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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 18, November 15, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Power Play in
South Waziristan
Guest Writer: Mohammad Shehzad
Islamabad-based freelance journalist and writer
The biggest quandary at present in Pakistan is not Musharraf's
uniform but the ongoing military operation in South Waziristan
against al-Qaeda
suspects and their supporters.
Nobody knows
what is actually going on in South Waziristan - journalists'
entry into the region is banned. On October 15, a fact-finding
group of seven Parliamentarians from the Muttehida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA, an alliance of six pro-Taliban
religious parties) was stopped from entering the tribal
region at Jandola (near Tank, about 290 kilometres from
Peshawar) citing a law that bans political activities in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]. The only
source of information is Director General Inter Services
Public Relations [ISPR] Major General Shaukat Sultan, whose
information is contested by the opposition and the media
in public, and by the diplomatic community in private.
The first military operation in FATA was launched on October
2, 2003, at Angor Ada. The first operation in Wana was launched
on January 8, 2004; the second on February 24, 2004; the
third between March 18-30, 2004; that was followed by a
series of operations from June 11 to the present date. According
to the official sources, the October 2 operation, in which
eight suspects were killed and 18 were captured alive, was
the most successful.
'But the military never presented the 'foreign' militants
before us!' complains Rahimullah Yusufzai, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) analyst on Afghan affairs.
The jihadists, independent journalists, and opposition
Parliamentarians have been challenging the military's viewpoint
- i.e., that the operations had been initiated to flush
out foreign terrorists hiding in the tribal areas - asserting
that there were no foreign terrorists in South Waziristan,
and if there are any, the Government should present them
before the public.
Yusufzai asserts, "The military might have arrested or killed
the foreign terrorists, but it is hesitant to present them
before the media. In fact, it arranged our meeting with
a 14-year old Tajik terrorist. The military is afraid to
make such things public because in that case the US could
mount pressure on Pakistan. The US is against the military's
talking to the militants. It wants the military to use force'.
"It is an outrageous lie if someone claims that there are
no foreign terrorists in South Waziristan," Sultan counters,
"It is absolutely true that the foreign militants have been
arrested and we have not presented them before the public
in the larger national interest."
The military has been fighting the 'invisible' enemies in
South Waziristan for more than a year without much success.
Often times, it gives an impression that it has failed.
Some analysts believe that a section of the Army is pro-militant,
but both Sultan and Yusufzai dismiss such notions. Yusufzai
argues: "If you are thinking why Abdullah Mehsud has not
been arrested, then the answer is, he is familiar with the
terrain. He has local support. He comes from the same tribe.
He can flee to North Waziristan or Afghanistan. I am dead
sure that there is no support to him from any section of
the military. Mehsud has killed the Chinese. It is a very
serious thing. No Pakistani Government can afford to annoy
China. So, rule it out that military could support him.
Mehsud enjoys a lot of support from his own people that
has really made the task difficult for the military."
Sultan concedes several hitches in the operations. "The
militants are mixed up with the civilians. The military
cannot target them in such a situation. Certain people,
to further their vested interests, portray the killings
of the militants as the killings of civilians. They glorify
militants as 'heroes.'"
The Government is upset with publications such as Nawa-i-Waqt,
Ummat, Jasarat, Friday Special, Takbeer, Nida-i-Millat,
Islam, which portray the militants as heroes. These
publications act as 'unofficial' mouthpieces of the jihadists,
and see the hand of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW),
Mosaad and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) behind
the events in South Waziristan.
Takbeer [Nov 3] has written that the US, India and
Israel are the real masterminds of the incidents in South
Waziristan, and that they want the tribal people to rise
up against the Army. India, the article claimed, is supplying
weapons to the tribal people and the US is very cleverly
dividing the two united groups of mujahideen, i.e.,
the Pakistani Army and the civilian mujahideen [tribal people].
Friday Special [Oct 7, Zafar Mehmood Sheikh] views
the lifting of the economic blockade on South Waziristan
as a humiliating defeat for the Army. "The relief has been
announced to silence the voices of such people who had been
protesting the military crackdown in Wana. In fact, the
killing in Wana was masterminded by Musharraf on the orders
of Bush. The latter wanted it for his election campaign
and Musharraf wanted it to protect his uniform." "The Army
is repeating 1971 in Wana. God forbid, Wana may not prove
to be another Bangladesh. Bangla Bandu was first declared
as traitor and this time the tribes of Wazirstan have been
declared terrorists… Wana will prove to be the last nail
in the country's coffin if better sense did not prevail
on Musharraf. He should stop arranging official visits to
Wana and allow independent journalists access to the area.
Only then the people of Pakistan will know about the atrocities
of Pak army in South Waziristan."
Disagreeing patiently with such views, Sultan claims, "There
is no ban on journalists' entry in South Waziristan." However,
he insists that journalists should not "expect that ISPR
would provide you vehicles or helicopters for your travel."
There is, nevertheless, a growing perception that the military
operations are creating a sense of hatred among the tribal
people against the Armed Forces. On Saturday night (November
13), at an Iftaar dinner in Rawalpindi, a local MMA leader
Hanif Abbasi, told this writer, "The Pak Army is committing
state terrorism in South Waziristan, exactly the way the
Indian Army is doing the same in Kashmir. It is targeting
innocent civilians."
Yusufzai echoes the growing concern: "The military operations
have displaced thousands of people in South Waziristan.
But the Army does not want it to be reported. The Pushtuns
are severely independent people. They never forgive their
enemies. The coming generations of the tribal people will
be full of hate against the Army and they will take revenge."
Prof. Ishtiaq, a professor of Islamic Studies, adds: "The
military can never win this battle. It might be able to
contain them [the tribal people] temporarily but it will
lose ultimately. The tribals never forgive and they never
forget. The present generation of the tribal people has
grown up during the Afghan jihad. They can forget their
religious duties but they can never forget their enemies.
Sometimes, injustice committed against the great grandfather
is avenged by the great grandson!" Ishtiaq also sees a conspiracy
in the Wana Operations: "The Pak Army has been pitched against
the tribal people under a plot. The West knows that the
tribal people are highly motivated and ideological. They
have the capability to defend the country. They are the
right-hand of the Army. The West wants to cut off this right
hand."
Lashing out at the Government, Mohammad Usman Qazi, a civil
society activist adds: "All the terrorists and criminals
have been arrested from Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi.
None of them was arrested from South Waziristan. Could the
military launch air attacks on these cities? Could the military
stop their water and food supplies? The military has done
so in South Waziristan because it treats it as an 'occupied
area'. South Waziristan is part of Afghanistan. The military
crackdown is sharpening the sense of alienation of the tribal
people. The blood of the Pushtun has always been very cheap
in Pakistan."
Contesting such feelings strongly, General Sultan asserts,
"The operation has been deeply appreciated by the local
people. They want to get rid of the terrorists. There is
no sense of hatred against the Army among the local people."
A diplomat in Islamabad endorses Sultan's views, "The Government
has found that some recently arrested terrorists in Karachi
had links with what's going on in South Waziristan. The
domestic violence in Pakistan has strong links with international
terrorism masterminded by the al-Qaeda. The US is very happy
with Pakistan's performance on terrorism and fully supports
Musharraf in this effort." This diplomat also remarked that
there was little chance of a repeat of 1971 in the present
circumstances. "There is no evidence of a 1971-like situation
in Pakistan. The terrorism has not spread out of South Waziristan-not
even to other agencies of the tribal areas. It is limited
to South Waziristan.'
There is, nevertheless, a unanimous view among civil society
activists and organisations, that only a political solution,
rather than present efforts at military domination, can
help resolve the situation in South Waziristan. Yusufzai
argues that "There is no military solution to any political
dispute. The Army committed atrocities against Balochistan
for more than 30 years, but the same problems are re-emerging
in the province. As long as the US forces will remain present
in Afghanistan and the country will face political instability,
the situation in South Waziristan is not going to change.
The military launches fresh offensive in South Waziristan
under the US pressure. Whenever, Karazai would make some
noise, Armitage or Khalilzad will twist Pakistan's Army
and the result is another military operation." He adds that,
"Jirga is the only solution to this dispute. Recently,
the military has forged another agreement... that the tribal
people will not be asked to present the foreign militants
before the authorities. They will only ensure that the militants
do not create any law and order situation for Pakistan.
This could have been accepted in the Shakai agreement. But
God knows what happened that the Corps Commander Peshawar,
Lieutenant General Safdar, announced that Nek Mohammad would
present the militants before the authorities. Nek Mohamamd
denied this and he was killed".
Usman Qazi also argues for a political solution: "The military
is not trained to resolve conflicts… We need civilian leadership,
not military dictators to resolve conflicts like 1971 or
South Waziristan. And the military should not forget that
the tribals are not timid like unarmed Bengalis. They are
armed to teeth and nails (sic). Fighting them is
not an easy task. They have already killed more than 200
soldiers and they are quite capable to further resistance."
Diplomatic observers add that the Pakistan Army is not trained
to fight the insurgency, but to fight a conventional war,
and that too, only with India. This, however, leads them
to underline the need to enhance the capacities of the Army.
General Sultan insists that events in South Waziristan need
to be seen in the context of global injustice. "As long
as the issues like Kashmir and Palestine will not be resolved,
global peace is impossible. Global injustice is the root-cause
of terrorism that is badly affecting Pakistan."
Clearly, before any solution can be arrived at in South
Waziristan - and such a solution would need to be political
- two of Pakistan's major problems would need to be addressed:
the first is that the military dictatorship refuses to accept
its mistakes or to learn from them. It continues to regard
the Army as the panacea for all problems. The second is
that the military regime is under US control. The latter
wants the Army to solve the problem only through the exercise
of force, rather than through efforts of conflict resolution.
In combination, this can only mean that the prospects of
peace in the country remain bleak.
Tilting the Balance?
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
India has often fumbled in achieving the right recipe of
adroitness and tact to maintain a 'friendly' neighbourhood.
Part of the problem lies in inept handling and inconsistent
policies, over the years, towards issues that have plagued
its relatively smaller neighbours. This scenario, however,
appears to be evolving somewhat, particularly with respect
to India's relations with its southern neighbour, Sri Lanka.
The Sri
Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, was on a state
visit in New Delhi from November 3 to 7, to strengthen Indo-Sri
Lankan relations. There was satisfaction on the dynamism
and energy of bilateral economic ties as a result of the
India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) of March 2000,
which had resulted in bilateral trade between the two countries
exceeding US$ 1.5 billion in 2003-04. However, though greater
economic cooperation was one of the major items on the agenda
of discussions, it was the announcement that a bilateral
Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and a Memorandum Of
Understanding on the Rehabilitation of the Airfield in Palaly,
Jaffna would be signed between the two Governments on mutually
convenient dates, that provoked controversy.
Over the decades of civil conflict between the Sri Lankan
Army (SLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
India had put the island on its negative list with respect
to military supplies. However, as a result of the ceasefire
agreement with the LTTE in February 2002, Sri Lanka was
taken off this list in January 2003. Since then, the idea
of a defence cooperation agreement has been in the air,
and was first discussed in October 2003, when Ranil Wickremesinghe
was the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the National Democratic
Alliance was in power in New Delhi. Again, on June 19, 2004,
the visiting Sri Lankan delegation, led by Prime Minister
Mahinda Rajapakse, and Indian officials agreed to expedite
the proposed defence cooperation agreement.
Although specific contours of the new 'defence cooperation'
have not been disclosed, the general drift was manifested
in the October 19, 2004, Press Release of the Sri Lankan
Defense ministry, published after a meeting between a five-member
Indian delegation, led by Ranjith Issar, Additional Secretary
in the Ministry of Defence, and Cyril Herath, Lankan Secretary
of Defence in Colombo. The Press Release mentioned "bilateral
defence cooperation in the field of Military Training, Exchange
of military Intelligence and information, Maritime surveillance
to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries,
official visits and bilateral meeting at different levels
participation in training programmes, joint military exercises,
etc were discussed among other matters." There can be little
ambiguity over the potential target of this cooperation.
Over the years, India's policies towards Sri Lanka has fluctuated
from the pro-active 'hands-on' approach of the late 1980s,
when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was dispatched
to island nation, to a distant 'hands-off' orientation after
the IPKF withdrew with substantial losses in March 1990.Despite
the IPKF's withdrawal, however, cooperation with the Lankan
security forces was maintained in view of the perception
of the threat that the LTTE posed to India, especially after
the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
on May 21, 1991, by a LTTE suicide cadre. Since then, India
has provided Colombo vital intelligence on the movement
of LTTE ships and vessels transporting arms and ammunition,
as well as occasionally more forceful interventions, such
as the sinking of the M.V. Ahat, a part of the LTTE's
shipping fleet, which was intercepted by Indian naval authorities
off the Tamil Nadu coast in January 1993. The ship was blown
up on the orders of one of the LTTE's leaders, Sathasivam
Krishnakumar, alias Kittu, who was on board the vessel,
after its interception by Indian Navy vessels.
The fact that the defence equation was moving forward was
reiterated by the November 1, 2004, visit of India's Chief
of Army Staff, N.C. Vij to Sri Lanka - the first by an Indian
Army Chief since the de-induction of the IPKF. After a visit
to the forward line at Omanthai in Vavuniya district, Vij
had said that, although there was a truce in fighting, the
Sri Lankan soldiers needed to be vigilant. Commenting on
the proposed Defence Agreement he said it was "of immense
importance. It would mutually help procurement of arms,
and training. Although the ceasefire is in force, recruitment
and boosting the moral of soldiers should continue."
Earlier, in September this year, the Indian Navy Chief,
Admiral Arun Prakash had also visited Sri Lanka to discuss,
among other things, the threat that the LTTE's naval wing,
the Sea Tigers, posed to 'both countries'. The emergence
of the Sea Tigers and its growing dominance along Sri Lanka's
northern shoreline, with an increasing frequency of skirmishes
with Indian fishermen, has been a cause of concern to India.
Unconfirmed reports have also indicated that the LTTE may
be supplying arms to the Naxalite (Left Wing extremist)
groups in the southern parts of the country, off the coastline
between the Machilipatnam and Guntur districts in Andhra
Pradesh. Restoring security in its Southern waters is consequently
of prime importance to the Indian Navy, especially since
the success of the Sethusamudram Canal Project in the Palk
Bay area hinges on the Indian Navy dealing with the Sri
Lankan Navy, rather than a 'third Navy'. [The Sethusamudram
project will link the Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar in the
South Coast by creating a shipping canal through the Rameswaram
Island]
Equally worrisome is the growing LTTE clout near the Trincomalee
Harbour, where the Sri Lanka Navy's Northern Headquarters
is located. The Sri Lankan Government, on August 9, 2004,
officially complained to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) that 13 camps of the LTTE, located along the southern
mouth of the harbour, had been newly setup, violating the
bilateral ceasefire agreement between Colombo and the Tigers.
An oil tank complex run by Indian Oil Corporation is located
near the harbour, giving an Indian tinge to these anxieties.
The economic content packaged along with the Defence Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) adds a crucial dimension to the current
bilateral engagement. India has offered a US$ 100 million
credit line for the development of Rural Infrastructure
projects in Sri Lanka. India is the second highest tourism
generating country in Sri Lanka and the number of Sri Lankan
Airline flights into various cities in India now stands
at 77 per week - the highest number of flights to India
by any airline. India has also offered a grant of US$ 7.5
million to build a state-of-the-art Cancer Hospital in Sri
Lanka. A second hospital project funded by the Indian Government
is located at Dickoya near Kandy, with an investment of
Rupees 200 million. In addition, Indian public sector undertakings
such as RITES (Rail India Technical and Economic Services
Ltd), National Thermal Power Corporation and Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd., have set up projects in Sri Lanka. Indian
Oil Corporation (IOC) recently paid the final amount of
$45 million for a $75-million deal with the Sri Lankan Government
to retail fuel in the island country. Lanka-IOC Pvt. Ltd,
a wholly owned subsidiary of IOC, has taken over a large
number of petrol bunks. India is also extending a $100-million
credit line for goods and services over a period of 20 years,
with a moratorium of five years. This includes a wheat loan
of $31 million. In a minor reverse flow, a few Lankan companies,
mainly in the confectionary business, would soon be setting
up shop in Chennai.
The proposed DCA has naturally roused some anxieties among
the LTTE and its sympathisers, and protests against the
Agreement have been articulated on both sides of the border.
Reacting to the latest developments, LTTE's chief peace
negotiator, Anton Balasingham, declared: "Tamil people view
that such an agreement is irrelevant during the time of
a peace process, suspended though, but altogether not given
up and therefore would tilt the military equilibrium, the
underlying principle of the ceasefire agreement." P. Sithamparanathan
of Sri Lanka's Tamil National Alliance (TNA) stated further,
on November 10, that the proposed military pact between
India and Sri Lanka might tempt the latter to restart the
war against the Tamil Tiger guerrillas, and that Tamils
fear "preparations are underway for another war in the island".
On the Indian side, Vaiko, the pro-LTTE leader of the MDMK
(Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) in the Southern
state of Tamil Nadu, met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to
express his disapproval.
The possible 'tilt' in the military balance between the
SLA and the LTTE acquires particular significance against
the backdrop of the stalled peace process, with both contesting
parties refusing to dilute their stated positions. The eventual
test of the trajectory of Indo-Sri Lankan relations may,
indeed, arise if the Island nation is plunged once more
into the vortex of civil war.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
November
8-14, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
3
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
2
|
4
|
7
|
13
|
Left-wing
extremism
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Manipur
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
6
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
8
|
6
|
15
|
29
|
NEPAL
|
8
|
2
|
14
|
24
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
6
|
52
|
59
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Assam
Government's
emissary
meets
NDFB
'Chairman'
in
Bangladesh:
On
November
13,
media
reports
quoting
official
sources
in
Guwahati
reported
that
the
emissary
deputed
by
the
Assam
government
met
the
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB),
'chairman'
D.R.
Nabla
alias
Ranjan
Daimari
in
Bangladesh
on
an
unspecified
day
and
held
discussions
with
him
regarding
a
list
of
names
of
NDFB
cadres
who
would
be
assigned
with
the
task
of
formulating
the
ground
rules
of
ceasefire.
Sentinel
Assam,
November
13,
2004
Prime
Minister
announces
troop
reduction
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
Ahead
of
his
maiden
visit
to
Jammu
and
Kashmir
on
November
17,
Prime
Minister
Dr.
Manmohan
Singh
on
November
11
announced
reduction
of
troops
deployed
in
the
State
this
winter
in
view
of
"improvement"
in
the
situation
there,
but
made
it
clear
that
the
decision
would
be
kept
under
"constant
review".
The
decision
was
taken
at
a
meeting
of
the
Cabinet
Committee
on
Security
(CCS)
which,
earlier
in
the
day,
reviewed
the
situation
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir,
in
general,
and
the
North-East,
in
particular.
The
Prime
Minister
however
added
that
"if
the
levels
of
infiltration
and
terrorist
violence
increase,
more
troops
as
necessary
will
be
redeployed".
The
Hindu,
Daily
Excelsior,
November
12,
2004
NEPAL
Country
will
experience
authoritarian
rule
soon,
says
Government
spokesperson
Mohammad
Mohsin:
During
a
meeting
at
Singha
Durbar
on
November
10,
Government
spokesperson
and
Minister
for
Information
and
Communications
Dr.
Mohammad
Mohsin
said
"the
country
will
probably
experience
an
authoritarian
Government
very
soon,
if
Maoists
do
not
come
to
the
negotiation
table…The
alternative
to
this
Government
will
be
one
you
people
can't
bear
with".
The
minister
pointed
out
that
a
dictatorial
system
was
required
to
bring
peace
and
maintain
law
and
order
in
the
country,
so
that
the
sovereignty
of
the
people
could
be
handed
back
to
them
as
soon
as
possible.
Nepal
News,
November
11,
2004
PAKISTAN
40
militants
killed
in
South
Waziristan:
Atleast
40
suspected
militants
have
been
killed
by
Pakistani
troops
hunting
Al
Qaeda
fighters
in
a
rugged
region
bordering
Afghanistan
this
week,
South
Waziristan
field
commander
Major
General
Niaz
Khattak
said
on
November
13.
Several
militant
hideouts
had
also
been
destroyed
in
the
ongoing
offensive,
with
an
extra
7,000
troops,
backed
by
helicopter
gunships,
pouring
into
the
tribal
region
of
South
Waziristan
on
November
12,
Khattak
said,
giving
a
detailed
briefing
in
village
Nano,
the
native
village
of
Al
Qaeda
terrorist
Abdullah
Mahsud.
Niaz
Khattak
said.
"My
reckoning
is
that
the
number
of
foreign
militants
in
the
area
should
not
be
more
than
100".
The
News,
November
14,
2004
Five
wanted
militants
reach
accord
with
Government
in
South
Waziristan:
Five
most
wanted
tribal
militants
on
November
11
signed
an
agreement
with
the
government,
pledging
to
live
peacefully
and
not
to
harbour
foreign
militants
in
South
Waziristan.
Yargulkhel,
Kurmezkhel
and
Malikkhel,
three
sub-clans
of
the
main
Ahmadzai
Wazir
tribe,
signed
the
agreement
with
the
authorities
in
Wana
on
behalf
of
the
five
militants,
including
Haji
Mohammad
Omar
who
had
been
declared
successor
to
the
slain
militant
'commander',
Nek
Mohammad.
The
four
other
militants
are
Maulana
Abdul
Aziz,
Haji
Sharif,
Maulvi
Abbas
and
Mohammad
Javed.
"The
tribes
have
deposited
Rupees10
million
as
guarantee
for
each
of
the
five
militants,"
said
Brigadier
Mehmood
Shah,
the
security
chief
(FATA),
in
Peshawar.
Dawn,
Daily
Times,
November
12,
2004
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