| |
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 9, September 1, 2014
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
|
Dangers
of a Deepening Darkness
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict
Management
Independent
India's history is replete with examples of the state's
unpreparedness for the challenges of terrorism and armed
violence, even where the emergence of the most vicious
movements was abundantly augured. We appear, today, to
be standing at another such crossroads, blissfully unready.
Islamist
radicalization on Indian soil has long been a Pakistan-backed
project, and it secured extraordinary success in Jammu
& Kashmir (J&K), after decades of sustained effort,
progressively transforming a cultured and inclusive Sufi
Islam into a hardline jihadi cult of murder. Pakistan's
efforts to extend this violent creed across the rest of
India have met with no more than fitful success, often
driven by fanatical Pakistani cadres, rather than by any
dramatic support from Indian Muslims, other than the very
fringe of an extremist fringe. The steady decline in Islamist
terrorist incidents, both in J&K
and across the rest
of India, and the continuous
successes against Indian jihadi
cadres and leadership, however, can only provide transient
comfort, as another, and potentially greater, storm gathers.
There are
ample portents of the new danger of an increasingly globalized
jihad, with escalating levels of tolerance for
the most brutal violence, unprecedented even in the past
record of a fairly malevolent Islamist terror. Indeed,
rarely in history have there been such clear forewarnings
of a danger of this nature, at such an early stage. If
these warnings are taken seriously, India has sufficient
time to prepare; and preparing an effective response must,
indeed, take precedence over any other concern of the
Government.
It is the
rise of the Islamic State (IS, formerly Islamic State
of Iraq and al Sham, ISIS), and the tremendous magnetism
that both its successes and its excesses have exercised
over the imagination of Muslim youth across the world,
that indicate that much worse is to come. Crucially, our
security and intelligence apparatus is woefully inadequate
and ill-equipped to repel a likely two-pronged assault:
an increasingly internationalized Islamist jihad
backed by Pakistan, and a strengthening Islamist fifth
column within the country.
It had
long been India's boast that no Indian citizen had ever
joined the global jihad, though this has been compromised
for some time now. However, few expected the very quick
success of IS in attracting Indian cadres, without any
presence in India or direct effort of recruitment. Already,
at least seven confirmed cases of Indians having gone
to Syria or Iraq to join IS have been documented (one
of these, Aarif Majid from the Kalyan area of Thane District
in Maharashtra, has already been killed fighting along
with IS cadres), and another dozen or so are suspected,
with these youth having travelled to Syria, Iraq or a
neighbouring country on a one-way ticket, and subsequently
having 'disappeared' towards the war zone.
In one
sense, of course, this is still reassuring; this is a
tiny number, considering the estimated 175 million Muslims
in the country. The comparison with the West is particularly
startling. Worried over the growth of extremism, most
Western nations have introduced a range of policies to
counter the trend, prominently including 'multiculturalism',
'deradicalization' and 'community policing', and many
'security experts' have long lamented the absence of these
in India. And yet, we find that Belgium, with a tiny Muslim
population of just under 629,000, officially estimated
that over 250 fighters had joined IS by April this year,
and the number, now, may have risen beyond 500; Australia
accounted for another 250; Denmark, 100; France, over
700; Germany 320; and UK, 500. Even Sweden with a Muslim
population of 47,000, has seen at least 30 of its citizens
joining the IS; and Switzerland, with 46,000 Muslims,
has confirmed 10 citizens in the IS ranks, outnumbering
the confirmed Indian cases. There are an estimated 20,000
foreign fighters in Iraq alone, drawn from at least 82
countries across the world. With the rapid IS expansion
in Iraq and Syria, the dramatic global projection of these
'successes' through an extraordinarily sophisticated media
campaign, as well as the declaration of a new Caliphate
under 'Khalifa Ibrahim' aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi claiming
that all Muslims are duty bound to support the Caliphate,
and the constantly escalating rhetoric of a resurgent
Islam rising against the 'loathsome infidel', many thousands
of youth from these countries may by now have added to
the ranks of the 'holy warriors'.
Islam has
grown organically within India, and has, over centuries,
evolved elaborate cultures of accommodation with other
Faiths. It is these, rather than any conscious effort
or intervention by the state, that has kept Muslims in
India substantially insulated against extremist doctrines
and violence. These cultures have, however, been under
continuous assault over decades, and have certainly begun
to fray, at least along their more extreme and isolated
edges. Already, a breakaway faction of the Indian Mujahiddeen,
the Ansar ut Tawheed wal Jihad fi Bilad al Hind,
located in Pakistan, has declared its intention to fly
the IS flag over South Asia; a Pakistani group, the Tehreek-e-Khilafat,
has also declared, "We are praying from the almighty
Allah to give us chance in our lives to see the expansion
of Islamic State boundaries toward the Sub-Continent and
Khorasan region..." IS has, of course, issued a farcical
map that includes India within a projected Islamic empire
of which this imagined 'Khorasan' is a part. With Pakistani
provocateurs and a substantial flow of West Asian money
to a widening network of hardline Wahabi mosques and institutions
across the country, these various streams may eventually
coalesce into a much wider extremist mobilisation than
has hitherto been the case. Disturbingly, the influential
Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, long celebrated as a moderating
influence in Indian Islam and a strong opponent of the
Partition, in one editorial in its mouthpiece, Dawat,
has argued, "it is very necessary to welcome the
announcement of the establishment of Islamic Caliphate
by the ISIS because Islamic caliphate is the aspiration
of every Muslim and there has never been a disagreement
on the issue among the Muslims in any period of history."
It is not clear whether this is the opinion of a single
commentator or the emerging consensus in the Jamaat, but
if this line of thinking inflates, the dangers within
India and across the sub-continent could swell exponentially.
Significantly, the leader of another prominent Sunni religious
institution, the Nadwatul Ulama, Salman Al-Husaini Nadwi,
wrote to Abu Bakr Baghdadi after the latter's declaration
of the Khilafat, referring to him as Amir-ul-Momineen
(leader of the Faithful), praying, "May Allah protect
you", and calling on all Muslims to "abide by"
Abu Bakr's directives, "if he follows Allah's Sharia".
The sectarian
angle is a further compounding factor. Shia-Sunni bloodletting
has, of course, a significant history in some areas of
the country. Nevertheless, the unending slaughter of Shias
in Pakistan, among other minorities there, has found no
resonances in India, other than occasional attacks by
Pakistan-backed extremists in J&K. IS actions and
declarations have, however, already provoked some disruptive
posturing. In an open letter, Salman Al-Husaini Nadwi
asked the Government of Saudi Arabia to prepare an army
of 'five lakh Indian Sunni Muslim youth' to fight against
the Shia militia in Iraq and elsewhere. On the other hand,
responding to the destruction of a number of shrines in
Syria and Iraq, and particularly the IS threat to demolish
Najaf and Karbala, the Shia's most sacred spaces (located
in Southern Iraq) the Anjuman-e-Haidiri, a nondescript
organisation in Delhi, has sought to augment its identity
by calling for a million Shias to join it in protecting
these holy places. While the organisation has made exaggerated
claims of a 100,000 who have already signed up, intelligence
sources indicate that no more than a few hundred have
actually done so. Most of these pretensions will quickly
fizzle out, but it is impossible to be sure, especially
where elements within at least some influential orthodox
Muslim institutions have begun to speak a disturbing language.
The IS
phenomenon, moreover, is just a beginning. As is the usual
case, most current analysis remains focused on the ongoing
crisis, which is most visible in Syria and Iraq; but it
is the entire Arab World, across West Asia and North Africa,
that is at risk of total destabilization. The countries
that have long exploited radical Islamism as an instrument
of domestic political management to sustain authoritarian
regimes, and have exported extremist ideologies and funded
terrorism in other theatres, will inevitably be confronted
with a vicious blowback that has the potential to destroy
the few superficially stable Governments that still survive
in this region. It is significant that over 2,500 fighters
are believed to have joined IS from Saudi Arabia; over
3,500 from Tunisia; at least 1,500 from Morocco; and unknown
numbers from Egypt, Jordan, the Emirates and Turkey. These
numbers are augmenting rapidly, and regimes in these countries
are now deeply apprehensive that IS, or elements within
it, will soon turn their attention against them.
Crucially,
a 2006
study by the Institute for Conflict
Management on "Demographic Trends in Asia and
India’s Security Futures" had noted that sheer demographic
pressures and population profiles, combining with regional
political cultures, constituted major and imminent threats
to stability across the Arab World, underlining the UNDP
Arab Human Development Report's observation, "Arab
authorities live in fear of the Arab street." The
study had further noted the tension between Shia and Sunni
populations and states, to conclude that this could "provoke
movements of covert warfare and terrorism, as well as
possible open confrontations in situations of rising disorder
in the Arab world."
Much of
this has already come to pass, but worse is likely to
unfold. It is useful to recall that the entire Government
system in India was thrown into disarray by the abduction
and captivity of 46 nurses and 39 workers in the ISIS
controlled areas of Iraq; we stumbled into some sort of
a 'solution' with regard to the first of these, but the
workers from Punjab remain untraceable, though current
reports indicate that a Saudi mediated resolution to this
crisis may also be at hand. With over seven million Indian
expatriates working in the region, the direct consequences
of a wider destabilization - both in terms of the humanitarian
crisis and potential extremist recruitment - would themselves
be overwhelming; the indirect impact is difficult even
to assess, and it must be abundantly clear that India's
systems are utterly inadequate to cope.
Nearly
six years after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, despite a flurry
of erratic and uncoordinated initiatives, India's vulnerabilities
to terrorism remain unchanged.
In the
meanwhile, IS has created a whole new level of terrorism,
challenging and demolishing well-equipped, Western-trained
armies, and fighting along fronts that extend across thousands
of kilometres. Its systems of command and control appear
to have achieved a high level of efficiency, and its exploitation
of contemporary media has been extraordinary. These accomplishments
will inevitably filter through to other theatres of terrorism,
as will the more virulent ideology and barbaric methods
of the IS jihad.
All this
is abundantly clear, yet there is little visible recognition
within the Indian security establishment of the urgency
of preparing a response. Diplomatic symbolism and little
storms in teacups about talks or no talks with Pakistan
will not prepare India for the next wave of jihadi
terrorism. A colossal augmentation of capacities and capabilities
in the intelligence-security systems of the country has
long been overdue. This is an imperative that can now
be deferred only at the risk of India's integrity.
|
Maoists:
Mobile Strategies
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On August
20, 2014, the Union Cabinet approved the extension of
mobile telephonic services to 2,199 locations affected
by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in the States of Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh,
Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The
project would be executed by Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
(BSNL). BSNL has already installed towers at 363 of these
locations. The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF)
would fund the capital expenditure and operative expenditure,
net of revenue, for five years. The project implementation
cost through the open tendering process is approximately
INR 35.68 billion. In 2013, the Cabinet had approved just
over INR 30 billion for the project. The project was delayed
by more than a year, apparently, because of differences
over project cost.
The USOF
which is administered by Department of Telecom (DoT) was
created under the National Telecom Policy of 1999 to help
provide telecom services at affordable prices to people
in rural areas where no phone facilities are available.
While USOF will provide both capital expenditure and operational
expenditure components of the proposed mobile rollout
for five years, the ownership of the assets to be created
is proposed to be vested with BSNL to ensure long-term
continuity of services. The network rollout will be monitored
by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), as it is
aimed at beefing up communications and surveillance operations
by national security agencies in these regions.
It is also
learnt that UMHA and the Prime Minister's Office want
the project to get underway immediately as "it is
of national importance with security considerations,"
and is running a year behind schedule, a top BSNL official
told the media. BSNL has already identified a sizeable
number of tower sites in consultation with the UMHA. Initially,
towers will be erected at places close to security camps
and Police stations.
The project
to install the towers in the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist)-affected
areas was conceived in 2010 when P. Chidambaram was the
Union Home Minister, but there was little progress in
the matter since then. After the Maoist attack on the
State leadership of the Congress party in Chhattisgarh
on May 25, 2013, the Union Cabinet approved the project
to install 2,199 mobile towers at a cost of INR 30.46
billion, and June 2014 was set as the deadline for completion
of the task. Thus far, however, only 363 towers have been
installed. Concerned about the delay, UMHA has been pressuring
the Telecom Department to expedite installation of towers.
One reminder was sent a week before the March 11, 2014,
Maoist attack in Sukma District in Chhattisgarh, in which
15 Security Force (SF) personnel and one civilian were
killed. The then Union Home Minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde,
observed, in a letter dated March 4, 2014, "The poor
communication network in the Naxal-affected areas is a
matter of serious concern." Stressing the need to
have a better communications network in place before the
Lok Sabha elections, Shinde emphasised that installation
of mobile towers should be expedited, especially in the
highly Maoist-affected States such as Jharkhand, Bihar
and Odisha, and called for an 'all-out effort' to complete
the whole process before the Lok Sabha elections. Shinde's
letter noted, further, "The work was awarded to Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) and installation and roll
out of mobile towers was targeted to be completed in 12
months."
The difference
over project cost, about INR 7.89 billion, between actual
requirement and the revised project budget approved by
the Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs, in June 2013,
was due to an 'arithmetic error', it was claimed. Official
sources argued, "There is an arithmetical mistake
in annual maintenance contract estimates, omission of
certain items that are required for roll out of projects,
revision of VSAT bandwidth charges and other. The DoT
is studying it." Further, there were technical specification
issues, such as whether to go for a solar powered 2G network,
and whether to go for 20 watts ‘base transceiver station’
(BTS)/cell phone tower or five watts, that delayed the
implementation of the project.
These issues
now appear to have been settled, but the implementation
of the project may still be headed for a bumpy ride.
First,
the tender for the work was initially floated by BSNL
in August 2013, but received lukewarm responses, with
major global players opting out, and just three Indian
players participating. That is unusual in the prevailing
economic situation, when companies are struggling to maintain
growth and profit margins, and the contract was for approximately
of INR 30 billion. In March 2014, the Telecom Commission
asked DoT and BSNL to go for retendering, citing the project’s
higher costs and poor response. After two months of the
re-tendering exercise, however, the two companies – Vihaan
Networks Ltd and HFCL – who had earlier qualified in the
technical bidding, were again in the fray, as no other
company, Indian or foreign, decided to participate. This
was despite the extension of the application deadline
by a week in May. A BSNL official noted, "During
recent pre-bid meetings, global telecom gear suppliers
were reluctant to participate in the bidding as they felt
that managing and maintaining mobile networks in Naxal-hit
regions is risky." A top executive of a leading foreign
gear maker conceded that the "additional responsibility
of maintaining expensive solar-powered mobile networks
in Naxalite hotbeds is fraught with significant business
risks". In such a situation, quality is likely to
be first casualty.
The second
issue is the provision of continuous power supply to the
towers. Solar power has its limitations, and even where
power supply is not very erratic, BSNL backup batteries
start providing insufficient back up, in some cases, within
just one year, due to poor maintenance. Solar panels need
regular cleaning of the surface, as dust decreases the
efficiency of the panels. Further, 24x7 availability (or
at least availability at short notice) of trained manpower
is needed for maintenance of batteries, to protected against
full discharge. Even three or four full discharges severely
affect the efficiency of batteries. Further, the restoration
time in case of some fault in solar-power towers is unknown,
but is likely to be substantial, as local knowhow is limited.
Arranging any outside service in LWE-affected areas will
create its own and significant problems.
Diesel
supplies to run generators are even more erratic, with
BSNL managing an inefficient network of its own, whereas
private operators generally outsource the service to locals.
Media reports indicate that shortages in diesel supplies
to mobile towers have long been an issue in existing towers
in Maoist-affected areas, with nodal supply points located
at long distances from the towers. In a note sent to the
Department in 2013, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs
observed, "it has come to the notice of MHA that
some existing BSNL towers in the LWE-affected areas remain
shut for long periods of time ostensibly due to non-availability
of diesel to run the generators etc. Hence, sufficient
monitoring mechanisms may be put in place to deliver better
services." It remains to be seen how these issues
will be addressed for the much wider network of towers
envisaged in the current project.
The third
issue is the identification of relatively secure locations
for the mobile towers. Though towers are initially to
be set up close to security camps and Police Stations,
given the very poor density of such establishments in
Maoist affected areas, it will be difficult to find appropriate
locations for such a large number of towers. Further,
the location of security camps and establishments are
based on strategic considerations, which may not coincide
with the technical requirements of the location of the
towers.
There is,
moreover, the BSNL's track record of providing poor service
even in areas where there is no threat from Maoists. The
organisation's efficiency in Naxalite afflicted regions
can only be expected to be poorer.
Crucially,
moreover, the Maoists recognize the threat that an efficient
- or even minimally working - cellular network constitutes
to their own security and survival, and have systematically
attacked isolated mobile towers wherever possible. According
the UMHA, at least 245 such attacks are on record just
between 2008 and 2013. The penetration of a public communications
networks into their areas of operation has been acknowledged
by the Maoists to be one of the crucial elements leading
to a decline in their operational effectiveness and recruitment
potential. In their Social Investigation of North Telengana,
in what was then the worst affected region of Andhra Pradesh,
the Communist Party of India - Maoist, observed, as far
back as in the early 2000s,
Earlier
there was the post and telegraph department in the
rural area. Branch post offices were set up in the
big villages. In addition to these tele communications
also came up rapidly... In the big villages with
a population of 5 to 7 thousand, there are 70 to
100 telephones. But the facility is not spread over
all the villages... Since phone can be obtained
with 600 rupees there are 300 applications from
one village... Cell phone facility spread to 60
kms up to Janagama, 40 kms towards Mulugu, and near
Bhupalapalli.This network exists in almost the whole
area of our operation. The cells are mainly established
by the medical, fertiliser, big grocery shops and
some rich peasants. Small contractors, political
leaders and police informers also bought them...
The middle class is opposing the blasting of the
exchanges. The increased communication network facilitated
the enemy to receive our information soon... Now
if a squad member goes to the village for food and
it is exposed, the police from the near by station
can encircle us within one hour. We are unable to
identify who leaded the information...
|
Attack
on Telephone Exchange / tower by Maoists: 2008-2013
State
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
Total
|
Andhra
Pradesh
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
2
|
2
|
0
|
9
|
Bihar
|
14
|
24
|
14
|
25
|
10
|
4
|
91
|
Maharashtra
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
7
|
Chhattisgarh
|
15
|
10
|
2
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
30
|
Jharkhand
|
10
|
14
|
6
|
8
|
3
|
1
|
42
|
Odisha
|
4
|
18
|
17
|
11
|
7
|
7
|
64
|
West
Bengal
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Madhya
Pradesh
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Total*
|
46
|
67
|
45
|
51
|
24
|
12
|
245
|
Clearly,
the Maoist efforts to impede the extension of the cellular
network can only intensify.
At present,
Security Forces are being given satellite phones in areas
outside the mobile network footprint. According to a June
19, 2014, media report, over 3,500 satellite phones are
to be provided to troops undertaking anti-Maoist and anti-insurgency
operations in the dense forests of the Maoist belt and
in the border areas of the North East region, to provide
them swift connectivity. These satellite phones or Digital
Satellite Phone Terminals (DSPTs) are being provided by
the state-run BSNL, after the Union Home Ministry made
a request in this regard to the Telecom Ministry.
The criticality
of mobile network coverage in Maoist affected areas can
hardly be overstated. It will help SFs to communicate
necessary information to their base locations, better
organise logistics and operations, and enormously extend
their intelligence capabilities, opening up numberless
sources of information among the general public, many
of whom are now exhausted and frustrated by unending and
counter-productive Maoist violence. Significantly, in
Jammu and Kashmir, the introduction on mobile network
was initially resisted by the State administration, as
it was feared that the Paksitan-backed Islamist terrorists
there would use cellular communications to plan attacks.
Experience, however, indicates that the expansion of the
communications networks helped SFs far more than the terrorists.
The mobile
phone network would not only provide the means to secure
an operational advantage for the SFs operating in Maoist-affected
areas, but would also extend the instrumentalities for
improving the very poor governance in these regions. In
Chhattisgarh, a small experiment by a non-Governmental
organisation (NGO) CGNet-Swara,
provides numerous examples of how mobile phones can be
an empowering tool for the Adivasis (tribals) in
remote areas. Tribal villagers and activists in remote
parts of Chhattisgarh call up the 'news service' using
mobile phones, and their observations and complaints are
recorded, uploaded on the CGNet-Swaras website, and communicated
to authorities. This has put pressure on Government officials
to act on grievances.
The extension
of the mobile phone network is a crucial counter-insurgency
and administrative tool, and has quantifiable impact on
the perceived well-being of the general population in
coverage areas. The present project will, naturally, meet
with tremendous resistance from the rebels, and will require
enormous determination, not only on the part of the implementing
agencies, but of the SFs and the Government on the whole,
to ensure its success. It remains to be seen whether such
determination is better available under the current regime
than was evident in its predecessor.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
August 25-31,
2014
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
|
Islamist Terrorism
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (BANGLADESH)
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
4
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Manipur
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jharkhand
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Odisha
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
6
|
3
|
7
|
16
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
11
|
1
|
12
|
24
|
FATA
|
2
|
1
|
33
|
36
|
KP
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
Punjab
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Sindh
|
15
|
6
|
8
|
29
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
|
|
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
'Declassify
all
data
about
the
assassination
of
Sheikh
Mujibur
Rahman',
urges
President
of
CPB
Mujahidul
Islam
Selim:
Communist
Party
of
Bangladesh
(CPB)
President
Mujahidul
Islam
Selim
on
August
29
urged
the
intelligence
agencies
-
Certified
Internal
Auditor
(CIA)
of
America,
Research
and
Analysis
Wing
(R&AW)
of
India,
Inter-Services
Intelligence
(ISI)
of
Pakistan,
and
Directorate
General
of
Forces
Intelligence
(DGFI)
of
Bangladesh
to
declassify
all
data
about
the
assassination
of
Sheikh
Mujibur
Rahman.
He
stated
this
during
a
discussion
on
the
1975
and
2004
August
massacres
in
Dhaka
city.
Daily
Star,
August
30,
2014.
INDIA
AuT
posts
online
tribute
for
the
slain
Indian
IS
jihadist,
says
report:
Two
days
after
reports
of
killing
of
Kalyan
youth
Arif
Ejaz
Majeed
while
fighting
alongside
the
Islamic
State
(IS)
in
Iraq,
the
Indian
jihadist
group
Ansar
ul-Tawhid
(AuT)
on
August
28
has
issued
an
online
tribute
to
him,
hailing
his
"martyrdom".
In
the
Ansar
al-Tawhid
eulogy,
addressed
to
"those
who
are
searching
for
paradise",
Arif
is
shown
dressed
in
an
Arab
kaffiyeh,
holding
an
assault
rifle.
The
image,
the
first
of
Arif
from
the
battlefield,
was
posted
online
on
Twitter
accounts
and
online
fora
linked
to
the
Ansar
ul-Tawhid.
Financial
Express,
August
30,
2014.
IS
recruiting
poor
Muslims
in
Kerala,
Tamil
Nadu,
Karnataka,
Maharashtra
and
J&K,
says
report:
Several
central
security
agencies
in
India
have
indicated
that
that
the
Islamic
State
(IS)
might
be
spreading
its
tentacles
in
India.
Sources
said
that
the
terror
outfit,
which
has
already
killed
thousands
in
Iraq
and
Syria
in
a
deadly
pursuit
to
establish
an
Islamic
Caliphate,
is
recruiting
poor
Muslims
in
Kerala,
Tamil
Nadu,
Karnataka,
Maharashtra
and
Jammu
and
Kashmir
(J&K).
Indian
Republic,
August
27,
2014.
IM
and
SIMI
turning
Chhattisgarh
into
terror
hub,
reveals
NIA
report:
Investigation
into
the
blasts
at
Narendra
Modi's
election
rally
in
Patna
(Bihar)
on
October
27,
2013,
have
revealed
that
Indian
Mujahideen
(IM)
and
Students
Islamic
Movement
of
India
(SIMI)
are
trying
to
turn
communally
peaceful
states
such
as
Chhattisgarh
into
new
hubs
of
terror
activities.
Chhattisgarh
figures
prominently
in
the
charge
sheet
filed
by
the
National
Intelligence
Agency
(NIA)
in
connection
with
the
Patna
bomb
blasts.
First
Post,
August
25,
2014.
First
such
prolonged
standoff
on
IB
after
1971
war,
says
Director
General
of
BSF
D.
K.
Pathak:
The
Border
Security
Force
(BSF)
on
August
26
said
that
this
was
for
the
first
time
after
1971
Indo-Pak
war
that
hostilities
between
the
two
countries
along
the
International
Border
have
entered
such
a
prolonged
spell
and
blamed
Pakistan
for
not
cooperating
with
them
in
defusing
tension.
"This
is
for
the
first
time
since
1971
war
between
the
two
neighbours
that
hostilities
have
prolonged
to
more
than
45
days
since
first
sniper
shot
was
fired
by
Pakistan
on
the
BSF
post
on
July
16,"
said
Director
General
of
BSF,
D.
K.
Pathak.
Daily
Excelsior,
August
22,
2014.
Assam
lost
157
lives
in
four
decades
in
Assam-Nagaland
border
row,
says
Forest
Minister
Rockybul
Hussain:
A
total
of
157
people
of
Assam
have
died
and
166
have
been
injured
in
incidents
of
violence
in
and
around
the
areas
of
the
State
bordering
Nagaland
in
the
last
40
years.
Only
two
Nagas
have
died
during
these
incidents.
The
Golaghat
District
has
borne
the
brunt
of
the
violence,
accounting
for
131
deaths
in
nine
clashes
during
1977-2014.
The
Sivasagar
District
accounted
for
the
maximum
number
of
incidents
of
violence
-
96
(from
March
1972
to
June
2014)
resulting
in
19
deaths.
Assam
Tribune,
August
29,
2014.
77
civilians
killed
in
violence
in
Assam
in
the
first
six
months
of
current
year,
says
Government
report:
The
Centre
has
said
that
Assam
has
witnessed
the
maximum
number
of
civilian
casualties
in
violence
in
the
past
six
months
of
current
year.
The
State
has
witnessed
the
killing
of
as
many
as
77
civilians,
which
is
the
highest
in
the
entire
north-eastern
region
during
the
period.
43
extremists
were
also
killed
in
violent
incidents
between
January
and
June
2014.
At
least
four
security
force
personnel
have
also
lost
their
lives
during
the
period.
Sentinel
Assam,
August
28,
2014.
India
hands
over
list
of
71
insurgent
camps
operating
out
of
Bangladesh:
India
has
handed
over
to
Bangladesh
a
list
of
71
camps
of
the
Indian
insurgent
groups
that
still
exists
in
the
neighboring
country.
"We
have
handed
over
a
list
of
71
Indian
insurgent
camps
which
are
still
operating
from
the
Bangladesh
soil,"
said
Director
General
of
Border
Security
Force
(BSF)
DK
Pathak
after
a
four-day
Border
Coordination
Conference
with
the
Border
Guards
Bangladesh
(BGB)
which
concludes
on
August
24.
Sentinel
Assam,
August
26,
2014.
Several
militant
groups
using
NSCN-K
facilities
in
Myanmar,
says
report:
According
to
reports
available
to
security
agencies
several
militant
groups,
including
the
Independent
faction
of
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA-I),
are
using
the
facilities
of
the
Khaplang
faction
of
National
Socialist
Council
of
Nagaland
(NSCN-K)
in
the
Taga
area
of
Myanmar.
Meanwhile,
promising
all
possible
support
to
India's
fight
against
terrorism,
Myanmar
has
said
it
will
bust
training
camps
of
North
East
militant
groups
on
its
soil
if
India
provides
specific
inputs
about
their
existence.
Asserting
that
his
country
will
never
allow
any
terror
outfit
to
use
its
soil
against
India,
Myanmar's
Information
Minister
U
Ye
Htut
said
his
government
will
cooperate
"fully"
with
the
new
Indian
government
in
cracking
down
on
militant
bases,
if
there
was
any.
Sentinel
Assam,
August
29,
2014;
Sangai
Express,
August
27,
2014
HM
spent
INR
800
million
in
last
8
years
on
terror
acts,
says
report:
The
Enforcement
Directorate
(ED,
which
has
registered
a
case
under
provisions
of
the
money
laundering
Act
against
Syed
Salahuddin,
chief
of
the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
(HM),
has
found
that
HM
spent
INR
800
million
in
the
last
eight
years
for
carrying
out
terror
activities
in
the
country.
The
case
was
earlier
being
investigated
by
the
Jammu
and
Kashmir
(J&K)
unit
of
the
agency,
has
now
been
transferred
to
the
ED
headquarters
in
Delhi
for
further
probe.
Asian
Age,
August
28,
2014.
NEPAL
17
CA
members
nominated:
Seven
months
after
the
first
sitting
of
the
Constitution
Assembly
(CA),
the
government
on
August
29,
nominated
17
of
the
26
members
to
the
House,
according
to
Minendra
Rijal,
Cabinet
spokesperson.
The
Nepali
Congress
(NC)
named
eight
of
the
nine
lawmakers
as
per
share
calculated
on
the
basis
of
its
seats
in
the
assembly.
The
Communist
Party
of
Nepal-Unified
Marxist
Leninist
(CPN-UML)
nominated
all
eight
and
the
pro-monarchy
Rastriya
Prajatantra
Party-
Nepal
(RPP-N)
its
sole
member
under
the
nomination
quota.
The
Hindu,
August
30,
2014.
PAKISTAN
32
militants
killed
in
Army
operation
in
FATA:
At
least
32
militants
were
killed
on
August
30
when
Security
Forces
(SF)
targeted
the
suspected
hideouts
of
militants
as
a
part
of
Operation
Zarb-e-Azb
in
North
Waziristan
Agency
Federally
Administered
Tribal
Areas
(FATA).
The
ISPR
spokesman
said
that
at
least
32
terrorists
were
reportedly
killed
while
three
of
their
hideouts
were
razed
to
ground.
23
explosives-laden
vehicles
and
four
ammunition
dumps
of
the
militants
were
also
dismantled
in
the
action.
Daily
Times,
September
1,
2014.
TTP
'chief'
Maulana
Fazlullah
says
his
men
too
could
lay
siege
to
Islamabad:
The
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan
(TTP)
'chief'
Maulana
Fazlullah
on
August
31
said
that
launching
an
attack
on
Islamabad
won't
be
a
difficult
task
for
his
fighters
after
having
observed
how
unarmed
protestors
were
able
to
lay
siege
to
the
seat
of
power
in
the
federal
capital
and
paralyse
the
Government.
"About
30,000
people
have
besieged
the
capital
of
Pakistan
for
the
last
two
weeks
and
the
Government
is
unable
to
deal
with
them,"
he
said
in
an
audio
clip
received
by
The
News.
He
said,
"Taliban
fighters
could
easily
seize
the
Parliament
House
as
our
numbers
are
far
bigger
than
these
people
and
we
are
well-equipped
with
sophisticated
arms."
The
News
,
September
1,
2014.
Pakistan
continues
to
be
a
safe
haven
for
terrorists,
says
Pentagon
Press
Secretary
Rear
Admiral
John
Kirby:
The
Pentagon
has
said
Pakistan
continues
to
be
a
safe
haven
for
terrorists.
"Extremists
and
the
safe
haven
pose
a
challenge
and
the
sanctuary
that
they
continue
to
enjoy
in
Pakistan,"
Pentagon
Press
Secretary
Rear
Admiral
John
Kirby
said.
He,
however,
added
that
"the
Pakistani
military
has
taken
action
against
some
of
those
extremist
threats
inside
their
own
country.
They've
conducted
operations
not
too
long
ago,
just
this
summer."
The
Hindu,
August
27,
2014.
Army
steps
in
to
revive
Government's
talks
with
protesters:
Army
on
August
29
stepped
into
the
political
crisis
by
talking
to
two
protesting
organizations
but
delivered
a
snub
to
the
beleaguered
Government
which
had
claimed
that
it
had
not
sought
military's
mediation.
Army
Chief
General
Raheel
Sharif
talked
to
Pakistan
Tehreek-i-Insaf
(PTI)
chief
Imran
Khan
and
cleric
Tahir-ul-
Qadri
of
the
Pakistan
Awami
Tehreek
(PAT)
in
the
presence
of
Federal
Minister
of
Interior
Chaudhry
Nisar.
Times
of
India,
August
30,
2014.
I
won't
resign,
says
Prime
Minister
Nawaz
Sharif:
Prime
Minister
(PM)
Nawaz
Sharif
said
on
August
31
that
he
would
not
in
any
case
resign
from
the
position
of
the
chief
executive
of
the
country.
PM
Nawaz
Sharif
said
he
would
not
succumb
to
the
pressure
of
a
few
thousand
people
who
have
made
the
capital
hostage.
The
premier
ignored
the
advice
of
close
aides
to
remain
at
his
residence
in
Lahore
in
view
of
the
increased
tension
in
Islamabad's
Red
Zone
and
returned
to
the
capital
on
August
31
afternoon
to
take
stock
of
the
developing
situation.
Daily
Times,
September
1,
2014.
TTP
'commanders'
form
new
splinter
group
TTP-Jama'at-ul-Ahrar:
Key
'commanders'
belonging
to
the
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan
(TTP)
on
August
26
announced
the
formation
of
a
new
group
by
the
name
of
TTP-Jama'at-ul-Ahrar,
with
Maulana
Qasim
Khurasani
as
the
new
ameer
(chief)
and
also
comprising
of
other
'commanders'.
Former
TTP
'spokesperson'
Ehsanullah
Ehsan,
who
has
been
nominated
as
the
'spokesman'
for
the
splinter
group,
mostly
comprising
cadres
from
the
Mohmand
Agency
of
TTP
Chapter
said
that
the
new
group
was
not
willing
to
take
sides
in
the
current
political
tussle
in
Islamabad
as
they
only
wanted
the
Shari'ah
(Islamic
Law)
system
to
prevail
in
the
country.
Dawn,
August
27,
2014.
SRI
LANKA
TNA
ready
to
resume
talks
with
the
Government,
says
TNA
leader
M
A
Sumanthiran:
The
Tamil
National
Alliance
(TNA)
Parliamentarian
M.
A.
Sumanthiran
said
on
August
28
that
TNA
was
ready
to
resume
talks
with
the
Government
in
search
of
a
lasting
solution
to
the
ethnic
crisis
based
on
power
devolution
within
a
united
Sri
Lanka.
He
said,
"The
Government
is
now
saying
it
cannot
hold
talks
with
the
TNA
because
we
are
representatives
of
the
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE).
The
Government
is
trying
to
evade
resolving
the
Tamil
issue
citing
these
false
claims.
We
do
not
have
any
hidden
agenda."
Daily
Mirror,
August
29,
2014.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
|
|
|