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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 34, March 7, 2005

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

 

PAKISTAN

The Jehad Lives On
Guest Writer: Amir Mir
Senior Assistant Editor, Monthly Herald, Dawn Group of Newspapers, Karachi

Contrary to the General Pervez Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan, a cursory glance over the activities of four 'banned' militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business, with changed names and identities, operating freely and advocating jehad against infidels to defend Islam.

  Also Read
Education Reform: Fundamentalist Fury -- Mohammad Shehzad
Balochistan: Opening another Front? -- Kanchan Lakshman

While banning six leading jehadi and sectarian groups in two phases - on January 12, 2002, and November 15, 2003 - General Musharraf had declared that no organization or person would be allowed to indulge in terrorism to further its cause. However, after the initial crackdown, the four major jehadi outfits operating from Pakistan - Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before, though under different names. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Maulana Masood Azhar, Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil and Syed Salahuddin - the respective leaders of these organizations - are again on the loose. The pattern of treatment being meted out to these leading lights of jehad by the Musharraf-led administration shows that they are being kept on the leash, ostensibly to wage a controlled jehad in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

After the 9/11 terror attacks, the four jehadi leaders were placed under house arrests in their respective home towns in Punjab, since they were becoming increasingly vocal in their condemnation of General Musharraf's policy of 'slavery to the Americans'. A countrywide crackdown also had to be launched against activists of the jehadi groups who were furious over Musharraf's u-turn on the Afghan jehad. Groaning under American pressure, Islamabad also had to temporarily stop cross-border infiltration into J&K, which eventually reduced violence levels in the Valley. Though most of the jehadi groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy, the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. This was chiefly due to the fact that the unholy alliance between the state agencies and the jehadi groups was quite old and had an ideological basis.

The failure of the Musharraf regime to counter extremist jehadis is, however, inexplicable within the current environment, as Islamabad has handed over more than 500 al-Qaeda operatives to the Bush Administration since the war on terror began. As the political will to dismantle the Islamist extremist groups that are not on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) 'Most Wanted list seems to be absent, almost all the major jehadi groups based in Pakistan continue to operate and pursue their agenda without any restrictions. General Musharraf, by his own admission, no longer controls the jehadis that the state had long supported, and the self-proclaimed holy warriors are far from ready to call it quits. On the other hand, the Pakistani establishment continues to maintain its long alliance with fundamentalist parties, which share a common goal with the jehadis: the liberation of 'Occupied Jammu & Kashmir' through jehad.

Had the six-party religious alliance - Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) - not sided with the General to pass the 17th Constitutional Amendment last year, the latter would have been left with no option but to quit the post of Army Chief by December 31, 2004. But then the military, the mullahs and the jehadis share a common belief in Pakistan's rightful claim over J&K. Consequently, Pakistan, the most trusted US ally in its war against terror, confronts a surging wave of Islamist fundamentalism. The growing influence of the fundamentalists in the country can be gauged by the fact that the MMA presently controls 20 percent of the seats in the Pakistani Parliament. This means that the religious right, which had been a vocal supporter of the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has successfully moved from the periphery to the center stage of national politics. As a result, support for the militant cause has also grown within sections of Pakistani society where it never existed before.

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)

Although the ongoing peace talks between India and Pakistan are being taken as a bad news by most of the militant outfits waging armed struggle against the Indian forces in J&K, the leadership of one of the most feared jehadi groups, the LeT and its parent organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, are keeping their fingers crossed. Sources close to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, say he has been persuaded by the establishment to go low key and to abstain from issuing statements criticizing the Indo-Pak peace parleys. In return, however, Saeed has been given assurance that no action would be taken against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and no restrictions on activities including collection of funds, holding of public rallies or the recruitment of jehadi cadres and their training. The result is that, after a year of hibernation under official pressure, Saeed, who founded the Lashkar in 1988, is again activate and making fiery speeches across Punjab. Saeed's close associates claim that young jehadis from various parts of the country continue to throng the Lashkar camps at Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir before being pushed into J&K, though at a limited scale now.

The Lashkar is the only jehadi group operating from Azad Kashmir that still keeps a comparatively large group of activists at its Khairati Bagh camp in the Lipa Valley. Another Lashkar camp is functional at Nala Shui in Muzaffarabad from where young militants are launched after being given initial training at the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's Muridke headquarters in Punjab. Unlike the past strategy of launching large groups comprising of 25 to 50 militants on a regular basis from the camps located on the LoC, Lashkar sources disclose, it has now been decided to keep training militants in limited numbers to launch smaller groups of not more than five to fifteen people, that too, at intervals.

Despite the official ban, banners can easily be seen in the urban and rural areas of Punjab, urging young boys to enroll with the Lashkar for jehad. These banners usually carry telephone numbers of the area offices. Similarly, Lashkar and Dawa activists can be seen outside mosques after Friday prayers distributing pamphlets and periodicals preaching the virtues of jehad in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Kosovo and Eritrea, besides vowing that the Lashkar would plant the flag of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi. The Lashkar leadership describes Hindus and Jews as the main enemies of Islam, claiming India and Israel to be the main enemies of Pakistan. The donation boxes of the Lashkar and the Dawa, which had initially disappeared after the January 2002 ban, have reappeared on public places as well as mosques all over the Punjab.

After the US State Department included the Lashkar in the list of its officially designated terrorist groups in December 2001, apparently acting under the establishment's directives, the then Lashkar chief, Hafiz Saeed, addressed a press conference in Lahore [on December 24, 2001] and announced that Maulana Abdul Wahid, who hails from Poonch district in Jammu, would head the Lashkar. While stepping down as Lashkar chief, Saeed said he would lead the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the new name for the Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad. During the news briefing, Saeed said the changes were aimed at countering intense Indian propaganda that Pakistan had been sponsoring the jehad in the Kashmir Valley, though he added, in the same breath, that his departure from the high office of Ameer of the Lashkar was not due to any internal or external pressures, be it Islamabad or Washington. A week later [on December 31, 2001], Saeed was placed under house arrest on flimsy charges of making inflammatory speeches and inciting people to violate law and order. He was then asked to evolve a new role for Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which would be more acceptable to the world. Over the following years, the Dawa successfully evaded many official restrictions mainly because it had dissociated itself from the LeT. At the same time, to give an impression that the Kashmir insurgency was an indigenous freedom struggle - the Lashkar was made to announce in 2002 that it was formally shifting its base to 'Indian Held Kashmir.'

Over the past two years, Hafiz Saeed has taken a number of steps to camouflage his jehadi agenda and to assume a role for the Dawa which could help evade the category of terrorism. The Dawa has increasingly shifted its focus on khidmat-e-khalq (social welfare) which is part of its dawat (Islamic mission) just like jehad. While giving more importance to taking its dawat to all sections of the populace, it has considerably expanded the base of its operations. Giving greater importance to college students as well, the Dawa leadership recently launched Tulaba Jamaatul Dawa, its student wing, which is working aggressively to take its dawat to youngsters across Punjab.

Saeed's close circles say the changing focus of the Dawa activities coupled with the caution exercised by him have helped their organization survive the fresh ban Musharraf imposed on several extremist outfits in November 2003. However, explaining Musharraf's decision to spare Saeed's organization, well-informed intelligence sources say the Dawa chief was more amenable to the establishment's control than the leaders of any other jehadi outfit, as he can readily agree to wage a controlled jehad in the Valley whenever required to do so. Further, his vulnerability has increased manifold after a split in Jamaat-ud-Dawa over distribution of the group's assets, that gave birth to a breakaway faction - Khairun Naas (Peoples' Welfare), led by Professor Zafar Iqbal.

These circles are convinced that General Musharraf would neither abandon the militants nor the military option until there is a formal resolution of the lingering Kashmir dispute. They pointed out that the last time Musharraf had made the promise of curbing militancy to the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, in May 2003, the militants were held back for only a couple of months before being allowed to resume infiltration across the LoC. And should the Indo-Pak peace initiative fail; there are those in the military establishment who believe the Lashkar could once again be the frontline jehadi outfit in J&K and Hafiz Saeed the new public face of the militancy there.

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)

Acting under the establishment dictum, one of the most dangerous jehadi organizations operating from Pakistan and active in J&K, the JeM, restyled itself as the Khudamul Islam, claiming it is devoted to preaching Islam and social work. The Jaish chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, who had to be released by the Indian Government in December 1999 after an Indian airplane was hijacked, is one of India's 20 most-wanted men.

However, Maulana Masood Azhar had to face the wrath of the Pakistani intelligence establishment after his group was found involved in the December 2003 suicide attacks against General Musharraf in Rawalpindi. Investigations into these attacks later cleared Masood Azhar's name after it transpired that one of the two suicide bombers - Mohammad Jameel - actually belonged to the Jaish's dissident group - Jamaatul Furqaan, led by Maulana Abdul Jabbar alias Maulana Umer Farooq. Much before the suicide attacks, Masood had informed the ISI high-ups in writing that Jabbar and 11 of his associates had revolted against him and he was no more responsible for their actions.

That the military and intelligence establishment of Pakistan continues to protect Masood Azhar is evident from Islamabad's refusal to a request by the International Police (Interpol) for taking the Jaish chief into custody. Interpol had been prompted to act at the behest of the US Department of Justice, which wanted charges filed against the Maulana from Bahawalpur and against Sheikh Ahmed Omar Saeed for their involvement in at least two crimes committed against American citizens - the 2002 murder of journalist Daniel Pearl and the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 (with a US citizen, Jeanne Moore, aboard). The Americans had maintained that under the US law, they have the right to investigate crimes against their citizens committed anywhere in the world.

The Jaish, which was launched by Azhar after being released from India, has largely confined its military operations within J&K. The only recorded instance of its operations outside Kashmir had been the December 13, 2001, attack on Parliament in New Delhi. Earlier, on October 10, 2001, a month after the terror attacks struck the United States, Masood Azhar had renamed Jaish as Tehrikul Furqaan. The move was motivated by reports that the US was contemplating declaring JeM a foreign terrorist. Despite its renaming, the US State Department designated the Jaish a foreign terrorist organization in December 2001, compelling Musharraf to ban the group in January 2002. Masood Azhar got his outfit registered under the new name of Khudamul Islam within no time.

The Jaish chief was kept under house arrest for a few months after the 9/11 terror attacks, but was subsequently set free. Though Masood Azhar, while conceding to the ISI's pressure, had directed his henchmen not to target the American interests in Pakistan, there are strong fears in the Pakistani intelligence circles that the dissident members of the Jaish, who are unknown and have gone underground, constitute the real threat. They are spread all over Pakistan, and are desperate to avenge the Taliban's fall and Musharraf's U-turn on Afghanistan and Kashmir. Both the Jaish factions - Khudamul Islam and Jamaatul Furqaan, already banned by the Musharraf Government - are now openly in conflict.

The murmurs of dissent in the outfit first surfaced when Masood Azhar failed to react to General Musharraf's policy change on Afghanistan after the 9/11 terror attacks. Several prominent Jaish members favoured retaliatory attacks against US interests in Pakistan to pressurize the military ruler against supporting the Bush administration. But acting under the agencies' command, Masood refused to acquiesce. As things stand, there are fears that ongoing disputes over possession of the various Jaish offices, mosques and other material assets could lead to more serious clashes between the two banned factions. At this stage, it is difficult to predict which of the two will eventually survive.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and United Jehad Council (UJC)

Led by Rawalpindi-based Yousaf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin, HM is the outfit to watch in the coming months. Of all the militant groups operating in J&K, the HM is the largest, with a 20,000-strong cadre base drawn from both indigenous and foreign sources. The Hizb happens to be one of the most lethal jehadi groups, and controls about 60 per cent of militants operating in J&K.

With India and Pakistan finally agreeing to allow travel across the Line of Control (LoC) by bus between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad, the Pakistani establishment has asked HM Chief Salahuddin to halt, for the time being, all militant operations against the Indian security forces in J&K. However, the United Jehad Council (UJC), an alliance of 13 Kashmiri jehadi organizations led by Salahuddin, has been restructured and three Pakistan-based jehadi groups, the LeT, JeM and Al-Badar Mujahideen have been brought into the UJC. This new adjustment is called Muwakhaat ('agreement on the basis of brotherhood') that is aimed at putting an end to the internal differences among the jehadi groups waging the Kashmir jehad.

According to the intelligence sources, reorganizing the command and control structure of the HM-led UJC was part of a strategy change to enable Pakistani intelligence to have tighter control over its running. With the restructuring of the UJC, they said, no component member of the UJC would be allowed to launch an attack in J&K, unless approved by the Council. That is why most of the smaller groups, which had been irritants for the ISI, have been merged to reduce the number of their representation in the Jehad Council from thirteen to five. Al-Barq, Tehreek-e-Jehad, Islamic Front, Brigade 313 and the Kashmiri component of HuM have been merged to form the Kashmir Freedom Force, which would be led by Farooq Qureshi of Al Barq. The Muslim Janbaz Force, Al Jehad Force, Al Fateh Force, Hizbullah and Jamiatul Mujahideen (JuM) have also been merged to form the Kashmir Resistance Force which would be led by Ghulam Rasool Shah. Similarly, many of the militant training camps have been moved from Azad Kashmir to Pakistan in Punjab and the Frontier provinces, with strict restrictions on the movement of militants. The training camps have reportedly been relocated at Taxila, Haripur, Boi, Garhi Habibullah and Tarbela Gazi.

The HM has witnessed four splits since 1990, and all were meant to remove Salahuddin. But the 'supreme commander' has survived and continues to control the HM and the UJC, while sitting in Rawalpindi. The Jamiatul Mujahideen of General Abdullah, the Muslim Mujahideen of Ahsan Dar, the Hizb-e-Islami of Masood and Al-Badar of Bakht Zameen, are the major groups that have discarded the umbrella of the HM in the past few years. In the words of one ex-intelligence official: "One of the tricks in the book is not to allow any individual jehadi group to become too strong. This is a tried and tested mode of keeping overall control on such groups. Whenever one group is seen as getting too strong or influential, the agencies try to split it and sometimes pit one against the other. And the Hizbul Mujahideen is no exception".

Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM)

Led by Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil till recently, the HuM has regrouped and is working in a low-key manner under the name of the Jamiatul Ansar, but insisting that it has a non-militant agenda. As the Government's anti-extremism drive brought into sharp focus Maulana Khalil's alleged al-Qaeda links, he had to resign from the top slot of the organization in January 2005, as advised by his spy masters.

Khalil, who was released in December 2004 after an eight-month detention in a seven by seven foot cell, submitted his resignation at a January 2005 meeting of the 'executive committee' of the HuM and asked the committee members to elect Maulana Badar Munir from Karachi as the new chief. Khalil was reportedly interrogated on the charge of sending trained fighters to Afghanistan even after the 9/11 terror attacks. The second allegation was that some militants involved in the suicide attempts on Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December 2003 belonged to his organization. Intelligence sources, however, insist that Khalil remains in the good books of the establishment and would continue calling the shots from behind the scene, despite his resignation as the Harkat chief, which was nothing more than an eye wash.

Since early 2002, the Harkatul Mujahideen Al-alami (HuMA) - an offshoot of the HuM, has been accused of mounting several deadly attacks in Karachi, including two abortive attempts on General Musharraf's life and a number of suicide bombings in the port city of Karachi. On September 29, 2001, the Government had banned the HuM following the Bush Administration's September 24, 2001, decision to freeze HuM assets along with those of 26 other organizations and individuals in connection with a worldwide campaign against the possible sources of al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorism.

According to intelligence sources, about 50 highly trained operatives of the Harkatul Mujahideen, using the cover of the Harkatul Mujahideen Al-alami, are bent on targeting Musharraf and US interests in Pakistan. HuM's association with Osama bin Laden was established on August 20, 1998, when US planes bombed the al-Qaeda training camps near Khost and Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan in retaliation to US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The US bombs destroyed two HuM training camps and killed 21 of its activists. As of today, the US intelligence agencies believe the Harkat still retains links, like most other jehadi groups, with the Taliban remnants and al-Qaeda operatives hiding on the Pak-Afghan border. They recall that Khalil took hundreds of his men to Afghanistan after the US-led Allied Forces had launched operations in the country in 2001.

Despite enthusiastic applause from the West for anti-militancy efforts of Pakistan's 'visionary' military ruler, it is evident that much remains to be done on the ground before these efforts will actually bear fruit. With changing scenarios all over the world, there has been a change of minds, yet what is required is a change of hearts.


INDIA
PAKISTAN

The Kashmir Dialogue
Guest Writer: G. Parthasarathy
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

On October 25, 2004, General Pervez Musharraf 'floated' some 'new ideas' for moving ahead on the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue in the ongoing dialogue process between India and Pakistan. He called for 'identifying' seven distinct regions in J&K on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). Two regions that he alluded to are Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas now under Pakistani control. The remaining five regions on the Indian side he was alluding to appear to include the Jammu Region (Hindu majority), the Poonch Region and the Valley of Kashmir (Sunni Muslim dominated), the Kargil Sector (Shia Muslim dominated) and the Ladakh Region (Buddhist majority). General Musharraf spoke of 'demilitarizing' these regions. He added that they should either be granted 'independence', placed under 'Joint Indo-Pakistan control,' or under 'UN Mandate'. Faced with criticism in Pakistan for not insisting on UN Resolutions, he hastened to clarify that all he had done was to float a few trial balloons.

The Manmohan Singh Government in New Delhi was placed in an awkward situation by General Musharraf's 'loud thinking'. Musharraf's proposals were very close to those put forward a few years earlier by the Washington based Kashmir Study Group headed by Kashmiri business tycoon Farookh Katwari, who was encouraged by the Clinton Administration in his efforts. Katwari's proposals sought to divide J&K on religious lines and to secure a semi-independent status for the Kashmir Valley. There were few takers for these suggestions in New Delhi. Sensing that he had no option but to respond to General Musharraf's 'trial balloons', Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set out India's position in unambiguous terms when visiting Srinagar on November 17, 2004. Dr. Singh asserted: "I have made it quite clear that any redrawing of the international border is something which is not going to be acceptable to us… Any proposal which smacks of a further division of our country on the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us… Within these two limits we are ready to look into any new proposals".

While the Pakistan Foreign Office predictably termed Dr. Manmohan Singh's response as disappointing and repeatedly kept urging 'flexibility', the presently unbridgeable gap between India's bottom line on the issue of J&K and Pakistan's expectations came into clear focus. It is obvious that no amount of diplomatic sophistry can bridge the vast divide between the two countries on what Pakistan calls the 'core issue'. Any possibility of a 'solution' to the Kashmir issue in the foreseeable future can thus be ruled out. The question that arises is how the two countries can evolve a framework which enables them to live with these differences, while demonstrating that tensions are being reduced and that ordinary Kashmiris are proceeding with their lives with safety, dignity and economic progress. Pakistan can derive some satisfaction from the fact that it has got New Delhi to discuss issues pertaining to J&K in a sustained manner thirty two years after the Simla Agreement was signed. New Delhi, in turn, can now be satisfied with the fact that this dialogue is taking place after a public pledge by General Musharraf that he would not allow territory under Pakistan's control to be used for terrorist activities against India. Pakistan also realizes that its quest for third party mediation has reached a dead end in world capitals that matter - Washington, Moscow, London, Paris and Beijing.

There now appears to be some recognition in Islamabad that while it must keep harping on words like 'core issue' and 'solution' while referring to J&K, what it can practically hope to achieve for the present is an unfreezing of the status quo in J&K, while simultaneously discussing a wide range of issues to reduce tensions and enhance confidence between the two countries. Given the predominance of the Army establishment in determining policies towards India, even a rational economic thinker like Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has no option but to place a long list of conditions to normalization of trade and economic relations. But Shaukat Aziz has indicated that such relations could expand as negotiations for a South Asian Free Trade Area (scheduled to be launched in January 2006) pick up momentum. One hopes that credible security guarantees will be obtained from Iran before the gas pipeline project through Pakistan is finally inked. This project can move ahead once the prices are agreed upon and India completes arrangements for alternate modes of transportation, should supplies be cut.

A wide range of issues have been discussed under the 'Composite Dialogue Process' between India and Pakistan in recent months. The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries have met twice. Foreign Minister Kasuri has visited India and External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh was in Pakistan last month. Despite these meetings, differences remain over hydroelectric projects like Baglihar and Kishenganga in J&K, with Pakistan either seeking World Bank intervention where its demands are not met, or stalling a mutually acceptable solution, as in the Tulbul Navigation project, despite India stopping construction work in deference to Pakistani demands in 1988. While there has been an inclination on both sides to remain inflexible on many issues, the most notable achievement has been the agreement to establish a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad last month. There is also to be a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore and for the first time in 30 years Pakistan has agreed to reopen the rail link between Munabao in Rajasthan and Khokrapar in Sind. A human dimension is now being given to the relationship with politicians, judges, lawyers, professionals and business men traveling across the border. But these measures can be best implemented only if the existing visa regime is liberalized and Consulates to issue visas are reopened in Karachi and Mumbai.

At the strategic military level, the pace of normalization has been could have been faster. The two countries agreed during the Lahore Summit in February 1999 to conclude agreements for prior notification of missile tests and to avoid incidents at sea. These agreements are yet to be concluded. Contacts between the Directors General of Military Operations and the Foreign Secretaries are being upgraded. Mutual confidence could be further enhanced if there are direct links between the Air Operations Directorates of the two Air Forces. Further while India has spelt out its nuclear doctrine to Pakistan, there has been no reciprocity on this score. It is evident that Pakistan wishes to maintain a posture of ambiguity on its nuclear doctrine in order to constantly hold out the threat of Kashmir being a 'nuclear flashpoint' to the international community, though this threat carries little credibility presently. New Delhi recognizes that while the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is 'India specific', Pakistan is not going to get into a suicide mode of using nuclear weapons unless its very survival is at stake.

There are still a number of areas where cooperation, confidence and contacts between India and Pakistan can be expanded. India should ensure that a large number of tourists from Pakistan are welcomed in J&K throughout the tourist season. Srinagar should be expeditiously made into an international airport. Bus routes between Kargil and Skardu and Jammu and Sialkot are other measures that can be taken soon. Moves need also to be initiated for free trade across the LoC. But amidst interest in such measures a degree of caution needs to be injected. Because of threats posed to American interests and his own security, General Musharraf has curbed the activities of two ISI supported Pakistani groups, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in J&K. But other groups like the Lashkar e Taiba continue to operate with support from the ISI. While overall casualties and infiltration levels have gone down, Pakistan based terrorist groups are now pointedly targeting vulnerable security forces installations, Government offices and politicians who do not toe Islamabad's line in Jammu and Kashmir. The infrastructure for promoting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir still remains intact. Pakistan is also arming and training insurgent groups operating in India's northeast with active cooperation from the Khaleda Zia Government in Bangladesh.

New Delhi appears to believe that it can and should move ahead on the process of normalization even if General Musharraf does not fully keep the promise he made on January 6, 2004, to end all support for terrorism on Pakistan controlled territory. It, however, remains to be seen how the military establishment in Pakistan acts in coming months on its policies of wanting to 'weaken India from within' and 'bleeding India with a thousand cuts'. The picture will become clearer when the winter snows melt in the Himalayas.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
February 28-March 6, 2005

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

0
0
5
5

INDIA

     Assam

1
0
4
5

     Delhi

0
0
3
3

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

3
2
16
21

     Left-wing
     Extremism

9
0
5
14

     Manipur

0
0
14
14

     Nagaland

0
0
1
1

     Tripura

0
1
2
3

Total (INDIA)

13
3
45
61

NEPAL

3
5
72
80

PAKISTAN

0
0
2
2

SRI LANKA

7
0
2
9
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

Three Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists killed in Delhi: On March 5, 2005, the Special Cell of the Delhi Police neutralised a module of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), when they first arrested two of its operatives and later shot dead three others at Kakrola Mor in South-West Delhi. Two of those killed have been identified as Pakistani nationals, while one is an Indian. "The militants who had made the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun their target were also planning to attack some big software companies based in Bangalore… The idea was to strike at the economic strength of the country as software is a major sector for India," Joint Commissioner of Police (Special Cell), Karnail Singh, told a press conference on March 6. The Hindu; Times of India, March 6, 2005.

CPI-Maoist kills eight civilians in Andhra Pradesh: Left-wing extremists (also known as Naxalites) of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) shot dead eight civilians and wounded two others at Vempenta village in the Kurnool district of Andhra Pradesh on March 1, 2005. Claiming responsibility for the killings, CPI-Maoist leader, Satyam, said it was a revenge act for the killings of nine people belonging to the lower castes in 1998. "If only the Government had set up a special court to try these accused, we would not have resorted to the killings," he said. Meanwhile, the State Home Minister, K. Jana Reddy, said "This is a barbaric and uncivilised act and those championing the cause of human rights should think about it." The Hindu, March 2, 2005.


NEPAL

48 Maoist insurgents killed during clashes in Bardiya district: At least 48 Maoist insurgents are suspected to have been killed during clashes between security force (SF) personnel and the insurgents in the Ganeshpur area along Nepalgunj-Guleriya section of the Mahendra Highway in Bardiya district on February 28, 2005. Four police personnel also died and 17 others were wounded during the clash. The incident occurred after the insurgents opened fire at the SFs, which reached the site to remove barricades set up by the former on the highway. Kantipur Online, March 1, 2005.



PAKISTAN

Government offers to buy tribesmen's arms at market price in South Waziristan: The Government on March 3, 2005, offered to buy weapons at market price from the tribesmen in South Waziristan. It intended to purchase anti-aircraft guns, missiles, mortars, rocket launchers, landmines, hand-grenades, light machineguns and AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles, said local administrator, Khan Bukhsh. "This is a golden opportunity for the tribal people… You can sell your weapons and the Government will pay you at market price," he said during a meeting with members of the Mahsud tribe at Tank city in South Waziristan. Khan reportedly gave the tribesmen one week to consider the Government's offer. Dawn, March 4, 2005.


SRI LANKA

LTTE kills six civilians in Polonnaruwa district: Six civilians were shot dead on March 5, 2005, at Welikanda in the Polonnaruwa district by cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Among the dead is a suspected cadre of the 'Colonel' Karuna faction and four Muslims. Sri Lankan Army spokesperson, Brigadier Daya Ratnayake, stated that their investigations had revealed that the shooting occurred inside two houses in Welikanda. "From what we have gathered from our preliminary investigations, we suspect the LTTE to be behind the killings," he added. Daily News, March 7, 2005.



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

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K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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