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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 40, April 18, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Prime Minister
Speaks: Finally, a Clear Voice on Terror
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management
There
can be no political compromise with terror. No inch
conceded. No compassion shown… There are no good terrorists
and bad terrorists. There is no cause, root or branch,
that can ever justify the killing of innocent people.
No democratic Government can tolerate the use of violence
against innocent people and against the functionaries
of a duly established democratic Government.
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For far too long, now, the political discourse on terrorism
has been clouded by a wide range of misconceptions, a great
deal of muddle-headedness and at least some self-serving
pretensions, and these have persistently stood in the way
of evolving a coherent national policy against this scourge,
even as they have obstructed India's Security Forces (SFs)
time and again from taking necessary action. In numberless
cases, where the SFs have, at great costs and with untold
sacrifices, imposed a measure of order in areas of widespread
violence, the advantage has quickly been wasted by political
adventurism and unprincipled deals with extremist leaderships
that have restored the sway of violent anti-state groups
in wide areas of the country. Political leaders at the highest
levels have repeatedly propounded the false sociologies
of 'root causes' and the fiction that terrorists and other
extremists, who have taken hundreds of innocent lives, are
best treated as 'our children' who may have 'lost their
way'. At the same time, many political parties have entered
into deceitful pre-election alliances to secure extremist
support during the polls, against promises of a 'soft-line'
in the post-poll order.
Even where political leaders have, in the past, condemned
terrorism, they have found it expedient to qualify their
remarks with platitudes about 'wayward children', 'legitimate
grievances' and the need for undefined and inchoate 'political
solutions'.
In a radical departure from this feckless tradition, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh has now articulated what can be
a sound and secure basis for a national counter-terrorism
strategy and internal security policy. At the Chief Minister's
Conference on April 15, 2005, the Prime Minister's statement
was crystalline in its clarity, sweeping aside the accumulated
debris of discredited political rhetoric - much of it emanating
from his own Party and Cabinet colleagues - to establish
and impose the beginnings of a consensus on a fractious
and opportunistic political community, as he emphasized
the dangers of "terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates,
drug trafficking and external forces interested in destabilizing
our polity", and "urged leaders of all political parties
to ensure that such forces and groups are kept away from
our political processes. We need to have zero-tolerance
for criminalisation of politics in our country."
It is unsurprising that such a statement should come, eventually,
from an economist Prime Minister, as he confronts the challenge
of integrating India's economy with the emerging global
order, and securing for the country its rightful place among
the 'great powers' of the future. For decades, expenditure
on policing and internal security has been casually dismissed
by planners as 'non-developmental expenditure' and, consequently,
in some sense, 'wasteful'. Instead, it has frequently been
argued, massive investment in areas of strife would address
the 'legitimate grievances and aspirations' of the people,
and magically wipe out violence. Billions of rupees have,
consequently, been poured into a bottomless pit, with no
visible impact on the intended beneficiaries, even as a
corrupt politicians-bureaucrat-contractor nexus has profited
hugely, and substantial volumes of these funds have also
flowed into the hands of insurgent and terrorist groups.
At the same time, ill-equipped State Police Forces, increasingly
supplemented by Central Paramilitaries and the Army, are
thrown into unequal and unending wars against elements that
are complicit with their own State political leaderships,
and that, at least on occasion, have had supporters in the
national political leadership as well.
Prime Minister Singh, however, clearly recognizes the "huge
societal costs" of the multiple anti-state movements across
the country, and notes:
Investments
are unlikely to fructify, employment is not likely
to grow and educational facilities may be impaired…
Delivery systems are often the first casualty. Schools
do not run, dispensaries do not open and PDS (public
distribution system) shops remain closed. Public service
providers can now ascribe all their inefficiencies
to "extremism".
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Recognizing
that "the challenge of internal security is our biggest
national security challenge today," Singh has called for
urgent police reforms, efficient policing, special attention
to intelligence gathering and the modernization of intelligence
services and Security Forces.
Clarifying another element of frequent political double-speak,
the Prime Minister dismissed efforts by many to underplay
the growing dangers of Left Wing extremism (Naxalism), emphasizing
the "inter-State and external dimension to Naxalism today.
This requires greater coordination between State Governments
and between the Centre and States. We have to take a comprehensive
approach in dealing with Naxalism given the emerging linkages
between groups within and outside the country…"
Singh reiterated that, "while talks and negotiations should
always be welcomed", these can only be with groups that
abjure violence:
…the
basic issues regarding violence and the State's obligation
to curb it should be clarified at the outset, so that
there are no misunderstandings or a feeling of being
let down at later stages. In our country, symbols
and gestures matter. Nothing should be done which
detracts from the authority of the Indian state and
its primary role as an upholder of public order. The
State should not even remotely be seen to back away
in the face of threats of armed violence.
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Few in India
have recognized or even understood the enormous effort and
sacrifice that has gone into the preservation of the 'symbols
and gestures' of Constitutional Democracy. It is useful,
in this context, to recall a small example of a 'routine'
operation during the recent Assembly elections in Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh and Bihar - areas widely afflicted by Naxalite
violence. A contingent of the Punjab Police (PP) was deployed
in Chhattisgarh for 22 days on polling duties, with a large
proportion of these in the Bastar area, including four of
the areas worst affected by Naxalite violence: Jagdalpur,
Kanker, Bijapur and Dantewada. One party of 50 PP personnel,
accompanied by one local policeman, started from Bijapur
to go through forests to reach a place called Sundra, to
prepare a helipad so that electoral officials and materials
could be brought in. This short journey was to be completed
in two stages, with an overnight stop at Sagmeta. They moved
from Bijapur at 07:00, and by 10:00, they were in the thick
of the forest. They were greeted by as many as 19 landmine
blasts, coupled with heavy firing. The commandos retaliated
and used area weapons - 2-inch mortars, GF rifles (grenade
launchers), Light Machine Guns and ALRs. They found that
all the existing forest trails were mined, so they marched
cross country, cutting a path through the forest and reached
Sagmeta, just 15 kilometres from Bijapur, at 17:00, completing
the journey in over 10 hours. At Sagmeta, from 23:00 to
05:00 the next morning, there was a pitched battle between
the police party and the Naxalites who were surrounding
them from all sides. They then received information that
the route to Sundra was heavily mined. The party consequently
stayed on at Sagmeta for another day. Firing on the party
started again at 2200 and continued till 0500 the next morning.
A helicopter was eventually pressed into service, and lifted
one party - about half a platoon - who secured the ground
at Sundra. The remaining policemen were then airlifted to
create and secure the helipad. They came under heavy fire
from the Naxalites through the night at Sundra as well.
For those who have not faced fire, it is difficult to understand
the enormous courage and character that it would have taken
this small contingent, as they confronted a faceless enemy,
although unused to the terrain, being in the area for the
first time. It is a tribute to their ruggedness, their training
and their experience in fighting terrorism in Punjab that,
despite the fact that they took casualties, they managed
to set up the polling station, and polling did take place.
What they saw was often horrifying, as people with mutilated
limbs lined up to cast their votes. These were the victims
of Naxalite 'justice', their limbs cut off - often by their
own relatives on Naxalite orders - on the mere suspicion
of being 'informers'. After polling was over, the party
returned, once again under heavy fire throughout the night.
While details of this expedition are available to me, it
was far from unique, and other parties in Kanker and other
districts were also subject to organised attacks - though
this was the most vicious. All Forces deployed for election
duties in the area suffered casualties, and 32 SF personnel
lost their lives during the elections in Chhattisgarh and
Jharkhand.
Prime Minister Singh has now made it clear that "there is
no place for violence and extremism of any kind in a democratic,
rule based society", but translating his newly articulated
vision into policy will require political will and perseverance.
I have, for
nearly a decade now advocated the need for a national policy
that would recognize the existing and future threat-potential
of terrorism and low intensity wars, and create the basis
for a radical reformation of internal security forces and
strategies, to create the skills, knowledge, attitudes and
infrastructure necessary to confront these dangers. It is
now necessary to initiate immediate processes to reform
the institutional structures that impinge upon internal
security management - the SFs, the justice system, intelligence
agencies, the bureaucracy, and most importantly the deeply
compromised political structures of this country.
Unless the Prime Minister can secure these ends, his exceptional
statement on terrorism and internal security would, regrettably,
be just that: an exceptional statement.
A Strategy of
Failure
Guest Writer: Suman Pradhan
Kathmandu-based Journalist and Analyst
Forty five years ago, in December 1960, King Mahendra dismissed
Nepal's first elected Government and instituted a system
of absolute monarchy that was only dismantled in 1990. In
its place came multi-party democracy and constitutional
monarchy. But the Royal coup on 1 February 2005 by his son,
King Gyanendra, has once again taken Nepal back to the days
of absolute monarchy.
Though the King has not banned political parties as his
father did 45 years ago, space for political activism is
severely restricted. Tough emergency measures since 1 February
have curtailed not just the political parties but also civil
society, the media and development agencies. Strong condemnation
of the coup within and outside the country has done little
to influence the regime's policies.
Two and half months later, with emergency still in force,
there is little sign of improvement. Of course, two and
half months are a short time to judge the performance of
a new Government. But available evidence suggests that the
length of time is immaterial for the simple reason that
most of the present regime's policy assumptions are flawed
and, consequently, point towards a continued future of violence
and conflict.
Flawed assumptions
Politically, Nepal has never been as polarized as it is
now. While the traditional ruling elite and the business
and industrial lobby support the King's actions and point
to the relative quiet of Kathmandu streets, the coup and
the emergency have not gone down well among the majority.
Recent polls have found that most Nepalis prefer multi-party
democracy and constitutional monarchy rather than a dictatorship
imposed from the Palace. For instance, a public opinion
survey sponsored by the US-based National Democratic Institute
(NDI) and conducted by AC Nielson / ORG MARG and Greenberg,
Quinlan, Rosner Research found "no significant support for
an absolute monarchy and instead showed a great commitment
to multi-party democracy and the rights it accords to the
citizens of Nepal." Though the poll was conducted well before
the coup, the NDI says its findings are relevant even after
the coup. Another recent poll by sociologists Sudhindra
Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, which was published in the Kantipur
newspaper on March 26, found that 54 per cent of respondents
supported full constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.
Only 5 per cent supported a Royal dictatorship.
Militarily, the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and the other
security services are still in a defensive mode, allowing
the Maoists
to seize the initiative at will. Recent military 'successes',
therefore, are nothing more than a repulsion of Maoist attacks,
and are not offensive operations in their true sense.
These flawed policies stem from flawed thinking and a serious
mis-reading of conditions prior to February 1. The Palace
acted on the assumption that the political parties, which
had made a mess of democracy since 1990, are unpopular and
have little support base. Palace actions were also justified
on grounds that bickering between political parties was
allowing the Maoists to gain the upper hand. And there seems
to have been a strong belief that international criticism
could be nullified by getting Nepal's other big neighbour,
China, on its side. All these assumptions have been proven
faulty.
Political trends
It is true that Nepal's political parties have little popular
appeal at this point in time. Support for the parties is
practically confined to their activists and partisan civil
society groups. The population at large remains indifferent
to their plight. Attempts by the parties to start a 1990-style
People's Movement have consequently yielded no results.
This may have given the Palace a window of opportunity to
act. But windows of opportunity, by definition, are temporary.
If the Royal regime makes serious missteps and fails to
provide a general impression of progress, that window will
close fast. That can be seen to be happening now.
The King's appointment of hardline Panchayat elements in
his cabinet, the decision to revive hated Panchayat-era
zonal commissioners, the campaign against democratic politicians
through selective use of the Royal Corruption Control Commission,
and efforts to constrict the role of the National Human
Rights Commission by creating another parallel human rights
body are all indicative of a vindictive approach towards
political parties and civil society. Nepal's hapless citizens
may not love the parties at this moment, but they definitely
do not want a return to the past either. But reviving Panchayat
era politicians and institutions has inevitably created
the impression that the King is moving beyond his stated
aim of establishing peace and strengthening democracy. What
Nepal is witnessing today is the gradual dismantling of
democratic institutions in favour of a Panchayat-style system.
Even the King's announcement of municipal elections in his
Nepali New Year's message on April 14 is being seen as little
more than a diversionary tactics. This will inevitably erode
whatever public support the monarchy may have had in the
immediate days after the coup.
Even in their current dismal state, the parties are well
placed to take advantage of these missteps. By constraining
the political parties, the King has already wiped out the
buffer between the monarchy and the people, between himself
and the Maoists. And since the Palace is mistrusted by a
large section of Nepalis, it is only a matter of time before
perceptions about the parties change. The parties can hasten
this process by instituting much-needed internal party reforms
that deals effectively with corruption and allow for a new
rejuvenated leadership to emerge. At the moment though,
such tendencies have been pushed to the backburner as the
parties rally to face the threat of an active monarchy.
But in the short to medium term, as public support for their
protests remain lacklustre, the parties will be forced to
re-think strategy and come up with reforms that help them
win public support again. Ironically, King Gyanendra could
prove to be the biggest catalyst for this rejuvenation of
the parties.
Advantage to the Maoists
The present schism between the monarchy and parties has
predictably given the Maoists a huge advantage. The Maoists
have also been boosted politically since the coup because,
as some western diplomats in Kathmandu note, "they have
actually come off better than the Palace in the eyes of
the international community." Maoist attempts to lure the
mainstream parties after February 1 speaks of the opportunities
they see in the current situation. But the parties are not
about to fall into that trap, despite increasing calls from
within by vocal student and other groups. Nepali Congress
(NC) president Girija Prasad Koirala, Nepali Congress -
Democratic (NC-D) president Sher Bahadur Deuba and several
CPN (UML) leaders have already ruled out that possibility.
Almost all the party leaders realise that striking an operational
deal with the Maoists could spell doom since that will mean
the Maoists will have hijacked the political opposition
to the Royal regime from the parties' hands. Such a deal
will also give the regime a pretext to violently suppress
the parties. None of the parties want that.
The parties' reluctance to join hands with the Maoists has
not constrained Maoist activities. After February 1, the
Maoists have been very active both in the military and political
sphere. Imposition of repeated blockades and strikes, attacks
on district headquarters and heavily defended military bases,
speak of their continued capability to inflict damage at
will. They have also managed to lure the Government into
instituting policies that attracts more international condemnation,
such as the village militia policy. But internal pressures
within the rebel outfit also appear to be growing. There
seems to be a policy tussle at the top rungs of the leadership
which appear to have affected party morale to a degree.
Recruitment and financial resources, already drying up before
the coup, may have worsened in recent months. Interviews
in the field indicate that Maoists have to rely more on
threats and coercion than genuine public support to keep
up recruitment in their ranks. For instance, there have
been credible reports about how the Maoists coerced villagers
in Rukum to participate in the deadly Khara attacks on April
8-9.
There is also indication that the Maoists do want a peace
interregnum to shore up their organization and finances,
but are caught in their own rhetoric. A peace dialogue with
the current autocratic regime will likely harm the Maoists'
image by providing legitimacy to the Royal coup. The reading
therefore is that no peace talks are likely in the near
term. The Government also seems to have reached the same
conclusions, and has, accordingly, ratcheted up the rhetoric
against the Maoists. But its military policy has failed
to match its rhetoric.
Flawed counter-insurgency
The regime's flawed assumptions in the military sphere are
obvious in the defensive nature of the war it is fighting.
Before the coup, the RNA, the Armed Police Force and Nepal
Police were all deployed in defensive positions. For any
casual observer who has travelled through Nepal's districts,
the most obvious aspect of security forces deployment was
that they were guarding their own bases and perimeters.
Offensive operations are rare, if any. And even those offensive
actions which have been reported were no more than retaliatory
or mopping up operations after a Maoist attack. The coup
has not changed this dynamic. Nepal's security forces still
remain in defensive formations, guarding their own bases.
Of course foot patrols are sent out regularly, but they
rarely venture into Maoist-controlled areas and mostly stay
on or near highways and popular foot trails. The defensive
posture of the security forces, coupled with the ill-thought
out withdrawal of police posts from rural areas under the
Unified Command concept, has given the Maoists an opportunity
to extend influence beyond their traditional strongholds.
The result is that, aside from urban areas and district
headquarters, the Government's writ rarely runs in Nepal.
If the authorities gambled that this will change after the
coup, it has not happened. The RNA leadership inevitably
talks of military offensives just round the corner, but
that corner keeps moving away. There are several reasons
for this. One is that the RNA simply lacks the manpower
and training to tackle an insurgency of this kind. Force
numbers are too inadequate to have any meaningful impact,
much less undertake offensive actions. And now, with the
Maoists frequently using blockades and strikes to disrupt
daily life, the RNA has been stretched thin to defend the
highways while at the same time securing their bases and
towns. Besides, the strategy is also handicapped by the
lack of a hearts and minds campaign as well as a political
component. In early April, during a briefing to diplomats
and development agency heads in Kathmandu, the RNA "talked
much about how they plan to win the war, but did not even
say a word about the political components that must be a
part of any such strategy," says a western development agency
head. The usual military modus operandi is to use
helicopter gunship with dumb bombs that cause more collateral
damage than Maoist kills.
The flawed counter-insurgency strategy has been further
exacerbated as the RNA grapples with the international arms
embargo after the coup. Reliable military sources say that
RNA has ammunition stocks to last just four months. If India
and the West continue with the embargo, the RNA will be
forced to seek military supplies elsewhere or begin manufacturing
ammunition at home. RNA Brigadier General Deepak Gurung
spoke bravely last month of manufacturing ammunition at
home, but he did not specify whether the RNA had the capability
to manufacture 5.56 mm bullets for both the Indian-made
INSAS and US-made M-16 rifles.
Clearly, international condemnation of the royal coup and
the effective arms embargo are having an effect on the RNA.
While it is premature to say that such strains have forced
the RNA to seek other means of fighting the Maoists, the
RNA and the Government have shown a willingness to use unconventional
methods of warfare. The foremost is the use of village militias,
which could have serious long-term security repercussions.
Though portrayed as a spontaneous uprising by common villagers
against Maoists, village vigilante groups in Kapilvastu
district have wrought carnage that can only invite Maoist
retribution. A field study by a group of human rights organisations
found that at least 42 villagers have died there, 31 of
them killed by the vigilantes on suspicion of being Maoist
sympathizers. What has gone underreported is that most of
these killings, which occurred in the last half of February,
have taken an ethnic/communal colour, as most of the victims
are said to belong to hill tribes, who had settled in the
fertile Terai plains over the last few years. One observer
who travelled to Kapilvastu recently said that the carnage
also appears to be a result of resource conflicts, particularly
between the landlords and settlers. In any case, encouragement
of village militias appears to be the Government's 'secret
weapon' against the Maoists. The Minister for Information
and Communication, Tanka Dhakal, has announced that the
Government will implement development packages in those
areas where the people take "courageous retaliatory action"
against the Maoists. Such inducements are likely to further
fan the violence in many more villages across Nepal.
In recent weeks, the RNA has used two strategies to counter
growing perceptions of its failure: it has made strong attempts
to fan rumours of an imminent split in the Maoist ranks,
and it has also portrayed recent Maoist attacks as 'victories'
for the RNA. Both are misleading. While credible reports
have emerged about some sort of disciplinary action against
top Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai and his wife Hisila
Yami, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Bhattarai
and Maoist 'supreme leader' Prachanda are on the verge of
a split. Knowledgeable sources note that disciplinary action
within the Maoist ranks is nothing new and point to the
fact that Maoist eastern commander Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal)
himself was disciplined by the party a few years ago, but
was again rehabilitated. In a statement issued on April
12, Prachanda himself alluded to this fact. Bhattarai too
recently clarified, "debates and differences on policy are
natural in a scientific party."
As for the RNA's second strategy, the Maoists did suffer
heavy losses in the April 8-9 battle in Khara. RNA says
that they recovered more than 150 Maoist bodies in the days
after the fighting. But the operation at Khara was more
a successful repulsion of a Maoist attack than an outright
military victory. From a tactical perspective, this is unsurprising
since the RNA has strengthened its base defences since 2003.
The Maoists are no longer in a position to over-run RNA
bases as was the case in 2001 and 2002. But the Khara operation
highlighted that it is the Maoists who still hold the initiative.
They choose the place and timing of battle rather than the
RNA. And despite being unable to overrun the RNA base in
Khara, the Maoists did have the satisfaction of knowing
that they successfully probed and tested the RNA's defensive
capabilities and tactics. Prachanda himself made this clear.
Acknowledging losses on the Maoist side, he said on April
12, "the two-day Khara campaign has provided valuable experiences
and lessons and will help in taking the war to a new level."
Even the blockades imposed by the Maoists provide a glimpse
of their capabilities. Only 10 percent of normal traffic
runs on highways during blockades, and that too under heavy
RNA security cover.
Misreading geo-strategic trends
The international community's response after the coup has
highlighted the new geo-strategic realities in South Asia:
no important power is willing to antagonize India over a
marginal country like Nepal. The United States and United
Kingdom have resolutely stood beside India in condemning
the coup. Any indications that the US is willing to go it
alone in Nepal was put to rest by US Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice during her visit to Delhi in March. Similar
though subtle signals have come from Beijing. The Chinese
Foreign Minister's visit to Kathmandu in late March and
early April did nothing to realize the regime's hopes of
material support from China. While China is content to lend
moral and political support, its relations with India are
too important to publicly dare Delhi by supplying military
assistance to Nepal. The joint-statement issued by Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart
on April 11 in Delhi is indicative of the tightening relationship
dynamics between the two giants.
But the royal regime failed to read these signals correctly
prior to and after the coup. Blatant efforts to play the
'China card' against India were based more on wishful thinking
than current geo-political trends. China's interests in
Nepal lie in a peaceful stable border and a firm check on
the pro-Tibet activities in Kathmandu. These interests were,
by and large, protected even by the party-based democratic
Governments in the past. The King's coup does not change
that reality on the ground except in one sense: the closing
down of the Dalai Lama's office in Kathmandu four days before
the coup to cultivate China. Besides this, and the reward
of the "this is Nepal's internal affair" comment from China,
the regime has failed to secure any material support. Misplaced
hopes that the Chinese would supply arms and ammunition
have come a cropper. Similar is the case of Pakistani efforts
to help the regime with arms supplies. Without China's approval,
the Pakistanis are not in a position to go ahead, which
became awfully clear during the Kathmandu visit by a Pakistani
economic delegation in late March.
Nepal's three-sided conflict is clearly worsening as an
active monarchy steadily wipes out the political middle
ground represented by the democratic parties and civil society.
A flawed counterinsurgency model, made worse by resource
constraints and a lack of political initiatives, has provided
advantage to the Maoists. Failure to correctly read domestic
and international trends means policy is being formulated
in a vacuum, devoid of a pragmatic base in ground realities.
Worse, by directly governing the country and dismantling
democratic institutions in favour of an authoritarian system,
the Royal Government is risking a popular backlash.
The Realities
of 'Peace'
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
President General Pervez Musharraf's 'cricket diplomacy',
and before that, the inauguration of the Srinagar-Muzzaffarabad
bus service (opening a route that had been shut down for
nearly 57 years), had, over the past weeks, once again pushed
the Indo-Pak peace process into the media centre-stage.
India had been guilty of the first phase of the frenetic
media build-up, as both the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) State
Government and the Centre enormously overplayed the 'bus
diplomacy' - with a high profile inauguration by the Prime
Minister at Srinagar, attended by Party Chief, Sonia Gandhi,
and a phalanx of other political leaders [in stark contrast
to the low-key inauguration by the 'Prime Minister' of Pakistan-held
'Azad Jammu and Kashmir' (AJK)]. Camera crews in India tediously
covered "every inch of the journey" from Srinagar to the
Kaman Post - the last Indian outpost on the bus route -
and the newly refurbished Aman Setu (Peace Bridge) that
spans the line between Indian and Pakistani control, hysterically
projecting the bus service as a major breakthrough towards
a 'solution' to the Kashmir imbroglio. Musharraf, on the
other hand, dismissed the bus service as "a small step towards
confidence building and a small contribution for the happiness
of the people."
In the interim, the General appeared to have been plotting
his revenge, as he forced an invitation - apparently to
attend a match in the ongoing Indo-Pakistan cricket series
- which he tenaciously expanded into a 'mini Summit' with
the Indian leadership, insisting throughout that the Kashmir
issue needed to be taken up "immediately" because "we don't
have time." He did not elaborate on this claim, but earlier,
on March 27, he had threatened that, if 'new Kargils' were
to be prevented, the Kashmir dispute would first have to
be resolved. However, if he had calculated on his capacity
to force the issue and secure a dramatic breakthrough or
at least some major concessions from the Indian side by
raising the rhetorical intensity of the media confrontation
several notches before his meetings with Indian leaders
and officials, the eventual Joint
Statement issued by the two countries
at the end of his quick tour - during which he spent a little
over an hour actually at the venue of the cricket match
- demonstrated his failure. Apart from the widening of CBMs
along lines already established in official-level talks
- greater 'people to people' contacts; more trade; and advancing
of 'institutional mechanisms' to focus on various outstanding
issues - nothing of significance was wrested from talks
with the Indian Prime Minister, even though these extended
long beyond their scheduled half hour. Reports suggest,
further, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took this opportunity
to reiterate his now clear stand that there would be no
redrawing of the Indian map, and no 'further Partitions'.
Significantly, the Indian leadership had sent out strong
and clear signals in the days preceding the General's visit,
prominently: on April 14 the Defence Minister accused Pakistan
of pursuing a 'two-faced' policy on Kashmir, at once sponsoring
terrorism and engaging in negotiations for 'peace'; earlier,
on April 8, the External Affairs Minister had stated that
"all options" were open "except redrawing the map of India
and having a second Partition"; and finally, there was the
Prime Minister's own lucid and exceptional address at the
Conference of Chief Ministers on April 15, in which he articulated
an utterly uncompromising vision on terrorism and its sponsors,
just a day before the General's arrival in Delhi.
The General's failed gambit was located in hard calculations
that provoked his observation, "we don't have time." Transformations
in the external and internal environment impinging on the
sustainability of Pakistan's enterprise of terror, as well
as on Pakistan's own future, have now demonstrated clearly
that the military and terrorist adventurism of the past
is no longer sustainable. To the extent that strategists
in Pakistan have long been convinced - and rightly so -
that without violence or the threat of violence, India will
never concede anything on Kashmir, and the increasing difficulties
of calibrating violence at a sufficient level within J&K,
it is clear that the Pakistani strategy is running out of
time. This is enormously compounded by Pakistan's rising
internal difficulties.
For one thing, Musharraf's efforts at political management
of increasing internal discontent and strife are not fructifying.
His efforts to arrive at a deal with the Pakistan People's
Party (PPP) leader, Benazir Bhutto, appears to have fallen
through (though Islamist extremist elements of the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal, increasingly restive with the passage of
time, insist that Asif Zardari, Bhutto's husband, is being
'built up' through the orchestrated arrest of PPP cadres,
and his brief detention on his return to Karachi, as part
of such a 'deal').
In Sindh, again, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)
- currently a member of the ruling coalition - is straining
at the leash. On April 11, Altaf Hussain, the founder of
the MQM, demanded a "new constitution for Pakistan" based
on "evolving geo-political and geo-strategic realities and
the ground realities in the country." He also sought a review
of Centre-State relations and the devolution of finances
to the States, claiming that provinces other than the Punjab
were being discriminated against under the present system,
and further threatened that his party would walk out of
the Government if military operations in Balochistan did
not end, and the proposal to build new cantonments in that
province were not abandoned. There are reasons to believe,
moreover, that any effort to move ahead on the proposed
Kalabagh Dam - essential to deal with the impending water
crisis in the country - may plunge Sindh into widespread
and violent protests and even the possibility of civil war.
The Awami Tehrik had organised a major demonstration on
March 31 against the building of the Dam, and the Pakistan
Oppressed Nations' Movement (PONAM) had also called for
strikes to protest the proposed Dam, the presence of the
Army and the establishment of cantonments in Balochistan.
Potential political strife in Sindh would overlay the extended
troubles in Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province,
as well as the increasing restiveness of the radical Islamist
elements within and outside Government. Incidents of violence
continue in Waziristan, despite the claims of a 'settlement',
and Balochistan has been destabilized to a point where it
became impossible to go ahead with the scheduled inauguration
of the new Port at Gwadar by Chinese Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao during his visit to Pakistan on April 5-9, 2005.
There is, moreover, a real and increasing problem in the
Northern Areas, where protests against school curricula
imposing 'Sunni beliefs' on the predominantly Shia population,
the demographic re-engineering of the region, and the issue
of identity cards, are mounting, even as state repression
intensifies, with several incidents of firing on unarmed
protesters reported over the past months. Significantly,
'elections' to the Legislative Council of the Northern Areas
- at best a toothless body - were held in October 2004,
but a 'Cabinet' is yet to be constituted, because Islamabad
will not allow even this figurehead to be constituted. It
is inevitable that other issues will gradually surface in
the Northern Areas - long neglected and forcibly kept out
of the reach of the national and international media - as
a discriminatory policy is pursued with regard to the other
and relatively favoured division of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
(PoK). Thus, while qualified enthusiasm has greeted the
Srinagar - Muzzafarabad bus link, and tentative agreement
appears to have been reached regarding the "operationalisation
of additional routes including that between Poonch and Rawalakot",
as well as the re-establishment of the Khokhrapur-Munnabao
route, there is a studied silence on the Kargil - Skardu
route that would bring two-Shia dominated areas closer.
The sense of discrimination in the Northern Areas is accentuated
by the fact that, while Muzzaffarabad is now linked to Srinagar
across the Line of Control (LoC), the road between Muzzafarabad
and Gilgit - both in PoK - lies in a state of disrepair,
and the journey must be undertaken via Attock or Mansehra.
Overlying all these are the broader economic, social, political,
demographic and resource crises looming in the near future.
While Kashmir is an 'emotional issue' for the jihadis
and for many ordinary Pakistanis, strategists recognize
that the critical conflict is over the region's water resources.
Projections suggest that Pakistan will suffer an acute shortfall
of water well before 2010, unless new resources and reservoirs
are made available, and, on the bounteous Chenab, these
can only be safely and advantageously constructed in Indian
J&K. In addition, the 'miracle' of Pakistan's projected
seven per cent rate of GDP growth is widely thought of as
being hollow - reflecting massive aid inflows and marginally
improved utilization of existing capacities, but no creation
of additional capacities or augmentation of investment flows.
There has been no decline in poverty levels, and little
by way of institutional reforms in critical areas such as
education, which could impact positively on future growth.
With one of the fastest-growing populations in the region
- the country's population is expected to grow by nearly
100 million in 2020 from the 2002 level of about 148 million
- Pakistan's developmental future is, at best, troubling.
Finally, the external environment is also changing dramatically,
and even the qualified 'tolerance of terror' extended by
the US is now being diluted, as America seeks radically
improved relations - military, economic and technological
- with India. Similarly, there is reason to believe that
China's incentives to encourage Pakistan in its mischief
are being progressively diluted by growing interests in
trade with India, and in regional stability, as Beijing
single-mindedly pursues its goal of economic reform and
expansion.
These factors are now increasingly recognized by the thinking
Pakistani, and are acutely confining Musharraf's room for
manoeuvre. The 'Kashmir front' is no longer sustainable,
as a multiplicity of 'internal fronts' open up. That is
the key to Pakistan's increasing 'reasonableness'. It is
a key India will do well to explore and exploit - especially
if acts of terror increase with the melting of the snows
in J&K.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
April
11-17, 2005
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
10
|
2
|
23
|
35
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
0
|
5
|
9
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Total (INDIA)
|
15
|
2
|
34
|
51
|
NEPAL
|
13
|
0
|
70
|
83
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
5
|
7
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Border Security Force submits
list of 190 terrorist camps to Bangladesh Rifles: The Director
General of Indian Border Security Force (BSF), R.S. Mooshahary
stated on April 17, 2005, that the BSF has handed over a list
of 190 camps of terrorist outfits in Bangladesh to the Bangladesh
Rifles (BDR) during a meeting between the two Forces, which
concluded in Dhaka on the same day. Mooshahary added that the
BSF also handed over a list of 161 terrorists taking shelter
in Bangladesh and requested the BDR to take action to evict
them. He also said that the 'general secretary' of the United
liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
Anup Chetia, has been released from prison in Bangladesh but
the authorities have not handed him over to India despite repeated
requests. Assam
Tribune, April 18, 2005.
BSF officer killed in firing by Bangladesh Rifles personnel:
An Assistant Commandant of the Indian Border Security Force
(BSF) was killed and two BSF personnel sustained injuries during
firing by personnel of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) along the
Lankabari border outpost in Tripura on April 16, 2005. "From
the marks on the ground, the spot enquiry established that assistant
commandant Jeevan Kumar and constable K. K. Surendran were dragged
inside Bangladesh territory and attacked by the BDR, resulting
in the death of the assistant commandant," said an Indian High
Commission press release in Dhaka on April 17. The
Hindu, April 18, 2005.
INDIA
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
holds talks with Gen. Musharraf: During their talks in New
Delhi on April 17, 2005, Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh,
and the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, are reported
to have committed themselves to increasing the frequency of
the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and commencing the Munabao-Khokhrapar
railway link by January 1, 2006. While the Prime Minister described
the talks as "very positive, fruitful and forward-looking,"
Gen. Musharraf said progress had been made in the discussions
during which all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, came up.
The Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, later told the media
that both sides had decided to "revive" their Joint Commission,
intensify work in the private sector Joint Business Council
and discuss obstacles to free trade at the Commerce Secretary-level
Joint Study Group on economic issues. Saran quoted Dr. Singh
as saying that he was willing to travel the road to "lasting
peace" with Gen. Musharraf. The Prime Minister reiterated that,
while redrawing of boundaries was not possible, India was willing
to take steps to bring the people living on the two sides of
the Line of Control (LoC) closer, including opening cross-LoC
trade and transport links. Saran also quoted Gen. Musharraf
as saying that confidence-building measures should be continued
between the two sides and no "deadline" or "timeline" had been
imposed to resolve the Kashmir issue, which had to be addressed.
The
Hindu, April 18, 2005.
Government open to talks with any group that shuns violence,
says Prime Minister: While observing that violence will
not win rewards and the Government will deal firmly with insurgency,
Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, said in New Delhi on April
15, 2005, that the Government is willing to conduct an honest
and meaningful dialogue with any group that shuns violence and
is ready to engage in talks. Addressing the Chief Ministers
Conference on Internal Security and Law and Order, he also said
"There are no good terrorists or bad terrorists. There is no
cause, root or branch, that can ever justify the killing of
innocent people. No democratic Government can tolerate the use
of violence against innocent people and against the functionaries
of a duly-established democratic Government." Daily
Excelsior, April 16, 2005.
NEPAL
60 Maoist insurgents killed
during clashes in Rukum district: According to the Royal Nepalese
Army (RNA), at least 60 Maoist
insurgents are believed to have died during
clashes with the troops at Dalphing in the western district of
Rukum on April 13, 2005. RNA sources claimed the clashes occurred
when a group of armed insurgents attacked a security patrol in
the area. Nepal
News, April 15, 2005.
PAKISTAN
11 Pakistanis
in Spain charged over suspected Al Qaeda links: Spanish authorities
have reportedly charged 11 Pakistani nationals over suspected
links with Al
Qaeda operatives who carried out the Madrid
train bombings in March 2004, which killed nearly 200 people.
One of the eleven, Shahzad Ali Gujar, is suspected of having transferred
funds to Al Qaeda cadres, including Amjad Farooqi, whom Pakistani
security forces killed during September 2004 and who was implicated
in the murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl. Investigators believe
Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan received some 800,000 euros ($1
million) in funds from Spain. Mohamed Afzaal, believed to have
headed the Pakistani cell in question, is suspected of sending
money in September 2004 to Rabei Ousman Sayed Ahmed alias "Mohammed
the Egyptian", who is currently in custody on suspicion of involvement
in the train bombings. Dawn,
April 14, 2005.
|
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