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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 34, March 7, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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The Jehad Lives
On
Guest Writer: Amir Mir
Senior Assistant Editor, Monthly Herald, Dawn Group
of Newspapers, Karachi
Contrary to the General Pervez Musharraf-led Government's
much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to
uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror
network in Pakistan, a cursory glance over the activities
of four 'banned' militant organizations in the country shows
they are once again back in business, with changed names
and identities, operating freely and advocating jehad
against infidels to defend Islam.
While banning
six leading jehadi and sectarian groups in two phases
- on January 12, 2002, and November 15, 2003 - General Musharraf
had declared that no organization or person would be allowed
to indulge in terrorism to further its cause. However, after
the initial crackdown, the four major jehadi outfits
operating from Pakistan - Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM),
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective
networks as openly as before, though under different names.
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Maulana Masood Azhar, Maulana Fazalur
Rehman Khalil and Syed Salahuddin - the respective leaders
of these organizations - are again on the loose. The pattern
of treatment being meted out to these leading lights of
jehad by the Musharraf-led administration shows that
they are being kept on the leash, ostensibly to wage a controlled
jehad in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
After the 9/11 terror attacks, the four jehadi leaders
were placed under house arrests in their respective home
towns in Punjab, since they were becoming increasingly vocal
in their condemnation of General Musharraf's policy of 'slavery
to the Americans'. A countrywide crackdown also had to be
launched against activists of the jehadi groups who
were furious over Musharraf's u-turn on the Afghan jehad.
Groaning under American pressure, Islamabad also had to
temporarily stop cross-border infiltration into J&K, which
eventually reduced violence levels in the Valley. Though
most of the jehadi groups accepted the establishment's
advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy,
the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the
authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure.
This was chiefly due to the fact that the unholy alliance
between the state agencies and the jehadi groups
was quite old and had an ideological basis.
The failure of the Musharraf regime to counter extremist
jehadis is, however, inexplicable within the current
environment, as Islamabad has handed over more than 500
al-Qaeda
operatives to the Bush Administration since the war on terror
began. As the political will to dismantle the Islamist extremist
groups that are not on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) 'Most Wanted list seems to be absent, almost all the
major jehadi groups based in Pakistan continue to
operate and pursue their agenda without any restrictions.
General Musharraf, by his own admission, no longer controls
the jehadis that the state had long supported, and
the self-proclaimed holy warriors are far from ready to
call it quits. On the other hand, the Pakistani establishment
continues to maintain its long alliance with fundamentalist
parties, which share a common goal with the jehadis:
the liberation of 'Occupied Jammu & Kashmir' through jehad.
Had the six-party religious alliance - Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA) - not sided with the General to pass the 17th Constitutional
Amendment last year, the latter would have been left with
no option but to quit the post of Army Chief by December
31, 2004. But then the military, the mullahs and the jehadis
share a common belief in Pakistan's rightful claim over
J&K. Consequently, Pakistan, the most trusted US ally in
its war against terror, confronts a surging wave of Islamist
fundamentalism. The growing influence of the fundamentalists
in the country can be gauged by the fact that the MMA presently
controls 20 percent of the seats in the Pakistani Parliament.
This means that the religious right, which had been a vocal
supporter of the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has
successfully moved from the periphery to the center stage
of national politics. As a result, support for the militant
cause has also grown within sections of Pakistani society
where it never existed before.
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
Although the ongoing peace talks between India and Pakistan
are being taken as a bad news by most of the militant outfits
waging armed struggle against the Indian forces in J&K,
the leadership of one of the most feared jehadi groups,
the LeT and its parent organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, are
keeping their fingers crossed. Sources close to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa
chief, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, say he has been persuaded by
the establishment to go low key and to abstain from issuing
statements criticizing the Indo-Pak peace parleys. In return,
however, Saeed has been given assurance that no action would
be taken against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and its militant
wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and no restrictions on
activities including collection of funds, holding of public
rallies or the recruitment of jehadi cadres and their
training. The result is that, after a year of hibernation
under official pressure, Saeed, who founded the Lashkar
in 1988, is again activate and making fiery speeches
across Punjab. Saeed's close associates claim that young
jehadis from various parts of the country continue
to throng the Lashkar camps at Muzaffarabad in Azad
Kashmir before being pushed into J&K, though at a limited
scale now.
The Lashkar is the only jehadi group operating
from Azad Kashmir that still keeps a comparatively large
group of activists at its Khairati Bagh camp in the Lipa
Valley. Another Lashkar camp is functional at Nala
Shui in Muzaffarabad from where young militants are launched
after being given initial training at the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's
Muridke headquarters in Punjab. Unlike the past strategy
of launching large groups comprising of 25 to 50 militants
on a regular basis from the camps located on the LoC, Lashkar
sources disclose, it has now been decided to keep training
militants in limited numbers to launch smaller groups of
not more than five to fifteen people, that too, at intervals.
Despite the official ban, banners can easily be seen in
the urban and rural areas of Punjab, urging young boys to
enroll with the Lashkar for jehad. These banners
usually carry telephone numbers of the area offices. Similarly,
Lashkar and Dawa activists can be seen outside
mosques after Friday prayers distributing pamphlets and
periodicals preaching the virtues of jehad in Kashmir,
Palestine, Chechnya, Kosovo and Eritrea, besides vowing
that the Lashkar would plant the flag of Islam in Washington,
Tel Aviv and New Delhi. The Lashkar leadership describes
Hindus and Jews as the main enemies of Islam, claiming India
and Israel to be the main enemies of Pakistan. The donation
boxes of the Lashkar and the Dawa, which had
initially disappeared after the January 2002 ban, have reappeared
on public places as well as mosques all over the Punjab.
After the US State Department included the Lashkar in
the list of its officially designated terrorist groups in
December 2001, apparently acting under the establishment's
directives, the then Lashkar chief, Hafiz Saeed,
addressed a press conference in Lahore [on December 24,
2001] and announced that Maulana Abdul Wahid, who hails
from Poonch district in Jammu, would head the Lashkar.
While stepping down as Lashkar chief, Saeed said
he would lead the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the new name for
the Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad. During the news briefing,
Saeed said the changes were aimed at countering intense
Indian propaganda that Pakistan had been sponsoring the
jehad in the Kashmir Valley, though he added, in
the same breath, that his departure from the high office
of Ameer of the Lashkar was not due to any internal
or external pressures, be it Islamabad or Washington. A
week later [on December 31, 2001], Saeed was placed under
house arrest on flimsy charges of making inflammatory speeches
and inciting people to violate law and order. He was then
asked to evolve a new role for Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which
would be more acceptable to the world. Over the following
years, the Dawa successfully evaded many official
restrictions mainly because it had dissociated itself from
the LeT. At the same time, to give an impression that the
Kashmir insurgency was an indigenous freedom struggle -
the Lashkar was made to announce in 2002 that it
was formally shifting its base to 'Indian Held Kashmir.'
Over the past two years, Hafiz Saeed has taken a number
of steps to camouflage his jehadi agenda and to assume
a role for the Dawa which could help evade the category
of terrorism. The Dawa has increasingly shifted its
focus on khidmat-e-khalq (social welfare) which is
part of its dawat (Islamic mission) just like jehad.
While giving more importance to taking its dawat
to all sections of the populace, it has considerably expanded
the base of its operations. Giving greater importance to
college students as well, the Dawa leadership recently launched
Tulaba Jamaatul Dawa, its student wing, which is
working aggressively to take its dawat to youngsters
across Punjab.
Saeed's close circles say the changing focus of the Dawa
activities coupled with the caution exercised by him
have helped their organization survive the fresh ban Musharraf
imposed on several extremist outfits in November 2003. However,
explaining Musharraf's decision to spare Saeed's organization,
well-informed intelligence sources say the Dawa chief
was more amenable to the establishment's control than the
leaders of any other jehadi outfit, as he can readily
agree to wage a controlled jehad in the Valley whenever
required to do so. Further, his vulnerability has increased
manifold after a split in Jamaat-ud-Dawa over distribution
of the group's assets, that gave birth to a breakaway faction
- Khairun Naas (Peoples' Welfare), led by Professor
Zafar Iqbal.
These circles are convinced that General Musharraf would
neither abandon the militants nor the military option until
there is a formal resolution of the lingering Kashmir dispute.
They pointed out that the last time Musharraf had made the
promise of curbing militancy to the visiting US Deputy Secretary
of State, Richard Armitage, in May 2003, the militants were
held back for only a couple of months before being allowed
to resume infiltration across the LoC. And should the Indo-Pak
peace initiative fail; there are those in the military establishment
who believe the Lashkar could once again be the frontline
jehadi outfit in J&K and Hafiz Saeed the new public
face of the militancy there.
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
Acting under the establishment dictum, one of the most dangerous
jehadi organizations operating from Pakistan and
active in J&K, the JeM, restyled itself as the Khudamul
Islam, claiming it is devoted to preaching Islam and
social work. The Jaish chief, Maulana Masood Azhar,
who had to be released by the Indian Government in December
1999 after an Indian airplane was hijacked, is one of India's
20 most-wanted men.
However, Maulana Masood Azhar had to face the wrath of the
Pakistani intelligence establishment after his group was
found involved in the December 2003 suicide attacks against
General Musharraf in Rawalpindi. Investigations into these
attacks later cleared Masood Azhar's name after it transpired
that one of the two suicide bombers - Mohammad Jameel -
actually belonged to the Jaish's dissident group
- Jamaatul Furqaan, led by Maulana Abdul Jabbar alias
Maulana Umer Farooq. Much before the suicide attacks, Masood
had informed the ISI high-ups in writing that Jabbar and
11 of his associates had revolted against him and he was
no more responsible for their actions.
That the military and intelligence establishment of Pakistan
continues to protect Masood Azhar is evident from Islamabad's
refusal to a request by the International Police (Interpol)
for taking the Jaish chief into custody. Interpol
had been prompted to act at the behest of the US Department
of Justice, which wanted charges filed against the Maulana
from Bahawalpur and against Sheikh Ahmed Omar Saeed for
their involvement in at least two crimes committed against
American citizens - the 2002 murder of journalist Daniel
Pearl and the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814
(with a US citizen, Jeanne Moore, aboard). The Americans
had maintained that under the US law, they have the right
to investigate crimes against their citizens committed anywhere
in the world.
The Jaish, which was launched by Azhar after being
released from India, has largely confined its military operations
within J&K. The only recorded instance of its operations
outside Kashmir had been the December 13, 2001, attack on
Parliament in New Delhi. Earlier, on October 10, 2001, a
month after the terror attacks struck the United States,
Masood Azhar had renamed Jaish as Tehrikul Furqaan.
The move was motivated by reports that the US was contemplating
declaring JeM a foreign terrorist. Despite its renaming,
the US State Department designated the Jaish a foreign terrorist
organization in December 2001, compelling Musharraf to ban
the group in January 2002. Masood Azhar got his outfit registered
under the new name of Khudamul Islam within no time.
The Jaish chief was kept under house arrest for a
few months after the 9/11 terror attacks, but was subsequently
set free. Though Masood Azhar, while conceding to the ISI's
pressure, had directed his henchmen not to target the American
interests in Pakistan, there are strong fears in the Pakistani
intelligence circles that the dissident members of the Jaish,
who are unknown and have gone underground, constitute the
real threat. They are spread all over Pakistan, and are
desperate to avenge the Taliban's
fall and Musharraf's U-turn on Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Both the Jaish factions - Khudamul Islam and
Jamaatul Furqaan, already banned by the Musharraf
Government - are now openly in conflict.
The murmurs of dissent in the outfit first surfaced when
Masood Azhar failed to react to General Musharraf's policy
change on Afghanistan after the 9/11 terror attacks. Several
prominent Jaish members favoured retaliatory attacks
against US interests in Pakistan to pressurize the military
ruler against supporting the Bush administration. But acting
under the agencies' command, Masood refused to acquiesce.
As things stand, there are fears that ongoing disputes over
possession of the various Jaish offices, mosques
and other material assets could lead to more serious clashes
between the two banned factions. At this stage, it is difficult
to predict which of the two will eventually survive.
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and United Jehad Council (UJC)
Led by Rawalpindi-based Yousaf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin,
HM is the outfit to watch in the coming months. Of all the
militant groups operating in J&K, the HM is the largest,
with a 20,000-strong cadre base drawn from both indigenous
and foreign sources. The Hizb happens to be one of the most
lethal jehadi groups, and controls about 60 per cent
of militants operating in J&K.
With India and Pakistan finally agreeing to allow travel
across the Line of Control (LoC) by bus between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad,
the Pakistani establishment has asked HM Chief Salahuddin
to halt, for the time being, all militant operations against
the Indian security forces in J&K. However, the United
Jehad Council (UJC), an alliance of 13 Kashmiri jehadi
organizations led by Salahuddin, has been restructured and
three Pakistan-based jehadi groups, the LeT, JeM
and Al-Badar
Mujahideen have been brought into
the UJC. This new adjustment is called Muwakhaat ('agreement
on the basis of brotherhood') that is aimed at putting an
end to the internal differences among the jehadi
groups waging the Kashmir jehad.
According to the intelligence sources, reorganizing the
command and control structure of the HM-led UJC was part
of a strategy change to enable Pakistani intelligence to
have tighter control over its running. With the restructuring
of the UJC, they said, no component member of the UJC would
be allowed to launch an attack in J&K, unless approved by
the Council. That is why most of the smaller groups, which
had been irritants for the ISI, have been merged to reduce
the number of their representation in the Jehad Council
from thirteen to five. Al-Barq, Tehreek-e-Jehad, Islamic
Front, Brigade 313 and the Kashmiri component of HuM
have been merged to form the Kashmir Freedom Force, which
would be led by Farooq Qureshi of Al Barq. The Muslim
Janbaz Force, Al Jehad Force, Al Fateh Force, Hizbullah
and Jamiatul Mujahideen (JuM)
have also been merged to form the Kashmir Resistance Force
which would be led by Ghulam Rasool Shah. Similarly, many
of the militant training camps have been moved from Azad
Kashmir to Pakistan in Punjab and the Frontier provinces,
with strict restrictions on the movement of militants. The
training camps have reportedly been relocated at Taxila,
Haripur, Boi, Garhi Habibullah and Tarbela Gazi.
The HM has witnessed four splits since 1990, and all were
meant to remove Salahuddin. But the 'supreme commander'
has survived and continues to control the HM and the UJC,
while sitting in Rawalpindi. The Jamiatul Mujahideen
of General Abdullah, the Muslim Mujahideen of Ahsan Dar,
the Hizb-e-Islami of Masood and Al-Badar of
Bakht Zameen, are the major groups that have discarded the
umbrella of the HM in the past few years. In the words of
one ex-intelligence official: "One of the tricks in the
book is not to allow any individual jehadi group
to become too strong. This is a tried and tested mode of
keeping overall control on such groups. Whenever one group
is seen as getting too strong or influential, the agencies
try to split it and sometimes pit one against the other.
And the Hizbul Mujahideen is no exception".
Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM)
Led by Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil till recently, the
HuM has regrouped and is working in a low-key manner under
the name of the Jamiatul Ansar, but insisting that
it has a non-militant agenda. As the Government's anti-extremism
drive brought into sharp focus Maulana Khalil's alleged
al-Qaeda links, he had to resign from the top slot of the
organization in January 2005, as advised by his spy masters.
Khalil, who was released in December 2004 after an eight-month
detention in a seven by seven foot cell, submitted his resignation
at a January 2005 meeting of the 'executive committee' of
the HuM and asked the committee members to elect Maulana
Badar Munir from Karachi as the new chief. Khalil was reportedly
interrogated on the charge of sending trained fighters to
Afghanistan even after the 9/11 terror attacks. The second
allegation was that some militants involved in the suicide
attempts on Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December 2003 belonged
to his organization. Intelligence sources, however, insist
that Khalil remains in the good books of the establishment
and would continue calling the shots from behind the scene,
despite his resignation as the Harkat chief, which
was nothing more than an eye wash.
Since early 2002, the Harkatul Mujahideen Al-alami (HuMA)
- an offshoot of the HuM, has been accused of mounting several
deadly attacks in Karachi, including two abortive attempts
on General Musharraf's life and a number of suicide bombings
in the port city of Karachi. On September 29, 2001, the
Government had banned the HuM following the Bush Administration's
September 24, 2001, decision to freeze HuM assets along
with those of 26 other organizations and individuals in
connection with a worldwide campaign against the possible
sources of al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorism.
According to intelligence sources, about 50 highly trained
operatives of the Harkatul Mujahideen, using the
cover of the Harkatul Mujahideen Al-alami, are bent on targeting
Musharraf and US interests in Pakistan. HuM's association
with Osama bin Laden was established on August 20, 1998,
when US planes bombed the al-Qaeda training camps near Khost
and Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan in retaliation to US
Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The US bombs destroyed
two HuM training camps and killed 21 of its activists. As
of today, the US intelligence agencies believe the Harkat
still retains links, like most other jehadi groups,
with the Taliban remnants and al-Qaeda operatives hiding
on the Pak-Afghan border. They recall that Khalil took hundreds
of his men to Afghanistan after the US-led Allied Forces
had launched operations in the country in 2001.
Despite enthusiastic applause from the West for anti-militancy
efforts of Pakistan's 'visionary' military ruler, it is
evident that much remains to be done on the ground before
these efforts will actually bear fruit. With changing scenarios
all over the world, there has been a change of minds, yet
what is required is a change of hearts.
The
Kashmir Dialogue
Guest Writer: G. Parthasarathy
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
On October 25, 2004, General Pervez Musharraf 'floated'
some 'new ideas' for moving ahead on the Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) issue in the ongoing dialogue process between India
and Pakistan. He called for 'identifying' seven distinct
regions in J&K on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).
Two regions that he alluded to are Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
and the Northern Areas now under Pakistani control. The
remaining five regions on the Indian side he was alluding
to appear to include the Jammu Region (Hindu majority),
the Poonch Region and the Valley of Kashmir (Sunni Muslim
dominated), the Kargil Sector (Shia Muslim dominated) and
the Ladakh Region (Buddhist majority). General Musharraf
spoke of 'demilitarizing' these regions. He added that they
should either be granted 'independence', placed under 'Joint
Indo-Pakistan control,' or under 'UN Mandate'. Faced with
criticism in Pakistan for not insisting on UN Resolutions,
he hastened to clarify that all he had done was to float
a few trial balloons.
The Manmohan
Singh Government in New Delhi was placed in an awkward situation
by General Musharraf's 'loud thinking'. Musharraf's proposals
were very close to those put forward a few years earlier
by the Washington based Kashmir Study Group headed by Kashmiri
business tycoon Farookh Katwari, who was encouraged by the
Clinton Administration in his efforts. Katwari's proposals
sought to divide J&K on religious lines and to secure a
semi-independent status for the Kashmir Valley. There were
few takers for these suggestions in New Delhi. Sensing that
he had no option but to respond to General Musharraf's 'trial
balloons', Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set out India's
position in unambiguous terms when visiting Srinagar on
November 17, 2004. Dr. Singh asserted: "I have made it quite
clear that any redrawing of the international border is
something which is not going to be acceptable to us… Any
proposal which smacks of a further division of our country
on the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to
us… Within these two limits we are ready to look into any
new proposals".
While the Pakistan Foreign Office predictably termed Dr.
Manmohan Singh's response as disappointing and repeatedly
kept urging 'flexibility', the presently unbridgeable gap
between India's bottom line on the issue of J&K and Pakistan's
expectations came into clear focus. It is obvious that no
amount of diplomatic sophistry can bridge the vast divide
between the two countries on what Pakistan calls the 'core
issue'. Any possibility of a 'solution' to the Kashmir issue
in the foreseeable future can thus be ruled out. The question
that arises is how the two countries can evolve a framework
which enables them to live with these differences, while
demonstrating that tensions are being reduced and that ordinary
Kashmiris are proceeding with their lives with safety, dignity
and economic progress. Pakistan can derive some satisfaction
from the fact that it has got New Delhi to discuss issues
pertaining to J&K in a sustained manner thirty two years
after the Simla Agreement was signed. New Delhi, in turn,
can now be satisfied with the fact that this dialogue is
taking place after a public pledge by General Musharraf
that he would not allow territory under Pakistan's control
to be used for terrorist activities against India. Pakistan
also realizes that its quest for third party mediation has
reached a dead end in world capitals that matter - Washington,
Moscow, London, Paris and Beijing.
There now appears to be some recognition in Islamabad that
while it must keep harping on words like 'core issue' and
'solution' while referring to J&K, what it can practically
hope to achieve for the present is an unfreezing of the
status quo in J&K, while simultaneously discussing
a wide range of issues to reduce tensions and enhance confidence
between the two countries. Given the predominance of the
Army establishment in determining policies towards India,
even a rational economic thinker like Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz has no option but to place a long list of conditions
to normalization of trade and economic relations. But Shaukat
Aziz has indicated that such relations could expand as negotiations
for a South Asian Free Trade Area (scheduled to be launched
in January 2006) pick up momentum. One hopes that credible
security guarantees will be obtained from Iran before the
gas pipeline project through Pakistan is finally inked.
This project can move ahead once the prices are agreed upon
and India completes arrangements for alternate modes of
transportation, should supplies be cut.
A wide range of issues have been discussed under the 'Composite
Dialogue Process' between India and Pakistan in recent months.
The Foreign Secretaries of the two countries have met twice.
Foreign Minister Kasuri has visited India and External Affairs
Minister Natwar Singh was in Pakistan last month. Despite
these meetings, differences remain over hydroelectric projects
like Baglihar and Kishenganga in J&K, with Pakistan either
seeking World Bank intervention where its demands are not
met, or stalling a mutually acceptable solution, as in the
Tulbul Navigation project, despite India stopping construction
work in deference to Pakistani demands in 1988. While there
has been an inclination on both sides to remain inflexible
on many issues, the most notable achievement has been the
agreement to establish a bus service between Srinagar and
Muzaffarabad last month. There is also to be a bus service
between Amritsar and Lahore and for the first time in 30
years Pakistan has agreed to reopen the rail link between
Munabao in Rajasthan and Khokrapar in Sind. A human dimension
is now being given to the relationship with politicians,
judges, lawyers, professionals and business men traveling
across the border. But these measures can be best implemented
only if the existing visa regime is liberalized and Consulates
to issue visas are reopened in Karachi and Mumbai.
At the strategic military level, the pace of normalization
has been could have been faster. The two countries agreed
during the Lahore Summit in February 1999 to conclude agreements
for prior notification of missile tests and to avoid incidents
at sea. These agreements are yet to be concluded. Contacts
between the Directors General of Military Operations and
the Foreign Secretaries are being upgraded. Mutual confidence
could be further enhanced if there are direct links between
the Air Operations Directorates of the two Air Forces. Further
while India has spelt out its nuclear doctrine to Pakistan,
there has been no reciprocity on this score. It is evident
that Pakistan wishes to maintain a posture of ambiguity
on its nuclear doctrine in order to constantly hold out
the threat of Kashmir being a 'nuclear flashpoint' to the
international community, though this threat carries little
credibility presently. New Delhi recognizes that while the
Pakistani nuclear deterrent is 'India specific', Pakistan
is not going to get into a suicide mode of using nuclear
weapons unless its very survival is at stake.
There are still a number of areas where cooperation, confidence
and contacts between India and Pakistan can be expanded.
India should ensure that a large number of tourists from
Pakistan are welcomed in J&K throughout the tourist season.
Srinagar should be expeditiously made into an international
airport. Bus routes between Kargil and Skardu and Jammu
and Sialkot are other measures that can be taken soon. Moves
need also to be initiated for free trade across the LoC.
But amidst interest in such measures a degree of caution
needs to be injected. Because of threats posed to American
interests and his own security, General Musharraf has curbed
the activities of two ISI supported Pakistani groups, the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
in J&K. But other groups like the Lashkar e Taiba
continue to operate with support from the ISI. While overall
casualties and infiltration levels have gone down, Pakistan
based terrorist groups are now pointedly targeting vulnerable
security forces installations, Government offices and politicians
who do not toe Islamabad's line in Jammu and Kashmir. The
infrastructure for promoting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir
still remains intact. Pakistan is also arming and training
insurgent groups operating in India's northeast with active
cooperation from the Khaleda Zia Government in Bangladesh.
New Delhi appears to believe that it can and should move
ahead on the process of normalization even if General Musharraf
does not fully keep the promise he made on January 6, 2004,
to end all support for terrorism on Pakistan controlled
territory. It, however, remains to be seen how the military
establishment in Pakistan acts in coming months on its policies
of wanting to 'weaken India from within' and 'bleeding India
with a thousand cuts'. The picture will become clearer when
the winter snows melt in the Himalayas.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
February
28-March 6, 2005
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
Delhi
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
3
|
2
|
16
|
21
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
9
|
0
|
5
|
14
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
14
|
14
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Tripura
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
|
13
|
3
|
45
|
61
|
NEPAL
|
3
|
5
|
72
|
80
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
SRI LANKA
|
7
|
0
|
2
|
9
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Three Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists
killed in Delhi: On March 5, 2005, the Special Cell of the
Delhi Police neutralised a module of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
when they first arrested two of its operatives and later shot
dead three others at Kakrola Mor in South-West Delhi. Two of
those killed have been identified as Pakistani nationals, while
one is an Indian. "The militants who had made the Indian Military
Academy in Dehra Dun their target were also planning to attack
some big software companies based in Bangalore… The idea was
to strike at the economic strength of the country as software
is a major sector for India," Joint Commissioner of Police (Special
Cell), Karnail Singh, told a press conference on March 6. The
Hindu; Times
of India, March 6, 2005.
CPI-Maoist kills eight civilians in Andhra Pradesh: Left-wing
extremists (also known as Naxalites)
of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) shot dead
eight civilians and wounded two others at Vempenta village in
the Kurnool district of Andhra Pradesh on March 1, 2005. Claiming
responsibility for the killings, CPI-Maoist leader, Satyam,
said it was a revenge act for the killings of nine people belonging
to the lower castes in 1998. "If only the Government had set
up a special court to try these accused, we would not have resorted
to the killings," he said. Meanwhile, the State Home Minister,
K. Jana Reddy, said "This is a barbaric and uncivilised act
and those championing the cause of human rights should think
about it." The
Hindu, March 2, 2005.
NEPAL
48 Maoist insurgents
killed during clashes in Bardiya district: At least 48 Maoist
insurgents are suspected to have been killed
during clashes between security force (SF) personnel and the insurgents
in the Ganeshpur area along Nepalgunj-Guleriya section of the
Mahendra Highway in Bardiya district on February 28, 2005. Four
police personnel also died and 17 others were wounded during the
clash. The incident occurred after the insurgents opened fire
at the SFs, which reached the site to remove barricades set up
by the former on the highway. Kantipur
Online, March 1, 2005.
PAKISTAN
Government
offers to buy tribesmen's arms at market price in South Waziristan:
The Government on March 3, 2005, offered to buy weapons at
market price from the tribesmen in South Waziristan. It intended
to purchase anti-aircraft guns, missiles, mortars, rocket launchers,
landmines, hand-grenades, light machineguns and AK-47 Kalashnikov
assault rifles, said local administrator, Khan Bukhsh. "This is
a golden opportunity for the tribal people… You can sell your
weapons and the Government will pay you at market price," he said
during a meeting with members of the Mahsud tribe at Tank city
in South Waziristan. Khan reportedly gave the tribesmen one week
to consider the Government's offer. Dawn,
March 4, 2005.
SRI LANKA
LTTE kills
six civilians in Polonnaruwa district: Six civilians were
shot dead on March 5, 2005, at Welikanda in the Polonnaruwa district
by cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Among the dead is a suspected cadre of the 'Colonel' Karuna faction
and four Muslims. Sri Lankan Army spokesperson, Brigadier Daya
Ratnayake, stated that their investigations had revealed that
the shooting occurred inside two houses in Welikanda. "From what
we have gathered from our preliminary investigations, we suspect
the LTTE to be behind the killings," he added. Daily
News, March 7, 2005.
|
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