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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 2, July 29, 2002

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that will bring you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.




STATISTICAL REVIEW

Fatalities inflicted by terrorist groups in Assam, 1992-2001

 
ULFA
NDFB
BLTF
NSCN/DHD
UPDS
Total
Civilians
SFs
Civilians
SFs
Civilians
SFs
Civilians
SFs
Civilians
SFs
Civilians
SFs
1992
35
10
37
10
0
0
8
14
0
-
80
34
1993
48
15
25
6
0
0
1
3
0
-
74
24
1994
49
7
108
22
0
0
16
6
0
-
173
35
1995
16
14
132
16
8
1
14
42
0
-
170
73
1996
59
48
176
25
53
6
14
8
0
-
302
87
1997
68
50
137
25
52
1
28
9
0
-
285
85
1998
97
42
305
22
126
5
3
3
0
0
531
72
1999
55
29
113
14
22
8
30
26
0
2
220
79
2000
162
27
95
20
23
0
15
9
71
9
366
65
2001
59
27
134
7
7
0
23
23
41
2
264
59
Total
648
269
1262
167
291
21
152
143
112
13
2465
613
Source: Complied from official sources and reportage in the English language press of India.

Note: SF=Security Force Personnel; ULFA=United Liberation Front of Asom; NDFB=National Democratic Front of Bodoland; BLTF=Bodo Liberation Tiger Force; NSCN/DHD=National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Dima Halim Daogah; UPDS=United People's Democratic Solidarity



ASSESSMENT


INDIA
PAKISTAN

Diplomatic Tourism: Powell in South Asia... Again
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management

‘Dead on arrival’ is how one observer described Colin Powell’s latest visit (his third since 9/11) to New Delhi and Islamabad. His earlier statements, downplaying the significance of this excursion, suggest that Powell himself did not expect much more.

India and Pakistan have become mandatory stopovers for roving Western VIP’s offering non-solutions to non-problems in South Asia – Powell, for instance, sees images of salvation in international observers for the forthcoming elections in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Meanwhile, the core problem in the region – the persistence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, and of the armies and infrastructure of the Islamist jihad in that country – is systematically downplayed.

The trend started after 9/11 (October 2001 saw Powell’s first tour here), and intensified after December 13, 2001, when India’s Parliament was attacked by Pakistan-backed terrorists groups, leading – particularly after the brutal Kaluchak massacre of May 14, 2002 – to the largest military mobilisation this region has seen. None – without exception – of these diplomatic delegations have had anything concrete to offer beyond platitudes about ‘talks about talks.’ And yet, to their home constituencies, they have repeatedly reported ‘great breakthroughs’ in the Indo-Pak imbroglio as a result of their sagacious interventions.

The greatest of these supposed ‘breakthroughs’ came in the wake of the artificial hysteria that was whipped up over an ostensibly imminent war – and possible nuclear holocaust – in South Asia in the latter part of May 2001, after the Kaluchak massacre tempted the Indian leadership to engage in an experiment in brinkmanship. The fact is, at no moment during that entire counterfeit crisis, was there even the remotest possibility of war, and the ease with which the tensions were abruptly dissipated by the Indian Prime Minister’s sudden pronouncements about ‘clear skies’ bore out the absurdity of Western projections. This did not, however, end war speculation, and ‘experts’ continued to argue that the next time there was a major terrorist strike in India, the country’s leadership ‘would not be able to resist public pressure’ for military retaliation against Pakistan – and Pakistan’s dictator, President Pervez Musharraf, sought international guarantees against Indian ‘overreaction’ in case of a major terrorist attack in India by groups that he ‘cannot control’. But another massacre of comparable magnitude did occur – at Kasimpura on July 13 – and there was not even a suggestion of a military response across the Line of Control (LoC).

This is crucial, because the pattern of Western – and particularly American – ‘peacemaking’ initiatives has become a critical input in the orchestration of tensions in South Asia, encouraging the major players here to sustain tensions in order to attract ‘favourable’ interventions. The Western discourse has also set an unacceptable limit on what needs to be done against terrorism, as evidenced by the incessant harping on infiltration across the LoC – Powell again saw fit to point out that it was ‘difficult’ to accurately monitor the movement of terrorists from Pakistan into J&K. The result is that, every time international (read, US) pressure escalates, General Musharraf makes a televised ‘address to the nation’ roundly condemning terrorism; for a few weeks, infiltration rates drop; and the ‘international community’, goaded by their ‘friend’ Musharraf, immediately begins to pressure India to offer some ‘concessions’ to placate Pakistan in return. There is something immensely offensive in this. As offensive as the suggestion that, since Osama bin Laden has not executed any further attacks on America after 9/11, the US somehow owes him something by way of reciprocal ‘concessions’. The logic appears to be that if a mass murderer agrees – even temporarily – to stop murdering our people, we owe him something by way of reward. This is a position that should be rejected with utter contempt. But it finds the most unlikely defenders in the ‘free world’.

This is not the only distortion in the Western discourse on terrorism in South Asia. The Americans continue to find it convenient to project Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ in the war against terrorism, and cite as evidence the fact that Pakistan has ‘co-operated’ with the US and has ‘handed over’ several Al Qaeda operatives, including some at leadership levels in the shadowy Islamist terrorist organisation. It is certain, however, that US Intelligence and policy makers are entirely aware of the duplicity of these claims. The truth is, at no point in the ‘war against terror’ has the Musharraf regime given a whit more than it has been forced to concede. To take an example, the much touted case of Abu Zubaidah – the senior-most bin Laden lieutenant to be arrested till date – in late March. Abu Zubaidah, and more than 50 other Al Qaeda cadre, were arrested at Faisalabad and handed over to US authorities only after the FBI had intercepted their telephonic communications and confronted local authorities, making it impossible for the latter to refuse to take action. In another high profile case in December 2001, over 120 Al Qaeda fighters were arrested in the Kurram Agency and subsequently given over to the Americans – but only when their presence could no longer be concealed or denied as a result of a quarrel between local tribal groups. There is ample intelligence regarding numerous cases where Pakistani authorities have turned a blind eye to the presence and activities of the Al Qaeda until US authorities have coerced action, or till the terrorists have found it possible to relocate to undisclosed destinations.

Much of this is incomprehensible, particularly in view of the sheer horror of what was done on 9/11, and of the enormous danger that the surviving Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates constitute. It appears, however, that domestic political compulsions and the inertia of past policies are, once again, taking America down a familiar path of supporting an unconscionable Third World dictatorship – and a sponsor of terrorism to boot.

 

ASSESSMENT

INDIA
BHUTAN

Terror Havens in the Land of the Thunder Dragon
Wasbir Hussain
Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati; Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

Separatist insurgencies in India’s Northeast have long had an external dimension. In 1956, Angami Zapu Phizo, who started the first tribal insurgency in the country, went into exile in Britain, via then East Pakistan, from where he led the Naga bush-war against New Delhi until his death in April 1990. Phizo’s successors in the Naga movement, as also a multiplicity of other separatist militancies, have also long operated out of bases outside India.

This has been a problem that has strained India’s ties with Bhutan since a band of heavily armed militants belonging to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) moved into the adjoining Himalayan kingdom in the early nineties, and established well-entrenched bases there, somewhat souring an otherwise agreeable bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Thimpu. ULFA’s surviving capacity to carry out violent operations in the north eastern Indian State of Assam — where the group seeks to establish a ‘sovereign homeland’ — is essentially based on their ability to cross over into safe havens in the jungles of Southern Bhutan.

Indian intelligence agencies put the number of ULFA camps inside Bhutan at 36 until recently, including its ‘General Headquarters’, ‘Council Headquarters’ and a number of training establishments. An estimated 2,000 cadres, both men and women, live in these camps, mostly located in the Southern Bhutan district of Samdrup Jhongkar, that has a contiguous border with Assam’s western district of Nalbari some 100 KM west of the State capital, Guwahati. It is to these bases that the ULFA hit squads mostly return after attacks in Indian territory, traversing the densely wooded and porous international border. The situation is complicated further by the presence in Bhutan of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamatapur Liberation Origanisation (KLO), two other terrorist groups active in Assam. Supported by the ULFA, these groups have established many camps on Bhutanese soil, with an estimated 21 such camps run by the NDFB alone, though many of these are common to the ULFA.

The presence of the Indian separatists now tops Bhutan’s national agenda, with the royal government describing it as a great threat to ‘national security and sovereignty.’ Counter-insurgency officials and policy makers in India, including Assam’s Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, are of the view that unless the rebels are denied sanctuary in the kingdom, militancy in Assam will remain impossible to contain. In a conversation with the author, Chief Minister Gogoi stated that he had already urged the Deputy Prime Minister and Federal Home Minister, L.K. Advani, , to take up the issue of the rebels’ presence in Bhutan with the Royal Government.

In accordance with an existing agreement, Indian paramilitary and police personnel, though not the Army, can enter Bhutanese territory in an extraordinary hot pursuit situation. In reality, considering the terrain, the rebels can only be taken on in a pincer attack backed by Bhutanese soldiers. New Delhi consequently had some reasons for satisfaction when Bhutan’s National Assembly once again deliberated on the presence of the Indian militants in the kingdom during its session earlier this month and reiterated its call to the rebels to pull out from the kingdom in a peaceful manner or face physical eviction through military force.

Such pullout calls to the rebels have been given by Bhutan several times in the past. In June 2001, the ULFA and the Bhutanese Government arrived at an agreement, which required the militants to reduce the number of their camps and the strength of their cadres in the kingdom, as a prelude to final withdrawal from the country. In December 2001, Bhutanese authorities claimed that the ULFA had ‘closed down four of nine camps’ in the country. That position has now changed, with King Jigme Singhye Wangchuk informing the National Assembly that it was of ‘no use’ if the ULFA agreed to move two or three camps, because it would not be possible for the authorities to determine whether remaining camps had simply been merged or relocated elsewhere within Bhutan. The country’s Home Minister, Thinley Gyamtsho, has stated that the ULFA had opened a new camp on a mountain ridge above the Samdrup Jongkhar-Tashigang Highway, a fact corroborated by Indian intelligence officials.

As a result, this time round, Bhutan’s National Assembly has decided to ask the ULFA to shut down its Headquarters and presence on Bhutanese soil, not just a few specific camps. The National Assembly thus concluded: "If the leaders of the ULFA refuse to relocate their headquarters, then it will be clear to the Government and people of Bhutan that the outfit has no intention of leaving Bhutanese territory and there would be no other option but to evict them physically." This is a tough stance for Thimphu to maintain, and for the ULFA, it is a difficult demand to comply with.

Evicting the heavily armed ULFA cadres from Bhutan is easier said than done, and here lies Assam’s problem. It is not clear whether the Royal Bhutan Police and the Royal Bhutan Army, despite the presence of some commando units trained by the Indian security establishment, can take on the trained ULFA rebels. Will Bhutan finally agree to let the Indian Army into the kingdom for a joint offensive? How does one flush out the rebels if Indian forces are to keep waiting on the borders to trap the fleeing militants? The greatest fear is that of possible retaliation by the ULFA on innocent Bhutanese citizens in case of firm action by the Royal Government.

There are other problem areas. New Delhi will certainly be concerned over suggestions by a few Bhutanese National Assembly members that Thimphu should look towards China for help in tackling the insurgents, rather than rely totally on India. These members suggested that India may be keeping its forces on the border with Bhutan in order to deliberately confine the rebels within the kingdom, though this perspective was discounted by Bhutanese Home Minister Gyamtsho.

Bhutanese authorities now say they will have one last sitting with the ULFA leadership in a bid to persuade them to leave the kingdom, lock, stock and barrel. Clearly, the Royal Government is still keen to resolve the matter without having to shed blood.

But, where will the ULFA shift its men and materials if it were to honour king Wangchuk’s wishes? Indications suggest exploratory moves towards the Indo-Myanmar border in the north eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, to link up with the group’s ally, the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-K), who have bases in the area. Bangladesh is another option, with much of the organisation’s senior leadership already based there.

In a telephonic interview with the author, Bhutan’s Foreign Secretary Ugyen Tshering stated that the ULFA leadership had told the Bhutanese authorities that they could not fulfil their commitment to withdraw from the kingdom because of the increased presence of Indian troops on the Indo-Bhutan border in the Assam sector. Thimphu has since taken up this issue with New Delhi, Tshering said.

At one stage, key officials of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) had mentioned the possibility of granting the rebels safe passage to move through Assam, if the ULFA wanted to move from Bhutan into another country. That, again, is a decision that will have to be taken at the highest level, and is unlikely in the present situation. Gyamtsho suggested that New Delhi might grant the rebels ‘amnesty’ if they were to withdraw from the kingdom and return to India. As things stand now, however, the stage has not reached for the ULFA to take up an amnesty offer even if New Delhi were to make one. Under the circumstances, both India and Bhutan will continue to be haunted by the presence of the Assamese separatists in the Land of the Thunder Dragon.

 

NEWS BRIEFS


INDIA

Dialogue between India and Pakistan possible only after Kashmir elections, says Powell: Addressing a press conference in New Delhi on July 28, the visiting US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said a dialogue between India and Pakistan appeared possible only after Legislative Assembly elections in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Stating that Kashmir was "on the international agenda", Powell asked India to allow ‘outsiders’ to monitor the forthcoming elections scheduled to be held in October 2002. He also added that, it seemed clear that infiltration was continuing and every effort was needed to end it. The Hindu, July 29, 2002

Five Naxals killed in Andhra Pradesh encounter: Five left-wing extremists — Naxalites — of the People’s War Group (PWG), including three women, were killed in an encounter in the Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh on July 26. Separately, in their first major strike after pulling out of the peace process, the PWG killed four police personnel and injured eight more in a landmine blast in Guntur district on July 23. The Hindu, July 24, 2002, Times of India, July 27, 2002.

NLFT terrorists kill six security force personnel in Tripura: Six security force personnel and a civilian were killed in an ambush, laid allegedly by the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) terrorists on July 26 at Debendrasardarpara in the West Tripura district of Tripura. An NLFT terrorist was also killed in retaliatory firing. Outlook, July 26, 2002.

Sensors deployed to detect infiltration in Kashmir: Speaking in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) on July 24, Union Defence Minister, George Fernandes, said that Unattended Ground Sensors are being deployed along the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to assist troops in detecting infiltration. He also said that the sensors, procured indigenously, are being deployed in considerable numbers. He added that after the Kargil War of Year 1999, 497 attempts of infiltration and exfiltration have been foiled on the LoC and IB. Press Trust of India, July 25, 2002.

 


Pakistan

PoK is worse than J&K, says Pakistan Hurriyat: Criticising Pakistan's Kashmir policy, the Pakistan chapter of the separatist alliance All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) said on July 24 in Islamabad that the situation in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) was worse than in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). While demanding establishment of a revolutionary command council comprising leaders from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC), APHC Secretary General Altaf Qadri claimed that the present PoK government was trying to deceive the people of Kashmir. Daily Times, July 25, 2002.

Al Qaeda planning to attack foreign missions: Intelligence reports suggest that 24 Al Qaeda operatives and approximately 12 other terrorists have entered Pakistan in the last few days and are planning to target certain embassies of European countries and the Indian High Commission. Al Qaeda cadres are reportedly planning to target the Indian Consulate in Karachi some time in August, besides attacking some European embassies in Islamabad. Intelligence sources added that terrorists might choose August 15, the Independence Day of India, for an attack on the Indian High Commission in Islamabad. Dawn, July 22, 2002.

No more concessions to India, says President Musharraf: Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said on July 28 in Islamabad before interactions with the visiting US Secretary of State, Colin Powell that he did not need to offer any more concessions to India to resolve the standoff over Kashmir. Meanwhile, commenting on the infiltration issue, he said, "It is already stopped in the past. It is not taking place and whatever the Indian side is saying is absolutely baseless." Dawn, July 29, 2002.

 


Sri Lanka

Security force personnel killed by LTTE: In what could have triggered a major standoff between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on July 25, 2002, a government soldier reportedly strayed into the LTTE-controlled area 150 metres east of the Muhamalai Checkpoint on the main A 9 Highway and opened fire. In retaliatory fire by LTTE cadres, the soldier was killed. The government termed the incident ‘unfortunate’, and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) chief Maj. Gen (Retd.) Trond Furuhovde said, "both the Army and the LTTE displayed tremendous responsibility and restraint in this very difficult situation’. Tamilnet, July 25, 2002, Daily News, July 25, 2002.

 

 

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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