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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 9, No. 34, February 28, 2011
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Dampened
Tinderbox
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
As
repressive regimes of long standing crumble across the
Arab world, raising the spectre of anarchy, there is
rising concern among leaderships in South Asia that
the ‘jasmine revolution’ may waft across parts of this
long troubled region as well.
On many
counts, South Asia is a tinderbox. As in the Arab world,
demography is a rising concern. With some of the highest
population densities in the world, the regional giants
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh alone will add at least
226 million people to their combined 2010 population
of about 1.52 billion in just a decade (on a ‘medium
variant projection), bringing unsustainable pressure
on already stressed resources and the environment. Between
35 and 45 per cent of the populations in these countries
subsist below fairly modestly defined poverty lines.
Administrations in these countries have failed to accommodate
a burgeoning ‘youth bulge’, with over 20 per cent of
their populations in the volatile 15-24 years age group.
Corruption, collusion, ineptitude and crippling deficits
in capacities for governance have kept alive, and often
compounded, violent movements of political dissent,
even as the state demonstrates significant evidence
of withering away across vast territories.
Against
this troubling backdrop, there is a surprising mix of
news relating to the major movements of political violence
in South
Asia. After a trend of continuous
escalation since 2005, total annual fatalities relating
to terrorism and multiple insurgencies in the region
have dropped from their peak of 29,638 in 2009, to 9,431
in 2010 [all data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal].
The most
dramatic turn-around was, of course, in Sri Lanka, where
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
were finally decimated,
after 26 years of war, bringing fatalities down from
15,565 in 2009, to none in 2010. While the promise of
peace is far from being fully realized by a triumphal
political leadership that remains principally committed
to its own consolidation, it is nevertheless the case
that some of the most urgent aspects of post-war reconstruction
have been addressed with a measure of efficiency. The
promised ‘solution’ to the Tamil issue is yet to crystallize,
although the political mandate that President Mahinda
Rajapakse sought as its precondition has been delivered
in both the Presidential
and Parliamentary
elections of January and April 2010, respectively. The
final report of the All Party Representative Committee
(APRC), which had been constituted by President Rajapakse
in July 2006, provides the necessary direction for constitutional
reform and an equitable resolution to the ethnic problem
in the country, but the Rajapakse regime has demonstrated
little enthusiasm for taking its recommendations forward.
Despite the collapse of the LTTE, the Government continues
to militarize the country even further, with the 2011
Budget making the highest allocation of SLR 215,220
to the Defence Ministry, as against, for instance, just
SLR 75,250 million for the Economic Development Ministry.
Despite a measure of concern about the Rajapakse regime’s
politics in the post-war phase, it is clear, however,
that there is simply no possibility of significant resurgence
of terrorist violence in the country in the foreseeable
future.
In Bangladesh,
on August 17, 2005, some 459 explosions were engineered
by Islamist terrorists across 63 of the country’s 64
Districts in the span of just half an hour. There was
rising global concern, at that time, over increasing
radicalisation in the country, the progressive concentration
of Pakistan-linked Islamist terrorist groups, the emergence
of Bangladeshi soil as safe haven and launch-pad for
terrorists into other countries, principally, though
not exclusively India, and deep collusion of state institutions
and the democratic political leadership in these developments.
Indeed, some had begun to speak of Bangladesh as ‘the
next Afghanistan’. The 2005 bombings, however, proved
to be a fatal over-reach by the Islamists, and set into
motion events that have led to sweeping de-radicalisation.
The principal perpetrators of that outrage, from the
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
and the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB)
were quickly arrested, tried and convicted, with their
top leaderships executed under the military backed interim
Government that took charge after Begum Khalida Zia’s
Presidential term ended on October 27, 2006. Processes
of de-radicalization have enormously accelerated after
Sheikh Hasina Wajed assumed power on January 6, 2009,
following a landslide electoral victory. While the Islamist
extremist infrastructure and cadre base remains substantially
intact across much of the country, its leaderships have
been ruined, even as Dhaka has initiated a number of
measures to permanently exorcise Islamist extremism
and terrorism from the country. Significantly, the Government
has initiated the investigation and trial
of War Criminals of the 1971 Liberation
War, which would bring to justice the men, prominently
including the top leadership of the Jamaat-e-Islami
(JeI), who collaborated with the Pakistan Army in the
genocide of an estimated three million people. After
decades of collusion with insurgent groups operating
in India’s Northeast, moreover, Bangladesh shut down
their camps and handed over large numbers of their leadership
and cadres to Indian authorities, bringing to an end
a long chapter of covert warfare against its neighbour.
While
tremendous gains have certainly been recorded, residual
dangers persist. Bangladesh continues to struggle against
foreign terrorist groupings, principally from Pakistan,
which are linked to domestic extremist formations. The
surviving capacities of the JeI, the JMB
and the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B),
while dormant, remain significant. Pakistani linkages
with, and covert support to, these groupings persists.
Moreover, the corrosive nature of violent and disruptive
street mobilization by political parties in Bangladesh
has the potential to destroy the tentative stability
that has been secured after decades of rising disorder.
The gains in Bangladesh have been nothing less than
dramatic, but if the Government loses focus, the risks
of a backslide are ever-present.
Nepal
is another success story, though risks of a spiral into
disorders remain. Between 2001 and 2005, a raging Maoist
insurgency had cost a total of 12,348 lives, with 4,896
killed in 2002 alone. In 2010, 37 fatalities were recorded,
principally in fratricidal turf wars between armed groups,
or in extortion-related violence. The country has moved
from political crisis to political crisis, but the peace
agreements of 2006 and after continue to exercise sufficient
restraint over the principal actors, including the main
armed groups. Regrettably, political deadlocks have
blocked the process of Constitution drafting, and, indeed,
every possible initiative of governance. It took more
than seven months, and 17 rounds of elections, to elect
a Prime Minister, Jhala Nath Khanal of the Communist
Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML),
whose tenure was put under threat within days, as the
formerly insurgent United Communist Party of Nepal –
Maoist (UCPN-M) demanded the accelerated implementation
of its seven point agreement with the CPN-UML as a condition
for continued support. Meanwhile, the United Nations
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), established by Security Council
Resolution 1740 on January 23, 2007, ceased operation
on January 15, 2011. Before this date, the country’s
three principal political formations, the UCPN-M, CPN-UML
and the Nepali Congress (NC), had constituted a task
force to define a political mechanism to complete the
task of ‘Army integration’ – the integration of Maoist
armed cadre with the Nepal Army. With a multiplicity
of armed groupings, most prominently including the UCPN-M,
retaining, and in some cases consolidating or augmenting,
their capacities for violence over the past years of
uncertain peace, the unrelenting chain of political
crises in the country remain fraught with constant danger
of a return to violence.
The tiny
Kingdom of Bhutan has seen little of armed disturbance
since its expulsion of Indian insurgent groups from
its soil in 2003. Though some ethnic difficulties remain
unresolved, particularly the question of the Ngolops
(ethnic Nepalese minority), the incipient trends towards
militant mobilisation that were visible in the early
2000s appear to have been neutralised.
India
is another of the qualified success stories of South
Asia, with total terrorism and insurgency related fatalities
collapsing from a peak of 5,839 in 2001, to 1,902 in
2010. Indeed, the two principal movements drivers of
violence in the country – the Pakistan-backed Islamist
extremist insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)
and the multiplicity of ethnic extremist insurgencies
in the country’s Northeast – appear to have succumbed
substantially to sheer exhaustion and the transformation
of their proximate and enabling environments. There
has been a significant decline in Islamist terrorist
incidents
outside J&K since the peak of
2008, the year that also saw the 26/11 attack in Mumbai,
accounting for 157 fatalities in this single incident.
There were no major (resulting in three or more fatalities)
Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K in 2009,
though 2010 recorded at least two such attacks, including
the German Bakery bombing at Pune, which killed 17.
Total
fatalities
in J&K have fallen from their
peak of 4,507 in 2001 to 375 in 2010, though another
111 persons were killed in street violence, principally
in Police firing, in an orchestrated campaign of militant-backed
stone pelting that escalated between June and October
2010. Indeed, the success of the stone-pelting campaigns
in 2010 and the paralysis they inflicted across the
Kashmir Valley have provoked anxieties that the events
of Tunisia and Egypt could be replicated in this insurgency-riven
region in the summer of 2011. This is far from likely.
For one thing, despite the utter confusion of state
responses to the stone pelting campaigns of 2010, the
reality is that institutional strengths and the democratic
constituency in J&K are far greater than anything
that could be imagined under repressive Arab despotisms.
Moreover, the insurrections of Egypt and Tunisia will
find little resonance in J&K for the simple reason
that, despite their slogan of ‘azadi’ (freedom),
the reality is that the separatists are fighting against
a democracy to establish a theocratic dictatorship,
at the behest of a rogue state with a hideous record,
both of rights violations and of failure to adhere to
the very theocratic vision it has instrumentalised and
exploited throughout its existence. The principal difficulty
in J&K remains a succession of spiritless Governments
in Srinagar and New Delhi that have sought to desperately
woo the most extreme separatist elements in the Valley,
rather than to strengthen and empower the democratic
constituency to effectively counter the perverse logic
of the Pakistan-backed separatists.
In India’s
chronically troubled Northeast, fatalities
fell from 1,051 in 2008, to 852 in 2009, and further
to 322 in 2010. Manipur and Assam, still the worst affected
State in the Northeast, registered the most significant
drops, from 416 and 391, respectively, in 2009, to 138
and 158 in 2010.
It is
in the Maoist
insurgency that the most dramatic
escalation of the recent past has been recorded, and
it is in theatres of Maoist violence that the most visible
indices of the state’s confusion and incompetence are
visible. February 2011 saw a nine-day crisis in Odisha,
after the abduction of the District Collector of Malkangiri
and a Junior Engineer, with the State Government simply
conceding all Maoist demands to secure their release,
exemplifying the wider infirmity and incoherence of
responses across much of the Maoist afflicted belt –
with the notable exception of Andhra Pradesh. Naxalite
(Maoist)-related fatalities, at 1,180 in 2010, now significantly
outstrip the combined total of all other terrorist and
insurgent movements in the country. Divergent assessments
of the intensity of Maoist activities have been provided
by official sources from time to time. What is evident
on the facts, however, is that the Maoists have not
been pushed out of any of the areas where they had established
their disruptive dominance prior to the launch of the
Centre’s "massive and coordinated operations" in late
2009 (abruptly suspended after the Maoist ambuscade
at Chintalnad in Chhattisgarh on April 6, 2010, in which
76 security personnel were slaughtered), and there is
reason to believe that they have substantially expanded
their areas of subversion. Unsurprisingly, Union Home
Minister P. Chidambaram conceded, on February 1, 2011,
that "The Communist Party of India-Maoist remains
a powerful and determined adversary."
The broadly
positive trends in India – with the exception of Maoist
violence – do not, however, provide an accurate index
to the quality of the State’s responses. Indeed, in
all spheres, it is a range of complex extraneous factors
that has led to dramatic improvements, where these have
been registered.
Pakistan
remains the core of instability and terror in South
Asia and, indeed, well beyond. Total fatalities, however,
dropped from the unnatural peak of 11,585 in 2009, to
7,435 in 2010, but were still higher than any preceding
year, including 2008, when the figure stood at 6,715
[the figures are likely to be gross underestimates,
since reportage from areas of conflict is poor, as authorities
deny access to reporters, international observers and
other independent institutions]. Significantly, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) accounts for the overwhelming proportion
of the dramatic drop in fatalities and violence, essentially
indicating active disengagement between the SFs and
extremists in this Province, as the total killed declined
from 5,497 in 2009 to 1,202 in 2010. US State Department
correspondence exposed by Wikileaks described
operations in KP and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) as "ham handed military tactics, which
included indiscriminate artillery bombardment" and "blind
artillery and F-16 bombardments" which had displaced
millions of innocent civilians from their target areas.
These ‘blind operations’ appear to have been scaled
back in KP and FATA through 2010. Terrorism-related
fatalities also fell in Punjab, from 441 to 316 over
the same period. However, FATA saw 5,408 killed in 2010,
as against 5,304 in 2009; in Balochistan, fatalities
rose from 277 to 347; while Sindh saw an increase from
66 to 162.
There
is increasing evidence of deepening radicalisation in
Pakistan, most dramatically exemplified by the assassination
of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, who was murdered by
his own security guard, with no reaction from others
in his security detail, because of his opposition to
the country’s blasphemy laws. There is substantial cumulative
evidence of Pakistan’s unwillingness to act against
terrorist formations operating from its soil into Afghanistan
and India, and the international pretence on this has
been blown away by the Wikileaks disclosures,
where Pakistani duplicity is explicitly and repeatedly
emphasised. Unsurprisingly, US-Pakistan relations continue
to deteriorate, though the Obama Administration remains
impotently trapped in a relationship described as ‘co-dependent’.
This can only worsen with the continuing farce of the
US AfPak policy, and the war of imminent flight the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is seen
to be fighting in Afghanistan. Islamabad remains unwilling
to act consistently against a wide spectrum of Islamist
terrorists and extremists – with the exception of the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and factions that operate
within the country – even as the stranglehold of radicalism
strengthens over the country’s institutions and chokes
off the most incipient signs of reform. A significant
proportion of foreign aid continues to be diverted to
the extremist constituency in the country, even as this
constituency continues to enjoy unfettered access to
a wide range of independent financial sources. In December
2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote, somewhat
coyly, that "some ISI officials... continue to maintain
ties with a wide array of extremist organisations, in
particular the Taliban, LeT
(Lashkar-e-Taiba) and other extremist organizations."
The persistent ambivalence about the role of state institutions
in promoting terrorism sourced from Pakistan is now
no longer sustainable, even as the country faces an
imminent ‘economic catastrophe’. Regrettably, the world,
and the US in particular, is yet to respond unambiguously
to this rogue state’s continuing adventurism.
The institutional
apparatus of South Asian states remains infinitely stronger
than that of the Arab world, even in countries that
have been systematically undermining, if not dismantling
it, over decades. Capacity deficits in security and
governance, nevertheless, remain endemic across much
of the region, and the potential for conflict continues
to augment. The realization of such potential, however,
is integrally linked to the quality of governance in
each constituent state, and even the apparently worst
of these can abruptly be turned around under determined
leadership. This, then, is the obvious and immediate
lesson of the present South Asian experience – as of
much of history: where states demonstrate a modicum
of wisdom and restraint, nations flourish; where states
and national leaderships are undermined by corruption,
opportunism, weakness, or even the mere absence of sagacity,
nations suffer, decline, and sometimes perish.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
February 21-27, 2011
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Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
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INDIA
|
|
Jammu and Kashmir
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
Jharkhand
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
1
|
0
|
7
|
8
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
4
|
1
|
0
|
5
|
FATA
|
1
|
7
|
26
|
34
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
14
|
0
|
3
|
17
|
Gilgit-Baltistan
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
20
|
8
|
29
|
57
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BHUTAN
No
ULFA camp in Bhutan, says Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi
Thinley: Bhutan Prime Minister Lyonchhen
Jigmi Thinley on February 25 said that law-breakers
from Assam, especially militant groups, including the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), will not be
allowed to take refuge in his country. He categorically
said that the ULFA had stopped setting up base in Bhutan and
the leaders and activists of the outfit had left the
neighbouring country.
Sentinel
Assam, February 26, 2011.
INDIA
Maoists
killed 700 tribals in five years: The
Chhattisgarh Government on February 24 told the Supreme
Court that it would not be possible to shift villagers
from relief camps within a definite timeframe due to possible
reprisals from the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
which killed 700 tribals in the past five years. These
tribals have been killed by the Maoists after being branded
as sympathiser of Salwa Judum (an anti-Maoist vigilante
group) or as Police informers.
Outlook
India, February 25, 2011.
‘State
actors’ in Pakistan involved with terror outfits, says
Minister of State for Home Gurudas Kamat: India
on February 23 said involvement of ‘state actors' in Pakistan
with terrorist outfits has come to light on a number of
occasions, including in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terror
attacks (also known as 26/11), and terror infrastructure
continues to exist in that country. "Inputs from central
security agencies and through various open sources confirm
that terrorist infrastructure continues to exist in Pakistan
and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir by way of numerous training
camps, communication centres and launching pads," Minister
of State for Home Gurudas Kamat told Rajya Sabha(Upper
House of Parliament) in reply to a question.
Times
of india, February 24, 2011.
Maoist-Northeast
militant groups nexus worries Ministry of Home Affairs:
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is worried
over the growing nexus of Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) with Northeast militant groups as a huge
cache of sophisticated weapons in possession of Northeast
insurgent groups, particularly the United Liberation Front
of Asom (ULFA), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and National
Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), is
feared to have been finding route to Maoists in West Bengal,
Jharkhand and Bihar. Disclosing that Maoists are enhancing
their striking power by adding sophisticated weapons like
AK-47, SLR and mortars in their arsenal, security sources
in the MHA said that Maoist military strategist Koteshwar
Rao alias Kishan’s inclination towards the Northeast
insurgent group was aimed at procuring sophisticated weapons
available in abundant quantity with Northeast insurgent
groups. Nagaland
Page, February 22, 2011.
Naxal-hit
States yet to fill 94,800 vacancies in Police force:
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) sources said
that there are over 94,800 vacancies to be filled up as
on December 31, 2010, by the Naxal [Left Wing Extremist]-affected
States. Of the 94,800 vacancies, as many as 33,000 alone
are from Andhra Pradesh, 18,000 in Jharkhand, 14,000 in
Maharashtra, 12,300 in West Bengal, 5,000 in Orissa, 4,500
in Bihar and 3,500 in Chhattisgarh. States have communicated
to the MHA that most of these posts would be filled up
during the calendar year 2011.
Business-Standard,
February 23, 2011.
NEPAL
UCPN-M
decides not to join Government: The Unified Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) on February 25 decided
not to join the Government saying the party is not convinced
with the position of Communist Party of Nepal-Unified
Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) on the seven-point agreement.
A meeting of the Maoist Standing Committee held in the
evening concluded that the UML failed to create a basis
on which the Maoist party could join the Government.
Nepal News, February 26, 2011.
All
the factories, industries and hotels across the country
will be turned into barracks, warns Maoist chairman Prachanda:
The Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M)
Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda on February
27 warned that all the factories, industries and hotels
across the country will be turned into barracks to ensure
the success of the people's revolt the party plans to
wage. Prachanda said that Maoists will not tolerate any
attempts to halt efforts aimed at ensuring peace and constitution
as well as bringing about a radical transformation in
the country. He also called upon all the factory workers
affiliated to the Maoist party to make "final preparations"
for people's revolt with all their power and might. He
further said that those who believe that the Maoists will
not wage any people's revolt and think that it is just
a bluff will soon be getting a rude shock. Earlier, in
a similar warning he had said that all "the universities
would be converted into barracks" if the regressive elements
intensified their conspiracies.
Nepal News, February 28, 2011.
PAKISTAN
26
militants and seven SFs among 34 persons killed during
the week in FATA: At least six persons were killed
when the US drone missiles hit a house and a car in a
village in Dilkhel Degan area of the North Waziristan
Agency (NWA) in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)
on February 24.
At least
10 militants were killed and several others were injured
on February 23 as Security Forces targeted militant hideouts
in Kurram Agency.
Ten suspected
militants were killed and another four injured when a
US drone attacked a suspected militant hideout in Miranshah,
the headquarters of NWA in the night of February 21.
Dawn;
Daily
Times;Tribune;
The
News, February 22-28, 2011 .
Militants
planning to target Chief Ministers and Iranian diplomats,
says National Crisis Management Cell intelligence report:
A joint team of three militant outfits are believed
to be planning to target the Provinces’ Chief Ministers
and Iranian diplomatic missions in the country, claims
a letter issued by the National Crisis Management Cell
in light of intelligence reports on February 22. Small
factions of Jundullah, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI)
and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have joined hands to carry
out terrorist attacks. Daily
Times, February 23, 2011.
Taliban
leader Mullah Omar revered by followers in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, says report: Afghanistan's
Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, the spiritual leader
of the Taliban movement that operates in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, still has a "very powerful" effect on his followers,
who are ready to fight on his orders. Omar recently exhorted
his men in an audio tape to keep fighting, an unnamed
Taliban ‘commander’ said. "His words have a very powerful
effect on us. We obey his orders, every Talib (student
of a religious seminary) does, and we believe in him,"
the ‘commander’ added.
Times
of india, February 23, 2011.
Government
ready for talks with those who lay down arms, says Prime
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani: Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gilani on February 25 reiterated the Government’s
resolve to continue pursuing a policy of three-Ds (dialogue,
development, deterrence), assuring talks with those Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) militants who are ready to surrender
their arms to local political agents. "We are ready
to hold talks with them (TTP) and bring them into mainstream
society," Gilani said, and clarified that the Government
would not enter a dialogue with those TTP who had been
working on foreign agenda. Daily
Times, February 26, 2011.
Supreme
Court seeks report on Balochistan security measures: The
Supreme Court on February 25 directed Attorney General
of Pakistan, Maulvi Anwarul Haq, to hold a meeting with
the Prime Minister Yousaf Raja Gilani regarding the rising
incidents of targeted killings and kidnappings in Balochistan
and inform it within three days about the policy statement
of the premier and steps being taken by the Government
to improve the security situation. The Supreme Court also
directed the Balochistan Chief Secretary, Inspector General
Of Police, Military Intelligence Director General, Frontiers
Constabulary and Levies Inspectors General to submit their
replies over the province’s deteriorating security situation
until March 2, 2010. Daily
Times, February 26, 2011.
No
Army operation in Balochistan, says Chief of Army Staff
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani: The Chief
of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on February
21 said that the Army was not conducting any operation
in Balochistan. He said Army troops were not deployed
in the interior of the Province, except one battalion
in Sui and the personnel were restricted to the cantonment.
Dawn,
February 22, 2011.
SRI LANKA
Canada
to ban LTTE assets: The Canadian Government
is mulling over the confiscation of all Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) banking and fund raising activities
in Canada. Minister for External Affairs G. L. Peiris
said that Canada was already in the process
of crafting the necessary legislation. The Minister said
that Jason Kenny, a Canadian Minister had taken the lead
in this respect.
Daily
News, February 26, 2011.
Cyber
war with LTTE still continues, say Army Commander:
Army Commander Lieutenant General Jagath
Jayasuriya on February 22 said that despite the nations
physical war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) militants being over resulting in their elimination
from the land, the warfare has not come to an end as the
'cyber war', the war on information highway, is still
continuing.
Colombo
Page, February 23, 2011.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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