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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 17, November 8, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Drifting into
Disaster
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The ongoing civil war between the 'People's Army' of Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Government's security forces,
took a violent turn immediately after the end of the short-term
ceasefire announced by the Maoists
for the Dashain festival between October 20 and 28,
2004. Within hours of the expiry of the temporary truce,
the security forces and the Maoists clashed at Kamirechour
in the Kavre Village Development Committee (VDC) of Dang
district on October 29. On October 31, some 1,000 Maoists
attacked Gamagdhi, Mugu District headquarters. The insurgents
have also threatened, according to a widely reported statement
by an unnamed 'Political Commissar', "to attack and destroy
the mid-western regional headquarters Birendranagar in Surkhet
district." The statement claimed, further, that, "the Gamagdhi
attack was an unplanned, small attack. Now we will show
them by attacking Birendranagar and turning it into ashes."
The Maoist threat against Birendranagar, one of the Government's
key strategic locations in the mid-western region, clearly
demonstrates the progress and direction of the 'protracted
war' in Nepal.
The Maoist 'Chairman', Pushpa Kamal Dahal, aka, Prachanda,
has made it clear that the armed confrontation with the
state is the primary instrument of the 'People's War', and
the movement has relied on popular Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
slogans such as 'The People without an army have nothing
of their own'; 'The main instrument of the state is the
army'; 'In the New Democratic Revolution the main form of
organization is the army and the main form of struggle is
the war'. The Maoists objective is to transform the unarmed
masses into the armed masses, and little effort has been
spared to this end over the past years. The absence of parallel
development and a sincere national leadership has made their
task easier, pushing common folk, voluntarily or under coercion,
into the armed struggle, validating the revolutionary theory
that war teaches war.
There has, over the past months, been a steady and strong
evolution of the Maoist military strategy from rural and
jungle-based guerilla warfare to a greater focus on urban
targets, with a number of tactical attacks on various district
headquarters, where the Security Forces are currently concentrated.
More significantly, the Maoists appear to be hunkering down
for a conventional confrontation, with reports that the
insurgents have commenced extensive construction of bunkers
and tunnels, particularly in the mid-Western and Western
districts of Rukum and Achham respectively. This fortification
and 'tunnel warfare' is expected to provide greater security
to the Maoist cadres and leadership against increasingly
sophisticated operations by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA)
which has received a substantial bounty of improved weaponry,
and has been conducting offensive operations using modern
weapons, armour and aircraft against the Maoists. At the
same time, these fortifications can be expected to provide
the Maoists a more secure base to launch their own operations
against urban targets.
Current trends in Maoist activity, consequently, suggested
that they see their movement as having reached the 'third
stage' postulated by Mao's theory of protracted war - the
strategic offensive (the two preceding stages are 'strategic
defense' and 'strategic equilibrium'). Indeed, the beginning
of the 'strategic offensive' phase had been announced by
the CPN-M after 10 days of the 'Central Committee' meeting
at an undisclosed location on August 31, 2004. The push
forward is motivated by the conviction that other revolutionary
movements such as "the Shining Path and the Colombian revolutions
failed because they let the strategic balance drag on for
too long. In Nepal, the Maoists think a quick push when
the state is vulnerable will take them to victory." It appears
that the Maoists now seek the 'decisive destruction of the
enemy's armed forces' and the seizure of power.
The Maoists have been long in their preparation, building
rural base areas and establishing military control and political
authority in ever-increasing parts of the countryside, to
surround the cities. Apart from the abductions and coercive
recruitment, largely among young rural students, the Maoists
have designed curricula for primary school students (4th
and 5th Grade) in the name of 'pro-people education'. The
curricula include subjects such as military science, Maoist
philosophy and ideology, profiles of Maoist leaders, and
history and politics of the People's War.
To increase the pressure on the Government, the Maoists
have extensively targeted the political and economic structure
across the country with devastating attacks on power plants,
bridges, telecommunication centers and government buildings,
which have caused immense damages to the national economy.
Since the end of the temporary cease fire on October 29,
there have been at least 30 incidents of Maoist violence
across the country, and the Maoists have detonated bombs
in all their attacks, including those at Gamagdhi in Mugu,
Humla, Jajarkot, Dolpa, Bardia, Palpa, Rukum and in the
mid-Marsyangdhi power plant project area. According to a
study conducted towards the end of 2003, the seven-year
long Maoist insurgency has cost the nation Rs. 66 billion,
with tourism being the worst hit sector of the economy incurring
a loss of Rs. 5.9 billion during 2002-03. Subsequently,
the slump in tourism sector had a spillover effect on the
banking and hotel industry, and ultimately on all productive
activities. Security expenditure has increased by almost
300 per cent over the last five years of the civil war.
The cost of destruction of physical infrastructure, such
as power stations, telephone towers and VDC buildings by
the Maoists was estimated at Rs. 18 billion. In general,
the overall business environment has deteriorated drastically
as a result of Maoist violence. The insurgents have also
been intensifying their activities in the districts surrounding
the Kathmandu Valley, simultaneously putting pressure on
the capital city itself with well-targeted bombings, abductions,
strikes and economic blockades. The buildings of more than
three-fourths of the 3,915 VDCs in the country have already
been totally destroyed by the Maoists, either during attacks
or in bombing incidents. Almost all the remaining VDCs are
vulnerable to their attacks.
Significantly, the Maoists are now claiming the lion's share
from the money allocated to VDCs for development works.
Various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international
NGOs, moreover, have been forced to recognize the Maoist
'People's Governments' in their areas of domination, and
can only work after procuring or securing the Maoists' permission
to continue their developmental projects. NGOs, along with
local businessmen, government employees and common civilians,
are now routinely paying 'revolutionary taxes' to the Maoists
in much of the country, even as the countryside witnesses
an incredible exodus from the rural areas, with an estimated
over two million villagers fleeing their homes over the
last two years. These distress migrants are mostly young
men and women who have streamed out of the hills into the
Indian Terai plain to the south, or into the District headquarters
and cities within Nepal. Observers estimate that the migration
continues at a rate of about 75,000 persons each month.
On the flip side, an offensive strategy for the Nepalese
security forces also appears to be crystallizing. The Royal
Nepalese Army (RNA) has rejected the proposal for a unilateral
ceasefire from the Government side, and continued its patrolling
activities even during the Dashain temporary ceasefire
period. In mid-October the RNA had carried out a week-long
and massive military operation, 'Operation Lekbesi', against
Maoist training camps in Myagdi, Baglung, Gulmi and Arghakhanchi
districts, to flush out the Maoists from their stronghold
areas, and had set up a 'tactical headquarters' at the Upallochour
barracks to coordinate their operations. At the same time,
the Army had conducted 'Operation Simarekha' in the Rukum,
Dolpa and Pyuthan areas and in the Accham District, establishing
significant presence in these areas of Maoist domination.
The Armed Police Force (APF) of Nepal, which has been working
under 'operational instructions' of the RNA, is also expected
to form a brigade for the security of Kathmandu, and to
establish a battalion in each of the 75 districts in the
country.
Despite some successes for the RNA, however, there is little
evidence, or even possibility of the political re-consolidation
of the country, and of the restoration of the institutions
of civil governance in the vast areas that have been lost
to the disorders. Indeed, as Kathmandu almost exclusively
and alternately emphasizes either talks or military operations,
there appears to be no will or motivation to restore the
structures and activities of normal civil governance in
rural areas, and the entire administrative paraphernalia
has been withdrawn into the District Headquarters across
the country.
On the political front, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's
Government had clearly specified that the Government would
hold a national election, even if the Maoists did not join
in a negotiation process, though the feasibility of an election
in prevailing circumstances is highly suspect. The Maoists,
in an official statement, have further claimed to have initiated
processes to 'hold dialogue' with all political parties
and organizations 'other than the royal palace and India',
to find a way out of the country's current political impasse,
and to preclude the possibility of 'foreign intervention'.
If anything, this move will only further isolate the incumbent
regime. The prime power in the conflict, King Gyanendra,
is yet to make public his stand on the future of his country,
and Nepal can only anticipate a further deterioration in
the situation, as the warring groups rely increasingly on
the 'military option'.
Manipur: Yet another
'final' assault
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
Army authorities are asserting that Sajik Tampak, a stretch
of thick-forested mountains in the Chandel District of Manipur,
which has long served as a citadel to four prominent militant
groups - the United National Liberation Front (UNLF),
the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) - has been 'captured'
after an intense battle. If true, this would be an outstanding
achievement for the security forces, since earlier attempts
at over-running this 'liberated zone' had resulted in several
red faces. For years, Manipur - stuck in a state of perennial
warfare against 15 active militant groups - had to suffer
the ignominy of tolerating the reign of the militants over
vast stretches of its territory, where even a minimal state
presence could not be maintained. The present 'victory',
however, is not unqualified, and Army authorities admit
that, "the area is yet to be completely cleared of rebels".
In January 2003, an attempt by three battalions (125th,
64th and 2nd) of the Border Security Force (BSF) to cleanse
the area of well-entrenched Manipur People's Liberation
Front (MPLF) militants proved a disaster. Even the desperate
use of helicopter gun-ships and sophisticated war equipment,
hailed as the biggest operation in 20 years of counter-insurgency
operations in the State, failed to outwit the insurgents,
who succeeded not only in surviving the synchronised onslaught,
but inflicted deadly losses on the BSF. Eight BSF personnel
were reported to have been killed although the official
fatalities figure was quoted to be only two. Worse, the
areas were never recovered from insurgent control, and the
BSF's failure left their confidence and audacity greatly
augmented. So disastrous were the consequence that Chief
Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, in a statement in the Assembly
on March 13, 2003, had advised the security forces not to
repeat the misadventure without adequate preparation.
More than a year later, in April 2004, another 'area domination
exercise' was conducted by the Army in Sajik Tampak, just
before the elections from the outer Manipur constituency
to the Indian parliament. Amidst calls for a boycott of
the elections by the militants, the operations were aimed
at neutralising the influence of the 'underground'. After
Army authorities claimed 'success' for their mission, the
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
informed the media, on April 19, that its cadres had killed
three Army personnel and seized their arms and communication
devices. Insurgent presence and activities in the area did
not appear to have been significantly undermined. These
are only the most recent in a long series of unsuccessful
efforts to recover these areas from insurgent domination
over the past decade and more.
It was against this backdrop that the Army launched the
current series of operations in the first week of October
2004, targeting the militants with the objective of making
them respond to the Chief Minister's October 17-call for
a 'negotiated settlement'. The Army, under clear direction
from Delhi, is seeking a 'decisive outcome' through these
operations, even as the Central Government is busy negotiating
with the Apunba Lup, an umbrella body of Manipuri organisations,
for a 'more humane law' to replace the controversial Armed
Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA).
About 7,500 Army personnel are reported to be engaged in
the operations in four districts: Imphal East, Bishnupur,
Churachandpur and Chandel. Significantly, the operation
was reported only in the first week of November, after it
had been underway for about a month, entirely outside the
glare of the media.
Given the duration of the current operation, however, the
neutralisation of about 54 militants (20 killed and 34 arrested),
as of November 6, out of an estimated strength of 2,000
cadres present in the area, is at best a modest achievement.
Considering the claim that more than 100 militant hideouts
have been attacked, the seizure of just 20 weapons indicates
a long struggle ahead. The troika of the UNLF, PLA and PREPAK,
along with a lone Kuki outfit, the KRA, appear to have evaded
the brunt of the Army's offensive.
The Army has been quick to assert the impact of the ongoing
operations, and its Public Relations Officer stated: "The
progress of the operation is so far very encouraging with
the local people actively supporting the soldiers in their
fight against militancy". Limited success is also confirmed
by the Editor of an English Daily in Imphal: "Since the
attack in Sajik Tampak started, there has been a quantum
decrease in activities and movement of the underground cadres."
Civil Government officials have reportedly reopened offices
in small towns and villages in the area, which had been
out of bounds for several years.
Perceived successes may however, be deceptive, and may not
even indicate a noteworthy long-term decline in the striking
capabilities of the militant groups. The underground organisations
that have mushroomed in this State since the formation of
the UNLF in 1964, have several other 'liberated zones' spread
out all over the State, including areas such as Thanga and
Thangjing hills in Bishnupur and Churachandpur districts.
They have repeatedly orchestrated strikes not only in the
areas along the border with Myanmar, but also in the heart
of the fortified capital city of Imphal. Apparently, such
capacities have been derived from an effective combination
of popular support, an elaborate intelligence network and
highly motivated cadre strength.
Worse, three of the four districts in which the current
operation is underway - Bishnupur, Churachandpur and Chandel
- share an international boundary with Myanmar, and the
insurgents have simply melted across the border during past
operations. This time around, however, the Myanmarese Army
is understood to be providing support to their Indian counterparts
to prevent the fleeing guerrillas from entering Myanmarese
territory. With encirclement by the Indian Army from three
directions, and containment action by the Myanmar forces,
the ongoing operations could force a desperate 'fight or
perish' choice on the Indian militants. But things do not
seem to be quite so simple, despite what authorities may
want us to believe. Certainly, the recent Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) signed between the Governments of Myanmar
and India does adequately addresss India's security concerns
and commits Myanmar to do everything to stop its territory
being used by the anti-Indian rebels. But, to believe that
Myanmar could amass sufficient Force to effectively deny
the rebels access across 358 kilometres of a notoriously
porous border with Manipur, let alone 'seal' it in entirety,
is far from realistic.
Irrespective of the claims of success by the Army, consequently,
a substantial number of the militants can be expected to
have crossed over the border to take refuge in their existing
camps in Myanmar. This is also what had happened when Indian
troops claimed to have 'sealed' the borders with Bhutan
when the latter conducted military operations against the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)
in December 2003. A number of these militants managed to
cross the border and travelled the entire length of at least
two of four Indian states - Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland
and Meghalaya - to reach the safety of their camps in Myanmar
and Bangladesh. Thus, in the present case, any effort that
falls short either of joint operations by the Indian and
Myanmarese Army or a quick show of aggression by the latter
on the militant bases in Myanmar, is bound to fail as far
as the larger objective of controlling militancy in Manipur
is concerned.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
November
1-7, 2004
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
1
|
0
|
9
|
10
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
5
|
6
|
27
|
38
|
Left-wing
extremism
|
3
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
Manipur
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
4
|
Tripura
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
|
11
|
8
|
32
|
51
|
NEPAL
|
4
|
1
|
28
|
33
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
8
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Ceasefire
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
can
be
considered,
says
Home
Minister
Shivraj
Patil:
Union
Home
Minister,
Shivraj
Patil,
on
November
7,
after
visiting
border
outposts
in
R
S
Pura
sector,
stated
that
a
cease-fire
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
can
be
considered
by
the
Government
of
India
"if
the
situation
so
arises".
However,
the
Home
Minister
charged
Pakistan
with
not
doing
much
to
stop
infiltration
from
its
side.
On
the
question
of
illegal
intrusions,
Patil
said
that
there
had
been
a
reduction
in
infiltration
from
across
the
border
after
the
fencing.
At
the
same
time,
infiltration,
though
not
on
a
large
scale,
was
still
going
on,
he
added.
Daily
Excelsior,
November
8,
2004
NDFB
threatens
to
pull
out
of
ceasefire
in
Assam:
The
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB),
on
November
6,
threatened
to
pull
out
of
the
unilateral
ceasefire
it
declared
'if
the
Government
does
not
stop
killing
its
cadres',
which
the
outfit
said
'sends
wrong
signals'.
In
an
e-mail
sent
to
a
Daily,
NDFB
'chairman'
D.R.
Nabla
alias
Ranjan
Daimari
stated
that
the
Government
must
formally
reciprocate
their
gesture
and
officially
call
a
ceasefire,
so
that
all
operations
against
the
outfit
are
stopped.
Sentinel
Assam,
November
7,
2004
PAKISTAN
Eight
soldiers
killed
in
South
Waziristan:
Eight
soldiers
were
killed
and
six
others
wounded
when
their
vehicle
hit
a
landmine
planted
by
militants
near
Kanigoram
in
South
Waziristan
on
November
4.
An
Inter-Services
Public
Relations
(ISPR)
spokesman
said
the
vehicle
was
part
of
a
military
convoy
that
was
travelling
from
Kanigoram
to
Ludda
when
the
incident
occurred
at
around
10.30am
(PST).
Dawn,
The
News,
November
5,
2004
NEPAL
Mugu
district
headquarters
attacked
by
Maoists:
Around
1,000
Maoist
insurgents
attacked
Gamgadhi,
the
headquarters
of
Mugu
district
on
October
31
and
destroyed
nearly
one
dozen
government
offices
including
police,
forest,
postal
and
revenue
offices,
and
also
private
houses
rented
out
to
two
Non-Governmental
Organisation
(NGOs)
by
setting
fire
to
them.
The
power
station
and
the
telephone
exchange
were
also
destroyed
in
the
Maoist
attack.
Later,
security
forces
recovered
a
dead
body
of
an
insurgent
and
one
of
a
former
policeman,
even
as
there
were
no
clear
reports
of
the
total
casualties.
This
was
the
first
attack
by
the
Maoists
after
the
brief
ceasefire
(October
20-28)
observed
by
both
the
Government
and
the
Maoists
during
the
Dashain
festival.
Nepal
News,
November
2,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
No
high
expectations
for
resumption
of
peace
talks,
says
Norwegian
Foreign
Minister
Jan
Petersen:
On
November
5,
the
Norwegian
Minister
of
Foreign
Affairs
Jan
Petersen
stated
that
he
has
no
high
expectations
for
the
resumption
of
peace
talks
between
the
Sri
Lankan
Government
and
the
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE).
"Based
on
signals
received
from
the
parties
over
recent
weeks,
I
do
not
have
high
expectations,
but
in
difficult
situations
it
is
even
more
important
to
keep
engaging
with
the
parties",
he
said.
Colombo
Page,
November
6,
2004
Navy
destroys
LTTE
transit
camp
in
Trincomalee:
The
Sri
Lankan
Navy,
upon
receiving
information
that
the
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
was
maintaining
a
camp
in
the
Palampatar
Santhiri
jungles
in
Trincomalee,
inspected
the
area
along
with
two
members
of
the
Sri
Lanka
Monitoring
Mission
(SLMM)
on
October
30
and
recovered
a
LTTE
flag,
two
hand
grenades,
a
VHF
signalling
antenna,
a
30
metre
antenna
cable,
notebooks
with
personal
details
and
some
weapons.
Two
tents
built
by
the
LTTE
were
also
found,
even
as
the
LTTE
cadres
had
reportedly
fled
the
camp
by
the
time
the
Navy
raided
it.
Daily
News,
November
2,
2004
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