INDIA
PAKISTAN
NEPAL
BHUTAN
BANGLADESH
SRI LANKA
Terrorism Update
Latest
S.A.Overview
Publication
Show/Hide Search
HomePrint
 
    Click to Enlarge
   

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 30, February 10, 2003

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

INDIA
IRAQ
USA

Cautious Engagement
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management

The doves in America are gradually transforming themselves into hawks, even as the most vocal opponent of the proposed Iraq campaign within the US Administration - Secretary of State Colin Powell - emerges among its strongest advocates, and opinion polls report 'hesitant domestic support for Bush's policies.' As the clouds of war deepen, there is an increasing tendency to polarisation - a 'with us or against us' orientation that excludes the many shades of grey, and the legitimate misgivings that many still have on the impending war.

There is, without doubt, truth in the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's argument that "Defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st-century threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy." The political paralysis, vacillation and policy reversal that have characterised counter-terrorism responses in the democratic world cannot generate an adequate response to the fanatical forces that threaten civilisation today, and the initiative will have to be seized by those who stand for freedom and order if these forces are to be defeated. Success in this enterprise, however, depends on the accuracy and effectiveness with which we define, engage with, and neutralize the 'enemy'.

That's the problem with Iraq. The autocratic and oppressive Saddam Hussain regime is, without doubt, a problem - but it is still far from clear that it is the most significant problem within the context of the rising threat of international terrorism. The American case has certainly been poorly argued on this count; but worse, there appears, in the American strategy, no clear theory of closure or coherent exit policy. America has an extended record of untidiness in this context - and this has been underlined in the recent past by the experience in Afghanistan and the visible strategy on Pakistan. The war in Afghanistan is far from over; the stability and survival of the tenuous Karzai regime are under constant threat; and, though Afghanistan has been all but destroyed, terrorism may well have emerged stronger, more dispersed and more complex as a result of the US intervention in that country. On the other hand, Pakistan - which is projected as America's 'strongest ally' in the war against terrorism - is fundamentally and ideologically in conflict with everything the US represents; is presently and certainly the worst nest of Islamist extremist terror in the world; and is probably - and in the Indian perspective, unquestionably - the most active state sponsor of international terrorism. America's engagement with these two countries does not appear to have sufficiently secured the ends of the 'global war against terrorism', even as a new and potentially immensely destabilizing campaign is planned in Iraq.

The US itself still remains substantially insulated from the consequences of instability and disorder in Asia - though the threat of an occasional terrorist act on American soil is great and rising. If a particular situation remains 'messy', or worsens further, withdrawal to the now imperfect 'fortress America' can still be contemplated. Those who are permanently located in this troubled neighbourhood, however, do not have this option, and would be required to deal with the chaotic impact of unfinished wars, collapsing states and a rootless, violent diaspora.

These dangers, precisely, are what underlie India's cautiously disapproving line on Iraq. Ironically, India voices many of the same concerns regarding Iraq that the US does in its advocacy of a 'peaceful resolution' of, and disapproval of any 'pre-emptive action' in, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir: that the existing regime can be bribed or coerced to improve its record without recourse to war; that the alternative to the present regime is uncertain and likely to be worse; that the destruction of a unsatisfactory but stable regime would plunge the entire region into disorder, and would create wider spaces for the operation of the forces of extremism and terror.

But India's immediate concerns regarding the impending war in Iraq are wider and far more direct. The economic and political impact of such a war, and of the possible destabilisation of the Middle East, could be substantial and immediate, and the memory of the deep financial crisis into which the country was plunged by the last Gulf War in 1990-91 is still fresh in the minds of policy makers here. Iraq is a significant source of oil for India, but more importantly, the fear is that a war would send the prices of oil spiralling from all sources, feeding an inflationary spiral that could undermine India's economy at a crucial phase of its current transformation. Over three million Indian workers in the Gulf are also threatened with a decline in, or loss of, employment, and foreign exchange remittances from these sources can be expected to fall dramatically. The potentially dampening effect of the war on the US economy also impacts on the Indian economy, as America is India's largest trading partner.

The greater danger, however, is that a war against Iraq may lead to more violence and instability in the immediate neighbourhood - and especially in Pakistan, Afghanistan and, possibly, Iran and Saudi Arabia as well. There are already indications of rising terrorist action in Afghanistan and this trend can be expected to intensify when the campaign against Iraq begins. In Pakistan, the Musharraf regime is expected to attempt to deflect domestic discontent and criticism of its support to the US war on Iraq by intensifying cross-border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and other theatres in India.

Despite these specific risks to Indian interests, the Indian position does accommodate the ambiguities of the situation and is not defined by an inflexible opposition to war - but reflects, rather, qualified opposition to unilateralism and haste in this engagement. It recognizes, moreover, that - irrespective of the decision and outcome of the proposed Iraq campaign, and the tactical disagreements on Pakistan and other issues - India is now fundamentally and irrevocably committed to the development and deepening of strategic ties with the US, and the basis of this commitment is not a transient and opportunistic convergence of interests, but a convergence of basic ideologies and shared values of pluralism, democracy, constitutional governance and an open global system that comprehends and promotes these values.


ASSESSMENT

INDIA
DUBAI

The Criminal-Terror Nexus, Again
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

"How easy it was for Al-Qaida's bankers to have five hundred thousand dollars wired from a bank in Dubai for anonymous use in automatic teller machines in Florida and Maine. How difficult it has been, even with the backing of United Nations resolutions and 150 nations, to find out who raised or sent those dollars… illegal money doesn't just feed other security threats - it also causes them."
- Lord Robertson, Secretary General, NATO, April 17, 2002.

In the second such incident since December last, on February 3, 2003, Dubai arrested and subsequently released a number of high profile organised criminals linked with international terrorism, despite Interpol red corner notices against many of these, and despite the fact that India had again handed over a list containing the details of some of these criminals to the United Arab Emirate (UAE) authorities as recently as on January 28, 2003.

Initial reports suggested that 26 members of the notorious Dawood Ibrahim gang, widely known as the 'D-Company', including two of the gangleader's brothers - Noora (Noorul Haque) and Mustaqim - had been taken into custody in Dubai. Both Noora and Mustaqim - along with Mohammed Dossa, another of the arrested gangsters - are accused in the 1993 Bombay Blasts case involving a series of explosions in commercial centres that killed 257 persons, and injured another 713, and are believed by Indian authorities to be part of the network that provides operational support to terrorists in close coordination with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Both Noora and Mustaqim are permanent residents of Dubai, with substantial business interests in this City State. Subsequent reports indicated that the number of gangsters arrested by Dubai authorities was as high as 110. Despite the arrests and the clear documentation on this count, Indian authorities had little expectation that the culprits would be extradited to face Indian justice. For one thing, the Indian Ambassador to Dubai was stonewalled by authorities in his efforts to secure official confirmation and details of the arrests; for another, the same drama had been played out with another of Dawood Ibarhim's brothers, Anees Kaksar Ibrahim, in early December 2002 ["Dubai-Pakistan: Fellow Travellers of Terrorism," SAIR 1.22, December 16, 2002].

In the latest incident, reports indicated that all the persons arrested were subsequently released with instructions to 'leave the country immediately'. On the surface, it was unclear why Dubai chose to take sudden action against these gang-lords and their cadres who have had settled operations in the country for well over a decade. Sources indicate that the motive was primarily to prevent a bloodbath on Dubai soil, rather than any larger concern regarding the criminal and terrorist activities engaged in by these groups in other countries.

Earlier, on January 19, 2003, one of Dawood Ibrahim's lieutenants, Sharad Shetty, was killed at the India Club in the city in what is believed to have been a revenge killing ordered by Dawood's former associate and - since the Bombay Blasts - current underworld rival, Chotta Rajan, for an unsuccessful attempt on Rajan's life in Bangkok in September 2000. The killing may also have been a bid to take over the lucrative betting cartel, which Shetty ran on Dawood's behalf, ahead of the Cricket World Cup Series. Shetty had been settled in Dubai since 1986, and had spawned a huge financial empire in the city despite a range of criminal charges pending in India, and a red corner Interpol notice relating to the murder of a Mumbai hotelier in June 1995. The present spate of arrests is believed to have been initiated when a large number of 'D-Company' men converged on Dubai in what was thought to be a prelude to a gang war to eliminate Chotta Rajan's network in the city. Dubai authorities, concerned with keeping their own turf clean - particularly on the eve of the annual 'Dubai shopping festival' - simply bundled up all the suspects, gave them a warning against such violence within their jurisdiction, and asked them to leave the country - probably for their safe havens in Pakistan - for a 'cooling off' period.

Indian authorities have failed to get any official version on these events - including identities, points of origin and eventual destinations - of the criminals arrested and released by Dubai, despite requests for information by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and diplomatic channels.

Dubai's conduct in this and other cases raises critical questions about the role of this tiny City State in the evolving international network of organised criminals and Islamist extremist terrorists. One of the largest and most unregulated financial centres in the world, with huge turnovers in undocumented movements of gemstones - including those originating in the world's worst conflict areas -, gold and cash, and located at the strategic crossroads of the Gulf, South Asia and Africa, Dubai has long been a financial hub for organised criminal and Islamist extremist groups, as well as a primary transit point for the shipping of contraband. The Dawood Ibrahim gang controls much of this contraband movement from and to South Asia, as well as, crucially, a large chunk of the illegal hawala transactions in the region. It is this latter element that constitutes the gravest threat within the context of contemporary international terrorism: hawala is the future of terrorist financing, as various systems of transfer through 'regular' banking and conventional money laundering channels all leave behind paper trails that are vulnerable to eventual discovery. A paperless transaction, the traditional South Asian hawala system leaves behind no evidence once the monies are delivered to the recipient.

There is significant evidence of massive flows of terrorist finance from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and into Dubai after the US campaign against the Al Qaeda - Taliban combine commenced in October 2001. It is certainly the case that much of the money, both before and after 9/11, that financed terrorism in different parts of the world moved through ventures located in Dubai. The reality of this superficially modernised City State is that it runs a highly efficient operation that uses contemporary technologies and commercial systems that supports the world of disorder, lawlessness and terror, and Dubai is, indeed, a direct beneficiary of, and heavily dependent on, its linkages with this underworld.

Dubai claims that it is 'cooperating' with US authorities to shut down terrorist financing through financial networks based on its soil - but the nature of the underground system is such that it cannot be shut down selectively, disallowing transactions by one group of users, while facilitating others. Authorities in this port city have long demonstrated strong sympathies and direct commercial linkages with a terrorism-linked international criminal underground operating from its soil. There is, at this point, little evidence that these sympathies and linkages have, in any measure, been diluted by the world's anger at the catastrophic terrorist attacks in the US, and by international anxieties regarding the rising tide of extremist Islamist terrorism. It may, however, have become temporarily necessary for ambivalent states like Dubai to try to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in South Asia
February 3-9, 2003

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

0
0
3
3

INDIA

17
5
28
50

Assam

1
1
3
5

Jammu & Kashmir

5
4
25
34

Left-wing Extremism

5
0
0
5

Tripura

6
0
0
6

PAKISTAN

2
0
0
2

SRI LANKA

0
0
3
3
*   Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.



INDIA


Acting Pakistan High Commissioner expelled on charges of funding Kashmiri separatists: The Indian government on February 8, 2003, expelled Pakistan's Acting High Commissioner Jalil Abbas Jilani and four non-diplomatic staffers for "involvement in activities incompatible with their official position". Jilani had earlier been named by the Delhi Police in the First Information Report registered after one of the two arrested All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) activists on February 6 alleged that he funded separatist activities in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Anjum Zamrooda Habib, chief of Muslim Khawateen Markaz, a Hurriyat constituent, who along with Delhi-based Hurriyat spokesperson Shabir Dar were arrested on February 6, confessed before a designated Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) court in Delhi that Rupees 3.07 lakh recovered from her was given by Jilani to be passed on to the APHC chairman Abdul Gani Bhat as a Nazrana (gift). She reportedly also revealed that Dar was frequenting the Pakistan High Commission for receiving money for an unnamed terrorist outfit. Meanwhile, in an apparent retaliatory move, Pakistan ordered on the same day the expulsion of India's Acting High Commissioner Sudhir Vyas and four non-diplomatic staffers from the country. Hindustan Times, February 9, 2003; Daily Excelsior, February 7, 2003.

Premier Vajpayee suggests unified command to tackle Naxalite violence: Speaking at a Chief Ministers' conference on internal security in Delhi on February 8, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee suggested the creation of a unified command structure by the nine States affected by left-wing extremist - Naxalite - violence. While expressing serious concern over Naxalite violence in the regions from the Indian border with Nepal to Andhra Pradesh, he said, "I would like to emphasise the need to remove all shortcomings in intelligence-sharing and mounting well-coordinated anti-Naxalite operations by the concerned States. If necessary, this should be done under a unified command." Times of India, February 9, 2003.

Dubai shuts down local LeT office; deports cadres to Pakistan, indicates report: According to a media report, authorities in Dubai on February 4, 2003, shut down the office of Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and deported some of its cadres to Pakistan. Reportedly, the crackdown was personally ordered by General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashed al Maktoum, Defence Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and crown prince of Dubai. India Monitor, February 5, 2003.

Russia bans three Pakistan-based terrorist groups: Russia has outlawed three Pakistan-based terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and launched legal procedures for impounding their assets in the country. Besides LeT, the Jamaat-e-Islam and Hizb-ut-Tahri al Islami have been included in Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) blacklist of 15 international terrorist groups submitted to the Prosecutor General's office for imposing a judicial ban and confiscation of their assets in Russia, the state-run Russia TV network said on February 4, 2003. Besides the Al Qaeda and Taliban, the Russian terrorist black list also includes various Islamist groups based in Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Egypt and Kuwait. Indian Express, February 5, 2003.

Dubai arrests Pakistan-based Mafia don Dawood Ibrahim's brother and others, indicates reports: According to a media report, Dubai authorities detained five close associates of Pakistan-based Mafia don Dawood Ibrahim including his brother Noorul Haq alias Noora, Mohammed Dossa and Aftab Batki on February 3, 2003. While Noora and Dossa are wanted in connection with the 1993-Mumbai serial bomb blasts case, Batki is alleged to be involved in various cases of counterfeit currency. Separately, another report said that 15 persons were arrested by the Dubai Police, including Mumbai bomb blasts accused Mustafa Majnun Dossa, Ejaz Pathan, top aides of Dawood associate Chhota Shakeel, Salim Talwar and Tariq Parveen. Further, a report of February 6 has indicated that an unspecified number of associates of Dawood Ibrahim might have been released in Dubai. They have also reportedly been asked to leave United Arab Emirates (UAE) immediately. Times of India, February 3 and 7, 2003.

ISI directs Lashkar-e-Toiba to use toy planes in J&K, indicates reports: According to media reports, to ensure a "mini replica" of the 9/11 attacks in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Pakistan's external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), has directed terrorists, especially of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), to use "toy planes" to target army posts and prominent personalities in the State. Quoting an interrogation report of a LeT cadre arrested recently in the State, official sources said that ISI had handed over a "fleet" of four dozen such planes, capable of carrying 10-15 kilograms of RDX, to LeT for carrying out attacks on army posts or helicopter gun ships of the Indian Air Force. These sources also said that two such planes were recovered on an unspecified date from the Rajouri district of Jammu region. These "toy planes" which can be operated by a remote control, take a set trajectory and hit a target within a range of 300 metres. The arrested Lashkar cadre is reported to have confessed that the plane was displayed at a recent LeT congregation in Pakistan. He also revealed that the ISI was also planning to destroy certain forward Indian positions at the Line of Control and International Border using these toy planes. The planes were reportedly being assembled in the LeT dominated area of Muridke in Pakistan. Indian Express, February 3, 2003.


PAKISTAN

Al Qaeda is a terrorist outfit, Federal government informs Lahore High Court: The Federal government on February 7, 2003, informed the Lahore High Court (LHC) that it considers the Al Qaeda a terrorist organisation in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and anyone who harbours its members is breaking the law. Deputy Attorney General Sher Zaman outlined the government's view of the Al Qaeda to the LHC in response to a petition challenging the detention of a doctor and his family accused of hiding four top Al Qaeda operatives at their Lahore residence. "Al-Qaeda has been globally declared a terrorist organisation by the United Nations Security Council Resolution number 1373 which makes it mandatory for all member states of the United Nations to implement it," Zaman said, quoting from an Interior Ministry statement. Dr Javed Ahmed Khawaja, his brother, two sons and nephew were arrested during a raid at their residence on December 18, 2002, and are accused of having links to the Al Qaeda. Nation, February 8, 2003.

Government lodges protest against Indian allegation of Pakistani High Commission funding Kashmiri separatists: The Pakistani government on February 7, 2003, lodged a protest with the Indian government, when it summoned its Acting High Commissioner Sudhir Vyas to the Foreign Office against what it described as "ridiculous and baseless" allegations against its Acting High Commissioner Jalil Abbas Jilani in New Delhi. Jilani is alleged to have paid a woman activist of the secessionist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) Rupees 3.07 lakh to be passed on to terrorist groups in Kashmir. A Foreign Office spokesperson said, "The government of Pakistan has lodged a strong protest with the Indian government over the ridiculous and baseless allegation made by Indian authorities accusing Pakistan's acting High Commissioner Jalil Abbas Jilani of providing money to the representatives of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference." "Registering an FIR [First Information Report] against acting High Commissioner under POTA [Prevention of Terrorism Act] law is the worst example of diplomatic depravity," he told reporters in Islamabad. Jang, February 8, 2003.

President Musharraf disputes US claims on Iraq Embassy's Al Qaeda links: President Pervez Musharraf on February 6, 2003, denied US claims that Iraq used its Islamabad Embassy as a liaison with the Al Qaeda network. He made these remarks while referring to US Secretary of State Colin Powell's claim before the United Nations Security Council on February 5. "I haven't heard entirely what he said. I have to analyse it. But if he said it, it is certainly not the truth," Musharraf told reporters in Moscow. "Certainly in Pakistan we think no such activity took place... We don't have any information or intelligence on this. If he (Powell) has the intelligence or information, we need to analyse whatever information he has." the President said. Musharraf also added that anti-war sentiment was on the rise in Pakistan and a war in Iraq could unleash a wave of unrest in the country. Daily Times, February 7, 2003.


SRI LANKA

Three LTTE cadres aboard arms carrying boat commit suicide: In a serious violation of the cease-fire agreement, three cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) reportedly blew themselves up in a boat carrying arms and ammunition off the island of Delft on February 8, 2003. The Sri Lanka Navy in a statement on February 8 said the incident occurred after a Navy Fast Attack Craft (FAC) on routine patrol covering the area south of Delft island off the Jaffna Peninsula detected a trawler being towed by an LTTE boat on February 7. Several attempts by the Sri Lanka Navy to search the LTTE boat in the presence of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) representatives failed. A permission to search the trawler was granted on February 8 after discussions with the LTTE Naval Commander. The LTTE cadres asked the cease-fire monitors on board who found arms on the boat to jump off before setting fire to the vessel and committing suicide. Sunday Observer, February 9, 2003.

Berlin peace talks conclude with LTTE agreeing to work with UNICEF on child soldiers: At the fifth round of peace talks held in Berlin, Germany, on February 7-8, the Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) negotiators agreed to work out safeguards to prevent the February 8 type of sea incidents (three LTTE cadres blew themselves up together with an arms-laden trawler off the island of Delft) from happening in the future, agreed to establish three committees in the Eastern Province to address local land and other issues and also agreed to request Amnesty International's Ian Martin to prepare for discussion a roadmap of human rights issues. The LTTE is reported to have also agreed to work with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on an action plan for child soldiers, a Norwegian embassy press release said on February 8. Tamil Net, February 9, 2003.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



To receive FREE advance copies of SAIR by email Subscribe.

Recommend South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) to a friend.

 

 

 

 

 
Copyright © 2001 SATP. All rights reserved.