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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 31, February 16, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Is there a 'Plan
B'?
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management
The present situation in Pakistan presents an urgent challenge,
not only for nations within the South Asian region, but
for the entire international community and the leaders of
the global war against terrorism. These challenges have
been underlined by a continuous succession of disturbing
disclosures since 9/11, and by the near complete uncertainty
of prospects for the future. Over the past months, the question
has been frequently asked by a number of senior government
officials and responsible diplomats from several countries:
what is to be done with Pakistan? A fundamental transformation
is inevitable over the coming years, but is it being facilitated
by the near exclusive reliance on the questionable commitment
and survival of the country's current dictator, General
Pervez Musharraf?
It is useful to ask, under the circumstances, is there a
'Plan B' for Pakistan? There appears to be little evidence
of any structured alternative even being considered by the
'international community', or any of its constituent nations.
The world, it appears, has fallen victim to the seduction
of the TINA ('There is no alternative') factor.
But the TINA argument has always been the plea of bankrupt
minds. Over the past years, the world could have created
an alternative, if its leaders had the capacity and
the will to imagine one.
Such an enterprise at constructing, if not a programme for
regime change in Pakistan, at least one for an alternative
successor regime (not just a modus vivendi with whichever
General grabs the presidency after Musharraf), is critical
for a number of reasons. For one, the country's own leadership
has proven chronically incompetent, and Pakistan is, to
all effects, now being run from the outside: most of its
critical decisions in the recent past have been coerced
by external pressure. More significantly, the internal dynamics
that obtain in Pakistan today will not survive the end of
the present year, after which the tensions that already
exist within the system will become unbearable. Musharraf,
if he sticks to his word, will no longer be the Army Chief
after the year-end. Though the new chief would be 'his man',
it is not clear how long such loyalties would abide - which
is why Musharraf has been extremely reluctant to relinquish
the post. In any event, a duality between the President
and the Army Chief would lead to further and necessary erosion
in Musharraf's authority and would significantly increase
political uncertainty in the country (it is useful to recall
that General Zia-ul-Haq held on to the post of military
chief throughout his Presidency for precisely these reasons).
Such uncertainty is already rising, and Musharraf has been
immensely weakened over the past months. A dictator's authority
is inevitably undermined by determined attempts at assassination,
and the two on Musharraf's life last December have deeply
damaged him, underlining his vulnerability in the eyes of
the Pakistani people, and of his enemies. Ambivalent supporters
now find it easier to distance themselves from the President,
and political opportunists will be tempted to bring out
the long knives. There is a concomitant loss of authority
among the masses as well, and this can only worsen over
time, as he becomes more isolated within a hardening security
bubble, more dependent on selective inputs from a narrow
coterie. The loss of authority and growing isolation is
already visible in Musharraf's decision to move his residence
and military headquarters from Rawalpindi to Islamabad,
signalling the raw fact that the President is no longer
safe among his own people. The fullest consequences and
magnitude of this shift are yet to be adequately noticed.
With the Al
Qaeda and its affiliates targeting him, moreover,
there is also the simple and brutal question of his very
survival from day to day. The cumulative destabilizing impact
of these factors, moreover, is multiplied manifold by the
prospects of a new Administration and changing perspectives
in Washington after the November 2004 US Presidential elections.
At this juncture, then, even if he survives, what does Musharraf
actually control? By his own admission, he no longer controls
the jehadis that he and his Army had long nurtured
- and it is now clear even to his most cynical detractors
that at least some of these are eager to kill him. By his
own admission, again, he does not 'control' the country's
nuclear programme and its nuclear scientists - since they
apparently proliferate nuclear technologies without his
knowledge. It is increasingly clear that he does not entirely
control the fundamentalist parties - including the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), whose political ascendancy he engineered
in the rigged elections of October 2002, and who subsequently
forced a humiliating compromise on him, including the commitment
to step down as Army Chief by the end of the current year.
The character and location of December's assassination attempts
demonstrate, moreover, that his control over parts of the
Army itself is not altogether complete.
Yet this insecure dictator remains the world's most critical,
indeed, 'indispensable', instrumentality in the war against
terror, and for the stabilisation of the wider region around
South Asia!
Significantly, within Pakistan, Musharraf's progressive
weakening has not been accompanied by the gradual emergence
or strengthening of other institutional alternatives. Indeed,
all political authority in the country has suffered continuous
erosion under his predatory regime. There is, of course,
deep and growing resentment within the democratic parties
and civil society, including the civilian bureaucracy, against
the military dictatorship, but this has not crystallized
into a working political opposition or a potential political
alternative, because Musharraf retains sufficient control
of the state's instrumentalities of repression to suppress
any manifestations of democratic political dissent.
The result is that, though his own grip weakens, no other
national institution has been allowed to grow under his
emasculating shadow.
Historically, as dictators become weaker, their reliance
on external support becomes the more urgent, and such support
has ordinarily been forthcoming for some of the most odious
regimes in the past. Historically, again, such external
support has seldom succeeded in restoring the crumbling
authority of such regimes, and has often contributed directly
in their erosion, and to a rising anarchy. Indeed, in Pakistan,
there is some evidence that the problems are currently being
compounded by their 'solutions'. Increasing international
aid makes the Musharraf regime even more unpopular in a
country where Islamism and hatred of America and the West
have been a necessary cultural and educational ingredient
for decades.
What, then, can be done with Pakistan? Militarist adventures
for 'regime change', as Iraq has amply demonstrated, are
not particularly efficient mechanisms to secure necessary
and desirable transformations. Indeed, as Iraq again demonstrated,
international regimes of sanctions and inspections could
be far more efficient in curbing the more dangerous of an
unhinged dictator's projects. Consequently, where there
are possibilities of reforms through existing international
and domestic institutions, pursuing these would be a far
more desirable course of action. Pakistan does have an incipient
- though sullied - democratic tradition, and in strengthening
it, a long-term alternative could have been created to the
present and corrosive dictatorship. There is a natural element
of transparency and predictability in even the most flawed
of democracies, which is totally lacking in the present
order in Pakistan. Today, under the Musharraf dictatorship,
no one knows what devastating secret is going to come to
light next. Within a free, multi-party democratic order,
at least the worst excesses of the present authoritarian
system would be held in check.
Instead, there has been a tendency to uncritical indulgence
of the rogue regime in Pakistan, encouraging it in its recklessness
by continuous concessions. Thus, instead of being brought
under a regime of harsh sanctions for illegal nuclear proliferation,
Musharraf finds it possible to refuse, in no uncertain terms,
to allow international agencies to investigate the proliferation
network in his country. He also refuses to take any action
against the principal proliferators on the plea that the
offences lie in the past (but all punishable offences
lie in the past), and the network has now been 'shut down'
(as have, according to his claims, been the terrorist camps
in Pakistan, apparently for two and a half years now). Any
international investigations into the proliferation network,
he argues further, would offend against Pakistan's 'sovereign'
status. But it is not Pakistan and its sovereignty that
are affected by these acts of proliferation. It is the world's
security.
The degree to which Pakistan threatens global security remains
deeply underestimated because of a peculiar characteristic
of its transgressions. Despite the great evil it has wrought,
there is no single, iconic figure that dominates its offences
against the norms of civilization - no 'lunatic' Saddam
Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi or Kim Jong Il. It is the entire
state apparatus that has internalised terrorism as an instrumentality
of state policy, and successive regimes and leaders have
pursued the same policies, irrespective of their proclaimed
political proclivities. This makes it harder, both to comprehend
and to control what Bernard-Henri Levy has described as
"the biggest rogue of all rogue states of today… what is
taking form there, between Islamabad and Karachi, is a black
hole compared to which Saddam Hussein's Baghdad was an obsolete
weapons dump."
There have been ample warnings, and these have gone unheeded
to disastrous effect in the past. It is the tragedy of all
nations and their leaderships that they fail to learn until
the bodybags come to their own doorsteps; and even then,
they learn very slowly. That is why evil triumphs; not because
it is stronger, but because we choose to look the other
way.
Emerging Co-operation
Against Maoist Subversion
P.G Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Two front ranking leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist)
[CPN (M)], Matrika Prasad Yadav and Suresh Bahadur Ale Magar,
were arrested in the Indian city of Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh
and subsequently handed over to Nepalese immigration authorities
of the far-western region on February 8, 2004. Earlier,
on November 20, 2003, a reported meeting between the General
Secretary of Communist Party of Nepal (UML), Madhav Kumar
Nepal and top Maoist leaders, including the chief Comrade
Prachanda and political wing leader Baburam Bhattarai, in
Lucknow had generated much controversy and confusion, both
in India and Nepal. It is after this Maoist rendezvous that
Indian security forces were instructed to be more vigilant
on the insurgents' incursions in border areas, especially
along the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and in the
Siliguri and Darjeeling areas of West Bengal. At the fifth
meeting of the India-Nepal Joint Working Group (JWG) on
Border Management held in Kathmandu on January 30-31, 2004,
both the countries decided to share intelligence on the
movement of Maoist subversives along the border.
Matrika Prasad Yadav, one of the leading ideologues and
politburo member of CPN (M), was also a key member of the
Maoist team involved in the peace talks with the Nepalese
Government through February - August 2003. He was recently
appointed the chief of the 'Madheshi Autonomous People's
Government', a self-styled government declared by the Maoists
in Sarlahi district on January 25, 2004. Matrika Yadav is
one of the 21 Maoist leaders against whom the Interpol has
issued red corner notices. Suresh Ale Magar, a former university
teacher, is a well-known figure in Maoist circles.
This was not the first set of major arrests of Nepalese
Maoists in India. Chandra Prakash Gajurel alias Gaurav,
another top Maoist leader, who was arrested from the Chennai
Airport in Tamil Nadu on August 20, 2003, is undergoing
trial at a Chennai court for allegedly using fake travel
documents. Nepalese media reported on February 7, 2004,
that Maoists injured during encounters with the security
forces had been treated at Indian hospitals, including more
than 128 in Uttar Pradesh and 60 in the city of Jalandhar
in Punjab. According to sources, on receiving the warning
signal from Interpol, security agencies in Uttar Pradesh
had launched search operations in December 2003 to apprehend
Nepalese Maoist leaders who were believed to be hiding in
the border villages. An unspecified number of injured Nepalese
Maoist cadres under treatment in Uttar Pradesh were subsequently
arrested and handed over to Nepalese authorities, and a
number of facilitators who have been helping them procure
treatment in various hospitals were also arrested. Importantly,
Bamdev Chettri an employee at Jawaharlal Nehru University
and the secretary of the Maoist linked Akhil Bharat Nepali
Ekta Samaj (ABNES) was arrested at Delhi on September 6,
2002, for his alleged links with Kashmiri militants and
Indian extremist groups, and was deported to Nepal. Earlier,
in April 2002, the Uttar Pradesh police had handed over
eight injured Nepali Maoists who were undergoing treatment
in private clinics in Lucknow. Similarly, the West Bengal
police had arrested Abhijit Mazumdar, son of the late Naxalite
(Left Wing extremist) leader Charu Mazumdar, who had emerged
as the chief conduit for the infiltrating Nepalese Maoists
in North Bengal. On June 12, 2002, nine Maoists were arrested
in Balrampur district in Uttar Pradesh and were handed over
to Nepal after a short detention. In September 2003, two
Maoists including an area commander were arrested in Madhubani
district in Bihar and handed over to the Nepali security
forces. Eight Nepalese Maoists had also been arrested in
Patna, Bihar, in February 2003. Nepali dominated settlements
in border areas, including Darjeeling and Siliguri in West
Bengal, as well as other major border cities, have been
brought under strict surveillance by the Indian security
forces. Indian concerns are accentuated by intelligence
inputs regarding the growing cooperation between the Indian
Left-wing extremist groups and Nepalese Maoists, and the
Indian Government has decided to form a special Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) wing, comprising of 20 to 25
companies to safeguard the border areas in 53 districts
seriously afflicted by Left Wing extremism. The decision
was taken in a Home Ministry meeting with the Chief Secretaries
of nine Naxalite infested states on November 21, 2003.
During the January Indo-Nepal JWG meeting, both the sides
had expressed concern on the enduring Maoist incursions
and agreed not to allow their territories to be used for
subversion by the insurgents. The recent arrests/deportations
are an indication of the increasing level of seriousness
being attached to Maoist activities in border areas. While
the Maoists are currently strengthening their position in
the Terai region on both sides of the border, they have
also been vigorous efforts to reinforce alliances with Indian
Left-Wing
extremist groupings like the People's War Group
(PWG)
and Maoist Communist Center (MCC)
both directly and through the Coordination Committee of
Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).
A Maoist 'commander' from the Mangalsen area, Jay Bahadur
Gharti, who surrendered before the security forces in July
2003, disclosed during a Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) press
conference on January 22, 2004, that the PWG and MCC conducted
training camps for the Nepalese Maoist cadres in 1998 in
Rolpa district and subsequently in years 2000 and 2001 in
the same district.
A few weeks before the beginning of 'People's War' on February
13, 1996, the political front of the CPN (M) led by Bhattarai
had submitted a list of 40 demands to the Nepal Government,
which, among other aspects, also highlighted an anti-India
agenda. The continuing anti-India posturing is reflected
in their recent attacks on Indian joint ventures in Nepal,
including Dabur Nepal and Surya Nepal in Birgunj. Further,
on January 27, 2004, in the first ever such incident reported
inside Indian territory, the Maoists had planted a powerful
'gagri' (water carrying vessel) bomb at Tanakpur in the
Champawat district of Uttar Pradesh. The extremely porous
1,800 kilometre-long border, which has been maintained according
to the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, offers uninterrupted
passage for illegal smuggling of goods, arms, ammunition,
narcotics, and human trafficking, as well as the movement
of civilian populations and workers from either side.
Currently, there is much to notice vis-à-vis the changing
dynamics of counter-insurgency operations by the Indian
and Nepalese security forces. Within Nepal, the Maoists
have once again begun announcing 'liberated autonomous regions'
especially in their strong holds, including the 'Madhesi
autonomous republic' in the Sarlahi district and the 'autonomous
region of Magarat' at Tawang village in the Rolpa district,
in January 2004. However, increasing Indian patrolling along
the border areas has led them to search for alternate routes
from their traditional northern transit point of western
Nepal to bring in arms and ammunition purchased in the open
market in Uttar Pradesh. Further, the recent Indian Government's
decision to exempt the nine left-wing affected States from
paying the cost of deployment of Central Para-Military Forces
(CPMF) is a great relief to States like Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, and has helped augment the ongoing anti-incursion
operations along the border.
The success of the Royal Bhutan Army's operations in December
2003 against Indian insurgent groups including the United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)
and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
operating from Bhutanese territory, has reportedly encouraged
India to mount pressure on Nepal for similar strikes on
hideouts of Indian Maoists across the Indo-Nepal border.
According to sources, it was one of the issues taken up
by the then Union Home Secretary N. Gopalaswami during his
meeting with his Nepalese counterpart Ananta Raj Pandey
on February 3-4, 2004. Indian forces have reportedly assured
technical assistance and aircraft surveillance in case of
a crackdown by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) on Maoist hideouts
bordering the Terai region in Uttar Pradesh, Purnea in Bihar
and Siliguri in West Bengal. Though India is the major supplier
of military equipment to Nepal, there is no formal agreement
between the security forces of the two countries. Some analysts
believe that if Bhutan, with a strike force of just about
6,000 personnel, can successfully act against the insurgents,
Nepal, with more than 72,000 RNA personnel, could do even
better.
The active co-operation between Nepalese Maoists and Indian
left-wing extremist groups has helped them expand their
areas of operation even beyond the conventional Compact
Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) corridor, extending from Nepal
through Bihar and the Dandakarnya region to Andhra Pradesh.
Increasing Indo-Nepalese co-operation could hit at the insurgents'
most influential base at the top of their 'corridor' in
Nepal, and could progressively weaken the movement in a
southward direction.
There has always been a certain sense of insecurity and
political animosity in Nepal due to the fact that it is
landlocked by India from three sides. While the deportation
of two Maoist leaders, as well as an increasing number of
cadres, underlines India's positive intentions on the Maoist
insurgency in Nepal, there is much that remains to be achieved
through a sustained engagement between the two countries.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
February 9-
15, 2004
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
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BANGLADESH
|
1
|
0
|
7
|
8
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
8
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
3
|
5
|
17
|
25
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
5
|
0
|
1
|
6
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Tripura
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
|
9
|
5
|
34
|
48
|
NEPAL
|
13
|
1
|
43
|
57
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Suspected
Al
Qaeda
supporters
threaten
to
bomb
Indian
deputy
envoy
in
Rajshahi:
The
Rajshahi
Metropolitan
Police
has
reportedly
beefed
up
security
at
the
office
and
residence
of
the
Indian
Deputy
High
Commissioner
in
the
city
after
a
letter
claiming
to
be
from
the
Al
Qaeda
threatened
to
blow
up
the
office
unless
the
diplomat
paid
Taka
50
million.
The
letter
was
delivered
at
the
office
on
February
8,
2004,
and
a
group
reportedly
claiming
itself
to
be
the
'mujahids'
of
Al
Qaeda
has
given
a
seven-day
ultimatum
to
the
Deputy
High
Commissioner
to
pay
the
money,
which
it
wants
to
use
for
sending
'Bangladeshi
Mujahids'
to
fight
'persecutors
of
Muslims'
in
India.
The
letter
also
claimed
that
anti-Islamist
groups
were
killing
hundreds
of
Muslims
in
India.
The
Daily
Star,
February
11,
2004.
INDIA
Northeast
witnessed
decline
in
fatalities
in
year
2003,
indicates
report:
Media
reports
quoting
intelligence
sources
said
that
the
northeast
region
witnessed
a
marginal
decline
in
terrorism
related
fatalities
in
the
year
2003,
compared
to
the
previous
years.
The
report
indicated
that
1072
persons
were
killed
by
different
terrorist
outfits
during
the
year
2003
as
compared
to
1172
in
2002.
The
largest
number
of
killings
was
reported
from
Assam,
which
recorded
379
deaths.
Tripura
recorded
286
deaths,
and
Manipur
witnessed
201
fatalities.
88
and
78
deaths
were
reported
from
Nagaland
and
Meghalaya
respectively.
Arunachal
Pradesh
witnessed
36
fatalities.
Mizoram
was
the
most
peaceful
State
in
the
region
with
four
deaths.
The
report
also
indicated
a
rise
in
the
number
of
abduction
cases.
Tripura
witnessed
the
largest
number
of
such
cases,
with
213
abductions
occurring
in
2003.
Nagaland
was
placed
second
with
167
cases,
while
Manipur
followed
with
79
cases
of
abduction.
The
corresponding
figure
for
Meghalaya
was
45.
21
cases
were
reported
from
Arunachal
Pradesh.
No
abductions
occurred
in
Mizoram.
Sentinel
Assam,
February
12,
2004.
NEPAL
Two
Maoist
leaders
deported
after
being
arrested
from
Uttar
Pradesh
in
India:
Indian
authorities
have
reportedly
arrested
two
Maoist
leaders,
Matrika
Prasad
Yadav
and
Suresh
Ale
Magar,
from
Lucknow
in
the
State
of
Uttar
Pradesh.
They
were
later
handed
over
to
the
Nepal
authorities
in
the
far-western
region
on
February
8,
2004.
Matrika
Prasad
Yadav
was
a
member
of
the
Maoist
team
who
took
part
in
the
failed
peace
talks
with
the
Nepalese
Government
in
2003.
Nepal
News,
February
9,
2004.
PAKISTAN
Al
Qaeda
training
terrorists
in
Pakistan
and
Kashmir
for
'sleeper
cells'
in
US:
The
Washington
Times
reported
on
February
10,
2004,
that
the
Al
Qaeda
is
training
hundreds
of
Islamist
radicals
in
Pakistan
and
Kashmir
to
send
them
to
"sleeper
cells"
in
the
United
States
of
America.
Quoting
unnamed
American
and
foreign
officials,
the
report
said
that
at
least
400
radicals
have
been
trained
or
are
in
training
in
special
camps,
and
many
have
already
been
routed
through
Europe
to
Muslim
communities
in
the
US.
US
intelligence
officials
were
quoted
as
saying
that
the
camps
operate
in
remote
regions
of
western
Pakistan
and
in
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK)
and
are
financed
by
various
terrorist
networks,
including
the
Al
Qaeda
and
sources
in
Saudi
Arabia.
Training
camps
in
PoK
were
reportedly
being
operated
by
the
Harkat-ul-Ansar
(HuA)
and
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT).
Jang,
February
11,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
LTTE
will
talk
to
any
Government
with
clear
authority,
says
'Colonel'
Karuna:
Speaking
to
the
Press
on
February
10,
2004,
after
meeting
Maj.
Gen
(Retd.)
Trond
Furuhovde,
head
of
the
Sri
Lanka
Monitoring
Mission,
at
the
Thenaham
Conference
Centre
of
the
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
in
Karadiyanaaru,
'Colonel'
Karuna,
senior
LTTE
'commander',
said
that,
"we
are
prepared
to
talk
to
any
government
that
comes
to
power
in
Sri
Lanka
with
clear
authority
and
power.
We
are
ready
to
negotiate
with
them
to
settle
the
conflict
by
peaceful
means.
We
are
also
firmly
committed
to
observing
the
ceasefire
agreement.
We
urge
the
Sinhala
people
to
reject
obscurantism
and
chauvinism
and
to
choose
political
forces
that
are
forward
looking
for
the
sake
of
peace
and
progress."
He
added
that
the
LTTE
"will
not
interfere
in
the
general
elections
in
the
east.
The
polls
will
be
free
and
fair
here."
Tamilnet,
February
10,
2004.
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The South
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
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the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
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and the
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Asia Terrorism Portal.
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