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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 9, September 15, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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J&K: Withering Roses - The Peace
Process Melts Down
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
It is perhaps
a sign of the extraordinary desperation that has gripped
policy-making on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) that the blossoming
of every single rose is heralded as evidence that summer
has arrived. The unremitting violence that has followed
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's August visit to Srinagar
has shown yet again that roses can be easily cut down, or
can simply wither away in the relentless heat of the real
world. Amidst the usual hand-wringing provoked by the violence,
however, few have asked the real question that needs to
be addressed: just why has peace-making proved so difficult
a business in Jammu and Kashmir?
One answer, perhaps, is that peace making is often founded
on false premises and half-truth. Much of the early-summer
peace initiative was based on the assumption that Chief
Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's 'Healing Touch' agenda
had succeeded in starting to build a working civil-society
consensus against violence. 'Healing Touch' optimists claimed
there had been a 'marked reduction' in violence since the
People's Democratic Party (PDP)-led alliance had come to
power. This was variously attributed to Sayeed's programme
of prisoner releases, his campaigns against corruption,
and the realisation among secessionist organisations that
they could find a place within mainstream political practice
and discourse.
In fact, the figures show, there was no really meaningful
decline in violence. If one considers the total
numbers of killings as an index, the events of
this winter closely mirror those of 2001 and 2002, slacking
off in the winter and then escalating as spring and summer
set in. There was, in fact, a far larger drop in killings
in the summer of 2002, compared with 2001, than anything
the 'Healing Touch' achieved. This could, perhaps, be attributed
to the impact of Operation Parakram, the massive military
mobilisation set in place after Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
terrorists stormed India's Parliament building in December
2001. Operation Parakram, it could be argued, established
a threshold level for violence, sustained since by a variety
of factors, ranging from United States of America pressure
on Pakistan, and a realisation in that country's military
establishment of the potential costs of a near-war situation.
A second myth is that political life in Jammu and Kashmir
has started to normalise. In fact, political discourse there
remains distinctly abnormal. Consider, for example,
the giant billboard outside Srinagar airport, welcoming
any tourists who might arrive. Set against the backdrop
of Kashmir in autumn, the billboard bears the visages of
Prime Minister Vajpayee and Chief Minister Sayeed. Nowhere
else in the country would a Congress-supported Chief Minister
be so eager to advertise his warm relationship with the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Nor, of course, would the
BJP be keen to share space with the leader of the party
committed to releasing terrorists from jail, and to dialogue
with Islamist secessionist groups like the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin
(HM).
Sadly for both these politicians - the twin poles of the
peace process initiated in March - things aren't quite going
according to plan. For one, there are few tourists to see
the billboard. Hotels and houseboats emptied after a string
of bombings and suicide-squad attacks executed to mark the
Prime Minister's visit to Srinagar. Underlying this is a
larger political problematic. "Our doors are open", the
Prime Minister said in Srinagar, "to all those, who reject
militancy and extreme positions and wish to play a constructive
role in taking Jammu and Kashmir forward on the high road
of peace and rapid development." This was of a piece with
his past position, notably articulated during the Ramzan
ceasefire of 2000-2001, when the Union Government sought
to engage elements within the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin politically.
For secessionist groups, armed or purely political, this
position is simply inadequate. For one, the All Parties
Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
head, Maulvi Abbas Ansari, has repeatedly rejected dialogue
with the Union Government's official mediator on Jammu and
Kashmir, N.N. Vohra. The APHC leaders believe their legitimacy
would be undermined unless New Delhi negotiates with them
at the highest political level, acknowledging the secessionists
as representatives of a de-facto nation. With general
elections on the horizon, the BJP simply cannot afford to
make such a large concession. Indeed, it is profoundly unlikely
that any political dispensation in New Delhi could
do so in the foreseeable future.
Matters are further compromised by the running battle within
the Hurriyat Conference. On September 7, Syed Ali Shah Geelani
leader of a faction within the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has
emerged as the Hurriyat's arch-foe, called for a parallel
meeting of the Hurriyat's General Council to chalk out the
organisation's course of action. The next day, 12 members
of the 23-member General Council elected a four-member body
chaired by Muslim League leader Massarat Alam, a long-standing
Geelani supporter recently released from jail by the PDP
Government, as a parallel Hurriyat Executive. Centrists
and Islamists are thus divided down the middle, and a bitter
leadership feud is underway.
On top of it all, the Hurriyat centrists are increasingly
finding themselves in confrontation with armed Islamist
groups. Prior to Vajpayee's visit, the Hurriyat sought to
avoid calling for a shutdown of shops and businesses, a
ritual practice when major Indian leaders visit Srinagar.
Geelani, however, issued a call, and was followed in quick
time by the Islamabad-based council of fourteen terrorist
groups, the Muttahida (United) Jehad Council (MJC).
The MJC attacked the Hurriyat centrists for having gone
soft on New Delhi, a position that was also adopted by the
LeT and JeM. The Hurriyat was then forced to issue a call
for a general strike. Hemmed in by pressure from armed groups
and Islamists, then, the Hurriyat centrists are as unable
as New Delhi to make major concessions.
It is profoundly unlikely that any short-term means can
be found to break the logjam. The United States of America
is mired down in Iraq, and South Asian concerns have largely
disappeared from its foreground consciousness. The situation
is unlikely to change until President George Bush is either
re-elected, or a successor takes his place with four years
in hand. In the meanwhile, all players in J&K have an interest
in using the time available to strengthen their positions.
The available data suggests Pakistan, will continue singing
the same tune it did until 2001, albeit at a slightly lowered
pitch. Violence, sadly, will continue to be the principal
medium of political discourse in J&K for some time to come.
What, then, might New Delhi's policy establishment do? It
could, for one, reject a third myth: that peace-making and
war-making stand in binary opposition. New Delhi bureaucrats
often treat security issues as something sundered from the
political process, rather than as an organic part of the
search for solutions. Unless the security establishment
can find creative means to make both ordinary people and
their representatives secure, it is unlikely that a meaningful
move towards peace can even begin. The killings of one-time
terrorists turned pro-India militia leaders, Mohammad Yusuf
Parrey and Javed Ahmad Shah, has signalled to potential
fence-crossers that India is unable to look after its own.
In turn, the de-escalation of aggressive counter-terrorist
operations as part of the 'Healing Touch' programme has
allowed terrorist groups to reassert their influence in
rural Kashmir. Recruitment of local cadre has, by all accounts,
picked up, notwithstanding the construction of a broad peace
consensus.
Politicians - the recent resignation of Jammu and Kashmir
Agriculture Minister Abdul Aziz Zargar is a case in point
- have learned the obvious lesson from this situation. On
the face of it, Zargar has committed no crime - or at least
none not common to many residents of rural J&K. Chand Usman
Khan - a terrorist accused in the Akshardham attack in Gujarat
on September 24, 2002 - confessed that meetings to plan
the outrage were held in Zargar's village home in the Anantnag
district. The Minister had, however, left his residence
in response to terrorism twelve years ago. There is no allegation
that Zargar knew of either the meetings or their substance;
but it is also true that he seems to have done nothing to
ask the police or army to liberate his village from terrorist
control. Zargar, like much of the ruling PDP, benefited
significantly from terrorist support in last year's elections.
His rival from the Noorabad constituency, Sakina Itoo, was
repeatedly targeted by terrorists during the election campaign;
Zargar was not. Terrorists through southern Kashmir told
voters to support the PDP, and National (NC) Conference
candidates suffered as a result.
The malaise is not restricted to the PDP. A Pakistani terrorist
recently arrested in Poonch, Naim Khan, told his interrogators
that a local NC legislator had paid protection money to
his organisation, the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Hurriyat centrists
- witness the case of assassinated leader Abdul Gani Lone
- have also discovered the cost of bucking the jehadi
fiat. Politicians, quite naturally, have learned that it
is best to make their peace with those who wield the guns,
rather than to strive for a genuine peace that excludes
these elements. This is the core of the peace paradox in
Jammu and Kashmir - a problem whose solution is the precondition
to a successful peace process.
A Nation Under Siege
Guest Writer: Deepak Thapa
Kathmandu-based journalist
and editor
It has been
more than two weeks since the end of the ceasefire between
the Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).
When the rebels declared, on August 27, 2003, that there
remained no justification for the seven-month-long truce,
all had not seemed lost. Since they had not explicitly stated
that the ceasefire had ended there still seemed a hint that
it was a pressure ploy to force concessions out of the Government.
For its part, the Government once again urged the Maoists
to return to the negotiating table even while it declared
that it was ready to face any new challenge.
But the very next day, August 28, the Maoists made clear
their intent when they struck in the heart of Kathmandu.
Two army colonels were shot, one of them fatally, sending
the Kathmandu establishment in a tizzy over what could follow.
Even more brazen was the attack the next day on a former
state Minister for Home Affairs, Devendra Raj Kandel. It
was during Kandel's tenure that the Nepali Government had
declared the Maoists 'terrorists' and announced rewards
for the capture or killing of top Maoist leaders. Although
Kandel survived the assassination attempt, there was no
doubt now where the Maoists were going to focus their attention
- Kathmandu.
In fact, during the ceasefire, the Maoists had made it quite
clear that Kathmandu would not be spared in the next round
of fighting, should the hostilities resume. Maoist leaders
had proclaimed as much in their public pronouncements as
well as in private conversations. In the preceding seven
years, the capital had seen only occasional bombings, and
these had not done much damage. The killings and sabotage
had been overwhelmingly limited to the rural hinterland.
In a repeat of what the country saw in the initial days
of the nine-month emergency imposed in November 2001, an
average toll of 10 Maoists killed has been reported every
day in various encounters since the breakdown of the peace
process. There have, however, not been any major battles
so far. The one exception was in the western Nepal district
of Rolpa, in the heart of Maoist country, when a 'long-distance
patrol' of a combined force of the Army and the armed police
was pinned down in a gully by Maoists for nearly 24 hours.
The Government troops ran out of ammunition and the Army's
newly acquired night-vision helicopters had to go to the
rescue. Details of this engagement are yet to be revealed
by the Army, and neither have any authoritative independent
reports emerged.
Besides the Rolpa encounter, the Maoist dead are accounted
for in minor skirmishes. The rebels themselves have, so
far, not mounted any major attacks in the manner they did
during the earlier fighting. They have struck soft targets
such as soldiers and policemen on leave or on guard duty,
suspected informants among ordinary folk, and abandoned
police posts. They have also laid booby traps on highways
and roads, injuring security personnel and civilians alike.
The Maoists have also called for a three-day bandh
(general strike) starting 18 September, and past experience
suggests that this could be the occasion for greater violence.
All in all, a strategy designed to strike terror among the
general population appears to have been adopted, and it
seems to be succeeding to some extent. People in the already
sparsely populated western Nepal are fleeing their homes
by the thousand, with the majority going to India to find
work.
To meet the new exigencies brought about by the renewed
fighting, the Army has entered an expansion phase. In the
past two years, it has already grown by 10,000 to reach
60,000. It is currently planning to add another 5,000 soldiers
to its force. In the field, counterinsurgency experts from
the US military, numbering around 50, are believed to be
conducting training. But the Army's image received a severe
battering when the National Human Rights Commission indicted
it for the massacre of 17 people in Ramechhap district in
eastern Nepal, on August 17, 2003, the very day the Government
and the Maoists sat down to the much-awaited third round
of talks. The killings, and the implied insecurity for the
Maoists, were cited as one of the reasons for the Maoist
withdrawal from the talks.
Much of the action is still going on in the hills and plains
outside Kathmandu, but the detached complacency of the capital's
denizens has now been shattered. In the past week a series
of bombs exploded, including one that killed a schoolboy.
These daring attacks have forced the Government onto the
back-foot, and security for top Government officials and
politicians has been tightened. Security personnel have
also been ordered not to venture out unless absolutely necessary.
Kathmandu's security apparatus was put under the unified
command of a Major General of the Army. An 11 pm to dawn
curfew was imposed in parts of the Kathmandu Valley, outside
the city limits. The capital appears to be in the grips
of a siege mentality.
But that did not prevent the Maoists from shooting dead
two people in a busy area on Kathmandu's outskirts on Friday,
September 12. One of them was affiliated to the students'
body allied to the Rastriya Prajatantra Party - the party
of Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa, and the other an
ordinary bystander. The Government's response was a night
time curfew in Kathmandu as well as in the twin city of
Lalitpur. For now, the siege seems complete.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
September 8-14,
2003
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Civilian
|
Security Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
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INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
19
|
11
|
39
|
69
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
3
|
13
|
9
|
25
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Maharashtra
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Manipur
|
2
|
0
|
13
|
15
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
|
24
|
24
|
73
|
121
|
NEPAL
|
19
|
22
|
67
|
108
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Counter-insurgent
leader Kukka Parray
killed in Baramulla,
Jammu and Kashmir:
Prominent counter-insurgent
leader and leader
of the Jammu and
Kashmir Awami
League, Mohammad
Yusuf Parray alias
Kukka Parray,
was killed along
with two of his
associates, while
eight persons,
including four
of his bodyguards,
were injured when
terrorists ambushed
his vehicle in
his hometown Hajan
in the Baramulla
district on September
13, 2003. Daily
Excelsior,
September 14,
2003.
Ten terrorists
killed in Manipur:
At least 10
terrorists affiliated
to the Kuki National
Front - Military
Council (KNF-MC)
were killed during
an encounter in
the Senapati district
of Manipur on
September 13,
2003. Indian
Express,
September 13,
2003.
US to stand
by India in the
fight against
terrorism, says
Assistant Secretary
of State:
Assistant Secretary
of State Christina
Rocca said in
Delhi on September
11, 2003, that
the United States
would stand by
India in its battle
against terrorism.
She also said
that the issue
of cross-border
infiltration remained
"very important"
in its agenda
with Pakistan.
Rocca said, "The
US will stand
by India in its
battle against
terrorism just
as India has stood
with the US in
its battle against
terrorism". Indicating
that the US enjoyed
good relations
with India and
Pakistan "simultaneously",
she added, "Pakistan
is a country in
the midst of a
major political,
economic and ideological
transformation.
It has not yet
safely escaped
the dangers of
serious crisis
on multiple fronts.
It must be assisted
to achieve a soft
landing that corrects
disturbing internal
trends, realigns
its direction
as a moderate
Muslim state,
and defeats definitively
all terrorism
emanating from
its soil." Indian
Express,
September 12,
2003.
Sahrai Baba
replaces slain
Gazi Baba as 'operational
chief' of Jaish-e-Mohammed:
While acknowledging
the killing of
its 'operational
chief' Gazi Baba
alias Shahnawaz
Khan during an
encounter on August
30, 2003, the
Pakistan-based
Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
has reportedly
appointed Sahrai
Baba in his place.
The Pakistani
Urdu daily Jung
quoted Jaish 'deputy
supreme commander'
Wali Hasan as
saying that Abu
Dajana has been
appointed as Sahrai's
deputy in Jammu
and Kashmir. Sahrai
was earlier 'district
chief' of the
outfit in Kupwara.
Gazi Baba, who
masterminded the
attack on the
Indian Parliament
in Delhi on December
13, 2001, was
shot dead by Border
Security Force
(BSF) personnel
in the Noorbagh
locality of capital
Srinagar. Daily
Excelsior,
September 9, 2003.
PAKISTAN
President
Musharraf
says
Taliban
and
Al
Qaeda
cadres
are
present
in
tribal
areas:
President
Pervez
Musharraf
said
in
an
interview
to
the
BBC
on
September
11,
2003,
that
reports
of
Al
Qaeda
and
Taliban
terrorists
finding
sympathy
in
Pakistan
and
using
it
as
a
base
for
launching
attacks
in
Afghanistan
were
"partially
true".
According
to
Musharraf,
"Shall
I
say
it's
partially
true
-
one
can't
deny,
I
will
be
the
last
person
to
deny
that
nothing
is
happening
in
the
tribal
areas
of
our
borders
with
Afghanistan…
Certainly
there
are
elements
that
may
be
hiding
there
and
certainly
there
are
abettors
who
sympathize
with
them."
He
also
said
that
Osama
bin
Laden
could
be
hiding
in
Pakistan's
north-western
tribal
region
bordering
Afghanistan.
"I
feel
that
he
(bin
Laden)
is
alive,
yes,
because
of
the
various
information
and
intelligence
that
has
come
up
now…
But
to
guess
whether
he's
in
Pakistan
or
in
Afghanistan,
the
possibility
exists
that
he
is
shifting
places,
shifting
bases
on
both
sides.
That
is
the
reality,"
added
Musharraf.
Jang,
September
12,
2003.
Islamist
separatists
in
China
are
trained
in
Pakistan,
claims
Communist
Party
secretary:
Islamist
separatists
in
China's
Muslim
northwest
are
securing
assistance
from
international
terrorists,
including
instruction
in
"several
training
camps
in
Pakistan,"
the
region's
Communist
Party
secretary
claimed
on
September
11,
2003.
Wang
Lequan,
also
a
member
of
the
party's
top-level
Politburo,
said
that
the
Taliban
had
helped
train
many
of
the
Xinjiang
separatists.
While
identifying
Pakistan
as
a
place
where
assistance
continues,
Leguan
said,
"They
have
several
training
camps
in
Pakistan."
Daily
Times,
September
12,
2003.
Al
Qaeda
leader
Al-Zawahri
urges
Pakistanis
to
revolt
against
President
Musharraf:
On
the
eve
of
the
second
anniversary
of
9/11,
fugitive
Al
Qaeda
leader
Ayman
al-Zawahri
was
quoted
as
saying
in
media
reports
that
Pakistanis
should
revolt
against
President
Pervez
Musharraf.
In
an
audiotape
aired
by
Qatar's
Al-Jazeera
television,
he
said,
"We
ask
our
Muslim
brethren
in
Pakistan:
until
when
will
you
put
up
with
the
traitor
Musharraf,
who
sold
the
Muslims'
blood
in
Afghanistan
and
handed
over
the
Arab
mujahideen
to
crusader
America?"
He
also
said,
"Had
it
not
been
for
his
treason,
the
surrogate
government
would
not
have
been
installed
in
Kabul,
that
government
which
brought
the
Indians
to
Pakistan's
western
borders…
Not
only
this.
He
opened
up
nuclear
installations
to
US
inspection,
choked
off
the
jihad
in
Kashmir
...
and
is
(planning)
to
recognize
Israel
-
all
for
a
handful
of
dollars
the
Americans
stack
in
his
pocket
...
The
officers
and
soldiers
of
the
Pakistani
army
should
realize
that
Musharraf
will
hand
them
over
as
prisoners
to
the
Indians...
and
flee
abroad
to
enjoy
his
secret
(bank)
accounts."
Zawahri
urged
"all
Muslims
in
Pakistan"
to
'unite'
to
protect
their
country
from
"the
crusade
allied
with
the
Hindus."
Jang,
September
11,
2003.
JeM
and
LeT
among
five
proscribed
outfits
functioning
under
new
names:
Five
Pakistan-based
terrorist
groups,
including
the
Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
and
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT),
which
were
proscribed
by
President
Pervez
Musharraf
on
January
12,
2002,
are
currently
functioning
openly
under
changed
identities,
according
to
the
Herald.
After
the
initial
crackdown
on
them
following
the
ban,
these
five
groups
are
"back
in
business"
with
changed
names
and
identities,
the
magazine
quoting
a
report
by
Pakistani
intelligence
said
in
its
latest
issue.
Four
of
Pakistan's
top
sectarian
outfits
have
effectively
regrouped
and
are
operating
their
respective
networks
as
openly
as
before
though
under
different
names,
it
said.
"According
to
a
report
prepared
by
Pakistani
intelligence
earlier
this
year
to
assess
the
situation
a
year
after
the
ban
was
enforced,
the
move
has
failed
to
check
either
the
activities
or
the
relentless
funding
of
these
terror
outfits
from
all
corners
of
the
world,"
it
said.
Further,
the
military
regime
has
been
unable
to
stop
the
"relentless
funding"
from
Saudi
Arabia
and
other
countries
to
the
terrorist
groups,
even
in
cases
where
Pakistani
missions
abroad
were
aware
of
the
identities
of
financial
sponsors
of
these
organisations,
it
said.
The
Hindu,
September
10,
2003.
|
|
Comparison of
Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir 2001-2003
Source: Union Ministry
of Home Affairs. (2003: Provisional Data)
|
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