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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 3, August 2, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Maoist Affiliates
Sever Ties
Guest Writer: Keshab Poudel
Managing Editor, Spotlight Weekly Magazine, Kathmandu
Two sister organizations of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
(CPN-M)
- the Kirant Workers Party (KWP) and Madhesi National Liberation
Front (MNLF) - announced their decision to terminate their
association with the Maoists and steer an independent course,
on July 27, 2004. After this split, the ongoing Maoist insurgency
is believed to have entered into a new phase. This is the
first major dissension within the Maoist fold since they
launched the People's War in 1996. In a press release issued
separately last week, the MNLF and KWP accused the CPN-M
leadership of not fulfilling their commitment to increase
the number of representatives of oppressed people, including
Madhesiyas (people living in the plains region, also called
the Terai) and indigenous people, at its top policy-making
level.
When the KWP and the MNLF were with the CPN-Maoist, one
senior leader from each of these groups was appointed as
a member of the Central Committee of the CPN-M, and a number
of other leaders were accommodated at different levels of
the organizational structure. A press statement released
by the 'Founding Chairman' of the MNLF, Jaya Krishna Goit,
on July 27, asserted that the Front had split and that a
new Janatantrik Terai Liberation Front had been floated
in its stead. Goit blamed the Maoist leadership for discrimination
against its Madhesi cadres. The statement accused the current
establishment at Kathmandu as well as the Maoists of discrimination
against the people of Terai (Madhes) region and alleged
that, just as the Government recruits the Hill people in
the bureaucracy that runs the Terai, the Maoists also appoint
only Hill people at the decision-making levels. The statement
emphasized the need to set up a federal state structure,
with rights of 'self-determination' for the Terai people.
Likewise, the Kirant Workers Party (KWP) - another sister
organization of the Maoists - has also decided to break
ties, blaming 'lack of coordination'. A press release issued
on July 27, 2004, - the same day the MNLF announced its
decision - in the eastern town of Dharan, the KWP has stated
that this decision was reached at an emergency meeting of
the KWP held at an undisclosed location. The meeting also
formed a new central coordination committee, which includes
the regional members of the Maoists' Mechi-Koshi bureau.
This is the third time that the KWP has broken its alliance
with the Maoists. It is useful to note that the former 'General
Secretary' of the KWP, Gopal Khambu, is a central committee
member in the Maoist organizational structure. Some senior
leaders of the KWP, including Khambu, were reportedly absent
from the July 27 meeting.
Minor incidents of discontent among Maoist leaders at local
levels have often been reported in the local newspapers
in the past, but these had no impact on the Maoists' operational
and institutional capacities. Last month, newspapers had
reported the killing of half a dozen Maoists in far-western
region after an internal dispute broke out among them. Following
the amnesty offered by the previous Government, over 800
Maoist cadres deserted the insurgent group and surrendered
before the security forces. The Ministry of Home has disclosed
that more than 500 such former cadres were currently living
in Government run rehabilitation centers.
The impact of these developments on the Maoists' operational
and organizational capacities, however, is expected to be
negligible. The breaking away of the two factions from the
Maoist Front, and desertion of some cadres, will not significantly
affect the strength of the Maoist organization, with its
nationwide network and ideologically indoctrinated workers.
Strategic analysts, however, do believe that the split may
have a long-term impact on the Maoist organization. "The
Maoists' strength relies on the strength of their own cadres.
It is too premature to predict the possible future scenario,"
said a senior police officer working with a counter-insurgency
team.
Other political analysts also hold the view that the MNLF
and KWP played a crucial role in expanding the Maoist influence
in the Terai and eastern parts of the country. However,
since the Maoists now established their own organizational
networks in these regions, the split will have minimal impact
in the short-term.
Meanwhile, the Government claims that it has also blunted
the Maoists' military capabilities. "Over the past few months,
the Royal Nepalese Army has weakened the Maoists' military
strength," claims Satchit Sumsher Rana, former chief of
the Royal Nepalese Army. "The Maoists are not in a position
right now to launch major attacks against the security forces,"
Rana stated in an interview on the Government-owned Nepal
Television.
Nevertheless, the Maoists continue to demonstrate their
strength and capability. They blew up a landmine in the
heart of Nepalgunj city, 450 miles west of the capital,
on July 27, injuring 22 civilians. The land mine was targeted
at a police vehicle. Further, in a village about four miles
south of Nepalgunj, the Maoists killed three people accusing
them of being 'fake Maoists'. Similarly, one person was
killed in each of two villages in Bara and Siraha - two
eastern Terai districts. Despite the split, evidently, the
Maoists continue to hold and demonstrate their influence
in the Terai. Moreover, The Maoists also declared a three
day bandh (shut down or general strike) in the Dhading,
Nuwakot and Rasuwa districts on July 28, 29 and 30. The
bandh crippled life across the districts and obstructed
the movement of vehicles on the Prithvi highway, which links
Kathmandu with the rest of the country.
With the split in the CPN-M, the prospects of the peace
process could also suffer further. The split has come at
a time when the Government and leaders of major political
parties are reviving efforts to restore negotiations with
the Maoists. The split in the Maoist Front could mean that
the Government may now have to deal separately with multiple
forces pulling in different directions. Although the CPN-M
is still by far the most powerful organization, the Government
cannot ignore the two other groups in case peace negotiations
commence.
The prospects for such negotiations, however, are receding
after the initial euphoria following the appointment of
a new Government in the war-ravaged Himalayan Kingdom on
June 2, 2004. The Sher Bahadur Deuba Government had promised
to end the conflict through talks. Unfortunately, subsequent
developments have failed to follow a positive direction,
and the Maoists have, in fact, stepped up their violent
activities across the country. In a statement released on
July 20, 2004, moreover, Maoist 'Chairman' Pushpa Kamal
Dahal alias Prachanda explicitly ruled out the possibility
of an immediate ceasefire, criticizing the Government for
stating that it cannot negotiate beyond the country's current
Constitution.
Prime Minister Deuba has also recently rejected the option
of declaring a unilateral ceasefire "I don't want another
peace process which would be aborted in months," he said.
During his earlier tenure in 2001 his Government had declared
a unilateral ceasefire - which was immediately welcomed
and followed, but eventually breached, by the Maoists.
Leaders of the Alliance that constitutes the Deuba Government,
however, continue to pressure the Prime Minister to take
'bold initiatives' to bring the Maoists to the negotiating
table. "The Government must declare unilateral cease-fire,"
demanded Madhav Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of Communist
Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), "The
Government needs to initiate the efforts."
Leaders of other major parties have echoed similar views.
"You cannot judge the Maoist leaders on the basis of their
press statements. They will sit on the negotiating table
in case we provide credible security to them," said former
Prime Minister and Nepali Congress leader, Girija Prasad
Koirala, who recently declared that he would work to bring
the Maoists into the national mainstream; "If we guarantee
their safety, the Maoists will come to the negotiating table."
Other leaders also remain strongly optimistic about such
an eventuality. "The efforts made by us to restore peace
are going on. There will be a major breakthrough in this
regard soon," declared Deputy Prime Minister Bharat Mohan
Adhikari. Civil society representatives and human rights
activists continue to press the Government and the Maoists
to immediately announce a ceasefire and re-engage in a peace
process. "If the Government and Maoists both exhibit due
seriousness, fruitful talks are likely," says Padma Ratna
Tuladhar, a former facilitator of the talks between the
state and the rebels.
Meanwhile, even as efforts to hold peace talks intensify,
the Maoists have stepped up violence. Three trucks of food
grains belonging to the World Food Program were looted in
Achham district, 450 miles west of capital on July 3. On
July 5, twelve police personnel and a civilian died in a
roadside ambush by the Maoists on a police vehicle in Parsa
district which borders India. A clash between the Maoists
and the security forces in Kache area of Salyan District
- 350 miles west of the capital - resulted in the death
of 11 security personnel and 11 Maoists on July 6.
At this stage, bringing the Maoists to the negotiating table
appears to be a far from easy task.
Nagaland: A Frozen
'Peace'
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
In what is now becoming a routine exercise at this time
of the year, the Union Government, on July 30, 2004, extended
the cease-fire in Nagaland with the insurgent National Socialist
Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
for another year. A decision to extend the truce, in place
since August 1997, was reportedly arrived at after the Union
Government interlocutor, K. Padmanabhaiah, held talks with
the NSCN-IM leaders Isak Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah at Chiang
Mai in northern Thailand.
Earlier, Isak Swu, had said: "A ceasefire is only important
if it facilitates the peace process. If it is necessary
for the progress of the peace process, we will extend it.
But if that is not the prospect we are looking at, then
we will not extend it. It will depend on our assessment
of the attitude of the new dispensation in Delhi." Muivah,
confirming his colleague's position, had added, "If one
is not prepared to work for an honourable solution, what
is the use of having a ceasefire? If after seven years the
ceasefire ends, it will be sad. But we are not responsible
if that happens."
While the cease-fire extension was on expected lines, some
apprehensions had been expressed before the deal had been
inked, and the NSCN-IM leadership had asked its cadres to
go under-ground, with Muivah declaring, "Don't expect me
to be a sitting duck when the enemy creates a situation."
These apprehensions had significantly been fuelled by the
NSCN-IM's reservations regarding the coalition United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) Government's Common Minimum Programme (CMP).
The CMP stated, "There shall not be any erosion of the current
territorial status of the northeastern States," which the
insurgent group construed as a rejection of its demand for
a 'Greater Nagaland', integrating all Naga-dominated areas
in India's Northeast. The rebel group is reported to have
subsequently decided to ignore the contents of the CMP on
the grounds that, 'that was an internal matter of the Government.'
Since November 1999, Padmanabhaiah, a former Union Home
Secretary, has been the Union Government's interlocutor,
and has held several rounds of talks with the Naga group
in Amsterdam, Bangkok, Japan, and Kuala Lumpur. That the
'Greater Nagaland' concept would be discussed in Kohima,
Chiang Mai, Bangkok, Amsterdam, et al, was clear when National
Security Advisor J.N. Dixit stated in Bangkok that, "Taking
into account the totality of the territorial limits of the
existing States, that is a matter to be discussed and that's
what we are doing."
The Union Government has long fulfilled two of the NSCN-IM's
conditionalities - talks at the highest level (including
Prime Ministerial) and outside India, in neutral countries
- but there have been no reciprocal concessions. There is,
moreover, little evidence of any dilution of the NSCN-IM's
intransigence on the 'Greater Nagaland' issue and its separatist
agenda.
While not much headway has been made in the negotiations
since the last cease-fire extension, it is now certain that
the insurgency in Nagaland sustains an entirely new genre
of politics in the State. While the fundamental responsibilities
of governance are increasingly neglected, Nagaland's Finance
Minister K. Therie has come up with a disingenuous solution
to stop extortion in the insurgency-wrecked State: he proposes
that the Government should fund the Naga insurgent groups
in order to 'exterminate the scourge of extortion', arguing
that this was 'the only way' to end extortion and intimidation
among the general population. Therie suggested that a 'neutral
agency' handle the funding of the insurgent groups during
the ongoing peace talks. Underscoring his commitment to
an 'honourable solution' to the Naga imbroglio, Therie warned
that the insurgent groups' existing extortion machinery
was adversely affecting the prices of essential and all
other goods and services, and was destroying the economy
and prospects of development in the State.
Within this context, the cease-fire and negotiations have
been transformed by the NSCN-IM into a new battleground.
The negotiating ensemble has primarily involved recurrent
extended cease-fires which, while they may have resulted
in the relative cessation of violence, appear to be acquiring
the character of ends in themselves. The 'high price of
peace' in Nagaland has been consolidated through the continuance
of a parallel power structure with an elaborate paraphernalia
of armed NSCN-IM cadres imposing 'taxes', operating an 'alternative
justice system', and maintaining an extended underground
economy and indeed, all the trappings of a 'state within
a state'.
Beyond the cessation of hostilities between the insurgents
and security forces, consequently, the ceasefire and peace
process have little to demonstrate as benefits for the people,
or measurable advances in the quality of governance. While
internecine clashes (with the rival Khaplang group - the
NSCN-K) continue, the people are forced to meet exorbitant
extortion demands by the insurgent groups. Insurgent cadres,
in violation of the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement, routinely
move out of their designated camps to indulge in abductions,
killing, intimidation and extortion. Muivah acknowledges
this 'problem', arguing, "How can we confine ourselves (to
the camps) when Khaplang's cadres and the NNC are freely
moving around with weapons? Can we leave the field open
to the enemy alone, either militarily or politically?"
The NSCN-IM has used the seven years of the ceasefire to
widen its support base both within Nagaland and in the neighbouring
States, including the hill areas of Manipur. A comparison
of the group's support base in the pre-August 1997 period
and the present demonstrates a continuous consolidation
of the group over widening areas. Organisations within the
State claiming to represent the opinions of an ambiguous
'Naga civil society', have now openly arrayed themselves
behind the NSCN-IM. In a recent press release, organisations
including the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR),
Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and Naga Mothers' Association
(NMA) have openly proclaimed their support for the insurgent
group, declaring their pride in associating with the outfit.
The Naga Hoho (apex tribal council), which had consistently
refused to be branded as a pro-NSCN-IM grouping till a few
years ago, now openly canvasses support for the group, not
only in Nagaland, but also in Manipur and Assam. In addition,
with an overtly friendly Democratic Alliance of Nagaland
(DAN) Government in Kohima and the former Congress Chief
Minister and bete noire, S.C. Jamir cooling his heels
as Governor of distant Goa, the NSCN-IM's capacity to dictate
terms can only grow.
Without any movement beyond an exclusive focus on competitive
bargaining, the peace process remains trapped in a quagmire.
Both parties will have to explore new and more efficient
alternatives if they are to engineer a move forward and
escape what has become an established and unproductive orthodoxy.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
July
26-August 1, 2004
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
4
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
16
|
13
|
19
|
48
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Manipur
|
0
|
5
|
0
|
5
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
6
|
0
|
6
|
12
|
Total (INDIA)
|
25
|
18
|
26
|
69
|
NEPAL
|
12
|
6
|
11
|
29
|
PAKISTAN
|
2
|
9
|
7
|
18
|
SRI LANKA
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Cease-fire
with
NSCN-IM
in
Nagaland
extended
for
another
year:
The
Union
Government
on
July
30,
2004,
extended
by
another
year
the
cease-fire
with
the
National
Socialist
Council
of
Nagaland-Isak
Muivah
(NSCN-IM)
following
talks
with
the
outfit's
leadership
in
Chiang
Mai,
Thailand.
The
decision
reportedly
came
at
the
end
of
two
days
of
talks
between
NSCN-IM
Chairman
Isaac
Chisi
Swu
and
Secretary-General
Thuingaleng
Muivah
and
Union
Government
interlocutor
K.
Padmanabhaiah.
The
Hindu,
July
31,
2004.
Five
police
personnel
and
two
terrorists
killed
during
suicide
attack
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
Five
Central
Reserve
Police
Force
(CRPF)
personnel
and
two
terrorists
were
killed
on
July
28,
2004,
after
an
overnight
gun-battle
inside
the
para-military
force
camp
on
the
banks
of
Dal
Lake
in
the
capital,
Srinagar.
Five
CRPF
personnel
died
when
a
two-member
suicide
squad
of
the
Al
Mansooran
outfit
barged
into
the
camp,
housed
in
Hotel
Livard
on
July
27-night,
Inspector
General
of
Police
K.
Rajendra
Kumar
told
Press
Trust
of
India.
Security
forces
engaged
the
terrorists
holed
up
in
the
camp
in
an
encounter
that
ended
during
the
early
hours
of
July
28
with
the
death
of
the
two
terrorists,
added
Kumar.
Al
Mansooran
is
a
front
outfit
of
the
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT).
Daily
Excelsior,
July
29,
2004.
NEPAL
Maoist-affiliated
organizations
sever
ties
with
insurgents:
The
Maoist-affiliated
Kirant
Workers
Party
(KWP)
after
its
Central
Coordination
Committee
meeting
at
an
undisclosed
location
released
a
statement
which
declared,
"since
some
problems
have
emerged
while
dealing
with
the
Maoists,
we
have
decided
to
break
the
alliance…
this
is
not
the
right
time
to
continue
with
the
People's
War."
This
is
the
third
time
that
the
KWP
has
broken
its
alliance
with
the
Maoists.
Earlier,
the
KWP
and
Kirant
National
Liberation
Front
(KNLF)
were
unified
in
the
presence
of
Maoist
chief
Prachanda
in
2003.
Similarly,
the
founding
member
of
Madhesi
National
Liberation
Front
(MNLF),
Jaikrishna
Goit,
in
a
separate
press
statement,
claimed
that
their
organisation
was
ending
all
ties
with
the
Maoists
because
of
continued
discrimination
against
people
of
Madhesi
origin
by
both
the
Maoist
cadres
and
leadership.
Nepal
News,
July
28,
2004.
PAKISTAN
Seven
persons
killed
in
suicide
bomb
attack
on
Finance
Minister
Shaukat
Aziz's
convoy:
Seven
persons,
including
the
attacker,
were
reportedly
killed
in
a
suicide
bomb
attack
on
the
car
of
Finance
Minister
and
Prime
Minister-designate,
Shaukat
Aziz,
at
village
Jaffar
in
Fateh
Jang
on
July
30,
2004.
While
the
driver
of
Aziz's
car
was
among
those
dead,
at
least
50
persons,
including
seven
police
personnel,
are
reported
to
have
been
wounded.
A
suicide
bomber
with
explosives
strapped
around
his
body
targeted
Aziz's
convoy
when
he
was
leaving
after
an
election
rally
at
Fateh
Jang.
The
Finance
Minister
is
currently
contesting
by-elections
from
two
National
Assembly
seats,
Attock
and
Tharparkar,
to
get
elected
to
the
Lower
House.
He
is
currently
a
Senator
and
Pakistan's
Constitution
stipulates
that
that
the
Prime
Minister
should
be
a
member
of
the
National
Assembly.
Dawn,
July
31,
2004.
Al
Qaeda
terrorist
wanted
in
1998
US
embassy
bombings
arrested
in
Gujarat:
Pakistan
stated
on
July
29,
2004,
that
it
had
arrested
a
senior
Al
Qaeda
terrorist
wanted
for
the
1998
bombings
of
US
embassies
in
Kenya
and
Tanzania,
which
killed
more
than
200
people.
Interior
Minister
Faisal
Saleh
Hayat
identified
the
man
as
Ahmed
Khalfan
Ghailini
and
said
he
was
a
Tanzanian
national
carrying
a
head
money
of
$25
million.
The
Minister
stated
Ghailini
was
one
of
the
12
persons
arrested
on
July
27
when
security
forces
raided
a
suspected
terrorist
hideout
in
the
city
of
Gujarat,
about
175
kilometres
southeast
of
the
capital,
Islamabad.
Hayat
said
Ghailini
could
be
extradited
to
the
United
States
after
Pakistani
authorities
completed
their
investigations.
Daily
Times,
July
30,
2004.
Two
Pakistani
hostages
executed
in
Iraq:
A
terrorist
group
holding
two
Pakistani
contractors
hostage
in
Iraq
said
on
July
28,
2004,
that
it
had
killed
the
men,
but
freed
their
Iraqi
driver,
according
to
the
Al-Jazeera
television
station.
The
group,
identified
as
'Islamic
Army
in
Iraq',
had
claimed
in
a
video
on
July
26
that
it
had
abducted
Raja
Azad
and
Sajad
Naeem
and
had
'sentenced
them
to
death'
because
their
country
was
discussing
sending
troops
to
Iraq.
In
a
new
videotape
sent
to
Al-Jazeera
on
July
28,
the
men
said
they
had
carried
out
their
threat,
the
station
reported.
Both
Pakistanis
were
working
for
the
Kuwait-based
al-Tamimi
group
in
Baghdad.
Jang,
July
29,
2004.
|
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