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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 15, October 28, 2002
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
|
|
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence
in Mizoram from 1996 to October 2002
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists
|
Total
|
1996 |
0
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
1997 |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1998 |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1999 |
2
|
5
|
0
|
7
|
2000 |
4
|
7
|
1
|
12
|
2001 |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2002* |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Total |
6
|
16
|
1
|
23
|
* Data till
October 27
Computed
from official sources and English language media.
Fatalities
Inflicted by National Democratic Front of Bodoland in
Assam from January 1992 -- October 2002
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Total
|
1992 |
37
|
10
|
47
|
1993 |
25
|
6
|
31
|
1994 |
108
|
22
|
130
|
1995 |
132
|
16
|
148
|
1996 |
176
|
25
|
201
|
1997 |
137
|
25
|
162
|
1998 |
305
|
22
|
327
|
1999 |
113
|
14
|
127
|
2000 |
95
|
20
|
115
|
2001 |
134
|
7
|
141
|
2002* |
79
|
10
|
89
|
Total |
1341
|
177
|
1518
|
* Data till
October 27
Computed
from official sources and English language media.
|
J&K: Forward to the Past?
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management
Three weeks
of negotiation, after the declaration of the fractured mandate
in the State Assembly elections in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K),
have finally yielded a Chief Minister designate - ironically
the leader not of the first or second, but the third largest
Party in the new Assembly. People's Democratic Party (PDP)
leader Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's 'victory' over Ghulam Nabi
Azad, who was projected as the Indian National Congress' (INC)
Chief Ministerial candidate, came after at least a measure
of the popular goodwill secured by the Alliance had been eroded
in what was seen as a somewhat unashamed scramble for the
cakes and loaves of power.
Attempting to predict the future is, of course, an activity
fraught with danger, but it is safe to speculate on the basis
of the historical record that Sayeed's elevation at the present
stage of the conflict in J&K bodes ill for the counter-terrorism
effort in the State. Sayeed was Home Minister in the ill-fated
V.P. Singh regime that came to power at Delhi in December
1989, and, to those unfamiliar with the facts, such experience
may suggest strong qualification to deal with the problems
that plague J&K. The truth, however, is that as Home Minister,
Sayeed was an unmitigated disaster. On December 11, 1989,
barely five days after he was sworn in, Sayeed's daughter
- Rubaiya Sayeed - was abducted by what was at that time an
inchoate and insignificant separatist group in Kashmir. Even
as intelligence agencies were negotiating the release of the
hostage, the Centre unconditionally conceded all the terrorists'
demands, and with this single act of abject capitulation all
of Kashmir simply exploded into a full-blown insurgency within
days. The Rubaiya Sayeed incident - and the then Central government's
response to this crisis - is now widely acknowledged as the
central event that triggered the terrorism in J&K that is
now in its thirteenth year, and has already cost at least
33,159 lives in the State.
The Rubaiya Sayeed incident sent out an unmistakable message
to extremists all over the country: the new Government - and
evidently its Home Minister - had neither the will nor the
understanding to define and implement a cogent and resolute
policy against terrorist violence. The impact was pervasive,
as the case of Punjab - at that time afflicted by India's
bloodiest terrorist movement - illustrates. When the V.P.
Singh regime took over, the Sikh fundamentalist terrorist
movement in the province of Punjab had been pushed inexorably
into a corner, with over 76 per cent of all incidents contained
within four police districts of the State (out of a total
of 15 police districts), along the border with Pakistan. Indeed,
even within these districts, the terrorists' sway was limited,
with just 13 police stations (out of 217 police stations in
the State) accounting for nearly 65 per cent of all terrorist
crime. The V.P. Singh government implemented a policy of conciliation
and appeasement encapsulated in a phrase the then Prime Minister
was inordinately fond of using: 'healing hearts'. It was assumed
that, with a few sympathetic, sentimental gestures, the terrorist
movement - at that time in its tenth year in Punjab - would
simply 'wither away'. Instead, the years 1990-1991 proved
to be the bloodiest in the entire course of the terrorist
movement in the State [Fatalities:
1990 - 4263; 1991 - 5265; as against 1988 - 2432; 1989 - 2072]
as terrorists coordinated their activities with increasingly
powerful and disruptive overground political movements. By
the end of the brief V.P. Singh regime, only four of the 15
police districts in Punjab registered a monthly average of
civilian casualties below 10, and terrorist violence engulfed
virtually the entire State.
The evidence of the PDP's election campaign, and Sayeed's
innumerable statements before and since his designation as
Chief Minister of J&K, suggest that there has been no evolution
of a counter-terrorism perspective, or any understanding of
the nature of the Pakistan backed movements in J&K among the
leadership of this political formation. The dominant 'response'
is still framed within platitudes about 'winning the hearts
and minds' of 'the people'. Sayeed has repeatedly underscored
his hostility to the ongoing anti-terrorist operations in
the State. He has declared that the only anti-terrorism law
currently available in the country, the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (POTA),
2002, would not be applied in J&K. This is crucial, particularly
in view of the disastrous record of convictions through normal
judicial processes. In the thirteen years of terrorism in
J&K, there have been exactly 13 convictions for terrorist
offences; eight of these have been on relatively minor offences
relating to illegal border crossing and illegal possession
of arms; only five relate to a single case in which murder
was on the chargesheet; not a single terrorist faces the death
sentence; and this is in a State where nearly 12,000 civilians
have been killed by terrorists. The judicial process operates
a virtual turnstile system, under which arrested terrorists
are easily and repeatedly enlarged on bail, and it is POTA
alone that has some provisions - under strict monitoring clauses
- for the preventive detention of terrorists for a reasonable
period of time. Sayeed has also promised the disbanding of
the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the J&K Police, though
this has now been diluted - through negotiations with the
PDP's alliance partner, the Congress-I, to a merger of the
SOG with the regular cadre of the J&K Police. Sayeed has also
declared that terrorists in custody for 'minor crimes' would
be released, and that a 'political process' involving negotiations
with all extremist formations in J&K would be initiated. Much,
if not most, of Sayeed's rhetoric on terrorism in the State
has been directed against the Security Forces and the counter-terrorism
campaign, and it is evident that, as Chief Minister, he will
seek to dilute and undermine these operations, and to appease
volatile and extremist groupings in the mistaken belief that
he can bribe or seduce the terrorist movement out of existence.
In some measure, the greatest of Sayeed's intended excesses
may be constrained by the imperatives of coalition politics
and the sobering effect of the INC and of other supporting
parties. There are, however, grave dangers here as well. In
the first instance, the record of the Congress Party has not
been particularly consistent on terrorism, and it is likely
that, as the party consolidates its position at the national
level, it will consider it expedient to project a posture
that rejects the option of hard action against terrorists.
This is already evident in the actions of an irresolute Congress
regime confronting a range of terrorist movements in Assam.
More significantly, there are now dangers of the emergence
of a new and extra-Constitutional 'Centre', with Sonia Gandhi's
Congress now controlling a majority of State regimes in the
country, either directly or through coalitions. This raises
the dangers of power without responsibility, and in the absence
of extraordinary sagacity - a virtue that has not been in
great evidence in any section of India's political leadership
- partisan considerations and political brinkmanship will
tend to undermine any surviving possibilities of a coherent
counter-terrorism perspective and strategy. The three-year
term that has been awarded to Sayeed under the 'rotation'
scheme means, moreover, that the scope of effective political
action would be no more than two years - a time-frame that
may have been sufficient for a political dispensation with
a clear mandate to crush terrorism, but hardly enough for
one that vests its entire faith in an inchoate philosophy
of winning hearts and minds, and ignores the realities of
the sub-conventional war that is being executed by Pakistan
in the province of J&K. Sayeed's pronouncements and the Common
Minimum Programme of the PDP-Congress alliance also reflect
a significant measure of Kashmiri parochialism, and incline
to a neglect of the Jammu and Ladakh regions, proclivities
that will deepen divisions and perceptions of a regime that
seeks to appease only the most radicalised elements of the
population.
The sentimentality of Sayeed's perspectives on terrorism is
not new, and this is a position that is common virtually across
the board in populist Indian politics. It has, moreover, been
repeatedly translated into a state policy of vacillation and
drift in various theatres of terrorism and mass political
violence with consistently disastrous results. In Punjab,
for instance, after the Rajiv-Longowal Accord and the subsequent
assassination of Harchand Singh Longowal, the Akali government
headed by S.S. Barnala that came to power after the elections
of September 1985, pursued precisely such a policy of appeasement,
and among its first acts was the release of over 2,000 extremists
at that time under detention. The impact on terrorist violence
was palpable and immediate, and the Barnala regime collapsed
in the chaos of its own creation within a little over 19 months.
Clearly, despite Sayeed's air of ingenuity when he articulates
his platitudes, he is, in effect, re-inventing the wheel,
and it is only a question of time before the imperatives of
governance and the maintenance of order reassert themselves.
In the interim, however, the body count can be expected to
escalate.
Clarity, consistency and continuity are vital in any successful
counter-terrorism strategy. While a measure of continuity
can be expected in J&K, since the primary tasks of engaging
the terrorists in the field are entrusted to Central Forces,
there are vast areas of intervention that fall into the purview
of the State Government. Moreover, a recalcitrant State Government
can create virtually insurmountable hurdles to an effective
counter-terrorism campaign. While political initiatives, developmental
programmes and 'good governance' (a much touted phrase which
has found little correspondence in the reality of Indian politics)
are immensely important, the dilution of the counter-terrorism
thrust in J&K will result in the reversal of very significant
gains that have been made, particularly over the past year.
Regrettably, it appears that India will have to relearn a
lesson that it should already have learned extraordinarily
well by now: you cannot negotiate with terror on your knees.
It is not clear whether Chief Minister designate Mufti Mohammad
Sayeed has the courage to get off his.
Assam:
Bloodshed in 'Bodoland'
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
On October
27, 2002, twenty-two impoverished migrant workers were roused
from their sleep in the early hours of the morning, marched
out of their hutments with their hands tied behind their
backs, and shot in cold blood; another fifteen were injured
in the brutal attack by the cadres of the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
on a small sleepy village in Western Assam's Kokrajhar district
along the Indo-Bhutan border. The insurgents then ambushed
a police party, which was rushed to the site of the massacre,
after being informed of the incident by the insurgents themselves.
The attack came only days after Guwahati-based newspapers
ran reports on the speech of the NDFB President Ranjan Daimary's
"willingness to resolve the issue of occupation and oppression
of Bodoland by India" on October 26, 2002. Addressing the
16th foundation day of the terrorist group, the 42-year
old Daimary, who prefers to be known by his pseudonym, D.R.
Nabla, however, maintained that before any such decision,
the organisation would 'deliberate over the past experiences'
of the Bodo people. A month and half earlier, on September
11, in an interview with a vernacular daily from Guwahati,
Nabla had stated that the success of Bodo and Naga peace
talks would encourage other insurgent outfits in the Northeast
to come forward for negotiations. Any flicker of hope of
peace arising out of such statements has now been extinguished.
The NDFB (formerly known as the Bodo Security Force) has,
since it inception in 1988, remained steadfastly opposed
to any negotiated settlement of its demands. Its declared
objective is the 'liberation of Bodoland from Indian expansionism
and occupation', and the NDFB pursues a strategy of 'armed
struggle that can ensure the freedom of the people'. The
latest attack was the fourth major strike against civilians
by NDFB this year:
- On January 15, 2002,
13 persons were killed by the NDFB cadres near Bijni in
Bongaigaon district.
- On January 21, 2002,
18 people were killed in a village under Udalguri police
station in Darrang district.
- On July 14, 2002, NDFB
insurgents massacred nine Adivasis (tribals) and injured
five others at the West Maligaon forest village relief
camps, Kokrajhar district.
These attacks
are to be viewed within the context of an ongoing turf war
between the NDFB and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT).
The BLT has, since 2000, been involved in a process of negotiations
with the Union government. For all practical purposes, BLT
has dismantled its insurgency infrastructure and is closer
to finalising terms for the establishment of the Bodoland
Territorial Council (BTC), an autonomous governing body
with administrative powers over a significant area in the
Bodo heartland in Assam. It is these developments that appear
to have driven the NDFB into a state of exasperation, since
its avowed aim of creating an independent Bodoland, struggle
is nowhere in sight after 16 years of 'armed struggle'.
It is the desire to be accepted as the dominant voice in
Bodo areas that has provoked repeated massacres of Bihari
and other non-Bodo communities.
The NDFB appears to be benefiting from the near-exclusive
focus on the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
of counter-insurgency operations in the State. Ironically,
the NDFB's attacks on civilians over the last year have
far exceeded the ULFA's depredations. Between May 2001 and
September 2002, the NDFB had killed 167 civilians and 17
security force (SF) personnel. In the same time span, ULFA
accounted for 66 civilians and 36 SF fatalities.
Incidentally the location of a preponderance of these attacks
is within striking distance of the Indo-Bhutan border, and
the NDFB's camps in Bhutan remain the prime factor behind
the success of the group's hit-and-run operations. There
is an urgent need to strip the NDFB of this a tactical advantage.
It improbably that Assam's 265 kilometre international boundary
with Bhutan will ever be effectively sealed, and pro-active
cooperation with the Royal Kingdom is indispensable if the
situation is to be brought under control. It can only be
hoped that the latest terrorist outrage will shake Indian
policymakers from their slumber, and encourage them to persuade
Bhutan against allowing groups such as NDFB and ULFA to
operate from its territory. It is now imperative that camps
of all the insurgent organisations operating out of Bhutan
be dismantled quickly.
The impact of the latest incident on trends of violence
in the region would largely depend on the state's responses.
If the attack in any way affects or undermines the talks
with the Bodo organisations over the proposed BTC, this
would tend to buoy up the insurgency. There are, consequently,
real dangers that the current phase of negotiations with
the BLT and also with factions of the United People's Democratic
Solidarity (UPDS)
and the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD)
could also begin to unravel. The result could be the withdrawal
of tactical over-ground organisations connected with these
militant from groups from the negotiation process and cooperation
with the security forces.
The message, which the NDFB tries to convey and which must
be clearly understood, is terror. The latest attack makes
it clear yet again that even after the successful culmination
of the negotiations with the BLT, peace will remain elusive
in the Bodo-inhabited areas of Assam. Under no circumstances
must the NDFB's terror be rewarded by greater prominence
or a preferred place on the negotiating table. While talks
with the BLT must continue, and terms of for the formalisation
of the promised BTC be finalised, the NDFB must receive
an unambiguous message that the language of escalating violence
cannot be a precursor to a dialogue for peace.
Mizoram:
Negotiating with Terror, Yet Again
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi & Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
The clock
has turned full circle in the Northeast Indian state of
Mizoram, along India's border with Bangladesh and Myanmar.
On the map, the State looks like the hood of the cobra,
and it is ruled by the Mizo National Front (MNF) government
headed by former guerrilla chieftain Zoramthanga. The
MNF government has been engaged in intensive peace negotiations
with the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF),
a militant group that threatens the 16 year long peace
in the State with a violent campaign for the redressal
of ethnic grievances and a demand for greater autonomy.
But the latest round of talks on October 17 hit a wall
when the Mizoram government negotiators told the BNLF
leaders that they could not concede the group's key demand
of a Bru Area Development Council, while vaguely promising
to work for the uplift of the minority ethnic group. This
has pushed the BNLF - a moderate Bru faction until now
- into a corner, increasing the possibility of hardliners
belonging to the breakaway Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram
(BLFM) hijacking the Bru movement for 'self-determination'.
The Brus, also known to the world as the Reangs, began
a political movement headed by the Bru National Union
in September 1997. In the same year, another Bru group
called the Reang Democratic Convention Party (RDCP), pushed
through a resolution demanding the creation, under the
Sixth Schedule of India's Constitution, of a separate
Autonomous District Council for the Brus. The majority
Mizo community was extremely wary of these developments,
seeing in them a possible move towards the dismemberment
of Mizoram. There was a rather harsh and immediate backlash,
with the Brus (Reangs) at the receiving end. Thousands
fled to the adjoining State of Tripura, arriving in the
northern sub-divisional town of Kanchanpur, while others
sought sanctuary in southern Assam's Hailakandi district.
Around this time, Bru miscreants killed a Mizo forester,
escalating the tension. The Brus accused the State's apex
student group, the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) of attacking
the community with the help of the Mizoram Police. What
began as a Bru sub-national movement turned into a communal
conflagration between the Brus and the Mizos.
The Brus or Reangs are said to have entered Mizoram around
1954 from the Maian hills in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill
Tracts (CHT). In 1961, there were only around 1,000 Reangs
in Mizoram. Their population rose to 9,829 in 1971. The
1991 Census put the number of Reangs in the state at 31,921,
a figure disputed by the community. They claim the number
of Reangs in Mizoram is much higher. Mizo leaders insist
that the Reangs, who had generally been nomads, are animists
and not Hindus as claimed by the latter and by groups
like the Rashtriya Swyayamsewak Sangh (RSS). The RSS took
up the Reangs' cause during the Mizo-Bru clashes in 1997
and had written an open letter to the state's Congress
Chief Minister of the time Lal Thanhawla.
The Brus' armed uprising actually gained momentum with
the BNLF giving shape to its agenda in 1999 at Bru refugee
camps in Tripura. On June 30, 2000, the BNLF carried out
its biggest ever strike, killing seven Mizoram Police
personnel. The number of Brus who had actually fled Mizoram
is also a matter of bitter dispute today. While the Mizoram
government says not more than 11,000 Brus had fled the
state in 1997, the Bru groups as well as the Tripura government
insists that at least 31,000 Brus are currently in the
refugee camps, awaiting repatriation to Mizoram.
Why are the Mizos, or for that matter the Mizoram government
(the Congress government earlier and the MNF regime now)
so opposed to the Brus' agitation? The argument put forward
by government leaders is that the Brus do not live in
any compact area in Mizoram, and, therefore, granting
them any politico-administrative structure is out of question.
The Brus are scattered in the districts of Mamit, Kolasib,
Lunglei and Langtlai, bordering north Tripura and Bangladesh.
Secondly, the State already has other autonomous structures
like the Chakma Autonomous District Council and another
such Council for the Pawi and Lakher communities. Leaders
like Lal Thanhawla point out that the Chakma Autonomous
Council was created in 1972 by New Delhi without consulting
or taking the Mizo leaders into confidence, implying that
had the Mizo leaders been consulted by the federal authorities
then, they may have opposed even the creation of the Chakma
Autonomous District Council. Thirdly - a bitter fact that
none would like to highlight - the Brus may or may not
be Hindus, but they are not Christians, who comprise more
than 85 per cent of Mizorams 891,000 population. Mizo
leaders, however, argue that the issue took a communal
turn only because groups like the RSS got involved.
Mainstream political formations, cutting across party
lines, as well as powerful student outfits like the MZP,
are opposed to granting any autonomy to the Brus on ethnic
lines. This mood was reflected during the seventh round
of talks with the BNLF on October 17 (the talks began
in September 2001) where Mizoram Chief Secretary H.V.Lalringa,
who headed the state government delegation, is said to
have told the BNLF that its demand for a Development Council
cannot be conceded. The officials, however, said that
a Rs. 200 million proposal has been placed before the
federal authorities in New Delhi for repatriation of the
Brus from Tripura and their re-settlement in Mizoram.
The outright rejection of the BNLF's Development Council
demand has reduced the group's bargaining power with the
community. This demand was itself a climb-down from the
BNLF's original demand for an Autonomous District Council
under the Constitution's Sixth Schedule, and the State
government was expected to treat the moderates and to
approach the issue with greater sensitivity. This was
particularly necessary because of the emergence of a hardline
group called the Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram. Significantly,
Mizoram Police officials deny knowledge of the existence
of the BLFM.
The break down of talks opens up two possibilities: the
BNLF could itself resume its armed struggle; or the recalcitrant
BLFM could step up its violence in a bid to assume centre
stage. If available reports are to be believed, the BLFM
has a hideout in Bangladesh's CHT and is also operating
along the Tripura-Mizoram border.
The heightening of violence would be particularly tragic
in Mizoram, which suffered immensely under the grip of
an armed uprising by the MNF for 20 years, beginning 1966.
This protracted insurgency ended in 1986 with the signing
of the Mizo Accord by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
Leaders of the underground MNF laid down arms and contested
elections, as the ruling Congress government resigned
to make way for a fresh political process. The legendary
MNF leader Laldenga became Chief Minister. Today, Laldenga's
deputy in the insurgent group, Zoramthanga, is the state's
Chief Minister. His biggest challenge now is to ensure
that the prevailing calm (there has been no violence since
the BNLF entered into talks in September last year) is
not shattered.
|
Weekly Fatalities:
Major conflicts in South Asia
October 21-27, 2002
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA |
8
|
56
|
30
|
94
|
Assam |
0
|
26
|
3
|
29
|
Tripura |
0
|
10
|
0
|
10
|
Jammu &
Kashmir |
7
|
12
|
22
|
41
|
Meghalaya |
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Bihar |
0
|
4
|
2
|
6
|
Left-wing Extremism |
0
|
4
|
3
|
7
|
PAKISTAN |
0
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
NEPAL |
0
|
2
|
70
|
72
|
Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
New law for
speedy trial of six major offences: Bangladesh President
Iajuddin Ahmed, on October 24, promulgated an Ordinance titled
"Special Tribunal for Speedy Trial Ordinance". The ordinance
would ensure speedy trial in six major offences - possession
of illegal arms, narcotics and explosives, murder, rape and
hoarding. The
Daily Star, October 25, 2002.
INDIA
NDFB terrorists
massacre 22 civilians in Assam:
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) terrorists massacred
22 civilians in Assam's Kokrajhar district, on October 27. A group
of approximately two dozen terrorists came to Dadgiri village
and dragged the sleeping residents, mostly immigrant labourers,
from their houses and shot at them indiscriminately with their
automatic weapons. While 22 succumbed to bullet injuries on the
spot, 16 more were injured. Security forces also believe that
the terrorists had come to the district from their Bhutan base
camps. The
Hindu, October 28, 2002.
Mufti Mohammed Sayeed to lead coalition government in J&K:
The People's Democratic Party (PDP) leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed
and the Congress President Sonia Gandhi reached a power sharing
agreement in New Delhi, on October 26-night. According to the
agreement, Mufti Sayeed would head the coalition government in
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), on a rotational basis for the first three
years. Thereafter, the Chief Ministership will go to the Congress
for the remaining three years. Both the parties have also agreed
to a Common Minimum Programme (CMP).
In the 87-member State Legislative Assembly the Congress has 20
members and the PDP has 16. The
Hindu, October 27, 2002
Suspected ATTF terrorists kill eight civilians in West Tripura:
Suspected All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) terrorists killed eight
persons including, three women and a child, and injured nine others
in Battila, West Tripura district, on October 26. Assam
Sentinel, October 27, 2002.
Six persons killed in clash between CPI-ML, Ranvir Sena in
Bihar: Four supporters of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
[CPI-ML (Liberation)] and two activists of the Ranvir Sena, a
private army of landowners, were killed in a clash between the
two groups in Kurmuri village under the Sikarhata police station
limits, Bhojpur district on October 24-25. The
Hindu October 26, 2002.
NEPAL
Maoists leader Prachanda calls for negotiations: A Press Statement
issued by Puspa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, leader of the Nepal
Communist Party (Maoist), generally referred to as Maoist insurgents,
called for a dialogue among the Maoist insurgents, political parties,
the King and the intelligentsia of Nepal to prevent what he called
the frittering away of the gains of the '1990-pro-democracy movement'.
He warned that the insurgents would continue with their campaign
of violence if such a dialogue, which he said was the 'appropriate
forum to deliberate on a new Constituent Assembly', was not called
for. Kathmandu
Post, October 26, 2002.
PAKISTAN
New National
Assembly to be convened in November first week: The Ministry
of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs spokesman, on October
25, said that the first session of the newly elected National
Assembly (NA) would be convened in the first week of November,
2002. Elections to various federal posts also might be held between
November 5 and 7. While the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker would
be elected on November 5, election for the post of Prime Minister
might be held on November 7. Jang,
October 26, 2002
Federal Law Minister outlines process of elections to the post
of Speaker, PM: Federal Law Minister Dr Khalid Ranjha said,
on October 25 that a secret ballot within two months of the oath
of the Prime Minister (PM) would be held to decide if the PM has
the confidence of the House. Run-off polls would be held if no
one was elected for the post, he also said. The National Assembly
Speaker and Deputy Speaker would be elected through secret ballot,
prior to the election of the PM. Dawn,
October 26, 2002
SRI LANKA
Agenda, government
team for second round of peace talks with LTTE announced:
The second round of government-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) peace talks due to begin on October 31, in Thailand, would
focus on three issues - forming the Joint Task Force (JTF), resettlement
of displaced persons and strengthening the implementation of the
ongoing 'permanent cease-fire'. The talks would be held at Nakompathon,
40 kilometres away from the Thai capital, Bangkok. Cabinet spokesperson
and government negotiating team leader G.L. Peiris disclosed the
broad agenda of the second round, and added Major General Shantha
Kottegoda would be among the three advisors to the government
team at the talks. The LTTE has already announced that 'political-wing
chief' Thamiselvam and Amparai-Batticaloa 'special commander',
Karuna, would be the additional members of its delegation. Daily
News, October 26, 2002; Tamil
Net, October 24, 2002.
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