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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 25, January 6, 2003

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

PAKISTAN
USA

Fissures in an Unnatural Alliance
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management

Both the United States and Pakistan have dismissed last week's clashes and exchange of fire between their troops as a 'misunderstanding', and high level interventions have sought to undo the damage inflicted by two incidents of friction - one of which ended in a five hundred pound bomb being dropped on an abandoned madrassa in Pakistani territory, killing two Pakistani soldiers who had taken shelter there. These incidents, by themselves, do not constitute a major crisis in relations between the two countries and their 'cooperation' in the war against terror; allied forces often have frictional confrontations in the field in other theatres of warfare as well. In the Pakistan-US case, however, the incidents are symptomatic of a deeper malaise, a fundamental conflict of interests and underlying ideologies between the two nations. What is in evidence here is, in fact, the gradual emergence of inevitable fissures in what was, from its very inception, an extraordinarily unnatural alliance. To the extent that this is the case, an escalation of tensions between US and Pakistani armed forces on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is an inevitability, though matters have been kept from going out of hand in the immediate future. It is clear, moreover, that US troops on the ground are getting impatient with Pakistan's duplicity, and are increasingly resentful of the visible support and accommodation that the Al Qaeda and Taliban survivors are receiving on Pakistani soil.

Impatience, however, has another face as well. As one commentator in the Jung Group's The News International expressed it, "Hatred against the US is all time high in Pakistan these days" (sic). That hatred manifested itself in a rash of demonstrations right across the country - in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Karachi, Quetta, Lahore, Bajore, Hyderabad, Kohat, Mansehra, Naushahro Feroze, Mirpurkhas, Larkana, Sukkur - after Friday prayers last week, as the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), the coalition of fundamentalist parties that cornered an unprecedented 53 seats in the National Assembly in the dubious November 2002 elections, called upon 'the people' to wage jihad against America 'to halt interference by imperialist forces in the affairs of the region.' In Islamabad, Maulana Samiul Haq, head of the notorious Haqqani madrassa that spawned the Taliban, intoned, "the more they suppress us, the more we will rise," and warned that American action against Iraq would "trigger a serious backlash from religious forces." In Lahore, Hafiz Hussain Ahmad of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JuI) declared, "Even before the attack on Afghanistan, we maintained that the US concern was neither Osama bin Laden nor Mullah Omar, but the Ummat (the world community of Muslims). The preparations for an attack on Iraq substantiate that claim. The world should rest assured that the next US target would be Iran, followed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan."

There is an entrenched lobby at Washington which has a deep - at times personal and vested, at other times professional, though erroneous - interest in keep America's unnatural alliance with Pakistan alive at any costs, and this group will underplay these trends. Nevertheless, these threats are real, and are broader and far more compelling than a few flashes of fire along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border suggest. The rising anti-US public demonstrations and protests mirror a mounting hostility within the Pakistan Army to the American 'war against terror' agenda. Crucial in this is the fact that it is immensely difficult for soldiers who have been systematically indoctrinated on a steady Islamist fundamentalist diet for over two decades now, and many of whom have fought shoulder to shoulder with the Taliban in Afghanistan, to suddenly abandon convictions that have become deep-rooted and go to the very heart of their notions of personal and national identity. At the higher levels of military and civilian leadership, where there is greater 'sophistication' of thought and perspective, compromises and readjustments conforming to the imperatives of the situation are possible. Even here, though, there are many senior generals who are simply incapable of making the necessary ideological transition, and at least some of these have dominated the long standing collaboration between the Pakistani Army, its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, and the jehadi-fundamentalist forces. Moreover, General Pervez Musharraf himself has actively exploited Islamist sentiments to execute military and quasi-military campaigns, both in Afghanistan and against India, and when he seeks, suddenly, to distance himself from such a position, or to purge the military leadership of Islamist elements, he sows confusion and loses credibility among his officers. At the middle and lower levels, however, where responses are more emotive and less analytical, the anti-Taliban - anti-Al Qaeda campaign is deeply distressing, and tensions can only be expected to rise, both within the Pakistani Forces, and in the Pakistani street.

In Afghanistan, consequently, US troops are now getting only the foretaste of what has been an everyday occurrence in India - terrorists operating out of Pakistani soil, executing operations across an international border, and then running back into Pakistani sanctuaries, with the authorities denying their existence and asserting an uncompromising sovereignty to obstruct any legitimate punitive action. It is this 'deniability', and the international collusion manifested in a pretended ignorance of a reality that is widely known, that has allowed Pakistan to create and nurture the jehadis over the decades, and to employ them as their primary strategic force to pursue geopolitical ambitions that are entirely disproportionate to the country's resources and capabilities. Clearly, however, playing this game against India is one thing; against the US, it may prove to be entirely another. What we are witnessing, consequently, is the emergence of a dynamic and inexorable process, with Pakistani duplicity, intransigence, and the collusion of its armed forces and intelligence agencies with the jehadis - including the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda - provoking harsh US reaction; and US reactions feeding the street anger and the resentment in Pakistan's security forces.

Countering this process will require a radical reassessment of American policies and orientation on Pakistan, as of the course and character of the 'war against terror' since 9/11. The conciliation and appeasement of 'moderate Islamist extremist' forces - if such a formulation is conceivable - has been integral to the US policy on Pakistan. America winks continuously at the sustained support to international Islamist radicalism and terrorism by Pakistan, as well as at the persistence of a vast terrorist infrastructure on Pakistani soil, as long as these are not seen to be directed against American targets, or to be currently engaged with the Al Qaeda - Taliban combine. This is myopic in the extreme, and has created the space precisely for the 'plausible deniability' that has allowed the Al Qaeda and Taliban survivors to relocate themselves in Pakistan, for the country to grow into the most significant centre of Islamist terrorism, and for these forces to increasingly direct their resources and attacks against Western targets. Much of this orientation has been based on a miscalculation regarding the risks of political collapse and anarchy if the 'indispensable' Musharraf 'loses control'. The spectre of anarchy and collapse in Pakistan, however, is the more real if current trends in appeasement and the consolidation of the forces of Islamist extremism and terror persist. If these processes are to be neutralised, the hard option will have to be seized, and a clear obligation placed on those who claim to 'rule' Pakistan: that they bring the conduct of their affairs in conformity with international norms; dismantle and destroy the infrastructure of terrorism; and cease provocation of, and support to, extremist activities within the country and across international borders. Failing this, the fullest force of international sanctions and direct military intervention should be brought to bear on a lawless nation that now not only jeopardizes the future of the South Asian region, but the possibilities of peace in the world at large.



ASSESSMENT

INDIA

NDFB: Losing Leaders, Losing Muscle
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati.

In the morning of January 1, 2003, acting on intelligence inputs about a top ranking National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) leader camping in the State capital, a Sikkim police team surrounded a partly constructed apartment near the Flourmill area in Gangtok. A few minutes later, the insurgent group's 'vice-president', Dhiren Boro alias Bipul Sonowal alias Chungthagra Boro, had fallen into the hands of the police authorities. Along with Boro were his wife Pratima Boro, two children and two bodyguards. For the police in Assam, in whose custody Boro is soon likely to find himself, the arrest is nothing less than a prize-catch. For the underground organisation, Boro's arrest was the second serious blow within a period of 36 days.

Earlier, in the morning of November 25, 2002, Govinda Basumatary alias B. Swmkhwr, General Secretary of the NDFB, was arrested at the Rangia railway station in Kamrup district while boarding the Kamrup Express, a train that runs between the upper Assam district of Tinsukia and the capital of West Bengal, Kolkata. It now appears certain that Basumatary's arrest provided the Assam police with vital clues about Boro's movements, who, according to his own admission, had been camping at Gangtok for the past one year.

The 45-year-old Boro's association with NDFB dates back to the 1980s, first as a member of the then Bodo Security Force (BdSF) and later as the Vice President of the re-christened NDFB in the early 1990s. The leadership of the group - comprising Boro, Basumatary, Chairman Ranjan Daimary alias D.R. Nabla and Publicity Secretary B. Erakdao - has been responsible for the death of 1,262 civilians (the highest by any extremist outfit in the State) and 167 security force personnel between 1992 and 2001. This coterie was instrumental in masterminding innumerable acts of wanton violence and terror, targeting not only the non-Bodo communities living in the districts of western and lower Assam, such as Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Darrang, Barpeta and parts of Nalbari, but the Bodo population as well. According to Assam police sources, NDFB accounted for the death of 127 civilians and 8 security force personnel in the year 2002. The NDFB lost a total of 119 cadres in 88 operations led by both the Army and the Police during the year.

In a game where individual leaders and their capabilities make or break an organisation, Basumatary and Boro's arrests are expected to curb the striking prowess of NDFB to a considerable extent. With these arrests, the NDFB's entire operational command passes into the hands of Chairman Daimary and publicity secretary Erakdao. With both of them living outside the country (Daimary stays in Bangladesh and Erakdao keeps shuttling between the group's camps in Bhutan and safe houses in North Bengal), they would face some difficulty in sustaining the succession of attacks that have been executed in Assam, till a new set of cadres are groomed to positions of leadership and given operational responsibility. The difficulty and loss of direction in the NDFB are intensified by the losses inflicted on the group by the security forces - 14 cadres have lost their lives in SF operations since Basumatary's arrest.

The arrests will also dampen the NDFB's expansion plans, both in terms of augmenting operational strength and finding protected bases in countries like Nepal. Intelligence sources indicate that the organisation, till the time of the arrests, was planning to raise a third 'battalion' (it currently has two, with a current estimated strength of some 3,500 personnel), to be based in Bangladesh, probably under the direct command of the Chairman Daimary. The other two 'battalions', located at Kalikhola and Kawai in Bhutan, presently manage hit and run operations in western Assam. The proposed third battalion would have facilitated an uninterrupted chain of activity, just in case the group needed to shift its bases from Bhutan. This plan, for the time being, will have to take a backseat till the organisation is able to recover its strength and reinforce its leadership.

What would also possibly be shelved are the machinations of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the elements in the Bangladeshi army to destabilise the region. The preliminary interrogations of vice president Boro, who amazingly is singing like a parrot, reveal the details of ISI training programme to a group of NDFB recruits in Bangladesh.

The possible dent in the NDFB's operational capabilities will also work to the advantage of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), the other Bodo group that has, since year 2000, renounced violence, and is on the verge of finalising an agreement with the Government of Assam on the formation of a Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The NDFB, in the competitive game to secure dominance over the Bodo constituency, which comprises nearly 13 per cent of the State's population, had emerged as the principal enemy to the idea of the BTC. The BLT's march towards finalising the agreement is now likely to be less hazardous.

On January 2, 2002, Khabar, a vernacular daily from Guwahati, published a front-page report on plans for a joint team of 60 cadres of both the NDFB and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) to orchestrate terror attacks in populated areas of Bongaigaon and Kokrajhar districts. The report predicted that, if everything went according to plan, several 'bloody strikes' (raktakta abhijan) would take place between January 12 and 18 in both the districts. Whether such strikes eventually takes place or not, it appears certain that, in the face of mounting pressure in terms of a fast declining team of senior cadres, both the ULFA and the NDFB will find strong reasons to move closer to each other.

There is evidence of a curious pattern emerging out of the recent arrests, a pattern that suggests the possibilities of a split within the NDFB. Incidentally, both Dhiren Boro and Basumatary hail from the Udalguri area of Darrang district, one of the NDFB's areas of strength. Boro belongs to the Rangagarat village, while Basumatary served as a teacher in the Udalguri College nearby, before he joined the underground. There is some speculation that both Basumatary and Boro actually gave themselves up in order to initiate a peace process with the government. Media reports, describing Basumatary's arrest, had suggested that the General Secretary was on his way to North Bengal to meet the other leaders to discuss possible negotiations with the government. It is also interesting that both leaders, soon after their arrests, made significant revelations about the organisation's activities, betraying their image of 'hard-to-crack' insurgents.

Nevertheless, the actual possibility of the NDFB as an organisation giving up arms and entering into a dialogue for peace appears to be remote. Two arrests, howsoever significant they may be, are certainly not a broad enough transformation to push a group that has obstinately and violently resisted any efforts for peaceful settlement, to the negotiating table. The organisation's current infirmity does, however, create a window of opportunity which can be widened with concerted counter-insurgency operations that can force the extremists to see reason and embrace a process of dialogue.



ASSESSMENT

INDIA

J&K: The Taliban Take on Rajouri
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent Frontline

Beloved brothers of Hasiyot:

We have left our country to fight for your freedom. But still you people feel no sense of gratitude. We urge you to stop helping the Kafirs (unbelievers). After this, no one who does so will be spared. He who helps a Kafir is also a Kafir. If you still do not pay heed, Allah has given his soldiers enough strength to finish you as well as the Kafirs.

- Posted by the al-Badr Mujahideen, Hasiyot Mosque, Rajouri, December 17, 2002.


In late November 2002, the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami put up posters in the village of Darhal, demanding that women students and teachers start wearing all-enveloping burkhas (veils). Those who defied the ban, the posters warned, would have their noses cut off. While most in the village were terrified, local school-uniform tailor Mohammad Rafiq believed he had been granted a god-given opportunity to prosper. Demand pushed up prices for basic versions of the five-metre dress from Rs. 175 to almost Rs. 1000, while better-quality 'imports' from Jammu sold for twice as much. Then, the local Army unit stepped in, and told Rafiq to stop black-marketing burkhas. Today, Rafiq's business has collapsed: his customers, mostly poor farmers who have to work in their fields and find the burkha enormously cumbersome at work, just aren't sure which choice of uniform to spend their meagre resources on.

Darhal's encounter with Taliban-style terror began with a local spat. When troops were first deployed in the area, they occupied part of the main higher secondary school building. To compensate students for the space, the Army put up tented accommodation, as well as a tin building. The school's laboratory facilities remained available to students, but soldiers used the other half of the main building. Parents lobbied hard to get the whole building back, scared mainly of the consequences of a terrorist assault on the troops. Then, in early November, an unrelated fracas broke out. A group of women students, out on a picnic near Kotranka were - depending on who one chooses to believe - either harassed by teenage boys from Darhal, or seen dancing to film music with them. The conservative rural community was scandalised, but sorted out the problem quietly by calling the boys concerned in for a telling-off.

A window of opportunity had, however, opened for the soldiers of the Islamic Right. They now claimed the picnic was the result of the 'corrupting influence of immoral dress,' combined with the close proximity of young army soldiers. After the first posters appeared in Darhal, the Army also dug its heels in. While they could not stop anyone from wearing a burkha if they chose, officers told the community, those who exercised the option would be stopped at the school gates and searched. Many villagers found the idea of such searches humiliating. Meanwhile, a second and third set of posters were put up starting December 2, each imposing a fresh deadline for adoption of the burkha, and warning of a variety of punishments ranging from mutilation to death.

"Several families who continued to send their daughters to school," says village headman Hadi Noor, "received beatings from the terrorists. Their girls' uniforms and books were burned, and the terrorists warned that their noses and ears would be cut off if they continued to offend." For the most part, Darhal parents solved their dilemma by simply pulling 11th and 12th-grade girls students out of the local government higher secondary school. The 80-odd girls who study there weren't able sit for the recent examinations because of the threats, and no alternate arrangements have been made by the State government.

No one in Darhal doubts that the Harkat's threats are credible. On December 17, al-Badr terrorists shot dead three teenage women at the tiny hamlet of Hasiyot, near Thanamandi in Rajouri. An al-Badr hit-squad walked into the home of 12th-standard student Tahira Parveen, who was then busy with her cousin's pre-wedding mehndi (henna) ritual, singled her out from among a group of women, and slit her throat with a hunting knife. Her friend Naureen Kaunser, who lived next door, died faster: shot dead at point-blank range. Sixteen-year-old Shehnaz Akhtar, already married though just a 10th-standard student, faced a more brutal end: she was marched out and decapitated. A note found in the Hasiyot mosque makes it clear that the al-Badr believed the three were informants. On past occasions, the Army had raided Hasiyot shortly after terrorist groups passed through the hamlet. This, coupled with the facts that Parveen's father had been killed on suspicion of being an army informer in 1997, and that Kaunser's father is a serving Border Security Force trooper, were evidently considered adequate grounds for the executions. "The girls' real fault", says Kaunser's father Mohammad Sadiq, "is that they were educated and did not treat the terrorists with the respect that they thought they deserved."

Contrary to media speculation, the killings at Hasiyot had little to do with the burkha issue. They were, however, part of a string of killings of civilians, intended to make clear the terrorists' domination of civil society. Four days after the Hasiyot killings, 4-year old Arfaz Ahmed, 7-year old Asid Mohammad and 12-year old Nazarat Hussain were shot dead at Surankote. Their father, Munshi Khan, who was seriously injured in the attack on his home along with a tenant - school teacher, Gurmeet Kaur - was believed by terrorists to be passing on information to the State police's Special Operations Group. Such killings are of a piece with similar assaults on anyone resisting far-Right fiat. Available data indicates that the overwhelming majority of civilian victims of terrorist violence are not Hindus [Table], but ordinary Muslims who are believed to be inadequately servile to the religious right.

Incredibly, despite the killings and the menacing notices, few women have actually started wearing the burkha in Rajouri: a tribute both to their courage and to the ground realities of their lives in this poor mountain region. Women in Rajouri, as in Poonch, Doda or Udhampur, work hard in the fields and are also responsible for taking cattle to nearby pastures. Carrying water up the hills takes up a major part of the day, as does foraging for firewood and fodder. The burkha simply doesn't allow for this kind of work. What the new ban has already achieved, however, is to strip rural women of any real shot at a higher education. "I know of one schoolmaster from a nearby hamlet", says Darhal Zonal Educational Officer M.A. Malik, "who was ordered to withdraw his daughter from the Government Degree College in Rajouri because they did not observe the burkha there." This, in turn, is part of a long-running campaign by the Islamic Right against women. In November 2001, 57-year-old schoolteacher Gulzar Lone was shot dead in front of his students at the Government Middle School in Alal, near Thanamandi for the 'crime' of having taught his daughter Jabeera Lone how to drive a two-wheeler.

At a rally after the Surankote killings, Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed said, the "time has come when the people should also use their influence, whatever little they have, on the militants and make them leave the gun." The Chief Minister, however, said nothing about what he intended to do to secure justice for those who, quite clearly, have no influence with terrorists.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in South Asia
December 30, 2002 - January 5, 2003

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

INDIA

14
11
46
71

Assam

0
0
4
4

Jammu & Kashmir

7
7
34
48

Left-wing Extremism

5
3
3
11

Manipur

1
0
0
1

Nagaland

0
1
0
1

Tripura

1
0
5
6

NEPAL

2
8
9
19

PAKISTAN

0
2
0
2
*   Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.




INDIA


NDFB 'vice president' Dhiren Boro arrested in Gangtok, Sikkim: Police on January 1, 2003, arrested Dhiren Boro, 'vice-president' of the proscribed National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) from Tadung in Gangtok, capital city of Sikkim. The police also detained his wife and two children who were with him. This is the first time that a terrorist leader from the Northeast has been arrested in the State. Sentinel Assam, January 2, 2003.

DHD announces cease-fire in Assam; government to reciprocate: The Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), a terrorist outfit active in the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts of Assam, announced on December 30, 2002, a 'suspension' of its activities and 'cessation of hostilities with the security forces (SFs) with effect from December 31 for a period of six months.' The DHD also said that this step is a 'goodwill gesture' to bring lasting peace in these districts. Meanwhile, official sources said that the DHD proposed to stop violence and hold talks with the Union and State governments to resolve the Dimasa issue within the framework of the Indian Constitution. The State government has reportedly reciprocated by agreeing to reach a cease-fire agreement with the DHD. Sources also said that peace talks would follow the suspension of operations and enforcement of 'ground rules'. Assam Tribune, January 1, 2003.

5,000 Kashmiri terrorists in various Pakistani camps, indicates report: A report in Daily Excelsior quoting official sources indicated that approximately 5,000 terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir were present at various camps in Pakistan. A majority of these terrorists hailed from the Valley, while 10 to 15 per cent belonged to the sensitive Rajouri and Poonch districts. The report indicates that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's external intelligence agency, has had to shift the Kashmiri terrorists from Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) to certain areas in Pakistan Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) after the May 14-Kaluchak massacre near Jammu. These details, the report says, are mostly based on revelations made by some captured terrorists during their interrogation in recent days. More than 1,000 terrorists had reportedly been shifted to a location in Pakistan Punjab near the Haripur-Taxila Road (HTR). Those shifted to the HTR section were drawn from four major groups - the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HuJI), Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM), Al Barq and Al Umar. Intelligence reports revealed the presence of 1,500 to 2,000 Kashmiri terrorists in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Most of them owe allegiance to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). Daily Excelsior, December 31, 2002.

Terrorist violence claimed 471 lives in Assam in 2002: A total of 471 persons were killed in various terrorism-related incidents in Assam in the year 2002, according to a report on December 30, 2002. The report quoting Assam police statistics, said that this includes 268 terrorists killed in various encounters, 177 civilians and 26 security force (SF) personnel killed by various terrorist groups. Giving a break up, the report further said 126 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) terrorists were killed in as many as 106 encounters, and the ULFA killed 25 civilians and 10 SF personnel. Another active group in the State, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) killed 127 civilians and eight SF personnel this past year. A total of 119 NDFB terrorists were also killed in 88 encounters. 23 terrorists of two more outfits in the area, the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) and the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), were killed in 18 encounters. These two groups, in total, killed 25 civilians. Besides, the DHD killed eight SF personnel during 2002. Sentinel Assam, December 31, 2002.

No terrorism-related casualty in Mizoram in 2002: Media reports of December 30 said Mizoram was relatively violence-free throughout the year 2002. Moreover, peace talks with the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) over repatriation of Reang refugees camping in North Tripura district and the mode of self-government for the Brus in Mizoram could not lead to a successful agreement. Stray terrorism-related incidents did occur in the State's areas bordering Manipur, but did not result in any civilian or security force casualty. Assam Tribune, December 31, 2002.


NEPAL

Maoist insurgents' parallel government advisor surrenders in Kaski district: Advisor-cum-member of the Joint Revolutionary People's Council - the parallel government of the Maoist insurgents--Lok Bahadur Thapa reportedly surrendered to the authorities in Kaski district, on January 1, 2003. While surrendering, Thapa said reforms and changes wished by the insurgents cannot be achieved through murder, violence, loot and destructive activities, and declared he would fight against violent policies. He added that he would not be associated with any affiliates of the Maoists. Thapa also said a solution to the current crisis should be reached through the monarchial and multiparty system. Nepal News, January 1, 2003



PAKISTAN

Al Badr forms suicide squad to target J&K police chief: According to a report in The News, a Pakistani daily, the Al Badr Mujahideen has claimed it has formed a suicide squad to target the police chief of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). "The director-general of police will be the main target of our group… The group has already formed a five-member suicide squad to target Suri [Ashok Kumar Suri is the J&K Director General of Police]," Ahmed Yar Gaznavi, spokesperson of the group, was quoted as saying. Jang, January 4, 2003.

Two Pakistanis killed as US bombs seminary near Pakistan-Afghanistan border: A US warplane on December 31, 2002, bombed an abandoned madrassa (seminary) in the Pakistani territory after a gun-battle between US and Pakistani troops on the border with Afghanistan. Two Pakistani security force personnel were killed and an American injured in the incident. The US military said that one of its soldiers was injured in Afghanistan on December 29 in an exchange of gunfire with a Pakistani border guard. The injured American was part of a unit conducting a mission with the Pakistani forces along the Afghan border when a disagreement appeared to break out, according to a statement released by the US military at their Afghan headquarters at Bagram air base. "A Pakistani border scout opened fire with a G3 rifle after the US patrol asked him to return to the Pakistan side of the border," the statement said. "That individual and several others retreated to a nearby structure… Close air support was requested and a 500-lb bomb was dropped on the target area", the statement added. Mohammad Khurshied, a local official in the South Waziristan tribal area, later said that a seminary in Angor Adda had been hit by the US warplane. Dawn; The Hindu, January 1, 2003.


STATISTICAL REVIEW

Terrorist Killings of Civilians in Rajouri District, Jammu & Kashmir

Year
Hindus
Muslims
Sikhs
Total
1997
9
17
0
26
1998
4
50
0
54
1999
17
50
0
67
2000
7
53
0
60
2001
12
75
0
87
2002*
24
90
1
115
Total
73
335
1
409

                        *      Data till December 25, 2002
                        Source: District Police, Rajouri

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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