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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments
& Briefings Volume 4, No. 32, February 20, 2006
Data and assessments
from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence
Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal |
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Troubles on the Western Front Kanchan Lakshman Research Fellow,
Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings
on Conflict & Resolution President
Pervez Musharraf said after talks with his visiting Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai
in Islamabad on February 15, 2006, that terrorism was a common enemy and the two
countries had to combat it together. And while Afghanistan, under intense pressure
from spiraling terrorist violence, accused Pakistan of failing to stop the Taliban
from launching cross-border attacks and suicide bombings, General Musharraf only
responded by calling on "all the progressive political elements in Pakistan" to
suppress those who ‘may be abetting the Taliban’. A few days before the Karzai
visit, a large Pashtun convention in Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) in Pakistan, had called for the erasure of the British-created
‘imaginary’ Durand Line, which functions as the technical border between Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Speaking at the rally after an unanimous resolution called for the
removal of the 2,640-kilometer-long Durand Line, Asfayandar Wali Khan, Chief of
the Awami National Party (ANP), said that it was imperative to do away with the
illusory line which, the Pashtun supremo declared, had artificially separated
the Pashtu-speaking people for over a century. The
Durand Line designates the shoddily marked 2,640-kilometer-long border between
the two countries. After being defeated in two wars against the Afghans, the British,
in line with their famed ‘divide-and-rule’ policy, succeeded in 1893 in imposing
the Durand Line between what was then British India (now the NWFP and Balochistan
of Pakistan) and a truncated Afghanistan. Named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the
then Foreign Secretary of the British Indian Government, the border, arguably,
was erected to divide the Pashtun tribes whom the colonial empire considered formidable
adversaries. The treaty, strongly opposed by the then Afghan Amir (chief)
Abdur Rahman Shah, was to be in force for a 100-year period. Citing the example
of the Berlin Wall, Asfayandar Wali Khan now advocates a separate state for the
Pashtuns, obliterating the Durand Line. “It's a line whose time has ended”, Asfayandar
who is the grandson of Khan Abdul Gafar Khan, revered as the ‘Frontier Gandhi’
in this part of the world, proclaimed. The ANP, which, just days before the convention,
had merged with the Pakhtoonkhawa Qaumi Party, is widely believed to be articulating
a position that finds favour with a majority of Pashtuns living on either side
of the border. At the Pashtun convention, sources indicate, many from the various
Pashtu tribes. endorsed the view for the creation of a separate Pashtun state.
The average Pashtun has, for long, hoped that the Durand Line will be erased to
enable Pakhtoons living in the NWFP, parts of North Balochistan and in the tribal
areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan to form a state of their own. Incidentally,
within Pakistan, the NWFP, Balochistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) are currently witnessing extensive unrest and anti-state violence. Pakistani insecurities
on the Afghan front are directly related to the contested nature of the Durand
Line. Most Afghans (and Pashtuns) believe that the Durand Line should rightly
have been drawn much further South, at Attock, and this is what the Afghans will
inevitably press for when their country is strong enough. Within this context,
it is useful to note that, south of the Durand Line, in what are currently the
Pakistani NWFP and FATA, land records, police, legal and administrative records
still refer to the people as 'Afghan'. The Taliban, as has been
documented extensively, exists on both sides of the border. While they have obviously
been weakened, they retain substantial subversive capacities. With Islamabad’s
strategy to quieten the chaotic Waziristan region along the Afghan border having
failed, the mountainous terrain along the Durand Line provides a secure pathway
and safe hideout for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. On February 17, Afghan television
channel Tolo broadcast video recordings of men beheaded in Pakistan because
they opposed the presence of Taliban and Al
Qaeda terrorists there. The macabre images showed the heads
of three men being held up in front of a crowd, which chanted "Long live Osama
bin Laden" and "Long live Mullah Omar." "The footage... shows half a dozen dead
bodies being dragged by a vehicle through the streets of Mandrakhel [in Waziristan]
– while a uniformed Pakistani military officer drives past without interfering,"
Tolo stated. Afghan officials
have consistently asserted that Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives are coming in
from Pakistan, where they are reportedly based in areas of the NWFP, FATA, and
also from Balochistan. Afghanistan has given Pakistan detailed information about
members of the Taliban who, Kabul says, are orchestrating an insurgency from Pakistani
soil. On February 18, President Hamid Karzai told a News Conference at Kabul,
"We gave our brothers a lot of information, very detailed information about individuals,
locations and other issues", referring to the intelligence handed over to the
Pakistani authorities. Karzai, according to noted Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid,
handed over extensive intelligence dossiers to Musharraf, containing details of
how suicide bombers who attack targets in Afghanistan are being recruited, trained
and equipped in Pakistan. The dossiers reportedly include the names and addresses
of Pakistani recruiters, trainers and suppliers. “In places like Karachi, Pakistani
extremist groups working on behalf of the Taliban for a fee carry out the recruitment
and then bring them to safe houses in Balochistan for training and equipping with
the (suicide) vests,” said a senior Afghan official who accompanied Karzai. The
official said that all top Taliban ‘commanders’, including Mullah Mohammed Omar,
are known to be living in Pakistan and the issue had been repeatedly raised with
Pakistan. Taliban have
regrouped rather well along the Afghan countryside, particularly in provinces
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Unsurprisingly, violence is significant
near the Pakistan border. The subversion that targets Afghan provinces close to
Pakistan, like Paktika, is a reality despite the fact that Islamabad has deployed
approximately 80,000 troops on their side of the border. The burden of evidence
suggests that the Taliban/Al Qaeda have in fact been provided space by the military
to operate in the Pakistani areas along the border. Notably, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal,
an Islamist alliance with close links to the Taliban, governs Balochistan and
the NWFP. The
security establishment in Afghanistan, including coalition intelligence sources,
has indicated a disturbing shift in terrorist tactics, with the Jihadis
increasingly adopting 'Iraq-style' suicide attacks. At least 30 suicide bomb attacks
have killed nearly 100 people since November 2005, most of them claimed by the
Taliban. There are 200 to 250 Fidayeen (suicide squad members) ready to
go into action, Mohammad Hanif, a Taliban spokesperson, disclosed to Western journalist
Scott Baldouf. And the more recent violence in Afghanistan indicates a widening
geographical expanse of subversion, with the Taliban and Al Qaeda orchestrating
attacks beyond the Taliban's traditional stronghold in Kandahar and Uruzgan. For
instance, thus far in 2006, terrorist violence has been reported from Helmand,
Herat, Konar and Nangarhar provinces, in addition to an escalation of fighting
along both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The U.S.-led coalition suffered
at least 99 fatalities in 2005, the highest toll since 2001, and overall terrorist
violence in Afghanistan during 2005 claimed at least 1,500 lives. Assisting the
Pakistani and Taliban strategy is the regrettable reality that the Karzai regime
has little control over southern and eastern Afghanistan. The end-game that Islamabad
seeks to achieve, while reframing its quest for 'strategic depth', is to prevent
the Kabul regime from stabilizing without a pre-dominant Pakistani role. Anything
contrary to this would mean an increase in the dissent on the Durand Line, and
a further destabilization of North Balochistan, the NWFP and FATA.
Terror,
Migrants and Politics Bibhu Prasad Routray Research Fellow, Institute
for Conflict Management
On
February 4, 2006, soldiers of the Indian Army’s 1/3 Gorkha Rifles picked up a
suspected United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
cadre – Ajit Mahanta – from his cottage at Gohain village under the Kakopathar
Police Station of Tinsukia district. Mahanta reportedly was subjected to torture
and killed during interrogations on February 5 and was subsequently dumped at
the Assam Medical College in Dibrugarh. In a politically charged Assam, where
elections to the State Legislative Assembly are due in May 2006, the issue has
assumed serious proportions, much beyond the regular demands of the repeal of
the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and withdrawal of Army from the State. The
Army’s corrective measures were swift. An inquiry into Ajit Mahanta’s death was
instituted. On February 12, the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, Lt.
Gen. Arvind Sharma, visited Mahanta’s house and handed over a compensation amount
of Rupees 100,000 to the family. Lt. Gen. Sharma announced that the Army would
construct Mahanta’s house, adopt both his young children and provide a job to
his wife. All that, however, appeared to have come a little too late and failed
to assuage the anger of the local people. Following
Ajit Mahanta’s death, a large crowd, swelling to anywhere between 15,000 to 30,000,
turned the area into a virtual war-zone blocking Highway 52, which links Assam
to Arunachal Pradesh, for over four days between February 7 and 10; mobs burnt
down passing vehicles, the railway station, post office and Government quarters
before marching on to the Kakopathar Police Station with an intention of setting
it afire. The ensuing fracas and firing on February 10 led to the death of nine
persons, including two Security Force (SF) personnel. The rampaging mob also managed
to snatch away two AK-47 rifles from the SF personnel. There
have, of course, been demonstrations over alleged human rights violations in Assam
in the past. However, it is difficult to place the current protests, which involved
extreme violence interspersed with calls for secession, within the overall trend
of similar protests, which usually end with the announcement of an inquiry. ULFA’s
stamp on the mass mobilization and the subsequent violent demonstrations in Kakopathar
is, in fact, visible. Sources indicate that in a general meeting, blessed by the
ULFA, held on February 10 at the blockade site of Kakopathar, resolutions such
as ‘Declare the area as a liberated zone’, ‘Launch People’s war on the Army’,
‘Attack Army bases in the area’, were adopted, which finally culminated in the
attack on the Kakopathar Police Station. During the blockade days, ULFA continued
to target the security force personnel in the nearby Pangeri and Makum areas,
resulting in exchanges of fire. Intelligence
sources indicate that, taking advantage of the negotiations with the Government
and the consequent easing of SF operations in the area, ULFA has been able to
regain its lost base in the upper Assam area and of late, has entered into fresh
understandings with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
present across the border in Nagaland. The Army’s arrest and interrogations of
several youths in the area, including Ajit Mahanta, can be seen in this light.
Electoral
politics is also playing the spoiler, with ULFA remaining a potent force, courted
by several political formations. Both the Government led by Chief Minister Tarun
Gogoi, hoping for a comeback to power and other political parties in the State
including the once powerful Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), have done their bit to take
advantage of the situation in the hope of securing some electoral advantage. The
State Government has allowed the situation to drift in the hope of taking electoral
advantage and there was hardly any determined effort to end the highway blockade
and accompanying violence. Moreover, since the formation of the ULFA-backed People’s
Consultative Group (PCG), on September 29, 2005, which has so far held two rounds
of dialogue with the Union Government at New Delhi, the Assam Government has allowed
the holding of several open meetings across Assam, including one at the politically
central Judges Field in Guwahati, where resolutions favouring an ‘independent
Assam’ have been passed. On
February 11, the Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi, during an election rally
at Tezpur in Upper Assam, promised to punish the guilty involved in the incident.
Such declarations of intent and clarity of purpose are rare, and were conspicuous
by their absence, for instance, in the Manorama Devi custodial killing of August
2004 in Manipur under similar circumstances. The
ongoing ‘peace talks’ between the PCG and the Union Government have not put a
halt on the endemic terrorist violence in Assam. According to a statement by Assam
Minister of State for Home, Rockybul Hussain, on February 6, 2006, since the first
meeting with the PCG on October 26, 2005, as many as 70 subversive incidents took
place in the State and public properties worth Rs. 9,570,300 were damaged. During
this period, four Army personnel, 12 civilians and 12 militants were killed. In
fact, ULFA’s violent activities have been systematic and have been used as a ‘driver’
to move the ‘peace process’ in a certain direction. A series of bomb blasts across
the State between January 20 and 24, was engineered to force the Union Government
to hold the second round of dialogue with the PCG on February 7. While the ULFA
has been able to successfully link the cessation of SF operations to the beginning
of a peace process, the Government, curiously, in spite of periodic assertions
to the effect, has not been able to convince ULFA to give up violence during the
talks with the PCG. Under
the circumstances, SF operations in the State have been carried out under enormous
pressure. On February 1, 2006, for instance, Army personnel were forced to call
off anti-ULFA operations at Jeraigaon, the native village of the outfit’s commander-in-chief,
Paresh Baruah, in the Dibrugarh District, following protests by organizations
like the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the PCG. Earlier, on August 31,
2005, the 2nd Mountain Division had laid siege at the Dibru-Saikhowa National
Park in Upper Assam for 27 days, surrounding an armed contingent of the ULFA,
but were forced to pull back after a PCG delegation called on the Chief Minister
seeking the termination of the operation ‘to create a congenial and conducive
atmosphere for talks’. Four ULFA cadres had been killed before the siege ended,
and a huge cache of arms and ammunition was recovered, though the bulk of ULFA
cadres were allowed to escape. That
the ruling Congress Party’s recent actions have been influenced by the forthcoming
elections was again evident in proposed amendments to the Foreigners Act, 1946.
Recommendations by the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs seek to establish
tribunals to pursue cases against the illegal migrants from Bangladesh, on the
pattern of the discriminatory and disastrous Illegal Migrants (Determination by
Tribunals) [IM(DT)]
Act, which was struck down by the Supreme Court on July 12, 2005. The withdrawal
of the IMDT Act led to a tremendous backlash from the Muslim organisations in
the State who had promised to ‘teach the Congress a lesson’ in the elections.
Amendments to the Foreigners Act, which would apply only to Assam, would again
attempt to lay the onus of proof on the police to establish the identity of suspected
foreigners before a judicial tribunal – the very clause that had ensured the failure
of the IMDT. Muslims
constitute nearly 30 per cent of the State’s population, and their support has
had defining impact on electoral outcomes in the past. Estimates indicate that
Muslims – including a large number of illegal migrants who have been fraudulently
assisted in securing voting rights – dominate at least 40 of the State’s 126 Assembly
Constituencies. Sonia Gandhi’s assertion on February 11 in Barpeta, an area believed
to be migrant dominated, that proposed amendments to the Foreigners Act would
provide the same protection to the alleged foreigners that the IMDT Act did, is
a clear indicator of the party’s intentions. Under
the IMDT Act, between January 1985 and December 2004, after a total expense of
Rupees four billion, just 12,424 persons were declared illegal migrants in the
State. Of these only 1,538 persons could be deported, with the police failing
to trace the whereabouts of the rest. The amended Foreigners Act will ensure that
the law enforcers would be similarly handicapped while dealing with the illegal
migrants from Bangladesh. Sources
indicate that Chief Minister Gogoi, earlier in favour of holding the elections
before the Bihu festivities in April, now wants these to be delayed to the maximum
permissible limit of May 22 in the hope of winning back the ‘minority vote’ and
containing the fallout of the Kakopathar incident. There are also indications
that ULFA is setting up candidates exclusively from Motok and Moran tribes (several
of the group’s leaders, including Paresh Baruah are from these tribes) to contest
the elections from five Assembly Constituencies in upper Assam. None of the political
parties in the State are likely to miss an opportunity of tying up with the ULFA
to secure their electoral victory. |
Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
February 13-19, 2006
  | Civilian |
Security Force
Personnel |
Terrorist |
Total |
BANGLADESH
| 0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
INDIA
| Jammu
& Kashmir | 2 |
2 |
11 |
15 |
Left-wing Extremism
| 3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Manipur
| 2 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
Tripura |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Total (INDIA) | 10 |
3 |
14 |
27 |
NEPAL | 3 |
3 |
0 |
6 |
PAKISTAN | 5 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
INDIA
Prime
Minister meets JKLF chief Yasin Malik:
On February 17, 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met separatist leader and chief
of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF),
Yasin Malik, in New Delhi and reportedly assured him that the Union Government
has an "open mind" and would like to involve a larger cross section of public
opinion to end "the period of suffering". In his first meeting with Malik, Dr.
Singh said there was an air of optimism in Jammu and Kashmir and an opportunity
to bring lasting and permanent peace in the State. Terming his meeting with the
Prime Minister as part of "consultations", Malik claimed that the peace process
would become irreversible only after key militant leaders were included in the
talks. Malik said he wanted the Union Government to hold talks with separatist
leaders in a third country on the line of negotiations being held with the Naga
insurgent group NSCN-IM. Malik is the second leader after Sajjad Lone of the People’s
Conference to be invited by the Prime Minister for talks on the Kashmir issue.
The Prime Minister’s meeting with Malik comes a week ahead of his talks with a
cross-section of political parties and separatists groups from the State. Daily
Excelsior, February 18, 2006.
NEPAL
Former
Prime
Minister
Sher
Bahadur
Deuba
released:
Former
Prime
Minister
Sher
Bahadur
Deuba
and
former
minister
for
Physical
Planning
and
Works,
Prakash
Man
Singh,
who
were
put
under
custody
by
the
Royal
Commission
for
Corruption
Control
(RCCC)
for
alleged
irregularities
in
the
Melamchi
Drinking
Water
Project
(MDWP),
were
released
at
midnight
on
February
13
after
the
Supreme
Court
scrapped
the
RCCC.
Deuba
was
reportedly
freed
from
the
Police
Academy
in
Maharajgunj
where
he
was
detained,
while
Singh
was
freed
from
Pahara
Gan
in
Tripureshwor.
The
Supreme
Court
ordered
the
scrapping
of
the
controversial
RCCC
saying
the
formation
of
the
anti-graft
body
was
unconstitutional
as
it
contradicted
with
Articles
83
(3),
84,
85,
88
(3),
89,
105
(7)
and
127
of
the
Constitution
of
the
Kingdom
(1990).
Nepal
News,
February
14,
2006.
PAKISTAN Lashkar-e-Toiba
chief put under house arrest in Lahore:
The Government on February 17, 2006 reportedly put Hafiz Mohamed Saeed, chief
of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
under house arrest and barred him from addressing a conference against the publication
of blasphemous cartoons in several European newspapers. The chief of LeT, which
is also known as Jamaat-ud-Da’awah, was put under house arrest in Lahore to stop
him from addressing an anti-cartoon conference in the city of Faisalabad in the
Punjab province, his spokesperson Yahya Mujahid said. Yahya claimed that a heavy
contingent of police arrived at the Lahore home of Saeed and told him he could
not go outside. Reuters,
February 17, 2006. Three
Chinese engineers and Pakistani driver killed in Balochistan: Three Chinese
engineers and a Pakistani driver were killed on February 15, 2006 in Hub city,
about 700 kilometers south of Quetta, capital of Balochistan province. Hub Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Pervaiz Zahoor, informed that the Chinese, Long Wan
Dei, Zhaobin and Veiy Jang Chang, were returning to their homes from work at Attock
Cement Factory. A man identifying himself as Meerak Baloch, spokesman of the Balochistan
Liberation Army, claimed responsibility for the attack. He said that the Chinese
should stop work on all projects that the Baloch oppose in the province. This
was the second attack in the province targeting Chinese after three engineers
helping to develop a deep seaport in Gwadar were killed on May 3, 2004 in a car
bomb explosion. Daily
Times, February 16, 2006. 9,300
seminaries registered so far: At least 9,300 seminaries belonging to the Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat
Madaris-e-Deeniya (ITMD), an alliance of five religious boards, have been registered
with the Government. Religious Affairs Minister Ejazul Haq said at a press conference
in Islamabad on February 14, 2006 that 11,882 seminaries are associated with the
ITMD. He said the registration process began immediately after an agreement between
the Government and the ITMD on September 22, 2005. There is no deadline for registration
as it is a continuous process, he said. Daily
Times, February 15, 2006. |
The
South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular
data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional
warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic,
political, and social issues, in the South Asian region. SAIR
is a project of the Institute
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South
Asia Terrorism Portal. |
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