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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 22, December 13, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Naga Peace Overtures
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
The meeting of the leaders of the National Socialist Council
of Nagaland - Isak- Muivah (NSCN-IM)
with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at New Delhi on December
7, 2004, and their subsequent 'homecoming' in Nagaland after
a self-imposed exile of 37 years, are, at a psychological
level, significant movements in the ponderous pace of the
Naga peace process - which commenced with a declaration
of ceasefire by the rebel group and the Government of India
seven years ago. NSCN-IM leaders Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng
Muivah had earlier visited Delhi to meet the then Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January 2003, and it is
a measure of the elephantine gait of the negotiations that
nothing much has changed since. Each such 'round' of high-level
meetings is, nevertheless, greeted with great enthusiasm
by the media and by those involved in the 'peace process'.
This time round, though the first encounter between Prime
Minister Singh and the Naga leaders was more about atmospherics
than 'substantive' discussions, there is reason to believe
that the process may, in fact, soon be pushed forward. For
one thing, Muivah and Swu are not in India just for this
meeting, but as part of an extended programme of 'three
or four months' that takes them back to Nagaland for Christmas
and New Year, and then returns them to New Delhi for a 'substantive'
phase of negotiations. At the end of this extended programme,
there would be some erosion of the credibility of the 'peace
process', were it not to yield any visible results. However,
it remains altogether unlikely that the current round of
talks would abruptly 'resolve' the 'Naga problem' that has
plagued India for 53 years.
In his meeting with Swu and Muivah, on December 7, the Prime
Minister promised a "mutually acceptable and honourable
solution that can ensure that the Naga people live a life
of peace with dignity and self-respect." This is, of course,
unimpeachable, but it remains far from clear whether the
situation in Nagaland and the NSCN-IM's vision and agenda
will lend themselves to any easy resolution. Nor, indeed,
has the mistrust between the negotiating parties been entirely
purged. In fact, the Naga leaders were originally scheduled
to arrive in Delhi in late November, but the visit was aborted
with allegations by the NSCN-IM that Central intelligence
agencies and the Nagaland Government were supporting and
arming a 'rival' Naga group, the Naga National Council (NNC)
in a gambit to 'divide the Naga people'. Another suspicion
was that the Government of India (GoI) was engaged in secret
negotiations with the NSCN's rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K)
as well, a charge the Government denied. Union Home Minister
Shivraj Patil also reportedly advised Chief Minister Rio
to 'rein in' his minister who was accused of providing support
to the NNC. On the other hand, the Government has repeatedly
accused the NSCN-IM of violating the 'ground rules' of the
ceasefire, particularly for the movement of armed rebel
cadres outside their designated camps and for administering
an extensive regime of extortion.
These, however, are just pinpricks in the expansive minefield
of talks. The real obstacles relate to the 'sovereignty'
issue and, most crucially, the demand for a 'greater
Nagalim', comprehending 'all Naga areas'.
The 'sovereignty' demand has gradually, though only implicitly
- in their public statements the NSCN-IM leaders remain
committed to an independent Nagaland, separate from India
- been transformed into a claim for 'greater autonomy'.
On the Nagalim issue, however, the rebels have remained
clear and unrelenting: they are not demanding a 'greater'
or a 'lesser' Nagaland; they are only demanding that all
Naga 'homelands' be brought under one political unit. The
problem, however, is that these claimed areas are spread
over the geographical territories of the Indian States of
Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, as well
as in parts of western Myanmar. While the Myanmarese territories
cannot be part of any 'settlement' between the Indian Government
and the rebels, there are compelling Constitutional constraints
on the transfer of the territories of any Indian State without
the consent of the States so affected. Assam, Arunachal
Pradesh and Manipur have all fairly clearly rejected the
inclusion of any of their territories in the "so-called
Nagalim". In an additional obstruction, Prime Minister Singh's
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government is committed
to a Common Minimum Programme (CMP) that has specifically
rejected the redrawing of boundaries in the Northeast. The
rebels are, moreover, claiming wide areas where the Naga
presence is, at best, nominal. In Assam, for instance, the
districts of Cachar, the North Cachar and Karbi Anglong,
have been proclaimed as parts of the projected Nagalim.
But the population of Nagas (according to the 1991 Census)
was just about 5 per cent in the North Cachar Hills, as
little as 0.37 per cent in Karbi Anglong and 0 per cent
in Cachar. In recent years, there have been deliberate and
concentrated efforts by various Naga organizations to alter
the demographics of many of these areas, with efforts to
settle a Naga population along the border areas inside Assam,
with places like Mariani in Jorhat and Merapani in Golaghat
district acquiring significant Naga settlements. There have
also been efforts to 'cleanse' Naga dominated areas in Manipur
of non-Naga concentrations. The Kuki Movement for Human
Rights (KMHR), for instance, has alleged that the NSCN-IM
militants had, on November 23, served a 'quit notice' to
Kuki villagers in Tamenglong district of Manipur, demanding
that the Kukis vacate these areas before Christmas. In Arunachal
Pradesh, the NSCN-IM has been involved in concerted proselytizing
activities among the tribals in the Tirap and Changlang
districts in an attempt to project them as a part and parcel
of the anticipated 'Nagaland for Christ'.
Many analysts have, moreover, noted that the Naga identity
is synthetic, and of relatively recent origin. The NSCN-IM
is dominated by the Tangkhul tribe - largely concentrated
in the hill districts of Manipur - to which Muivah belongs,
and, in lesser measure, by the Semas, represented by the
nominal head of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu. Other tribes
have often chafed under this domination, and many of the
fratricidal clashes between various Naga factions - particularly
the NSCN-K and, more recently, the NNC - are manifestations
of divided tribal loyalties. Two influential tribal organizations,
the Ao Senden and the Sumi Hoho (the apex bodies of the
Ao and Sumi tribes), have, further, decided to boycott the
reception organized for Muivah and Swu at Dimapur on December
14. Indeed, among the imperatives that impel the NSCN-IM's
demand for an 'integrated Nagalim' is the fact that leaders
like Muivah and 'Home Minister' Rh. Raising would have very
little tribal following in a 'Nagalim' that excluded the
hill districts of Manipur. Any meddling with State territories
in the Northeast, however, would be highly disruptive, as
was clearly demonstrated by the violent reaction in Manipur
after the ill-advised extension of ceasefire 'without territorial
limits' in June 2001 - which had been interpreted as a covert
recognition of the 'Greater Nagalim' idea. Several militant
non-Naga tribal groups - including, most recently, the Kuki
National Army, have threatened a 'bloodbath' in the event
of any territorial reorganization that affects their respective
'traditional' lands.
Each of these streams of opposition have long and complex
histories that would obstruct any easy settlement between
the Centre and the NSCN-IM, and many more political entities
- including the elected Governments of the affected States
of the Northeast, the most consistently ignored parties
in the 'search for peace' in Nagaland - would have to be
taken into confidence before any sustainable advances can
be made.
Nevertheless, advances are, in fact, now a distinct possibility.
During their current tour of Nagaland, the rebel leaders
would be interacting with a wide spectrum of the local leadership
- including the Naga Hoho, the traditional umbrella organization
uniting over 30 Naga tribes - to gauge 'popular sentiment'.
They would certainly hear many and impassioned pleas for
peace, and at least some complaints against the misconduct
and extortion by NSCN-IM cadres. Muivah and Swu have been
deprived of such direct feedback for nearly the entire period
of their almost four-decade exile, though they had made
a clandestine visit to Dimapur in May 1999 - crossing over
from Thailand. During that visit, they had consulted with
their cadres in an effort to hammer out a 'solution' short
of the 'independence formula', but failed to arrive at a
consensus. While the NSCN-IM is anything but a democratic
entity, its leadership is not, and cannot be, entirely indifferent
to the transformed mood of the people in Nagaland who are
exhausted by the unending and fratricidal violence, and
their own exclusion from the opportunities of development
and the fruits of modernity. Significantly, moreover, both
Muivah and Swu are now feeling the burden of age, and there
are many who believe that they would be eager to arrive
at an early settlement, fearing a dissipation of the movement
in the event of their demise.
Hammering out an 'honourable' agreement, however, remains
a challenge, though not one that is insurmountable. Much
of what the NSCN-IM demands by way of 'greater autonomy'
already exists within, or can be created by minor amendments
to, the Indian Constitution. As regards 'Greater Nagalim'
the Centre can be expected to offer a process, rather than
a solution, one that would involve the gradual enlargement
of dialogue and conciliation between all concerned parties
and States; one that would certainly be protracted but which
could, eventually, yield an outcome untainted by the bloodshed
and exclusionary hatred that has long afflicted the conflicting
contentions of tribal groups in India's Northeast. If the
Indian state is to engage in negotiations based on questionable
principles with armed insurgent groups, this is, perhaps,
the best that can be hoped for.
ULFA: Playing Hard
to Get
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
chief's rejection of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's offer
of peace talks on December 9 has been interpreted as a great
setback to the possibility of durable peace in Assam. It
took less than two days for Paresh Baruah to decline the
offer. The objections put forward by him in his rebuff to
the Prime Minister were:
- Absence of the signature
of the Prime Minister on the formal letter.
- The 'precondition' that
ULFA should 'abjure violence' before the peace talks could
begin.
- No mention of the principal
demand of the outfit, i.e. sovereignty of Assam in the
letter.
Paresh Baruah,
in an e-mailed response, said, "Had the Prime Minister been
sincere, he would have signed the letter himself and not
by his internal security advisor." This distilled the essence
of the theatre of the absurd that has been enacted in Guwahati,
Delhi and Dhaka over the past month, after Assamese litterateur
Indira Goswami submitted a one and half page appeal for
negotiations with the ULFA to the Prime Minister on November
18. On December 7, the Prime Minister's office had sent
a letter to the 'negotiator', Goswami, inviting the rebel
group for talks.
Paresh Baruah, in turn, had assured Goswami that he would
discuss the PM's letter with his 'general council', an expression
which carries little meaning today in view of the arrest
and elimination of most of its members. The 'general council'
boasted a strength of over 220 when it last met in Nagaon
in 1995. It consists of ULFA's 'central committee' members,
the political wing, armed wing, the mandals and the
anchalik parishad leaders, at present estimated at
not more than 70, and most of these members (referred to
as senior hardcore cadres in local Press parlance) are either
on 'field duty' or are cooling their heels in various camps
and safe houses spread across the region. A 'council meeting',
consequently, could only be conducted by way of a series
of phone calls by the 'commander-in-chief' from his base
in Dhaka.
The 'general council' in the present case appears, however,
to have assumed a different character altogether. According
to vernacular newspapers, the 'commander-in-chief' consulted
a number of people in Guwahati over the phone, including,
according to the Dainik Janambhumi, "one time comrades,
sympathetic political leaders, journalists, non-political
NGO activists and intellectuals". It is at the end of this
process of consultation that the emphatic rejection of the
offer of talks emerged, with the proviso that negotiations
could be considered if the Government conceded ULFA's demand
to put the 'sovereignty issue' on the agenda for discussions.
This outcome is unsurprising. Excerpts from an earlier statement
by the 'sincere' ULFA 'C-n-C', in which he rejected the
Mizo National Front (MNF) model of peace talks (which brought
peace to Mizoram in 1986, after nearly two decades of insurgency)
on August 13, 2004, are instructive. Baruah stated: "We
will not move an inch from our earlier stand. We have come
too far and sacrificed too many of our boys to turn back
on our dream of sovereign Assam." He added further, "The
Mizos are no better as they continue to be subjugated by
the great Indian machinery. The offer of talks is so hollow,
we can see through it. We do not want to fall for that trap."
Nevertheless, it is still unclear why the ULFA Chief chose
to endorse Goswami's initiatives. In the past, several organisations
including the All Assam Students' Union (AASU), the Assam
Sahitya Sabha, the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad
(AJYCP), and several individuals of repute like singer Bhupen
Hazarika and film maker Janhu Baruah have attempted to mediate
between the Government and the insurgent leadership. ULFA
has cold-shouldered all such efforts and, on occasions,
accused some of the would-be mediators of being 'Indian
agents'. In September 2004, the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba
Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP), from which most of the initial
batch of ULFA leaders was drawn, initiated a two-day conclave
(Jatiya Mahasabha) in Guwahati, which overwhelmingly decided
in favour of dialogue in which the Government was expected
to take the initiative. The 'mahasabha' called for
a unilateral ceasefire by the Government, and asked the
ULFA to give up violence. Subsequently, the AASU also urged
the Government to declare an 'experimental' 100-hour ceasefire
with the outfit. ULFA had remained altogether unresponsive
to each of these initiatives. It was possibly Goswami's
willingness to pursue talks with the 'sovereignty' issue
on the agenda that made her more acceptable. On October
23, Goswami had said, "ULFA has been fighting for 25 years
on the issue of sovereignty. We just cannot ignore it. We
have to listen to this aspect at the negotiating table and
find out why they are fighting."
However, with the exception of the political manoeuvre of
the then Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia, who in the early-1990s
effected a vertical split in ULFA after failing to progress
beyond the preliminary rounds of peace talks with a group
of ULFA militants, which included its chairman Arabinda
Rajkhowa, no effort of consequence has succeeded in drawing
the ULFA to the negotiating table. Paresh Baruah has remained
the most significant and inflexible opponent to a peace
process, though there is now a substantial section of ULFA
cadres and leaders who would prefer to pick up the negotiation
offer. These leaders and cadres, however, have little power
within the current structure of the organisation, with Baruah
commanding the loyalty and obedience of its armed cadres.
As General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 4 Corps stationed
in Assam, Lieutenant General Anup Singh Jamwal, stated on
December 10, 2004, "The military wing of the outfit is controlling
everything and therefore, it is important to involve Paresh
Baruah in the negotiation process."
Despite the current and apparent impasse, this is an option
that is not excluded at present. On December 11, 2004, Indira
Goswami submitted a second letter urging the Prime Minister
to write a personal request to the ULFA Chief to rethink
on the negotiation issue. However, there is need for both
scepticism and caution in appeasing a terrorist group that
has not balked from the repeated use of extreme violence
against innocents. Indeed, even as Goswami was approaching
the Government with her original proposals - clearly authorised
by Baruah - the ULFA had triggered a series of explosions
in different parts of the State on November 25. Again, on
December 9, an intercept of messages from the ULFA 'chief'
to his cadres revealed the group's plans to carry out a
series of attacks on vital installations and prominent personalities,
including Congress party leaders and 'Hindi-speaking people'
in the State. Another report indicated that 400 ULFA cadres
have entered the upper Assam districts from Myanmar to carry
out serious acts of sabotage. A December 12 report further
detailed the group's extortion activities in Assam under
its new 'finance secretary' Nipesh Bhagat. Seventy-five
businessmen in the State have already been asked to pay
Rupees 200,000 each through handwritten extortion notes.
Among the recurrent principles that emerge from the various
theatres of insurgency across India is the fact that terrorist
groups seldom negotiate unless they have been pushed to
the wall - and even in these circumstances, they often engage
in negotiations as a tactic to buy time to regroup. After
ULFA lost its safe haven in Bhutan following the military
action there in December 2003, there were some claims -
as there had been on many occasions in the past - that ULFA's
'back had been broken'. With some pressure now mounting
in Myanmar as well, where the group has a substantial proportion
of its armed cadres, there is reason to believe that many
among the rebels will find the offer of a negotiated settlement
tempting.
But the ULFA is clearly far from finished, and will retain
its capacity to create significant nuisance as long as it
retains its bases in Bangladesh, and continues to enjoy
the support of the Government and intelligence apparatus
there. There is also extraordinary financial incentive to
keep the operation going, both in terms of direct infusions
from Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence, as well as
from extortion and the many lucrative businesses the ULFA
leadership has set up over time. Indian policy-makers have
long been married to the idea of 'bringing back the boys'
by the simple expedient of buying off the insurgent leadership
and cadres - and this was the essence of the hugely celebrated
'Mizoram model'. Evidently, their offers are still to match
the expectations of the ULFA leadership.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
December
6-12, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
2
|
6
|
8
|
16
|
Left
Wing
Extremism
|
2
|
2
|
0
|
4
|
Manipur
|
1
|
1
|
8
|
10
|
Mizoram
|
0
|
1
|
3
|
4
|
Tripura
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
7
|
10
|
20
|
37
|
NEPAL
|
10
|
6
|
60
|
76
|
PAKISTAN
|
11
|
0
|
0
|
11
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
rejects
offer
for
negotiations:
The
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
on
December
9,
2004,
rejected
the
invitation
from
the
Prime
Minister's
Office
(PMO)
for
peace
talks.
In
a
statement
e-mailed
to
the
media
in
Guwahati,
ULFA
'Commander-in-Chief'
Paresh
Baruah
said,
"The
reply
of
the
Prime
Minister
to
Dr.
Mamoni
Raisom
Goswami
[noted
Assamese
writer
Indira
Goswami]
will
disappoint
the
peace
loving
people
of
Assam.
It
is
not
surprising
that
the
Prime
Minister's
reply
was
sent
by
the
security
adviser
to
PMO
which
shows
that
the
Prime
Minister
did
not
think
it
worth
to
give
a
personal
reply
to
the
sincere
effort
of
Dr.
Goswami."
He
claimed
that
the
PMO's
letter
is
contradictory
and
confusing.
He
pointed
out
that
on
one
hand
the
letter
said
that
the
Prime
Minister
hasn't
put
any
pre-condition
for
talks
but,
on
the
other,
the
letter
made
it
clear
that
the
Prime
Minister
is
ready
to
talk
only
with
the
groups
prepared
to
abjure
violence,
which
itself
is
a
pre-condition.
Assam
Tribune,
December
10,
2004.
NSCN-IM
leaders
meet
Prime
Minister
Manmohan
Singh
in
New
Delhi:
Leaders
of
the
National
Socialist
Council
of
Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM),
Chairman
Isak
Chisi
Swu
and
General
Secretary
Thuingaleng
Muivah
met
Prime
Minister
Manmohan
Singh
and
Union
Home
Minister
Shivraj
Patil
in
New
Delhi
on
December
7,
2004.
"Our
government
will
make
sincere
effort
to
find
an
honourable
way
out,"
Dr.
Singh
told
the
visiting
NSCN-IM
leaders.
During
their
30-minute
meeting
with
Singh,
the
Naga
leaders
reportedly
emphasised
that
"a
solution
cannot
be
found
in
violence
and
blood."
Subsequently,
at
a
meeting
with
Shivraj
Patil,
the
leaders
expressed
confidence
in
the
Indian
leadership
and
said
"the
whole
world
is
seeking
peace.
So
we
also
want
peaceful
solution."
Tribune
India,
December
8,
2004.
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act,
2002
repealed
by
Lower
House
of
Parliament:
On
December
6,
2004,
the
Lower
House
of
Indian
Parliament
(Lok
Sabha)
passed
a
bill
to
repeal
the
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act,
2002
(POTA)
and
approved
the
new
law
-
Unlawful
Activities
(Prevention)
Amendment
Act
(UAPA)
to
tackle
terrorism.
Both
the
bills,
passed
by
the
House
by
a
voice
vote,
replace
earlier
ordinances.
The
Hindu,
December
7,
2004.
PAKISTAN
11
persons
killed
in
Quetta
bomb
blast:
Eleven
persons,
including
two
army
personnel,
were
reportedly
killed
and
26
others
sustained
injuries
when
a
bomb
attached
to
a
bicycle
exploded
at
Quetta
in
the
Baluchistan
province
on
December
10,
2004.
At
least
a
dozen
vehicles,
including
a
military
truck,
were
destroyed
and
several
shops
damaged
in
the
blast
which
occurred
at
Mezeen
Chowk.
Meanwhile,
a
person
identifying
himself
as
'Azad
Baloch'
(Free
Baloch)
informed
journalists
at
Quetta
Press
Club
that
the
Baloch
Liberation
Army
was
responsible
for
the
blast.
However,
Deputy
Inspector-General
of
Police,
Pervez
Bhatti,
said
law-enforcement
agencies
were
investigating
the
blast
from
different
angles.
Dawn,
December
11,
2004.
Terrorists
reduced
to
100
in
South
Waziristan,
says
Maj.
Gen.
Niaz
Khattak:
Briefing
the
Peshawar-based
media
at
the
Durrani
Fort
on
December
9,
2004,
about
the
Army's
achievements,
Maj.
Gen.
Niaz
Khattak
stated
that
persistent
military
operations
against
foreign
terrorists
and
their
local
harbourers
have
reduced
the
strength
of
these
elements
to
100
in
South
Waziristan.
He
added
there
were
approximately
600
foreign
terrorists
at
the
time
the
Army
launched
operations
against
the
Al
Qaeda
and
their
local
tribal
sympathisers.
"Their
strength
has
reduced
to
100
plus
now,
who
too
lost
support
of
the
local
population,"
he
told
newsmen.
Regarding
Army's
losses,
Khattak
stated
that
the
Pakistan
Army
and
the
paramilitary
Frontier
Corps
had
thus
far
lost
200
personnel
in
Waziristan.
More
than
246
terrorists,
including
at
least
100
foreigners,
were
also
killed,
while
579
were
arrested
in
35
military
exercises.
Dawn,
December
10,
2004.
Bilateralism
has
last
chance
on
Kashmir
issue,
says
President
Musharraf:
On
December
6,
2004,
at
a
breakfast
meeting
with
editors
of
leading
British
dailies
in
London,
President
Pervez
Musharraf
stated
that
bilateralism
had
a
last
chance
for
finding
a
peaceful
solution
to
the
Kashmir
issue.
"I
am
giving
bilateralism
a
final
chance.
Let
it
not
fail,"
the
President
said.
Gen.
Musharraf
added
that
when
he
talked
of
bilateralism
to
address
this
issue
he,
in
fact,
was
showing
flexibility.
He,
however,
made
it
clear
that
Pakistan
had
not
changed
its
stance
on
Kashmir
and
was
ready
to
move
forward
only
if
India
was
ready
to
do
so.
"I
have
not
moved
an
inch.
We
are
prepared
to
move
if
they
move.
We
are
not
appeasing
them,
we
are
not
on
an
appeasement
course
at
all,"
he
said
in
reply
to
a
question.
The
president
said
he
thought
"India
has
moved
back"
and
he
was
appreciative
of
it.
The
News,
December
7,
2004.
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