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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 15, October 28, 2002

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal




STATISTICAL REVIEW

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Mizoram from 1996 to October 2002

 
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
Terrorists
Total
1996
0
4
0
4
1997
0
0
0
0
1998
0
0
0
0
1999
2
5
0
7
2000
4
7
1
12
2001
0
0
0
0
2002*
0
0
0
0
Total
6
16
1
23

* Data till October 27
   Computed from official sources and English language media.

Fatalities Inflicted by National Democratic Front of Bodoland in Assam from January 1992 -- October 2002

  
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
Total
1992
37
10
47
1993
25
6
31
1994
108
22
130
1995
132
16
148
1996
176
25
201
1997
137
25
162
1998
305
22
327
1999
113
14
127
2000
95
20
115
2001
134
7
141
2002*
79
10
89
Total
1341
177
1518

*  Data till October 27
   Computed from official sources and English language media.


ASSESSMENT

INDIA


J&K: Forward to the Past?
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management

Three weeks of negotiation, after the declaration of the fractured mandate in the State Assembly elections in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), have finally yielded a Chief Minister designate - ironically the leader not of the first or second, but the third largest Party in the new Assembly. People's Democratic Party (PDP) leader Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's 'victory' over Ghulam Nabi Azad, who was projected as the Indian National Congress' (INC) Chief Ministerial candidate, came after at least a measure of the popular goodwill secured by the Alliance had been eroded in what was seen as a somewhat unashamed scramble for the cakes and loaves of power.

Attempting to predict the future is, of course, an activity fraught with danger, but it is safe to speculate on the basis of the historical record that Sayeed's elevation at the present stage of the conflict in J&K bodes ill for the counter-terrorism effort in the State. Sayeed was Home Minister in the ill-fated V.P. Singh regime that came to power at Delhi in December 1989, and, to those unfamiliar with the facts, such experience may suggest strong qualification to deal with the problems that plague J&K. The truth, however, is that as Home Minister, Sayeed was an unmitigated disaster. On December 11, 1989, barely five days after he was sworn in, Sayeed's daughter - Rubaiya Sayeed - was abducted by what was at that time an inchoate and insignificant separatist group in Kashmir. Even as intelligence agencies were negotiating the release of the hostage, the Centre unconditionally conceded all the terrorists' demands, and with this single act of abject capitulation all of Kashmir simply exploded into a full-blown insurgency within days. The Rubaiya Sayeed incident - and the then Central government's response to this crisis - is now widely acknowledged as the central event that triggered the terrorism in J&K that is now in its thirteenth year, and has already cost at least 33,159 lives in the State.

The Rubaiya Sayeed incident sent out an unmistakable message to extremists all over the country: the new Government - and evidently its Home Minister - had neither the will nor the understanding to define and implement a cogent and resolute policy against terrorist violence. The impact was pervasive, as the case of Punjab - at that time afflicted by India's bloodiest terrorist movement - illustrates. When the V.P. Singh regime took over, the Sikh fundamentalist terrorist movement in the province of Punjab had been pushed inexorably into a corner, with over 76 per cent of all incidents contained within four police districts of the State (out of a total of 15 police districts), along the border with Pakistan. Indeed, even within these districts, the terrorists' sway was limited, with just 13 police stations (out of 217 police stations in the State) accounting for nearly 65 per cent of all terrorist crime. The V.P. Singh government implemented a policy of conciliation and appeasement encapsulated in a phrase the then Prime Minister was inordinately fond of using: 'healing hearts'. It was assumed that, with a few sympathetic, sentimental gestures, the terrorist movement - at that time in its tenth year in Punjab - would simply 'wither away'. Instead, the years 1990-1991 proved to be the bloodiest in the entire course of the terrorist movement in the State [Fatalities: 1990 - 4263; 1991 - 5265; as against 1988 - 2432; 1989 - 2072] as terrorists coordinated their activities with increasingly powerful and disruptive overground political movements. By the end of the brief V.P. Singh regime, only four of the 15 police districts in Punjab registered a monthly average of civilian casualties below 10, and terrorist violence engulfed virtually the entire State.

The evidence of the PDP's election campaign, and Sayeed's innumerable statements before and since his designation as Chief Minister of J&K, suggest that there has been no evolution of a counter-terrorism perspective, or any understanding of the nature of the Pakistan backed movements in J&K among the leadership of this political formation. The dominant 'response' is still framed within platitudes about 'winning the hearts and minds' of 'the people'. Sayeed has repeatedly underscored his hostility to the ongoing anti-terrorist operations in the State. He has declared that the only anti-terrorism law currently available in the country, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002, would not be applied in J&K. This is crucial, particularly in view of the disastrous record of convictions through normal judicial processes. In the thirteen years of terrorism in J&K, there have been exactly 13 convictions for terrorist offences; eight of these have been on relatively minor offences relating to illegal border crossing and illegal possession of arms; only five relate to a single case in which murder was on the chargesheet; not a single terrorist faces the death sentence; and this is in a State where nearly 12,000 civilians have been killed by terrorists. The judicial process operates a virtual turnstile system, under which arrested terrorists are easily and repeatedly enlarged on bail, and it is POTA alone that has some provisions - under strict monitoring clauses - for the preventive detention of terrorists for a reasonable period of time. Sayeed has also promised the disbanding of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the J&K Police, though this has now been diluted - through negotiations with the PDP's alliance partner, the Congress-I, to a merger of the SOG with the regular cadre of the J&K Police. Sayeed has also declared that terrorists in custody for 'minor crimes' would be released, and that a 'political process' involving negotiations with all extremist formations in J&K would be initiated. Much, if not most, of Sayeed's rhetoric on terrorism in the State has been directed against the Security Forces and the counter-terrorism campaign, and it is evident that, as Chief Minister, he will seek to dilute and undermine these operations, and to appease volatile and extremist groupings in the mistaken belief that he can bribe or seduce the terrorist movement out of existence.

In some measure, the greatest of Sayeed's intended excesses may be constrained by the imperatives of coalition politics and the sobering effect of the INC and of other supporting parties. There are, however, grave dangers here as well. In the first instance, the record of the Congress Party has not been particularly consistent on terrorism, and it is likely that, as the party consolidates its position at the national level, it will consider it expedient to project a posture that rejects the option of hard action against terrorists. This is already evident in the actions of an irresolute Congress regime confronting a range of terrorist movements in Assam.

More significantly, there are now dangers of the emergence of a new and extra-Constitutional 'Centre', with Sonia Gandhi's Congress now controlling a majority of State regimes in the country, either directly or through coalitions. This raises the dangers of power without responsibility, and in the absence of extraordinary sagacity - a virtue that has not been in great evidence in any section of India's political leadership - partisan considerations and political brinkmanship will tend to undermine any surviving possibilities of a coherent counter-terrorism perspective and strategy. The three-year term that has been awarded to Sayeed under the 'rotation' scheme means, moreover, that the scope of effective political action would be no more than two years - a time-frame that may have been sufficient for a political dispensation with a clear mandate to crush terrorism, but hardly enough for one that vests its entire faith in an inchoate philosophy of winning hearts and minds, and ignores the realities of the sub-conventional war that is being executed by Pakistan in the province of J&K. Sayeed's pronouncements and the Common Minimum Programme of the PDP-Congress alliance also reflect a significant measure of Kashmiri parochialism, and incline to a neglect of the Jammu and Ladakh regions, proclivities that will deepen divisions and perceptions of a regime that seeks to appease only the most radicalised elements of the population.

The sentimentality of Sayeed's perspectives on terrorism is not new, and this is a position that is common virtually across the board in populist Indian politics. It has, moreover, been repeatedly translated into a state policy of vacillation and drift in various theatres of terrorism and mass political violence with consistently disastrous results. In Punjab, for instance, after the Rajiv-Longowal Accord and the subsequent assassination of Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali government headed by S.S. Barnala that came to power after the elections of September 1985, pursued precisely such a policy of appeasement, and among its first acts was the release of over 2,000 extremists at that time under detention. The impact on terrorist violence was palpable and immediate, and the Barnala regime collapsed in the chaos of its own creation within a little over 19 months. Clearly, despite Sayeed's air of ingenuity when he articulates his platitudes, he is, in effect, re-inventing the wheel, and it is only a question of time before the imperatives of governance and the maintenance of order reassert themselves. In the interim, however, the body count can be expected to escalate.

Clarity, consistency and continuity are vital in any successful counter-terrorism strategy. While a measure of continuity can be expected in J&K, since the primary tasks of engaging the terrorists in the field are entrusted to Central Forces, there are vast areas of intervention that fall into the purview of the State Government. Moreover, a recalcitrant State Government can create virtually insurmountable hurdles to an effective counter-terrorism campaign. While political initiatives, developmental programmes and 'good governance' (a much touted phrase which has found little correspondence in the reality of Indian politics) are immensely important, the dilution of the counter-terrorism thrust in J&K will result in the reversal of very significant gains that have been made, particularly over the past year.

Regrettably, it appears that India will have to relearn a lesson that it should already have learned extraordinarily well by now: you cannot negotiate with terror on your knees. It is not clear whether Chief Minister designate Mufti Mohammad Sayeed has the courage to get off his.

 

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Assam: Bloodshed in 'Bodoland'
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

On October 27, 2002, twenty-two impoverished migrant workers were roused from their sleep in the early hours of the morning, marched out of their hutments with their hands tied behind their backs, and shot in cold blood; another fifteen were injured in the brutal attack by the cadres of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) on a small sleepy village in Western Assam's Kokrajhar district along the Indo-Bhutan border. The insurgents then ambushed a police party, which was rushed to the site of the massacre, after being informed of the incident by the insurgents themselves.

The attack came only days after Guwahati-based newspapers ran reports on the speech of the NDFB President Ranjan Daimary's "willingness to resolve the issue of occupation and oppression of Bodoland by India" on October 26, 2002. Addressing the 16th foundation day of the terrorist group, the 42-year old Daimary, who prefers to be known by his pseudonym, D.R. Nabla, however, maintained that before any such decision, the organisation would 'deliberate over the past experiences' of the Bodo people. A month and half earlier, on September 11, in an interview with a vernacular daily from Guwahati, Nabla had stated that the success of Bodo and Naga peace talks would encourage other insurgent outfits in the Northeast to come forward for negotiations. Any flicker of hope of peace arising out of such statements has now been extinguished.

The NDFB (formerly known as the Bodo Security Force) has, since it inception in 1988, remained steadfastly opposed to any negotiated settlement of its demands. Its declared objective is the 'liberation of Bodoland from Indian expansionism and occupation', and the NDFB pursues a strategy of 'armed struggle that can ensure the freedom of the people'. The latest attack was the fourth major strike against civilians by NDFB this year:

  • On January 15, 2002, 13 persons were killed by the NDFB cadres near Bijni in Bongaigaon district.
  • On January 21, 2002, 18 people were killed in a village under Udalguri police station in Darrang district.
  • On July 14, 2002, NDFB insurgents massacred nine Adivasis (tribals) and injured five others at the West Maligaon forest village relief camps, Kokrajhar district.

These attacks are to be viewed within the context of an ongoing turf war between the NDFB and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). The BLT has, since 2000, been involved in a process of negotiations with the Union government. For all practical purposes, BLT has dismantled its insurgency infrastructure and is closer to finalising terms for the establishment of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), an autonomous governing body with administrative powers over a significant area in the Bodo heartland in Assam. It is these developments that appear to have driven the NDFB into a state of exasperation, since its avowed aim of creating an independent Bodoland, struggle is nowhere in sight after 16 years of 'armed struggle'. It is the desire to be accepted as the dominant voice in Bodo areas that has provoked repeated massacres of Bihari and other non-Bodo communities.

The NDFB appears to be benefiting from the near-exclusive focus on the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) of counter-insurgency operations in the State. Ironically, the NDFB's attacks on civilians over the last year have far exceeded the ULFA's depredations. Between May 2001 and September 2002, the NDFB had killed 167 civilians and 17 security force (SF) personnel. In the same time span, ULFA accounted for 66 civilians and 36 SF fatalities.

Incidentally the location of a preponderance of these attacks is within striking distance of the Indo-Bhutan border, and the NDFB's camps in Bhutan remain the prime factor behind the success of the group's hit-and-run operations. There is an urgent need to strip the NDFB of this a tactical advantage. It improbably that Assam's 265 kilometre international boundary with Bhutan will ever be effectively sealed, and pro-active cooperation with the Royal Kingdom is indispensable if the situation is to be brought under control. It can only be hoped that the latest terrorist outrage will shake Indian policymakers from their slumber, and encourage them to persuade Bhutan against allowing groups such as NDFB and ULFA to operate from its territory. It is now imperative that camps of all the insurgent organisations operating out of Bhutan be dismantled quickly.

The impact of the latest incident on trends of violence in the region would largely depend on the state's responses. If the attack in any way affects or undermines the talks with the Bodo organisations over the proposed BTC, this would tend to buoy up the insurgency. There are, consequently, real dangers that the current phase of negotiations with the BLT and also with factions of the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) and the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) could also begin to unravel. The result could be the withdrawal of tactical over-ground organisations connected with these militant from groups from the negotiation process and cooperation with the security forces.

The message, which the NDFB tries to convey and which must be clearly understood, is terror. The latest attack makes it clear yet again that even after the successful culmination of the negotiations with the BLT, peace will remain elusive in the Bodo-inhabited areas of Assam. Under no circumstances must the NDFB's terror be rewarded by greater prominence or a preferred place on the negotiating table. While talks with the BLT must continue, and terms of for the formalisation of the promised BTC be finalised, the NDFB must receive an unambiguous message that the language of escalating violence cannot be a precursor to a dialogue for peace.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Mizoram: Negotiating with Terror, Yet Again
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi & Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

The clock has turned full circle in the Northeast Indian state of Mizoram, along India's border with Bangladesh and Myanmar. On the map, the State looks like the hood of the cobra, and it is ruled by the Mizo National Front (MNF) government headed by former guerrilla chieftain Zoramthanga. The MNF government has been engaged in intensive peace negotiations with the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), a militant group that threatens the 16 year long peace in the State with a violent campaign for the redressal of ethnic grievances and a demand for greater autonomy.

But the latest round of talks on October 17 hit a wall when the Mizoram government negotiators told the BNLF leaders that they could not concede the group's key demand of a Bru Area Development Council, while vaguely promising to work for the uplift of the minority ethnic group. This has pushed the BNLF - a moderate Bru faction until now - into a corner, increasing the possibility of hardliners belonging to the breakaway Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM) hijacking the Bru movement for 'self-determination'.

The Brus, also known to the world as the Reangs, began a political movement headed by the Bru National Union in September 1997. In the same year, another Bru group called the Reang Democratic Convention Party (RDCP), pushed through a resolution demanding the creation, under the Sixth Schedule of India's Constitution, of a separate Autonomous District Council for the Brus. The majority Mizo community was extremely wary of these developments, seeing in them a possible move towards the dismemberment of Mizoram. There was a rather harsh and immediate backlash, with the Brus (Reangs) at the receiving end. Thousands fled to the adjoining State of Tripura, arriving in the northern sub-divisional town of Kanchanpur, while others sought sanctuary in southern Assam's Hailakandi district. Around this time, Bru miscreants killed a Mizo forester, escalating the tension. The Brus accused the State's apex student group, the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) of attacking the community with the help of the Mizoram Police. What began as a Bru sub-national movement turned into a communal conflagration between the Brus and the Mizos.

The Brus or Reangs are said to have entered Mizoram around 1954 from the Maian hills in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). In 1961, there were only around 1,000 Reangs in Mizoram. Their population rose to 9,829 in 1971. The 1991 Census put the number of Reangs in the state at 31,921, a figure disputed by the community. They claim the number of Reangs in Mizoram is much higher. Mizo leaders insist that the Reangs, who had generally been nomads, are animists and not Hindus as claimed by the latter and by groups like the Rashtriya Swyayamsewak Sangh (RSS). The RSS took up the Reangs' cause during the Mizo-Bru clashes in 1997 and had written an open letter to the state's Congress Chief Minister of the time Lal Thanhawla.

The Brus' armed uprising actually gained momentum with the BNLF giving shape to its agenda in 1999 at Bru refugee camps in Tripura. On June 30, 2000, the BNLF carried out its biggest ever strike, killing seven Mizoram Police personnel. The number of Brus who had actually fled Mizoram is also a matter of bitter dispute today. While the Mizoram government says not more than 11,000 Brus had fled the state in 1997, the Bru groups as well as the Tripura government insists that at least 31,000 Brus are currently in the refugee camps, awaiting repatriation to Mizoram.

Why are the Mizos, or for that matter the Mizoram government (the Congress government earlier and the MNF regime now) so opposed to the Brus' agitation? The argument put forward by government leaders is that the Brus do not live in any compact area in Mizoram, and, therefore, granting them any politico-administrative structure is out of question. The Brus are scattered in the districts of Mamit, Kolasib, Lunglei and Langtlai, bordering north Tripura and Bangladesh. Secondly, the State already has other autonomous structures like the Chakma Autonomous District Council and another such Council for the Pawi and Lakher communities. Leaders like Lal Thanhawla point out that the Chakma Autonomous Council was created in 1972 by New Delhi without consulting or taking the Mizo leaders into confidence, implying that had the Mizo leaders been consulted by the federal authorities then, they may have opposed even the creation of the Chakma Autonomous District Council. Thirdly - a bitter fact that none would like to highlight - the Brus may or may not be Hindus, but they are not Christians, who comprise more than 85 per cent of Mizorams 891,000 population. Mizo leaders, however, argue that the issue took a communal turn only because groups like the RSS got involved.

Mainstream political formations, cutting across party lines, as well as powerful student outfits like the MZP, are opposed to granting any autonomy to the Brus on ethnic lines. This mood was reflected during the seventh round of talks with the BNLF on October 17 (the talks began in September 2001) where Mizoram Chief Secretary H.V.Lalringa, who headed the state government delegation, is said to have told the BNLF that its demand for a Development Council cannot be conceded. The officials, however, said that a Rs. 200 million proposal has been placed before the federal authorities in New Delhi for repatriation of the Brus from Tripura and their re-settlement in Mizoram.

The outright rejection of the BNLF's Development Council demand has reduced the group's bargaining power with the community. This demand was itself a climb-down from the BNLF's original demand for an Autonomous District Council under the Constitution's Sixth Schedule, and the State government was expected to treat the moderates and to approach the issue with greater sensitivity. This was particularly necessary because of the emergence of a hardline group called the Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram. Significantly, Mizoram Police officials deny knowledge of the existence of the BLFM.

The break down of talks opens up two possibilities: the BNLF could itself resume its armed struggle; or the recalcitrant BLFM could step up its violence in a bid to assume centre stage. If available reports are to be believed, the BLFM has a hideout in Bangladesh's CHT and is also operating along the Tripura-Mizoram border.

The heightening of violence would be particularly tragic in Mizoram, which suffered immensely under the grip of an armed uprising by the MNF for 20 years, beginning 1966. This protracted insurgency ended in 1986 with the signing of the Mizo Accord by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Leaders of the underground MNF laid down arms and contested elections, as the ruling Congress government resigned to make way for a fresh political process. The legendary MNF leader Laldenga became Chief Minister. Today, Laldenga's deputy in the insurgent group, Zoramthanga, is the state's Chief Minister. His biggest challenge now is to ensure that the prevailing calm (there has been no violence since the BNLF entered into talks in September last year) is not shattered.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in South Asia
October 21-27, 2002

 
Security Force Personnel
Civilian
Terrorist
Total
INDIA
8
56
30
94
Assam
0
26
3
29
Tripura
0
10
0
10
Jammu & Kashmir
7
12
22
41
Meghalaya
1
0
0
1
Bihar
0
4
2
6
Left-wing Extremism
0
4
3
7
PAKISTAN
0
1
1
2
NEPAL
0
2
70
72
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

New law for speedy trial of six major offences: Bangladesh President Iajuddin Ahmed, on October 24, promulgated an Ordinance titled "Special Tribunal for Speedy Trial Ordinance". The ordinance would ensure speedy trial in six major offences - possession of illegal arms, narcotics and explosives, murder, rape and hoarding. The Daily Star, October 25, 2002.


INDIA

NDFB terrorists massacre 22 civilians in Assam: National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) terrorists massacred 22 civilians in Assam's Kokrajhar district, on October 27. A group of approximately two dozen terrorists came to Dadgiri village and dragged the sleeping residents, mostly immigrant labourers, from their houses and shot at them indiscriminately with their automatic weapons. While 22 succumbed to bullet injuries on the spot, 16 more were injured. Security forces also believe that the terrorists had come to the district from their Bhutan base camps. The Hindu, October 28, 2002.

Mufti Mohammed Sayeed to lead coalition government in J&K: The People's Democratic Party (PDP) leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and the Congress President Sonia Gandhi reached a power sharing agreement in New Delhi, on October 26-night. According to the agreement, Mufti Sayeed would head the coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), on a rotational basis for the first three years. Thereafter, the Chief Ministership will go to the Congress for the remaining three years. Both the parties have also agreed to a Common Minimum Programme (CMP).
In the 87-member State Legislative Assembly the Congress has 20 members and the PDP has 16. The Hindu, October 27, 2002

Suspected ATTF terrorists kill eight civilians in West Tripura: Suspected All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) terrorists killed eight persons including, three women and a child, and injured nine others in Battila, West Tripura district, on October 26. Assam Sentinel, October 27, 2002.

Six persons killed in clash between CPI-ML, Ranvir Sena in Bihar: Four supporters of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI-ML (Liberation)] and two activists of the Ranvir Sena, a private army of landowners, were killed in a clash between the two groups in Kurmuri village under the Sikarhata police station limits, Bhojpur district on October 24-25. The Hindu October 26, 2002.


NEPAL

Maoists leader Prachanda calls for negotiations:
A Press Statement issued by Puspa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, leader of the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), generally referred to as Maoist insurgents, called for a dialogue among the Maoist insurgents, political parties, the King and the intelligentsia of Nepal to prevent what he called the frittering away of the gains of the '1990-pro-democracy movement'. He warned that the insurgents would continue with their campaign of violence if such a dialogue, which he said was the 'appropriate forum to deliberate on a new Constituent Assembly', was not called for. Kathmandu Post, October 26, 2002.


PAKISTAN

New National Assembly to be convened in November first week: The Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs spokesman, on October 25, said that the first session of the newly elected National Assembly (NA) would be convened in the first week of November, 2002. Elections to various federal posts also might be held between November 5 and 7. While the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker would be elected on November 5, election for the post of Prime Minister might be held on November 7. Jang, October 26, 2002

Federal Law Minister outlines process of elections to the post of Speaker, PM: Federal Law Minister Dr Khalid Ranjha said, on October 25 that a secret ballot within two months of the oath of the Prime Minister (PM) would be held to decide if the PM has the confidence of the House. Run-off polls would be held if no one was elected for the post, he also said. The National Assembly Speaker and Deputy Speaker would be elected through secret ballot, prior to the election of the PM. Dawn, October 26, 2002


SRI LANKA

Agenda, government team for second round of peace talks with LTTE announced: The second round of government-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) peace talks due to begin on October 31, in Thailand, would focus on three issues - forming the Joint Task Force (JTF), resettlement of displaced persons and strengthening the implementation of the ongoing 'permanent cease-fire'. The talks would be held at Nakompathon, 40 kilometres away from the Thai capital, Bangkok. Cabinet spokesperson and government negotiating team leader G.L. Peiris disclosed the broad agenda of the second round, and added Major General Shantha Kottegoda would be among the three advisors to the government team at the talks. The LTTE has already announced that 'political-wing chief' Thamiselvam and Amparai-Batticaloa 'special commander', Karuna, would be the additional members of its delegation. Daily News, October 26, 2002; Tamil Net, October 24, 2002.

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that will bring you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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