhist tribes.... [46]
The decision to settle these refugees in Arunachal Pradesh (then known as the North East Frontier Agency, NEFA) was taken in 1964 by the then Governor of Assam, Vishnu Sahay, who was administering the Frontier. During 1964-1969, a total of 2,748 families of Chakma and Hajong refugees, comprising 14,888 persons, were settled at three locations in Arunachal in the districts of Lohit, Changlang and Papum Pare. [47] The governments White Paper says that by October 1979, the number of the refugees swelled to 21,494. The estimated population of these refugees according to the 1991 Census is 30,064. The refugees themselves, the White Paper says, put their present number at 65,000.
The Arunachalese greatly resented the governments decision to settle the refugees in their area without consulting the local tribal communities. [48] From time to time, they demanded their repatriation. The Indian Government replied in no uncertain terms that the Chakma refugees were eligible for Indian citizenship, but stopped short of actually initiating moves to confer such citizenship. In 1992 and 1993, in replies to an MP from Arunachal Pradesh and to the State Chief Minister respectively, the then Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, M.M. Jacob, stated categorically that the central government is strongly of the opinion that citizenship should be granted to these refugees to which they are entitled under the Citizenship Act, 1955. [49] Jacob, the official document says, also urged the Arunachal Pradesh government to immediately grant citizenship to the Chakma and Hajong refugees so that they enjoy all rights that flow from it.
This was the start of a bitter anti-refugee agitation in the frontier State. The States powerful student group, the All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (AAPSU), issued Quit Arunachal notices on these refugees in July 1994, and soon slogans started appearing on all available wall space in the States major towns against the unwanted guests. There were cases of arson and violence directed against the refugees; their children were denied school admission and medical facilities; trade licences were cancelled; and a general social boycott was imposed. A ruling by the High Court and then by the Supreme Court, Indias apex court, that the Chakma and Hajongs in Arunachal Pradesh were foreigners, greatly strengthened the position of the indigenous Arunachali tribals. Then, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) stepped in and filed a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court charging the State Government of remaining a mute spectator to what it called 'gross human rights violations' against the minority Chakmas and Hajongs in the State. Both the State government and the student outfit denied these charges. [50] In fact, all forces in the State closed ranks against the refugees. This was an emotive issue and could cost any political party an election if it were to show any leniency or favour towards the refugees. The issue remains unresolved. With New Delhi failing to initiate any new move to confer citizenship on the Chakma and Hajong refugees, students and political parties appear to have decided to adopt a wait and watch approach. This could well be the lull before the storm. All it needs is a spark for a fresh anti-refugee stir in this State. And an election could well provide that spark. As in Assam, in Arunachal Pradesh, too, the outsider issue has come to dominate local politics to a great extent.
To put it simply, both the Government and a majority of intellectuals and Think Tanks in Bangladesh deny that there has been any illegal influx of their people into Assam or any other part of India. They claim that the economy of the Indian States bordering Bangladesh is not sound and, therefore, does not have anything to attract their people to cross over. Dr. S.A. Malek, political adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, asserts: Why should our people migrate to Assam or anywhere else in India? The living standards in Bangladesh today is quite satisfactory. [51] Dhakas non-government Track II policy influencers are, however, simultaneously making out a case for lebensraum or living space for their country and people. Today, analysts and academicians like former Foreign Secretary and former High Commissioner to India, Farooq Shoban, and Chairman of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, talk about visa-less travel, border-less trade and other policies that would remove restrictions on the movement of their population across the international border.
The idea of lebensraum has been variously articulated in Bangladesh for a long time, though the use of the expression itself is relatively recent. In the early nineties, Sadeq Khan, a former diplomat, stated:
All projections, however, clearly
indicate that by the next decade, that is to say by the first decade
of the 21st century, Bangladesh will face a serious crisis of lebensraum... if consumer benefit is considered to be better served
by borderless competitive trade of labour, there is no reason why
regional and international co-operation could not be worked out to
plan and execute population movements and settlements to avoid critical
demographic pressure in pockets of high concentration... A natural
overflow of population pressure is very much on the cards and will
not be restrainable by barbed wire or border patrol measures. The
natural trend of population overflow from Bangladesh is towards the
sparsely populated lands in the South East, in the Arakan side and
of the North East in the Seven Sisters side of the Indian sub-continent.
[52]
Of late, this idea of a free movement of people seems to have enough buyers within Bangladesh, and has been strongly articulated by several leading thinkers, economists and former diplomats there. [53] There was strong support for a regime of 'hassle-free' cross-border migration of people. S.A. Malek, despite his denials of cross-border migratory pressures within his country, readily agreed with the view that an effective sub-regional co-operation between Eastern India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal under the aegis of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation) but distinct from it, would be beneficial for the people of this sub-region in so far as matters of trade and travel were concerned. [54]
Similarly opinions were expressed by Muhammad Yunus [55] in favour of sub-regional linkages between Eastern India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. He goes on to talk of a possible European Union type of structure. Nevertheless, even as he speaks of borderless trade and visa-less travel in the sub-region, Yunus does not think that there is any economic incentive for Bangladeshis to migrate to Assam or any other north eastern Indian State. Bangladeshis would rather like to migrate to such Indian cities as Chennai, Delhi or Hyderabad where the economies are looking up. [56]
Farooq Sobhan, suggested that a document like an identity card should suffice for people to travel between the two nations. He also favours a work permit mechanism for workers to stay and work in the two countries. Sobhan, however, conceded that there was 'some' Bangladeshi migration into India's Northeast: I see no reason why we should not acknowledge that there has been some migration to Assam. [57]
The refrain among a section of Bangladeshs elite seems to be the same. Prof. Amena Mohsin [58] for instance, asserts: Migration is a normal and natural phenomenon and cannot be stopped. The need today is to evolve ways to legalise it. Erecting a barbed-wire fence along the Indo-Bangladesh border to check migration of people cannot serve anybodys purpose, she observed. [59]
The Bangladeshi assertion, however, that the state of the countrys economy is not so bad as to encourage large-scale migration, is untenable. A Dhaka-based think-tank, the Centre for Policy Dialogue states:
The state of the economy in the financial year (FY) 1999, representing the period from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999, presents a mixed record depending on the time perspective within which it is viewed. If we look at the events specific to FY99, the economy performed better than might have been expected. If, however, we take the long view then a variety of governance problems appear to have aggravated Bangladeshs development crisis, which poses serious hazards for the country in the days ahead. [60]
Bangladesh was hit by devastating floods in the first half of 1999, the worst such disaster in contemporary memory. Yet, its economy revived quite well, mainly due to the impressive recovery in crop production (GDP growth in 1999 was estimated at 5.2 per cent according to the CPD study). But the CPD study also notes:
...without prejudice to the impact of the floods, the inability to enhance the revenue effort by the Government of Bangladesh remains a longer term problem. A revenue-GDP (Gross Domestic Product) ratio of below 12 per cent puts Bangladesh in the class of Sub-Saharan Africa. [61]
On Poverty Alleviation, the CPD study notes:
The agenda for poverty alleviation
remains at best on the rhetorical agenda of this government (the government
of the day) as it has been on the agenda of its predecessors... The
inherited approach to poverty alleviation, based on a plethora of
donor funded projects under implementation by a variety of ministries
as well as the entire NGO community, remains the order of the day
with successive governments...
But the study admits this is not working: "...poverty levels remain stabilised at around 50 per cent . [62] The poverty agenda lacks any overreaching goal based on a vision defined in categorical targets backed by specific programmes with identified budget allocations to realise these targets. [63] Clearly, all is not well for the poorest of the poor in Bangladesh and this, perhaps, explains the desire in Bangladesh for a serious initiative to achieve sub-regional economic co-operation and population movements that can transcend national boundaries.
Eastern Indias premier business
and industry body, the Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC), with its
headquarters in Calcutta, has already launched a definite initiative
for sub-regional co-operation. It has roped in industry leaders, economists,
bankers and foreign policy think-tanks from eastern India, Bangladesh,
Nepal and Bhutan and has launched, what has been called, the Greater Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna
Initiative (GGBMI) for a Eastern South Asian sub-regional economic
co-operation.
[65]
The Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB) is supporting this initiative and has already appointed a staff consultant to prepare a preliminary study of the benefits of sub-regional co-operation and the agenda ahead. The World Bank has also agreed [66] to support the project by sharing its research on transportation logistics for the sub-region. USAID would make available the work done on energy resource sharing in the sub-region. [67]
The ICCs transnational initiative on the emerging east began in 1997 and is now gathering momentum with several countries showing interest in the idea. Canada has also expressed its interest in sharing their experiences of regional economic co-operation.
The steering committee of the GGBMI met at Kathmandu and earlier this year at New Delhi to give shape to the project and push ahead with the idea. Convinced that sub-regional co-operation, with SAARC and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) in place, would lead to a win-win situation for all the member-countries involved, the Delhi meeting zeroed in on the following benefits of such an initiative:
Ø Increase in market size and scale of economies;
Ø Reduction of non-tariff barriers;
Ø Improvement of physical and institutional linkages; and
Ø Improvement of access to raw materials and natural resources. [68]
All the 18 key people who attended the Delhi meeting (steering committee members and special invitees like representatives from the ADB) were convinced that the initiative would succeed only if the political mindset in each country could be influenced about the benefits of such sub-regional co-operation. The convenors of the member countries in India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are to meet the political leadership in their respective countries on the issue.
The ICC is the co-ordinating body for the GGBMI and the nodal body for India. In Bangladesh, it is the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In Nepal, the nodal body is the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry will co-ordinate the initiative in Bhutan.
The ADBs role would be that of, what the Bank calls, an honest broker. It would carry out master-plan and feasibility studies, finance projects and mobilise co-finance and investments once the project is put in place.
During a recent presentation on the GGBMI, ADB officials
cited some examples of existing 'growth triangles' including the Greater
Mekong sub-region; Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore; Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand;
Southern China-Hong Kong-Taiwan and Central Asian Republics.
[69]
The migration of people from one place to another may be a natural phenomenon and a common human experience. As an instance, one may point to the current browning of America where, originally, between 1846 and 1930, an estimated 50 million people from Europe went and settled. In South Asia, an estimated 25 million people are believed to have been involved in the processes of mass population movements during the last 50 years. But, when a sizeable group of people migrate in waves to a particular area, the host region gets hit, both politically and economically. Indias Northeast is a victim of this cross-border human traffic. This has led to indigenous people taking up arms and seeking to secede from India as in Tripura. In Assam, xenophobia has gripped the people, with some sections casting doubt on the nationality of even bona fide citizens belonging to the religious and linguistic minority communities.
Clearly, the issue of migration (popularly referred to in the region as the issue of infiltration from Bangladesh) has become a major political-economic issue, not only in the Northeast of India but in the country as a whole. For instance, Bangladeshi migrants living in New Delhi clashed with the police over the arrest of a man belonging to the community in June this year. This was enough to propel the issue of the Bangladeshi influx into India into the national limelight with enormous media coverage. The issue has not only come to dominate local politics in the region, it has also drawn the attention of the central government. For instance, a report of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, while noting the change in the demographic composition of the areas bordering Bangladesh, has made the following observation: The large-scale influx of illegal Bangladesh immigrants has led to large tracts of sensitive international borders being occupied by foreigners. This has serious implications for internal security. [70] The seriousness with which the Indian Government views the problem of infiltration is indicated by its decision to fence the entire 4,096 kilometre stretch of the Indo-Bangladesh border spread over five States at a cost of Rs 1,334 crore. [71]
The issue of migration into Northeast India cannot be brushed aside as an uncalled for fear on the part of the regions indigenous population. There is a combination of factors on both sides which are responsible for the continuing influx of illegal migrants, one of which is the steep and continuous increase in Bangladesh's population and a sharp-deterioration in the countrys land-man ratio. The pull factors on the Indian side include ethnic proximity and kinship, enabling easy shelter for immigrants; a porous border with Bangladesh; better economic opportunities (Dhaka's denials notwithstanding); and interested religious and political elements encouraging immigration.
Of late, it is being increasingly felt that market linkages and hassle-free trade and business activity in the sub-region of eastern India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal could greatly boost the economy of the area. If this happens, it is felt that the migration of people for economic reasons would come to a halt or reduce considerably. But, for any such sub-regional initiative to reach its logical end, the mindset of the political leadership in the countries in the region will have to change. Mutual hatred has been among the hallmarks of politics in the Indian sub-continent. Under the circumstances, it would require a sustained drive by the key players of this sub-regional link-up plan to achieve their goal. Until then, migration and its resultant politics will continue to dominate events in Indias Northeast.
* Wasbir Hussain is Editor of The Northeast Daily, Guwahati. He has been covering insurgency, ethnic strife, and other major political and social developments in the seven north eastern Indian states for the past 15 years. Before his present assignment, Hussain was Special Correspondent with The Asian Age; Regional Editor of The Telegraph; and Special Correspondent of The Telegraph. He bagged the 1996 Sanskriti Foundation National Award for excellence in journalism. He also writes in The Hindu on issues concerning the Northeast.
[1] Located at: Longitude 89.460 E to 97.300 E and Latitude 21.570 N to 29.300 N.
[2] Census of India, 1991.
[3] See Annexure-I in Memorandum Submitted by the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS) to Union Home Minister LK Advani, March 27, 2000. The Memorandum was signed by Shyama Charan Tripura, Chairman, Advisory Committee of the TUJS.
[4] During the six-year period of the agitation, bandhs and roadblocks were organised intermittently.
[5] Monirul Hussain, The Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity, New Delhi: Manak Publications, 1993, p. 10.
[6] Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 44.
[7] Hussain, The Assam Movement, p. 41.
[8] Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian Tea Industry, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 96.
[9] Kinsley Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, Cited in Hussain, The Assam Movement, p. 43.
[10] Edward Gait, A History of Assam (1905), Calcutta: Thacker, Spinck and Co., 1933, p. 414.
[11] Hussain, The Assam Movement, pp. 41-42.
[12] Baruah, India Against Itself, p. 67.
[13] Susanta K. Das, Spotlight on Assam, cited in Baruah , India Against Itself , p. 50.
[14] Hussain, The Assam Movement, p. 60.
[15] The Conference of the Chief Electoral Officers of States was held on September 24, 1978, in Ootacamund, Tamil Nadu.
[16] Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist, New Delhi: Viking-Penguin, 1994, p. 138.
[17] Muslims are a religious minority in Assam and constitute nearly a third of the States 22 million-population, while Bengalis are regarded as the chief linguistic minority.
[18] Baruah, India Against Itself, p. 118.
[19] For a full text of the Assam Accord, see:
www.satp.org/India/Documents/Assam_Accord,%201985.htm#Assam_Accord
[20] See Governor of Assam, Report on Illegal Migration Into Assam, submitted to the President of India by the Governor, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S. K. Sinha, November 1998, p. 6. The Report can also be accessed at
http://www.satp.org/India/Documents/Assam_Illegal%20Migration%20into%20Assam.htm
[21] Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, Eastern Pakistan: Its Population and Economics, cited in Report on Illegal Migration Into Assam, p. 6.
[22] Report on Illegal Migration into Assam, pp. 17-18.
[23]
Ministry of Home Affairs, North-East Division,
Supplementary Status Report
on Illegal Immigration of Bangladeshi Nationals, New Delhi:
Government of India, n.d.
[24] Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist, p. 32.
[25] The National Register of Citizens is a contemporaneous register prepared by the officers appointed under the provisions of the Census Act in the course of census operations.
[26] Northeast Daily, Guwahati, April 12, 2000
[27] The groups and or individuals who have expressed their disagreements include the United Minorities Front, All Bodo Students Union, Autonomous State Demand Committee and Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha) representing Kokrajhar, S. K. Bwiswmuthiary.
[28] Northeast Daily, April 17, 2000.
[29] The Lower House of the Indian Parliament
[30] See the text of the Assam Accord:
www.satp.org/ India/Documents/Assam_Accord,%201985.htm#Assam_Accord
[31] Bodo Leader U.G. Brahma and Karbi Leader Holiram Terang, quoted in Northeast Daily, April 17, 2000.
[32] UMF leader Hafiz Rashid Choudhury, quoted in Northeast Daily, April 17, 2000.
[33] See M. V. Kamath, Neglected Assam, Illustrated Weekly, Bombay, January 20-26, 1980.
[34] Northeast Daily, May 10 and May 25, 2000.
[35] B.G.Verghese, Indias Northeast Resurgent, New Delhi: Konark, 1997, p. 166.
[36] S. R. Bhattacharjea, Tribal Insurgency in Tripura, cited in Verghese, Indias Northeast Resurgent, p. 167.
[37] Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996, p.67.
[38] Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist, p. 123.
[39] Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India, p. 197.
[40] Verghese, Indias Northeast Resurgent, p. 179.
[41]
Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 1995,
p.78.
[42] Tripura Home Ministers reply in the State Assembly to a question by an opposition leader on February 14, 2000.
[43] See Memorandum Submitted by the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity.
[44] Government of Arunachal Pradesh, White Paper on Chakma & Hajong Refugee Issue, Itaganagar, 1996.
[45] Ibid..
[46] Verghese, Indias Northeast Resurgent, pp. 225-26.
[47] White Paper on Chakma and Hajong Refugee Issue.
[48] The resentment was expressed by the protagonists of the anti-refugee stir like the All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union which served Quit Arunachal notices to the Chakmas and Hajongs and graffiti appearing on the walls in different parts of the state. For more details see Verghese, pp. 226-27.
[49] White Paper on Chakma and Hajong Refugee Issue.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Interview with the author, Dhaka June 2000. Also see North East Daily, June 16, 2000.
[52] Holiday, Dhaka, October 18, 1991.
[53] These were impressions gathered during the author's visit to Dhaka in June 2000.
[54] Interview with the author, Dhaka, June 2000. Also see North East Daily, June 16, 2000.
[55] Muhanmmad Yunus is known for having revolutionised banking in Bangladesh, a country of 130 million people, by advancing micro-credit to poor villagers without any collateral. His Grameen Bank model has come to be used in countries as diverse as China, United States, Kenya, Malaysia, the Phillipines, Togo, Tanzania and South Africa among others.
[56] Interview with the author at Dhaka, June 2000. Also see North East Daily, June 16, 2000.
[57] Interview with the author at Dhaka, June 2000. Also see North East Daily, June 16, 2000.
[58] Prof. Amena Mohsin teaches international relations at Dhaka University.
[59] Interview with the author at Dhaka, June 2000. Also see North East Daily, June 16, 2000.
[60] See the chapter State of the Bangladesh Economy, 1999: An overview, in A Review of Bangladeshs Development 1998-99, Dhaka: University Press, 2000, p. 1. Centre for Policy Dialogue is a non-government initiative to promote an ongoing process of dialogue between the principal partners in the decision making and implementing process.
[61] Ibid., p. 4.
[62] Ibid., pp. 8-9. The population of the country is around 130 million.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna are among the major rivers of the sub-continent. These rivers can be linked as a water-superway.
[65] The initiative began in October 1997 and took shape a year later, in November 1998. Document supplied by the Indian Chamber of Commerce (henceforth ICC).
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Presentation by the Asian Development Bank at the meeting.
[69] Northeast Daily, June 28, 2000.
[70] Disclosed to the Author by official sources.
[71] Northeast Daily, May 24, 2000.
|