The entire debate on Kashmiri
separatism, as also the recent resurgence of the controversy over
'autonomy' has substantially ignored the enormous plurality of the
State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). To some extent, the regional
identity of Jammu and the plight of the
exiled Kashmiri pandits
have received limited - though entirely inadequate - attention in
the media and in some of the ill-informed political debates on the
subject. But the relationship between the Muslim dominated regional
Centre at Srinagar and the complexities, conflicts and identities
within the Ladakh sub-region have been entirely neglected, not only
in the public debate, but also by the political executive both in
Srinagar and in Delhi, as also by the various departments that were
supposed to be monitoring the situation in this forgotten Himalyan
hinterland. That there is even less understanding of the dynamics of sub-regional identities,
such as Kargil's relationship with Leh, and Zanskar's with Kargil,
is, consequently, entirely unsurprising within this context of general
neglect.
Recent events in the State,
however, have forced at least the transient acknowledgement of a problem
in Ladakh. The J&K State Assembly's decision to pass a resolution
seeking the restoration of Kashmir's special status to a 'pre-1953'
position spurred the minority communities in the State the
people of Jammu, the Ladakhi Buddhists and the Kashmiri Pandits
to revive their demands for autonomy and, increasingly, separation
from the Valley. In June 2000, an agitation was launched by the Ladakhi
Buddhists, led by the Ladakhi Buddhist Association (LBA), to press
their demand for Union Territory status.
The agitation brought an immediate albeit passing focus
on their grievances. This paper traces the origin of their difficulties
political, economic and social and of their demands
for direct administration from New Delhi; and the political and strategic
implications of these for the State as well as the central governments,
especially within the context of the crisis scenario that emerged
as a result of the conflict in Kargil.
The Ladakh region consists
of a Buddhist-majority Leh district and Shia Muslim-majority Kargil,
originally part of Baltistan, which has a small Buddhist minority
concentrated in the Zanskar area. Its area of 95,876 square kilometres
constitutes 60 per cent of the States area, albeit sparsely
populated (with 2.27 per cent of the State's population). LBA's demand
for Union Territory status
emanates from deep-rooted alienation and a widely shared perception
among the Ladakhi Buddhists of having been treated as a 'colony' by
the Kashmiris and, over the last five decades, they have launched
several rounds of agitation to achieve this objective.
A Hegemonic
Valley and the Politicisation of the Ladakhis
Buddhist-majority Ladakh had
strong reservations and insecurities with regard to the transfer of
power from the Dogra Maharaja, Hari Singh, to a Kashmiri administration
under Sheikh Abdullah in 1949. The Ladakhis did not identify themselves
with the Kashmiris, and were further alienated by the iniquitous power
structure and partisan policies of the Abdullah government. The Constituent
Assembly (dominated by Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference) had
created a unitary state with a clear concentration of powers in the
Valley. The Constitution did not recognise the federal principle of
organising political power to create equitable representation for
the underlying social and cultural heterogeneity of society in the
State. Sheikh Abdullah painstakingly constructed a 'monolith structure'
that emphaisised "one organisation (the National Conference)
one leader (Shiekh Abdullah) and one programme (Naya
Kashmir)."
What resulted in the name of
'majority rule' was, in fact, 'Kashmiri rule'. Ladakh had only two
seats in the State Assembly and Sheikh Abdullahs five-member
cabinet had no representative from the region. What followed was an
unending succession of discriminatory policies that created an unbridgeable
hiatus between the Valley and Ladakh.
Thus, in the wake of the Pakistani
raiders' attacks in 1947-48, the Muslim refugees in the Valley had
received substantial state aid, but no resources were sanctioned for
rehabilitating the Buddhist refugees of the Zanskar area, nor was
any financial aid granted for reconstructing and restoring the gompas Buddhist temples that were the life and soul of the
local religion and culture. The small relief provided by the Government
of India never reached Zanskar; it was distributed among the Muslims
of Suru Karste area in the Kargil tehsil. The studied indifference with which the
State government transferred Zanskar to the Leh tehsil
was in marked contrast to the way Doda was readily carved out as a
separate Muslim-majority district in the Jammu region. Land reforms initiated in the State were perceived as targeting
the gompas and elicited
strong criticism from the Buddhist clergy. Indeed, Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru had to intervene to persuade the State government
to suspend the application of the Land Reforms Act to the gompas.
The decisions of the Shiekh
Abdullah government to impose Urdu in Ladakhi schools, to discontinue
scholarships for children of backward areas, and the termination of
grants-in-aid provided by the Dogra regime for three primary schools
run by Shias, Sunnis and Buddhists were also strongly resented. No
allocation whatsoever was made in the first budget for Ladakhs
development. Kushak Bakula protested in the State Assembly: "Read
the Budget statement from one end to the other, you will not find
Ladakh mentioned even once." In fact, there was no separate plan for
Ladakh till 1961. Finally, Maulana Masoodis statements regarding
the communal composition of Ladakh being a Muslim-majority district
created grave misgivings that the government planned to officially
relegate the Buddhists to complete political irrelevance.
The biased and discriminatory
policies of the Kashmiri leadership provided an impetus for the politicisation
of the Ladakhi Buddhists. Being a minority community in the State
and anxious to protect their distinct religion and culture, they wanted
to take an independent decision about their political future. Ladakhi
Buddhists were projected as a "separate nation by all the tests
race, language, religion and culture determining a nationality." They emphasised historical links with the
Dogras of Jammu rather than with the Kashmiri Muslims. Two sets of
arguments were offered. Since Sheikh Abdullahs case rested upon
the Treaty of Amritsar, the Maharajas transfer of power was
valid for Kashmir Valley alone, as Ladakhs relationship with
the Dogras was governed by a separate treaty resulting from the War
of 1834, 12 years before the Treaty of Amritsar came into force, in
which the Valley did not figure. Second, the arrangements which subjected
the Ladakhis to the Dogras had ceased to be operative, like the Treaty
of Amritsar, breaking the constitutional link tying the Ladakhis to
the State of J&K, and they were morally and juridically free to
choose their course, independent of the rest of the State.
A memorandum submitted to Prime
Minister Nehru on May 4, 1949, by Cheewang Rigzin, President, LBA,
pleaded that Ladakh not be bound by the decision of a plebiscite,
should the Muslim majority of the State decide in favour of Pakistan. They sought to be governed directly by the
Government of India, or to be amalgamated with the Hindu-majority
parts of Jammu to form a separate province, or to join East Punjab.
Failing all options, they would be forced to consider the option of
reuniting with Tibet. The strategic and commercial importance of neighbouring
Tibet and China, with Leh as the nerve centre of the Central Asian
trade, was underlined.
Empathising with the Ladakhis,
the then Sadar-i-Riyasat,
Dr. Karan Singh, acknowledged that,
even
more so than in Jammu, the Ladakhis were feeling uneasy and insecure
under the Sheikhs administration. Forming as they did a distinct
cultural entity, they felt that their position in the new dispensation
with only two members in the State Assembly (on the basis of population)
was extremely precarious and made them totally subordinate to the
Kashmiris. They urged that instead of leaving them at the mercy of
the Sheikhs government, an Administrator should be sent from
the Centre to the Region.
Sheikh
Abdullah's Regime: Promises & Disappointments
The National Conference government
accepted Ladakh's demand for a Central Administrator, but never implemented
the decision. While Nehru shared the Ladakhis' concerns, he persuaded
the Ladakhi Buddhist delegation not to press its demands, since any
constitutional or administrative action could weaken Indias
stand on Kashmir in the UN Security Council.
National Conference members
from Ladakh then sought internal autonomy from the Kashmir Valley.
Kushak Bakula demanded federal status for Ladakh in 1952. The Ladakh unit of the National Conference
called for the institution of an elected Statutory Advisory Committee,
and demanded that no measures affecting the political, economic or
religious life of Leh tehsil would be passed by the State's Constituent Assembly without
prior approval of this body. The main demands of the Ladakhis included
the formation of a Ministry of Ladakh Affairs headed by a popularly
elected Ladakhi member of the Legislative Assembly; adequate representation
in the legislature and civil service; establishing Panchayat
and Rural Development Departments; development funds for constructing
roads and canals and promoting agriculture and horticulture; and replacement
of the Kashmiri police by local personnel. They wanted Bodhi, their
mother tongue, to be made the medium of instruction for school education,
and special provisions to be made for facilitating higher education
and training in medicine, law, engineering, agriculture and forestry. Kushak Bakula argued that Ladakh would bear
essentially the same relationship to the J&K State as Kashmir
to India, with the local legislature being the only competent authority
to make laws for Ladakh.
Initially, Sheikh Abdullah
and Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to the State Constitution granting limited
regional autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh. The Basic Principles Committee
of the Constituent Assembly was entrusted with this task and a plan
was prepared to establish five autonomous regions: Kashmir Valley,
Jammu, Gilgit, Ladakh and a region comprising the districts of Mirpur,
Rajouri, Poonch and Muzaffarabad. Three provinces, namely, Kashmir
Valley, Jammu and Poonch-Mirpur-Rajouri would each have an executive
head and council of ministers responsible to the provincial legislature.
The regional councils would administer Ladakh and Gilgit. The State
legislature would be empowered to alter the area of these autonomous
units and to establish new units. However, this plan also perished on paper,
since Sheikh Abdullah was not prepared to concede to Jammu and Ladakh
the very rights and privileges which he himself had demanded from
the Indian state. In the context of the Indian states relationship
with J&K, the Sheikh had argued:
Enlightened
opinion in India recognised the vital human urges of Kashmiris and
. . . afforded them opportunities of achieving their political and
social objectives. This mutual accommodation of each others
viewpoint, which has been accorded constitutional sanction, should
not be interpreted as a desire for separatism. After all in a democratic
country, the ultimate factor which decided the relationship between
various units is the measure of willingness of each of these parts
to come closer to each other for the common good of all. History has taught us that false notions of
uniformity and conformity have often led to disastrous consequences
in the lives of many nations. (emphasis added)
But when the leadership in
Ladakh and Jammu argued that their status as a federating unit of
J&K would be a healthy unifying force among different peoples
of the State, the Sheikh backtracked.
Bakshi's
Regime of Handouts
After Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal
in 1953, his successor, Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi, started on a good
footing with the Centre's support and the goodwill of the Jammu and
Ladakh regions. He gave an assurance that rights and privileges secured
for the State as a whole would be shared in equal measure by the people
of different parts. Ladakh was better represented in this regime,
both in the National Conference party leadership and the State government.
Kushak Bakula, Deputy Minister of Ladakh Affairs, represented Ladakh
for the first time. However, Bakshi shared political power with other
regions only to neutralise their opposition. Kushak Bakula, for example,
was inducted on the condition of locating his ministry at Leh, "effectively
reducing him to the position of a District Officer." Bakula had no powers to make changes in
the administration, to create posts or to allocate funds.
Nevertheless, compared to the
total neglect during Abdullahs regime, Ladakh now fared better.
During the Second Plan (1956-61), Rs 8.665 million was invested in
the regions development. However, no major agricultural, industrial
or power generation projects were initiated during the ten years of
Bakshis rule. As a result, the people of Ladakh continued to
nurse grievances against the Valleys dominance in the States
power structures.
Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, who
succeeded Bakshi in 1963, withdrew the system of direct central administration
- on the pattern of the North East Frontier Areas (NEFA) - that had
been introduced in Ladakh after the Chinese aggression in 1962. He tried, however, to make amends by constituting
a ten-member Ladakh Development Commission with Kushak Bakula, the
Minister of State for Ladakh Affairs, as the chairman, and Agha Ibrahim
Shah, Member of the Legislative Council from Kargil, as the vice-chairman.
The Commission was to advise the government on policies for good governance
and speedy development of Ladakh but, owing to several limitations,
it proved to be ineffective. Disillusioned by the discrimination against
Ladakh by successive State governments, the District National Congress
unit led by Kushak Bakula submitted a memorandum to the central government
in 1967 seeking revival of a NEFA-type administration.
The
Communalisation of Political Processes
The State government responded
to Ladakh's demands for regional autonomy by undercutting the political
base of such groups and creating alternative political alignments,
often along communal lines. Sadiq promoted a new leadership of lamas by supporting Kushak Thiksey against
Kushak Bakula on the one hand, and, on the other, favoured the Muslim leadership
of Kargil against the Buddhist leadership of Leh. Political differences
between Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhists were becoming public. In 1969,
several incidents, including the alleged desecration of the Buddhist
flag by a Muslim, the stoning of the Jama Masjid and Imam Bara by
a Buddhist procession, and subsequent reactions in Kargil, progressively
divided the two communities politically. The Buddhist Action Committee
raised a number of demands, including the status of a Scheduled Tribe
for the Ladakhis, the settlement of Tibetan refugees in Ladakh, construction
of a rest house in Kargil, recognition and introduction of the Bodhi
language as a compulsory subject up to high school, and the provision
of a full-fledged cabinet minister who would be the real representative
of Ladakh. The agitation leader, Kushak Tongdan, led
a sit-down relay hunger strike in Leh bazaar and Nubra Valley. The
State government did induct Sonam Wangyal in the Cabinet, but the
other demands were not accepted, perhaps because they were opposed
strongly by the Muslim Action Committee, which feared that the Buddhist
demand for settlement of Tibetan refugees would upset the ethnic balance
in the region.
This was a game of building
political majorities. The Ladakhi Buddhists were suspicious and distrustful
of the Kashmiri Muslim majority relegating them to a minority within
Ladakh, and hence the demand for settling the Tibetan refugees. This
was perceived as an attempt to build a Buddhist majority, arousing
fear in the Shia Muslim minority in Kargil, which, in turn, tried
to forge a political majority by joining hands with the Kashmiri Muslims,
despite a complete absence of cultural and ethnic similarities. A
vicious circle resulted, leading to the beginning of divisions among
the Ladakhis into the Ladakhi Buddhists and the Ladakhi Muslims, along
a communal faultline.
After his return to power in
1975, Sheikh Abdullah, once again, backtracked from his commitment
to create federal structures and reorganise the constitutional set-up
of the State. Nor was he willing to share political power equitably
with the constituent regions of Ladakh and Jammu.
The regional grievances of an inadequate share in the States
developmental allocations persisted. In a repeat performance of his
first stint in office, all office-bearers of the National Conference
party organisation came from the Valley. Deprived of their due share
in state power, the people in Ladakh as well as in Jammu started a
movement to assert their respective regional identities.
The
Agitation for Regional Autonomy
In 1980, the police firing
and lathi-charge on Buddhist
agitators protesting against the decision of the district authority
to transfer a diesel generator from Zanskar to Kargil snowballed into
a mass agitation in Ladakh. People of different shades of political
opinion closed ranks and set up the All-Party Ladakh Action Committee
to express solidarity with the people of Zanskar and demanded regional
autonomy from the Kashmir Valley. The State government was accused
of treating them as slaves. Demanding divisional status for Ladakh,
the people demanded that their homeland be declared an
autonomous region within the State. Following student demonstrations
in Poonch, Ladakhi Buddhists, for the first time, resorted to violence.
The protestors, including monks, held public meetings and pelted stones
on being lathi-charged and tear-gassed by the police. Later, Border Security
Force (BSF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) units were flown
in to the affected areas. On January 5, 1981, the Ladakh Action Committee
launched a full-fledged agitation.
Initially, the State government
responded positively and appointed a ministerial sub-committee to
look into their grievances. The Cabinet Committee held detailed parleys
with the Ladakh Action Committee from January 12 to 15, 1981, on a
wide range of subjects. They included plan allocations on a rational
basis rather than on the existing population basis, commissioning
of hydel projects, improved communications, adequate reservation of
seats in professional institutions, marketing facilities, construction
of small dams, industrial development, tourism, transport facilities,
irrigation projects, development of culture and language and the status
of Scheduled Tribe for Ladakhis. The State government promised to request
the central government to grant tribal status, but resisted sharing
of political power with Ladakh. Citing the Sikri Commission Report,
Sheikh Abdullah denied the regional imbalances and discrimination
suffered by Leh district. The Ladakh Action Committee criticised the
governments unrealistic yardstick for making development allocations
ignoring the regions enormous size, scanty population, difficult
terrain and general economic backwardness. Sheikh Abdullahs claim that Ladakhs
problems were being looked after by a separate Ladakh Affairs Ministry
did not stand scrutiny, because, except for brief interludes, the
Ministry was always headed by a non-Ladakhi and did not enjoy significant
powers and responsibility in respect of Ladakh.
Frustrated by the State governments
apathetic attitude and delaying tactics, the Ladakh Action Committee
resumed its agitation on January 15, 1982. There were violent clashes
between the demonstrators and police and Leh district experienced
its first curfew for four days. In sub-zero temperatures, 10,000 people
gathered to attend the funeral of their first martyrs. In a meeting
with Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, Kushak Bakula and P. Namgyal reiterated
demands for regional autonomy and tribal status. They argued that
one-member representation of Leh district in the State Assembly was
inadequate and underlined the need for delimiting the district into
four assembly segments Leh, Nubra, Changthang and Sha
and a separate parliamentary seat for the Leh district. Sheikh Abdullahs government did not
concede any of the demands of the Ladakh Action Committee.
Sub-regional
Variations
Significant intra-regional
political differences in Ladakh emerged during this agitation. Notwithstanding
the nomenclature of the All-Party Ladakh Action Committee and demands
for regional autonomy of the Ladakh region and tribal status for the
Ladakhis, its predominantly Buddhist character was not coincidental.
A parallel Kargil Action Committee constituted by the National Conference
and the Congress raised a different slogan provincial
status for the two districts of Leh and Kargil on the pattern
of Jammu & Kashmir divisions. The State government subsequently used the
Kargil Action Committee's stand to reject the demand for regional
autonomy on the plea that all Ladakhis did not want it.
The
Agitation for Union Territory Status
The secessionist movement in Kashmir that gained strength
the late 1980s was once again followed by voices of separatism in
Ladakh. An agitation was triggered by a scuffle between a Buddhist
youth, Rigzin Zora, and four Muslims in the Leh market on July 7,
1989, at which time a coalition government headed by Farooq Abdullah
was in power. The mishandling of the situation by the local police
and the State governments refusal to appoint a commission of
inquiry exacerbated the situation. J&K Armed Police (JKAP), was
subsequently deployed, and fired at Buddhist processionists killing
some protestors, forcibly entered Buddhists houses, desecrated
objects of worship, and resorted to indiscriminate beating of locals
and looting of property. These actions led the LBA to embark upon
a violent struggle, once again demanding the separate constitutional
status of a Union Territory for Ladakh. The movement emphasised their
poor and inadequate political representation in the State Assembly
and total neglect and discrimination in the socio-economic development
of the Buddhist-majority Leh district, and reiterated the general
perception that the Valley had always treated Ladakh as a colony.
As evidence, they cited the gross under-representation
of Buddhists in the State services and the Kashmiri-run
administration. The J&K Secretariat had only
one Buddhist employee. Out of 200,000 government employees, only
2,900 were Ladakhis, and there was no Buddhist among 18,000 employees
of nine corporate sector units. Rs. 250 million was spent under the World
Bank-aided Social Forestry Schemes, but Leh district was ignored.
It had no share in the funds disbursed by the Central Land Development
Bank and the Khadi and Village Industries Corporation in the State.
Between 1987 and 1989, the State government had received more than
Rs. One billion from the Prime Ministers Special Assistance
Fund, but Leh got only Rs. 2.1 million. For tourism development schemes
in 1990, a sum of Rs. 5.9 million was earmarked for the Valley; Leh
was given only Rs 700,000, while the neighbouring Kargil district
received Rs. 1.7 million. Under the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna, the Valley
was given Rs 72 million, while Leh received just Rs. 2 million.
The State government was accused of adopting unrealistic
norms for allocation of Plan funds to Ladakh, of neglecting the power
sector, and of unimaginative planning of power projects. Srinagar
refused the central energy ministers proposal for two National
Hydel Power Corporation (NHPC) projects in Leh and Kargil in 1988.
Micro hydel projects at Basgo, Sumur and Hunder were yet to be commissioned
despite being launched a decade earlier. The State government had
withheld sanction for the Domkhar Hydel project that had been technically
cleared by the Central Water Commission years earlier. Work on the
Kumdok, Tagtse and Bogdang micro hydel projects, had not progressed
beyond perfunctory surveys for ten years. Another case in point was the Stakna Hydel
Project, which took over 25 years to build, cost nearly Rs 350 million,
was operational for barely four months a year and produced just 2
MW electricity.
The Buddhists obviously resented the neglect of the
rich Bodhi language and the imposition of Urdu as the medium of instruction
for Ladakhi children. Although 84 per cent of the population of Leh
district is Buddhist, Bodhi teachers were provided in only 32 of the
252 government schools. Despite specific recommendations of the Gajendragadkar
Commission, the State government had not set up a degree college for
the 200,000 inhabitants of the region. Successive State governments
were also accused of 'Islamising' Ladakh by encouraging Buddhists
conversion to Islam, with the ulterior motive of disturbing Ladakhs
demographic balance. More significantly, the systematic dismantling
of important forums for Ladakhs development, such as the Ladakh
Affairs Department, the absence of Ladakhi representatives in Farooq
Abdullahs coalition government and the Buddhists one seat
in Ladakhs share of four seats in the State Assembly, had resulted
in simmering discontent among the Ladakhi Buddhists.
The Buddhists increasingly accused the Kashmiri
Sunni Muslims of practicing majoritarian politics
driven by communal considerations, and of dominating Lehs administration
and economy. Kashmiri Muslims bagged the development contracts for
constructing buildings, roads and bridges in connivance with the Kashmiri-dominated
bureaucracy. Kashmiri hotel-owners and traders called the shots in
Lehs market. They had reaped most of the benefits from the influx
of foreign tourists into Ladakh since 1975 and they, according to
the Buddhists, were instigating the local Muslims Argons to flex their muscles in
a way that the 15 per cent minority [of Muslims] wanted to dictate
terms to the [Buddhist] majority.
Social Boycott
As a consequence of the agitation, the Buddhists boycotted
the Kashmiri Muslims. Valley traders soon vanished from the Leh market
and their hotels and restaurants were shut down. The entire Kashmiri
officialdom fled Leh, Khalsi, Nubra and Zanskar areas. Violence was
more severe in the villages, where Muslim houses were burnt and crops
were damaged. Some Muslims were forced to convert to Buddhism. In
retaliation, Ladakhi students studying in colleges at Srinagar and
Buddhist pavement hawkers were sufficiently intimidated to leave the
Valley.
Subsequently, the social boycott was extended to the
local Muslims. The Buddhists avoided the Muslim areas and did not
enter hotels, restaurants or shops run by Muslims. Farmers were prohibited
from exchanging tools. All Buddhist houses sported brightly-hued flags
and vehicles driven or owned by Buddhists bore yellow stickers. No
inter-religious marriages were allowed and meetings among relatives
of different faiths were stopped. Violators faced punitive action
by the LBA. For example, its mobile magistrates imposed
on-the-spot fines on Buddhists buying goods from Muslim shops. Social
boycott ruptured the centuries-old bonds of amity between the Ladakhi
Muslims and Buddhists. Interestingly, even its proponents could not
justify it except as a tactical move. At the peak of the boycott, LBA leader Rigzin
Zora described it in the neutral terms of a non-cooperation
policy and later admitted that it was an exercise in arm-twisting
[and] was crude, uncivilised and unbecoming of us. Nonetheless,
many stressed that though unfortunate, it was necessary
to drive the point home that the Muslims [local minority] should
not bank upon the Kashmiri Sunni Muslim majority in the State to dictate
terms to us [the local majority]. A common refrain was that It
taught them (the Muslims) a lesson as they had allowed themselves
to be instigated by forces in the Valley.
The Buddhists launched a civil disobedience movement
against the J&K government with an indefinite strike by Buddhist
government employees from September 2, 1989. Government officials
were not allowed to visit Buddhist villages and houses and contractors
and labourers stalled work on State government projects. The government
machinery was paralysed. Denouncing Kashmirs imperialism
and hegemonism, the LBA activists call was to free
Ladakh from Kashmir. The LBA president asserted that 'the Kashmiri
rulers have been systematically eroding the Buddhists ethnic
and cultural identity for the last forty-two years and it can be saved
only by making Ladakh a Union territory.' The Kargil Muslims (comprising
nearly half the regions population) resolutely opposed this.
The government agreed to negotiate with the LBA leaders in view of
their threat to boycott the impending general elections.
Proposal for Autonomous Hill Council
At the tripartite talks between the central government,
the State government and LBA leaders on October 29, 1989, an agreement
was reached whereby the LBA withdrew its demand for Union Territory
status in favour of an Autonomous Hill Council on the lines of the
Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. The LBA leaders realised that Union
Territory status would require an amendment to Article 370 of the
Indian Constitution, which would be a virtually impossible task given
the hostility of the Kargil Muslims and the Kashmiri leadership. The
Hill Council was accepted as a compromise to provide a mechanism for
self-governance by granting autonomy to Ladakh in administration,
economy and planning.
After the Congress (I)s ouster at the Centre,
however, the tripartite agreement on the Autonomous Hill Council (AHC)
remained on paper. V.P. Singh's and Chandra Shekhars subsequent
governments took no interest in Ladakhi issues, and the proposal was
revived only after the Congress returned to power in 1991. The central
government then impressed upon the LBA leadership to secularise its
political demands, and the then Union Home Minister, S.B. Chavan,
insisted on the lifting of the social boycott of Muslims. Consequently,
talks between the LBA and the Ladakh Muslim Association (LMA) ended
the boycott. The Buddhists relented because they needed the LMAs
support, and the latter acquiesced because its demand that concessions
to Ladakhis should not be given in the name of a communal body
was conceded. The two organisations joined hands to demand
a Hill Council, and the Ladakhis gained the support of all the people
of Leh. The Kashmiri leadership, however, strongly opposed the Hill
Council and succeeded in deferring its implementation. The Centre
backtracked to avoid rubbing the Kashmiri leadership on the
wrong side and jeopardising efforts to restore normalcy in the
Valley. It was precisely this kind of Valley-centric thinking that
had alienated the people of Ladakh, who believed that the Centre belittled
and disregarded their aspirations because they had not challenged
Indias political and security interests nor resorted to
the gun against the state. The LBA leaders were at pains to
explain that our religious beliefs of ahimsa and peaceful co-existence do not
approve of violence
but we are being forced to lose our identity
and fight for our dues. They reasoned:
While the government has
conducted negotiations with the militant movement of Bodos and ULFA
of Assam, Ladakhis have been neglected just because they have chosen
to follow the ideals of ahimsa
in redressing their demand. We fear we too will have to deviate
from our cherished ideals of non-violence to drive home the point
to the government that our demand is just, democratic and constitutional.
With this opinion gaining ground, the LBA leaders
and heads of Buddhist monasteries threatened a revival of the agitation
and a possible recourse to violence. The LBA president, Thupstang
Chhewang, warned that "the simmering passions of Ladakhis especially
the younger generation might lead to establishment of their links
with anti-social elements if the sentiments of Ladakhis are not respected."
In October 1993, the tripartite talks reached agreement
on setting up the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council at Leh. The government
assured enactment of the requisite legislation in three months, but
nothing happened. Frequent deferment of the Hill Council disturbed
the youth who revived the agitation in April 1995. They threatened
to start a violent struggle if the Union government failed to introduce
a comprehensive Bill on the autonomous status of the Hill Council,
or if it did not honestly implement the agreed decision in the stipulated
time.
The Autonomous Hill Council Act
The P.V. Narasimha Rao government finally relented,
and the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council Act was enacted on May 9, 1995.
The Act provided for an Autonomous Hill Council each for Leh and Kargil,
and an inter-district advisory council to advise them on matters of
common interest to both districts, and to resolve their differences
and preserve communal harmony in Ladakh. Councils were to have tenures
of five years. The objectives of decentralisation and devolution of
powers were clearly affirmed in the 'Reasons for Enactment' that conclude
the official text of the Act:
Ladakh region is geographically
isolated with a sparse population, a vast area and inhospitable terrain
which remains land-locked (sic)
for nearly six months in a year. Consequently, the people of the area
have had a distinct regional identity and special problems distinct
from those of the other areas of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The
people of Ladakh have, for a long time, been demanding effective local
institutional arrangements which can help to promote and accelerate
the pace of development and equitable all-around growth and development
having regard to its peculiar geoclimatic and locational conditions,
and stimulate fullest participation of the local community in the
decision-making process. It is felt that decentralisation of power
by formation of Hill Councils for the Ladakh region would give a boost
to the people of the said region. The present measure is enacted to
achieve the above objective.
The Leh Council has twenty-six elected members and
four nominated by the State government from among the principal minority
(read Muslim), women and two eminent persons. The Council has an executive
body of five councillors, including one Muslim. The sitting Members
of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and Members of Parliament (MPs)
are ex-officio members, but without voting rights. The Leh Council
has 26 territorial constituencies whose boundaries were drawn in collaboration
between State officials and local leaders so as to ensure adequate
representation from the sparsely populated regions of the district,
and to prevent domination by central Ladakh (Leh and surrounding areas
in the Indus Valley).
The executive powers and functions of the Council
included allotment, use and occupation of land vested in the Council
by the government, formulation and review of development programmes
for the district, budget (Plan and non-Plan), formulation of guidelines
for the implementation of schemes at the grassroots level, special
measures for employment generation and poverty alleviation, promotion
of co-operative institutions and local culture and languages, management
of un-demarcated forests and canals or watercourses for agriculture,
desert development, tourism planning, promotion and development; and
preservation of the environment and ecology of the area. The Council
has extensive rights to collect State taxes and levy local taxes and
fees of different kinds, including taxes on grazing, business, transport,
entertainment and 'temporary occupation of village sites and roads.'
The Council also has the power to hire and fire public servants of
all but the very highest ranks, and all government employees except
those in the judiciary and police are 'transferred' to the Council,
although it remains at the discretion of the government to recall
them. In theory, then, the Council enjoys considerable powers and
freedom to formulate its own development plans. Yet, just five years
after the enactment, the Council has lost almost all local support,
has managed to achieve little or no change in development policies,
and appears to be in disarray ideologically, politically and administratively.
Voices From Kargil
While Lehs Buddhist minority (in the State)
felt insecure about the Muslim-majority Valley dominating Ladakh,
the Shia Muslims of Kargil believed that Buddhist-majority Leh overshadowed
Kargils identity. The people of Kargil strongly resented the
Leh-centric conception of the Ladakh region, which, until the 1980s,
had all the district headquarters and central government offices.
Keeping in mind the religious affinity, close economic links and political
alignments with the Valley, Kargilis traditionally have identified
with the Kashmiri leadership, although they did not support the secessionist
movement in the Valley. The Centre is blamed for Kargils backwardness,
lack of an airport and discriminatory policies in recruitment to the
Ladakh Scouts. Compared to Leh, the political equations
are clearly reversed in Kargil.
That is precisely why the Kargil Muslims did not accept
an Autonomous Hill Council, although its leaders across the political
spectrum supported the idea in principle. Stressing that they
have not rejected the Autonomous Hill Council but only postponed the
decision until the turmoil in the Valley was resolved, Kargilis
did not wish to antagonise the Kashmiri leadership, respecting the
latters denouncement of an Autonomous Hill Council as amounting
to Kashmirs territorial disintegration. Many shared the
view that "Kashmiris have always stood by us
We owe it
to them."
Another complicating factor in this political equation
is injected by the Buddhist minority in the Zanskar area of the Kargil
district. A small Buddhist community of 18,000 in Zanskar feels neglected
and discriminated against by the Kargil Muslim-majority administration.
Their long-standing demands for a monastery, serai
and cremation ground in Kargil town are cited as examples. Kargil
leaders, on the other hand, are indignant about Zanskars demand
for a separate sub-hill council when they themselves have not accepted
an Autonomous Hill Council for Kargil district. Echoing the LBAs
arguments in Lehs context, they argue that the "minority
[Buddhists] must live according to the [Muslim] majoritys considerations
and support Kargils interests." This, however, did not deter the Zanskars
Buddhist Youth Association President, Tsewang Chostar, from sitting
on a dharna in May 1995
to demand a separate State Assembly constituency for Zanskar, because
it remains totally cut off from the rest for the State for eight months
in a year.
The Kargil Crisis
The present agitation, launched in June 2000 by Ladakhi
Buddhists, can, consequently, be seen as the revival of their long-standing
demand for direct administration from New Delhi. In the current context,
however, this movement also has far-reaching implications for India's
security, as well as for the political future of the State of J&K.
After a gap of nearly forty years since the Chinese aggression in
1962, the Kargil crisis in May 1999 once again brought home the political
and strategic significance of the Ladakh region.
Kargil is the only sector on the Line of Control where
the Pakistan Army enjoys the advantage of higher positions. In capturing
the heights at Dras, Kargil and Batalik, Pakistan's military planners
had exposed the Achille's heel of the Indian Army, catching the latter
napping in a strategically important area. Pakistan's scheme sought
to establish dominance over the captured high ridges, so that the
Indian army would find it impossible to dislodge it, and would consequently
acquiesce to the loss of territory just as Pakistan did to the seizure
of Siachen Glacier in 1984. However, the Atal Behari Vajpayee government's
decision to unleash the Air Force and bombard enemy posts in Kargil
and, the Indian military victories on the ground in the recapture
of the Tololing heights, followed by the strategically important Tiger
Hill in the Dras sector and Jubar Hill in the Batalik sector, backed
by international pressure, forced Pakistan to withdraw its troops.
While the intruders were thrown out of Indian territory,
Pakistan has succeeded in turning Kashmir into India's festering wound.
The cost of manning the Kargil border alone has been estimated at
Rs. 18 billion a year. That is a huge drain on the exchequer, even
higher than the defence of Siachen. More importantly, there were indications
that Pakistan was trying to extend its proxy war through infiltration
and dumping of arms and ammunition in the hitherto 'clean' Ladakh
region. In the 'first ever arms seizure' in this region, Leh police
seized a large cache of sophisticated arms and ammunition, including
25 AK-47 and-56 rifles, one LMG, one MMG, plastic explosives, one
rocket launcher, three rockets, fifteen hand grenades, three batteries,
fuse wire and a sniper rifle, and arrested 24 people from the border
villages of Thang, Tyakshi, Pachathang and Turtuk. They also discovered
that several young men of the border villages had been crossing, over
several weeks, to Skardu in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) for arms
training. On their return, many infiltrated the armed forces as well
as civilian agencies. For instance, the Leh police arrested two constables
Mohammad Ali and Ahmed Shah from Thang village. Significantly,
Ibrahim, an undercover agent working for the Intelligence Bureau (IB),
had switched sides and turned out to be the major conduit for arms
and ammunition dumped in the upper-Ladakh region to foment insurgency.
The local Shia Muslim population of Kargil district,
though sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause, had generally refrained
from joining the ranks of the militants. Nevertheless, the massive
scale and an uncanny accuracy of the Pakistani artillery shelling
that resulted in the destruction of an ammunition depot worth Rs.
One billion and a television tower, followed by the shelling of the
district and military administration headquarters in the nearby Baru
area, led the security forces to suspect that Pakistani artillery
was being directed from the Kargil area by an enemy agent with a high
frequency wireless set. The Indian Army's recovery of Indian cement
bags (purchased from Dras for casting slabs to fortify bunkers), receipts
of payments made to a mason in Dras and the Pakistan Army's 'out-passes'
to Srinagar from the intruders' bunkers in Dras, also indicated a
possible and substantial collusion between some local citizens and
Pakistani intruders.
With a continuing battle raging in the highest and
most inhospitable terrain in Siachin and Pakistan opening a new military
front in Kargil, the military and strategic significance of the Ladakh
region cannot be over-stated. While the Indian Army has launched a
drive to procure sophisticated military equipment for effective surveillance,
no borders can be secured without the support of the local populace.
Notably, both during the 1965 War and, according to some accounts,
the intrusions in Kargil, first reports of intrusions were received
from local shepherds. There is, clearly, a great deal of popular antipathy
to the Pakistani position in this region, and this needs to be consolidated.
The Indian Army has already initiated several steps in this direction.
A new Corps has been raised, and this will generate more employment
and give a boost to development activities in the areas across the
Zojila Pass. Ghulam Hassan Khan, the National Conference MP from Kargil,
pointed out, "till yesterday, the representation of Kargil (read
Muslim instead of Kargil) was not even one per cent in Ladakh Scouts,
ITBP, ITBF, SSB, Railways and nationalised banks because it was a
Congress decision to deny these rights to Kargil. Army's transport
contracts and vegetable supply orders would go to Leh 'come what may'."
The situation has now changed and, without prejudice, Khan does concede
that over 300 persons have been recruited from the area (community)
into these institutions in the post-Kargil days. "The SSB has
set up a unit in Kargil. Over 70 youth were recruited into the ITBP
and the Ladakh Scouts. The Army has given enough contracts to the
Kargil transporters for the first time in the history." The importance
of recruiting locals was realized at the time of Kargil crisis, when
the Indian Army required substantial numbers of soldiers and porters
who were well acclimatised and familiar with the mountainous terrain,
as also for translating the intercepts of infiltrators' communications
in the Pushto, Persian, Balti, Ladakhi and Skardu dialects of Kargili.
A more serious challenge, however,
is for the State and central governments to arrest the communalisation
of political processes in the Ladakh region. In this context, the
Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC) Report's recommendations subjecting
Ladakh to an undisguised communal cleaver needs to be
seriously reviewed. The Report recommended breaking up the mountainous
region into two new provinces consisting of just one district each
predominantly Buddhist Leh and predominantly Muslim Kargil.
Ladakh had already been sundered by its division into two districts
(Leh and Kargil) by Sheikh Abdullah in 1979, and Kargil had been excluded
from the Ladakh Autonomous Council set up in 1995. The transfiguration
of two districts into two provinces would serve only to sharpen communal
and ethnic boundaries.
The RAC Report has failed entirely
to provide a logical, cogent and uniform rationale for restructuring
the State into the eight proposed provinces, except a brief and sweeping
statement that "the prevailing classification of provinces/divisions
is hampering the process of social and human development and that
it was coming in the way of democratic participation at the grassroots
level within the state." Yet, the Report also recommends that
"the government may consider setting up of District Councils
as an alternative to the Regional/Provincial Councils." Such district councils were clearly irreconcilable
with the assertions of the preceding paragraph, since they would work
within the existing provincial arrangement. Also, while the Committee
rightly questioned the administrative inclusion of Ladakh into the
Kashmir region, it failed to rectify this anomaly by granting independent
provincial status to Ladakh.
It is also important to note that while the J&K
Legislative Assembly had unanimously passed an identically worded
State Act to replace the Autonomous Hill Council Act of the central
government in October 1997, Farooq Abdullah made it clear that the
measure was 'a temporary one'. The introduction of the Panchayati
Raj Act in J&K further complicates the issue. All this illustrates
the temporary and precarious nature of Leh's newly won autonomy. It
is the uncertainty of the political future of the Leh Hill Council
and the State Assembly's resolution adopting the State RAC's Report
without instituting political mechanisms for equitable sharing of
political power with the constituent regions of Jammu and Ladakh,
that provides the context for the revival of the LBA's demand for
Union Territory status. In a week-long stir in June 2000, LBA President
Tsering Samphel said "we (Ladakhis) have always been treated
with contempt, be it employment, education or infrastructure. The
only way out is to let Ladakh assume a Union Territory status." He threatened that, if this demand was not
met, "the Ladakhis
would seek the option of looking for
a mass asylum in some foreign country
but certainly not with
China which has ravaged our culture in Tibet
we would approach
the United Nations pleading to somehow protect our cultural identity". While Samphel reiterated that the LBA "would
continue to abide by the Buddhist religious codes even while taking
an agitational path", Goy Lobxang Nyantak, the youth-wing leader
of the LBA, sought to caution the state government as well as the
Centre that "the God-fearing folk of this region would be forced
to take up arms if their long-pending demand remained ignored
[and]
it will only be for the administration to blame if we happened to
resort to a warpath. It (violence) may appear anti-religious, but
the motive, nonetheless, is to protect our identity." While the demand for Union Territory status
enjoys support from across the political spectrum of the Congress
and the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) in the Leh district, its prospects
are not bright, since it is vehemently opposed by the Kargilis who
comprise nearly half the population of the region.
The best course available to the Farooq Abdullah government
is to strengthen the Leh Autonomous Hill Council (LAHC), especially
now, since Kargil is also seriously rethinking the idea of a development
council, an offer which they had turned down in 1995. There are three
main reasons in support of such a course of action. First, the funds
for the LAHC do not lapse. Second, the latter has the power of recruitment
as well as the power of postings at the local level. Third, development
has significant local participation. As Ghulam Hassan Khan, the National
Conference M.P from Kargil, put it, "when the Plan money will
come in September, we will have just a month or so for spending it,
unlike Leh where they would keep it in the account and spend it at
the proper time with interest." With a growing realisation of the significance
of an autonomous hill council, the people of Kargil are seriously
reconsidering the prospects of accepting the hill council offer, which
will help the district grow.
Conclusion
Prime Minister Vajpayee's decision
to initiate the peace process with Kashmiris by opening the doors
of dialogue to the Hurriyat Conference as well as the militant leadership
of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, within the larger framework of insaniyat, is a momentous step in the right direction. While this
is, no doubt, critical to bringing peace to the Valley, the coalition
government at the Centre, must not lose sight of the political aspirations
of the people of Ladakh and Jammu. The simmering passions of Ladakhis
must be creatively channelized into processes of political participation
and the development of the region. The peace process must encompass
a dialogue with all the people of the State because a just
and lasting peace in J&K can only be brought about by creating
a set of political mechanisms that provide a sense of belonging and
participation to all sub-national and sub-regional communities and
group identities.