Assam: Demographic Invasion | Fatwas from Hell | South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 11.6
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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 6, August 13, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT


INDIA
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Assam: Demographic Invasion
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management

More than three decades of ethnic and communal strife, as well as multiple insurgencies, in Assam, have never seen a significant echo outside the Northeast, other than the occasional arrest of, or incident involving, a militant hiding out in some distant part of the country. Indeed, the violence of India’s wider Northeast has remained almost hermetically sealed within the region since its beginnings in 1951, with the Naga insurrection.

Abruptly, a local – albeit sizeable – conflagration in the Bodoland Territorial Administrated Districts (BTAD) of Assam has found violent reverberations in Mumbai and Pune in Maharashtra, Ranchi in Jharkhand, as well as parts of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal… even as communal organizations from Delhi and other parts of the country send ‘fact finding missions’ into the affected areas in Assam, to conclude that a great conspiracy against the State’s ‘Muslim citizens’ is afoot. The purported ‘Muslim anger’ over developments in the Bodo areas has congealed with apparent distress over the treatment and violent displacement of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. India’s ‘failure’ to ‘do enough’ for the Rohingyas was one of the supposed triggers for the ‘protest’ in Mumbai and Ranchi, which culminated in pre-planned rioting on August 11, 2012.

Curiously, little notice has been taken here of Muslim-majority Bangladesh’s inflexible position that Rohingya refugees would receive neither admission into nor shelter on, Bangladeshi soil. Indeed, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina rather curtly told British Secretary of International Development Affairs Andrew Mitchell in London, that ‘countries including Britain, which are concerned over the Rohingya issue, should hold talks with Myanmar instead of putting pressure on Bangladesh.’ If the Indian leadership was susceptible to learning anything, it would see a strong lesson here.

Unfortunately, leaderships and administrators in this country remain tenaciously uneducable. Far from seeing the intentional mischief in the present troubles, they have sought to impose a pall of confusion over the most basic issues, claiming that the violence in the Bodo areas has no relationship to the long unresolved, and implicitly encouraged, problem of illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Thus, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi baldly claimed, on July 27, 2012, “There are no Bangladeshis in the clash but Indian citizens.”

Successive administrations in Assam have refused to address, and indeed, have sought vigorously to cover up, the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migration that has destabilized the State and the wider Northeast for decades now. The general pretext has been that no authoritative estimate of illegal migrant populations is available, but this begs the question, since it is the administration that is required to produce such an estimate, and has defaulted persistently on this duty. Indeed, even the Supreme Court’s goading on this issue has fallen largely on deaf ears, or has met with fitful efforts at ‘compliance’, quickly abandoned at the first signs of predictable resistance.

On July 12, 2005, the Supreme Court of India noted that Assam was facing “external aggression and internal disturbance” on account of the large-scale illegal influx of Bangladeshi migrants, and that it was “the duty of the Union of India to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam from such external aggression and internal disturbance as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution…”

In 2005, the Centre decided to update the National Register of Citizens (NRC) ‘within two years’, on the basis of the 1971 rolls. The exercise failed to take off. On April 22, 2009, during tripartite discussions between the Central and State Governments, and the All Assam Students Union (AASU), the Government promised to initiate NRC updates in two revenue circles, Chaygaon in Kamrup District and Barpeta revenue circle in Barpeta District. The process commenced on June 7, 2010, as a pilot project, but almost immediately ran into trouble, with ‘law and order problems’ surfacing in Barpeta. On July 21, 2010, protestors under the banner of the Barpeta District Unit of the All Assam Muslim Students Union (AAMSU), demonstrated violently outside the Deputy Commissioner’s Office, demanding a halt to the process. Police eventually opened fire, killing four and injuring 50. While no official suspension was announced, the ‘pilot project’ stood abandoned from this point on.

On March 26, 2012, the Government announced the ‘decision’ to re-launch the Registrar General of Citizens’ Registration pilot project to update the NRC in three phases from July 1, 2012. AAMSU, with 24 other ‘minority organizations’ objected to the decision. The process has not begun till date.

Over the intervening years, Governments, both at the Centre and in the State have done much to muddy the waters. The most perverse initiative was the introduction of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act of 1983 (IMDT Act), ostensibly intended to ‘facilitate’ the quick detection and expulsion of illegal migrants, but, in fact, designed to disable the far more effective provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946, which continue to apply to the rest of the country. With action initiated only on the basis of a complaint, not suo moto by state agencies, and the onus of proof shifted from the accused to the complainant, the IMDT made it nigh impossible to identify and expel any significant number of illegal migrants. The Supreme Court thus noted, in 2005, that though enquiries were initiated in 310,759 cases under the IMDT Act, only 10,015 persons were declared illegal migrants, and even among these, just 1,481 illegal migrants had been expelled in the duration of the Act, till April 30, 2000. On the contrary, it was noted, that West Bengal, where the Foreigners Act was applicable, and which also faced a major problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh, 489,046 persons had been deported between 1983 and November 1998, a significantly lesser period. The IMDT Act, the Court observed, “is coming to the advantage of such illegal migrants as any proceeding initiated against them almost entirely ends in their favour, (and) enables them to have a document having official sanctity to the effect that they are not illegal migrants.”

In September 2000, the Supreme Court had directed the Union Government to repeal the IMDT Act by January 2001. The then Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government at the Centre failed to comply, claiming it did not have the requisite numbers in the Upper House. Unsurprisingly, the present Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government failed to initiate any process to implement the Supreme Court's standing orders, till the Court struck down the IMDT Act in its order of July 12, 2005. Nevertheless, the Congress continues to contest every move seeking any change to the status quo that it has engineered on illegal immigrants in Assam, on its own cynical electoral calculus.

In the interim, efforts to ‘regularize’ illegal migrant populations and entrench their ‘rights’ in what should be protected tribal areas, on the basis of opportunistic arrangements with militant formations seeking accommodation with the State, have continued through the disastrous Assam Accord of 1985 and, more significantly in the present context, the Bodo Accord of 2003. Under the latter Accord, the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, intended to protect the special rights of vulnerable Tribal populations, was amended to guarantee the land rights of ‘all communities’ living in the BTAD. It is this unprincipled and opportunistic legislation that is being used by Muslim communalists within and outside Assam to claim that all Muslims in the BTAD are Indian citizens with constitutional protection to the lands they have acquired.

Through all this, the sheer enormity of the demographic reengineering in the region has been entirely ignored. Since no Government has committed itself to a detailed enumeration of citizens or of illegal migrants, there are, of course, no ‘official’ estimates of the actual illegal migrant population in Assam. Nevertheless, authoritative estimates have periodically come into the open source from official quarters.

In 2005, then Assam Governor Lt. Gen. Ajai Singh, in a report to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), leaked to the Press, had claimed that “upto 6,000” Bangladeshis enter Assam every day. The statement was subsequently modified under pressure from the Congress to claim that the number applied to Bangladeshis entering India, not Assam alone. A 2001 UMHA estimate claimed that “150 to 170 lakh (15 to 17 million) Bangladeshi infiltrators have crossed into India illegally since 1971.” Again, on July 14, 2004, the then Union Minister of State for Home, Shriprakash Jaiswal, conceded in Parliament that, out of 12,053,950 illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators all over India, 5,000,000 were present in Assam alone.”

Census figures also provide significant indices for the scale of infiltration. The Provisional Census 2011 indicated that Assam’s population, at 31,169,272, had registered an increase of 4,513,744 over the preceding decade. Of the State’s 27 Districts, Dhubri, bordering Bangladesh, had recorded the highest growth, at 24.4 percent. The decadal growth rate for Assam, at 16.93 per cent, was lower than the overall national growth, at 17.64 per cent. Details of trends in various population groupings under the Census 2011 are yet to be released.

2011 Census data clearly suggests that the scale of infiltration has declined. Between 1971 and 1991, the Muslim population in Assam grew by 77.42 per cent as against 41.89 per cent for Hindus. Between 1991 and 2001, again, the corresponding figures were 29.3 per cent for Muslims and 14.95 per cent for Hindus. The result was that, currently, of 27 Districts in Assam, at least six have 60 per cent Muslim population, while another six have over 40 per cent Muslims. And of the 126 Assembly seats, 54 Members of Legislative Assembly, are dependent on Muslim ‘vote banks’.

There are numerous troubles between a multiplicity of communities in Assam, and the Indian leadership and administration has failed to keep pace with contemporary trends, with the growth of populations, and with the transformation, opportunities and challenges of new technologies and processes. At base, every administration has to be anchored in principles of justice, efficiency and honesty. If this is the case, law and order automatically falls into place. When there is occasional trouble, people turn to the authorities and not to radical and armed extremist formations.

Unfortunately, the integrity of administrations has been comprehensively compromised across India, and more so in the States of the Northeast. The communalization of politics, a trend that commenced well before Partition, has progressed through the decades of Independence, even under and within purportedly ‘secular’ parties. The external environment has also been radicalized, with a jihadi ideology now entrenched in Pakistan finding reverberations across the world, and, at least in some measure, in India as well. It is significant, in this context, to note that, Lafikul Islam, the ‘publicity secretary’ of the All Bodoland Muslim Student’s Union (ABMSU), had warned the State Government on July 7, 2012, that, if the ‘culprits’ of the violence of July 6, 2012, were not arrested within 24 hours and the atrocities against the minorities did not end, ABMSU would declare jehad and take up arms. Within the current international milieu, such sentiments are sure to find their echoes among the Islamist lunatic fringe – and its mirrors in other communities – pushing India into a widening conflagration.

India’s administrators, enforcement and intelligence officials cannot, within the current global context, continue to remain as ignorant as they evidently are, both of local trends within their jurisdictions, and of international trends impinging on perceptions and motivations of local populations. There is evidence that the current cycle of violence was at least partially linked to Bodo-Muslim competition to encroach on forest land, in the latter case, for the construction of an Idgah in the Bedlangmari area in Kokrajhar. However minor such an incident may appear to be on the surface, no competent administrator or intelligence operative could possibly ignore its potential for mischief – and yet, this is precisely what happened. Vast areas of forest and public land in Assam are being progressively encroached upon, with full connivance of the administration, and this cannot continue without consequences.

Law and order in India can no longer be maintained without understanding the subtle trends in violence all over the world. Terrorism and insurgency are no doubt significant patterns that will demand our attention, but there are other patterns of low-grade violence – such as the rioting in the Bodo areas – which will challenge the state progressively, especially, where terrorist and insurgent movements begin to fail. Unless administrators, police leaders and intelligence operatives are sensitive to past trends, social contexts, and international developments, they will continue to fail to respond effectively. There is tremendous need, today, to enlarge the training programmes for the superior services, whose officers are being found wanting in crises with increasing frequency.

Above all, the corrupt politics of vote banks and crass electoral calculi, to the manifest detriment of the national interest, must be defeated. India’s diversity can only be held together by the unity of law and of justice, not by the unprincipled horse-trading that governs politics today.

PAKISTAN
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Fatwas from Hell
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 9, 2012, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) urged senior clerics to issue a fatwa (religious edict) against the country’s democratic system and Security Forces (SFs). The letter, sent by TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, also sought to explain why the TTP had rebelled against the state, arguing that the Army was killing “mujahideen” who were fighting for the enforcement of “God’s law” in Pakistan. The TTP also questioned the silence of clerics, when the Government publicly acknowledged that it was a “front-line ally of America and NATO forces”.

Meanwhile, on July 16, 2012, during a protest rally in Jamrud tehsil (revenue unit) of Khyber Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Ibrahim, the Jama’at-e-Islami (JeI) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief, declared, “NATO supply is haram (forbidden) and against the Sharia’h, we will issue a fatwa against it.” However, no subsequent report of such a fatwa is available in the open source.

On July 10, 2012, the Idara Pasban-e-Sharia’h (Centre of the Guardians of the Sharia’h), a TTP offshoot, distributed a pamphlet in the streets and mosques of Miranshah Bazaar in North Waziristan Agency, opposing the reopening of the NATO supply route through Pakistan and declared militant attacks on Pakistan military and Government institutions halal (legitimate). The Urdu pamphlet criticised Pakistan’s military and political leadership for striking a deal with the US and betraying the nation, declaring “The Pakistani Army is with the kafirs (infidels), is from among them, and the Mujahidin’s jihad against it is justified and even mandatory.” 

Islamabad had accepted the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s ‘long pending’ apology for the November 26, 2011, Salala Checkpost incident, in which 24 Pakistani troopers were killed and which led to the closure of the supply routes,  on July 3, 2012, reinstating the NATO supply. This decision was not well received by the Islamists. A massive protest convoy, under the aegis of the Difa-e-Pakistan (Defense of Pakistan Council, DPC) led by the founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Chief of Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD) Hafiz Mohammad Saeed on July 7, 2012, moved through the Lahore District of Punjab, voicing the strongest opposition to the resumption of the supply lines. The demonstrators rode on the tops of the buses chanting, “One solution for America, jihad, jihad!”

On July 24, 2012, militants attacked a NATO truck, killing the driver, in Jamrud tehsil of Khyber Agency of FATA. Fearing further attacks, Islamabad temporarily stopped NATO supply trucks crossing its border to Afghanistan via its two supply routes in Khyber Agency and Chaman (Balochistan), on July 26, 2012. Despite rising threats the supplies to US-NATO troops via Khyber Agency were restored on August 4, 2012, while the Chaman route was restored on August 8, 2012.

Unsurprisingly, a marginal Islamist grouping, the Abdullah Azzam Brigade, attacked a NATO container on August 6, 2012, killing the driver in the Tedi Bazaar area of Jamrud tehsil.  Abu Zarar, spokesperson of the outfit, threatened to target Pakistani security personnel in future if they continued to provide security to NATO supplies. A second NATO container was partially damaged in a blast on August 7, 2012, along the Jamrud Bypass road in Jamrud tehsil.

But Islamist extremist fatwas in Pakistan are not restricted to the jihad against the kafirs. In an almost paranoiac act of hatred, a cleric in the Pakistan’s Punjab province, on June 12, 2012, warned that a jihad would be launched against polio vaccination teams, even as the World Health Organisation (WHO) expressed concern at the re-emergence of the disease across the country. In Muzaffargarh District, Maulvi Ibrahim Chisti declared the anti-polio campaign as “un-Islamic” and announced at the local mosque that jihad should be carried out against the polio vaccination team.

Chisti’s was only one in a long chain of fatwas against polio vaccination in Pakistan, which endanger the health of 34 million children under the age of five. The Lancet medical journal claimed that vaccination problems in 2011 led to the highest number of polio cases in a decade in Pakistan, 198, compared to 144 in 2010. In the current year, 23 polio cases had already been recorded by July 20, 2012. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) notes ‘persistent wild polio virus transmission’ is restricted to three groups of districts: Karachi, Districts in Balochistan, Districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.

Following Chisti’s ‘divine formulation’, TTP ‘commander’ Hafiz Gul Bahadur on June 18, 2012, issued a fatwa denouncing vaccination as an American ploy to sterilise the Muslim community and banned it in the North Waziristan Agency of FATA until the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stopped its drone strikes in the region. Bahadur’s declaration was a reflection of the consensus reached by the various militant outfits that formed the shura-e-mujahidin, and came two days before health workers had decided to accomplish their target of 161,000 children in the area. A tripartite coalition of tribesmen-mullahs-militants appears to have crystallized against the ‘common enemy’ – the US. Tribal elder Qadir Khan declared, “Polio vaccination will be banned until drone attacks are stopped.” A similar line was reiterated by another tribal elder, “Drone martyrs so many children, while polio afflicts one or two out of hundreds of thousands.”

The TTP-Gul Bahadur faction’s announcement also escalated the controversy surrounding the Pakistani surgeon Doctor Shakeel Afridi, who had been recruited by the CIA to help find slain al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden under the cover of a polio vaccination programme. On May 23, 2012, he was sentenced to 33 years in prison for “high treason” and conspiracy against the state of Pakistan. Linking the present ban on polio vaccination to CIA’s attempt at espionage, the TTP ordered local doctors to halt the vaccination programme in the Agency. Citing Doctor Shakeel Afridi’s case, Bahadur declared, “There was a strong possibility of spying on mujahidin for the US during the polio vaccination campaign.” The polio vaccination campaign was subsequently stopped in the North and South Waziristan Agencies. Fawad Khan, Director of Health, stated that at least 160,000 children in North Waziristan and 80,000 in North Waziristan would be affected if polio drops were not administered.

The polio drive was hit further by an armed assault on a doctor working for WHO in the Sohrab Goth area of Karachi on July 17, 2012. On July 20, another doctor associated with WHO’s polio prevention campaign was shot dead in Junejo Town at Al-Asif Square in Karachi, disrupting immunisation efforts in and around the city.

Adding to the corpus of fatwas was the edict issued on May 11, 2012, in the Kohistan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), by a former legislator and member of the Jama’at-e-Ulema Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-Fazl), Maulana Abdul Haleem, against secular education and justifying the honour killing of women. Explicitly asserting the notion of male supremacy over women, he pronounced that parents should not promote their daughters’ secular education, declaring that those who send their daughters to school are bound to burn in hell. Worse, in one of the most abrasive pronouncements legitimising acid attacks and violence against women, Haleem announced that any woman using a cell phone would have acid thrown in her face. Acid attacks on women are already at an all time high in the region, with at least 150 women disfigured every year. According to a Rand Corporation commentary, hundreds of women in Pakistan and Afghanistan have been blinded or maimed by acid thrown on their veiled faces by male fanatics who consider them “improperly dressed.” 

A law was enacted in December 2011 establishing tougher penalties for acid attack convictions: from 14 years in jail to life imprisonment, and a fine of up to USD 11,000, a large sum for most Pakistanis. Despite the law there are victims with scarred bodies and faces every week lined up in hospitals across the country. A recent victim of an acid attack was a 10 year old girl, whose face was seared in May 2012 in the Faisalabad District of Punjab.

Haleem also threatened women working in Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with forcible abduction and marriage to local Kohistani men. Declaring NGOs working in the region as “hubs of immodesty”, Haleem stated:
Some women from these NGOs visit our houses frequently, mobilizing naïve Kohistani women to follow their agenda in the name of health and hygiene education, which is unacceptable to Kohistani culture. Married female NGO workers should go back to their husbands, whereas the unmarried ones will be forcibly wedded to Kohistani men to make them stay at home. If women working in NGOs enter Kohistan, we won't spare them and solemnize their nikah (marriage) with local men.

Endorsing a Hanbalite morality, local imams and tribal courts have issued ‘stoning to death’ fatwas for adultery. In July 2010, the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) was outraged at a “judgment of stoning to death due to illicit relations”, pronounced by a self-styled jirga (council) convened in Kala Dhaka (Torghar District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), on the basis of an allegation that a man and a woman were seen walking together in a field in Madakhail. In another incident, on July 6, 2012, five women were killed by tribal elders for dancing and singing with men at a wedding party in a remote village of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A tribal council of clerics condemned the women to death for “fornication and staining their families’ names”.

Adhering to a Wahhabite literalist interpretation of the Islamic texts, hardliners prescribe corporal punishments for any failure to comply with their interpretations of Islamic codes of dress and conduct. In an attempt to enforce Sharia’h in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, Maulana Fazlullah, also known as Mullah Radio, had set up a “parallel government” in Swat and established Sharia’h courts. Fearing the wrath of TTP, a popular Pakistani singer, Ghazala Jawed (24), who fled the Swat District to Peshawar to pursue her career in music, was shot dead on June 18, 2012. Under the banner of Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohmmadi, (TNSM, Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws) Maulana Fazlullah has issued fatwas against women’s education, women’s voting rights, barber shops and music shops.

Apostatising Shias through fatwas issued by orthodox extremist clergy has hardened the spectre of sectarianism in the country, incarcerating Shias and other minorities within a ‘goblet of fire’. In June 2011, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the breakaway faction of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), distributed pamphlets calling Shias “wajib-ul-qatl” (obligatory to be killed), and also issued an open letter against the Hazara-Shia community in Quetta. In May 2011, SSP summarised a fatwa that called Shias Kaafir (Infidel). The fatwa was allegedly issued by various ulama from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and was found in a Wahhabi madrassa (religious seminary), Darul Uloom Imdadia, in the Mariabad sub-valley of Quetta.

Backed by provocative decrees of apostasy, the extremists have let loose a reign of terror against Shias and other minorities. According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there have been at least 797 incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan from January 1, 2005, to August 12, 2012, which have claimed at least 2,250 lives.

State complicity in such religious decrees has been a fact since the 1979 Hudood Ordinances introduced by Presidential decree under the then President General Zia-ul Haq. The laws introduced under the Hudood Ordinances cover the offences of Zina (various forms of unlawful sexual intercourse) Qazf (wrongful accusation of Zina crimes), and offences Against Property and Prohibition. These laws made certain offences punishable by hadd, which is defined as “punishment ordained by the Holy Qur’an or Sunna.”

Current trends in the pronouncement of fatwas legitimize barbarity and provide a religious-legal basis for extreme oppression of women, as well as of minority communities and those regarded as ‘deviants’ by the extremists. Despite some legislative restraints on these extremist decrees, Governments in Pakistan have done little to constrain the fanatics who announce and impose these fatwas and the regimes of terror that back them.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
August 6-12, 2012

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

 

Left-wing Extremist

0
0
1
1

INDIA

 

Assam

1
0
4
5

Jammu and Kashmir

1
1
2
4

Meghalaya

1
0
0
1

Left-wing Extremism

 

Chhattisgarh

0
4
0
4

Jharkhand

0
0
4
4

Total (INDIA)

3
5
10
18

NEPAL

0
0
1
1

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

1
4
0
5

FATA

6
5
24
35

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

5
4
12
21

Sindh

12
2
1
15

Total (PAKISTAN)

24
15
37
76
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

Bangladesh starts monitoring mosques and madrassas, says Islamic Foundation's Director General Shamim Mohammed Afzal: Facing threat from militants and extremists, Bangladesh has launched a nationwide programme for monitoring mosques and madrasas to ensure clerics follow guidelines issued by the state-run Islamic Foundation. Islamic Foundation's director general Shamim Mohammed Afzal told, "We have engaged our 40,000 staff having background in Islamic studies to monitor the mosques and see if the imams or khatibs are conveying our messages against militancy in line with the real Islamic teachings". IBN Live, August 8, 2012.


INDIA

Death toll in Bodo-Muslim clashes in Assam reaches 84: The death toll in Bodo-Muslim clashes in Assam has reached 84 with the recovery of seven more bodies during the week. While four dead bodies were recovered on August 8 (two in Kokrajhar District, one in Chirang District and one in Baksa), three persons were killed in Kokrajhar District on August 6. The clashes had started on July 20. Times of India, August 7-13, 2012.

LeT may hijack planes ahead of Independence Day, alerts IB: Security at New Delhi's Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA) has been beefed up after Intelligence Bureau (IB) alerted security agencies that militants belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) may try to hijack a plane ahead of the Independence Day on August 15. Hindustan Times, August 11, 2012.

Two senior ISI officers are exclusively in charge of the Indian operatives of the LeT, says Abu Jundal: One of the prime handlers of the November 26, 2008 (26/11) Mumbai attacks and arrested LeT operative Abu Jundal told the Maharashtra Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) that two senior Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) officers are exclusively in charge of the Indian operatives of the LeT. He further told that right from the recruitment to the operations stage there are always two high-ranking officers in charge of the Indian operatives. Rediff; Hindustan Times, August 8-11, 2012.

MHA admits to Maoist influence in six Districts in Delhi: While there has been no incident of violence by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in Delhi, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has admitted that this year they have assessed influence of front organisations of Maoists in its six districts. "The influence of Maoists in areas is assessed on the basis of both over ground activities by front organisations and violent activities by underground cadres," Minister of State for Home Jitendra Singh said on August 8. India Today, August 10, 2012.

Andhra Pradesh Government extends ban on CPI-Maoist and six affiliates: The Andhra Pradesh Government on August 9 extended by one year the ban on the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and six of its affiliates while declaring the Revolutionary Democratic Front as an "unlawful association". The ban on CPI-Maoist has been extended as per the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Public Security Act, 1992 and would come into effect from August 17, the order said. Business Standard, August 10, 2012.

Central Government identifies at least 14 Muslim fundamentalist organisations in Assam and five in Manipur, says report: Highly placed sources said that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) has prepared a list of 19 Muslim fundamentalist organisations of Assam (14) and Manipur (5). The identified organisations in Assam included Muslim Tiger Force (MTF), Muslim Liberation Front (MLF), Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) and Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA). Assam Tribune, August 8, 2012.

Four more factions of KCP willing to sign pact in Manipur, says report: State Government and the Central Government are trying to include four more factions of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) in the ongoing peace process. The report states that Union Ministry of Home Affairs and Manipur Government officials met leaders of the factions headed by Taibangangba, Lamphel, City Meitei and Pakhanglakpa in New Delhi recently and the leaders agreed in principle to sign a ceasefire agreement. Telegraph, August 11, 2012.

NDFB-RD calls off unilateral truce in Assam, claims report:Ranjan Daimary faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-RD) on August 7 announced its withdrawal from the one-year-old unilateral ceasefire. A statement signed by Myanmar-based IK Songbijit, the chief of the NDFB-RD's armed wing, said the decision to withdraw the unilateral declaration for cessation from all types of violence has been taken after "considering all aspects of present reality." Times of India, August 8, 2012.


NEPAL

Janajatis unveil party name and policy: Janajati (indigenous people) leaders and intellectuals on August 9 announced the proposed name and the manifesto of the proposed party, the day the country marked the International Day of Indigenous People. The proposed 'Social Democratic Pluri-National Party' will aim to include people from all social, political and ethnic backgrounds, leaders said. eKantipur, August 10, 2012.

UCPN-M chairman Prachanda steps up efforts to strike a "working alliance" with the Mohan Baidya led CPN-Maoist: Unified Communist party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda has stepped up efforts to strike a "working alliance" with the Mohan Baidya led CPN-Maoist-Baidya. "Dahal is working to build an alliance with the CPN-Maoist to boost his strength in national politics," said leader Khajaraj Bhatta. Leaders close to Dahal said that he has already held talks with Baidya and urged him to maintain a working alliance. eKantipur, August 7, 2012.


PAKISTAN

24 militants and six civilians among 35 persons killed during the week in FATA: Ten militants were killed and four others injured when jet fighters bombed their hideouts in Mamozai area of Orakzai Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on August 12.

A remote-controlled bomb attack killed three soldiers in Mir Ali town of North Waziristan Agency.

Thirteen militants were killed and eight others got injured when warplanes pounded in Bootakhel and Toorsimath areas of Mamozai areas in Orakzai Agency on August 10. Daily Times; Dawn; The News; Tribune; Central Asia Online; The Nation; The Frontier Post; Pakistan Today; Pakistan Observer, August 7-13, 2012.

Pakistan to release key Afghan Taliban 'commander' and former chief of Quetta Shura Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, reveals official: Pakistan may release a key Afghan Taliban 'commander' and former chief of Quetta Shura Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar to provide impetus to Afghanistan's ongoing reconciliation efforts with the Taliban. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was arrested in Karachi in February 2010, is ranked second in influence to Taliban head honcho Mullah Omar. American officials believe that in addition to overseeing the Taliban's military operations, Mullah Baradar was the head of the Quetta Shura. Tribune, August 8, 2012.

TTP plans attacks on security installations in Punjab, warn Intelligence reports: Intelligence reports states on August 10 that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may attack the Pakistan Air Force Base and other security installations in Lahore before Eid to avenge the August 1, 2012, killing of its commander, Ghaffar Qaiserani (alias Saifullah), at Dera Ghazi Khan. Central Asia Online, August 11, 2012.

TTP urges senior clerics to issue fatwa against democracy and Security Forces in the country: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) urged the senior cleric in a letter to issue a fatwa (religious edict) against democratic system and Security Forces (SFs), and explain why the TTP had rebelled against the state. The letter read, "Please go through this letter and help the Muslims know the Taliban stance," read the six-page letter in Urdu, sent by TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan. The letter also complained about the clerics who were "silent" when the government was publicly acknowledging being a "front-line ally of America and NATO". Daily Times, August 10, 2012.

TTP will not hold talks with any political party, says TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 8 described the Government as "liberal and secular" and said they will not hold talks with any political party, including the Awami National Party (ANP) that rules the north western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan said that an offer of talks from the ANP was misleading and that the militants considered the incumbent rulers liberals and secular and thus "not sincere to the cause of Islam". Indian Express, August 11, 2012.

Pakistan's military to make final decision on North Waziristan operation, says report: On August 7 Pakistan's military brass in its next Corps Commanders Conference, which is scheduled to be held sometime in August 2012, would make a final decision on the operation in the North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to the informed officials, two options are likely to be discussed in the moot: the launch of a full-scale military offensive with the logistical support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or a curtailed crackdown in the area through intelligence sharing between the two forces. However, the Army said that it was carrying out targeted actions against militants in North Waziristan Agency, but denied planning joint operations with the United States." The Nation; Dawn, August 7, 2012.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

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Dr. Ajai Sahni


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