Unmasking of Prabhakaran
Brig (Dr) S P Sinha (Retd)
In the recent history of
Sri Lanka Vellupillai Prabhakaran has become synonymous with the Sri
Lankan Tamils’ fight for independence. The transformation of Prabhakaran
from a popular insurgent leader to an acknowledged terrorist has been
tragic. He has come a long way since he gained notoriety for the assassination
of the Jaffna Mayor, Alfred Duraiappah on 27 July 1975. His name soon
acquired a ‘halo’. The cyanide pill, which the Tigers of the "Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE) carried hung around their neck, to
be swallowed rather than allow themselves to be taken prisoner, has
reinforced that image. The cyanide pill and the suicide bomber became
the defining emblem and the creed of the Tigers.
The unceremonious withdrawal
of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka in March 1990
before it could decisively tame the LTTE gave Prabhakaran an aura of
invincibility. The international media played up the failure of IPKF
to achieve a decisive victory over the LTTE despite its overwhelming
superiority in numbers and in the process, unwittingly perhaps, further
reinforced Prabhakaran’s image as a great insurgent leader. Political
and military leaders of both Sri Lanka and India have hailed him as
an accomplished guerrilla leader and a political strategist. Profiles
of Prabhakaran and the LTTE, the organisation created by him in his
own image, sketched by a cross section of political and military leaders
would draw attention to his mystique. Here are a few:
"Regardless of
the criticisms and prejudices that I may have about this young man,
I cannot help but acknowledge his deep idealism and his political and
military skills. His commitment to the creation of a Tamil Eelam, in
my judgement, is unalterable… Events over the years have shown him as
an accomplished political strategist and military tactician."
-- JN Dixit, India’s
former High Commissioner, in Sri
Lanka (April 1985 - April 1989) in
Assignment Colombo1
"In sum they (LTTE)
created the most fearsome militant group the world has ever seen with
each member possessing an extra-ordinary fanaticism. They have also
been eminently successful in maintaining an aura of mystery, which in
turn has nourished their mystique. This mystique was most evident in
the case of Vellupillai Prabhakaran who was the undisputed leader of
the LTTE.’’
-- Lt Gen Depinder Singh,
PVSM, VSM, Overall Force Commander,
Indian Peace Keeping Force (July
1987 – 29 February 1988) in IPKF
in Sri Lanka2
"I have a high
regard for the LTTE for its discipline, dedication, determination, motivation
and technical expertise; but find little justification in its senseless,
mulish, destructive insistence on continuation of military means in
the search of an honourable solution to the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka.’’
-- Maj Gen SC Sardeshpande,
UYSM, AVSM, General Officer Commanding
54 Inf Div (6 January 1988 – March
1990) in Assignment Jaffna3
"… I did not expect
anything else from the Tigers. It is the most ruthless and most effective
guerrilla organisation in the 20th
century. But that doesn’t mean we are
saying that they are useless, so we must kill them. So, we tried our
best keeping in mind that we were dealing with a merciless megalomaniac
who has killed every single person who has opposed him…"
-- Chandrika Kumaratunga
in an interview with Shekhar
Gupta, senior Editor, India Today,
15 May 19954
Prabhakaran is charismatic,
physically brave and his commitment to the cause of an independent Eelam
is beyond doubt. Although he would like to see himself as a leader of
not only Sri Lankan Tamils but also of Tamils in southern India, the
events of nearly two decades of civil strife have shown that he lacks
the political skill, temperament and flexibility of response to lead
the Sri Lankan Tamils out of the vortex of violence into which he has
led them. Over the years, his concern for his fellow Tamilians and the
goal of creating a just and free society have been overtaken by his
egotism to the extent that he now believes that he alone represents
the aspirations of all Tamils.
It is not intended
here to go into the racial history of Sri Lanka but merely to recapitulate
that by the end of the ‘70s the cumulative effect of discriminatory
policies of successive Sinhala majority governments had completely alienated
the Tamils. The ambush of an army patrol code-named "Four Four
Bravo" on 23 July 1983 by the LTTE near Tinneveli in which 13 Sri
Lankan soldiers were killed triggered the anti-Tamil riots in Colombo
and adjoining areas in which more than a thousand Tamils were killed.
The July riots turned the ethnic strife into an all-out civil war.
The escalation of violence
by the LTTE in the subsequent years forced the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)
to launch a massive offensive against the LTTE. Within a week of the
start of operation "Liberation" on 26 May 1987, the LTTE stronghold,
Vadamarachi, had fallen and the SLA was poised to launch its offensive
on Jaffna, which was averted due to India’s intervention. Prabhakaran,
with his back to the wall, reluctantly agreed to the Indo-Sri Lanka
Agreement, but he had no intention of implementing the accord. In an
ironical twist to the events, the IPKF, which was inducted into the
North and East of Sri Lanka to protect Tamil interests, ended up fighting
the LTTE. Prabhakaran then collaborated with Premadasa to compel India
to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka. After the withdrawal of IPKF in
March 1990, the LTTE was in virtual control of Jaffna Peninsula, most
of the Northern Province and some pockets in the East. This situation
lasted till Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected President in 1994, when
Prabhakaran rejected the devolution package offered by her and unilaterally
broke the ceasefire. Thereupon, the SLA launched a massive offensive
that resulted in the loss of Jaffna for the LTTE. In yet another reversal
of fortunes, the LTTE was to recapture the Elephant Pass in April 2000
and much of the land lost in the Northern Province. Since then the SLA
has consolidated its position in Jaffna Peninsula but the LTTE has carried
out some spectacular attacks in the heart of Colombo. In a daring attack
on the Katunayake Air Base and the adjoining Bandaranaike International
Airport on 24 July 2001, the LTTE destroyed 11 aircraft, which included
two Kfir bombers, two MI-17 helicopters, one MIG 27 fighter, three Chinese
K8 trainers and three Airbus planes. The loss virtually grounded the
Sri Lankan civilian airlines and its Air Force.
Most of the suicide
attacks on civilian targets by the LTTE has been in the Sinhalese majority
South, particularly the capital, Colombo. But the terrorist attacks
in the South have left Tamils living in the Sinhalese majority area
vulnerable to reprisals. In choosing the South for terrorist attacks,
Prabhakaran has shown that he is prepared to abandon the Tamil population
in the South, particularly the plantation Tamils, at the mercy of Sinhalese
marauders. So much for Prabhakaran’s commitment to the Tamil cause!
Tamil insurgency had
a popular cause in its early days but the clashes between the different
rival militant groups resulted in the destruction of Tamil Eelam Liberation
Organisation (TELO) and other smaller groups. In these clashes LTTE
cadres killed something like 800 cadres of TELO and other militant groups.
By mid 1980, Prabhakaran’s hegemony over Jaffna was complete. His advent
as the undisputed leader of the LTTE also marked a paradigm shift in
the level of violence against innocent civilians. In one of the first
acts of terrorism carried out by LTTE on 14 May 1985, 146 civilians,
mostly Buddhist monks, were killed in cold blood at Anuradhapura.5
In consequence, the moral authority of the Tamil campaign was forever
lost.
The cult of suicide
has attracted admiration for the LTTE even from some military leaders
of India and Sri Lanka. The willingness to swallow the cyanide pill
by the LTTE cadres has been seen as commitment to the Tamil cause. But
it is argued here that there is no difference between the followers
of a religious cult who willingly drink poison from a bowl on the prompting
of the cult leader and the "Tigers" of Prabhakaran who swallow
cyanide. Anna Brenchley eloquently describes the parallel thus:
"Sects are usually
hierarchical with a charismatic leader at the apex. His position is
maintained with absolute ruthlessness and he has total control over
all resources. There is no pretence of democracy. Brainwashing is continual
to ensure their continued dedication and results in members’ willingness
to sacrifice their lives, their children’s lives and all human decency
to the cause. The leader determines what the cause demands of them.
They acquiesce."6
What, then, is the
difference between followers of a religious cult who indulge in mass
suicide and the Tigers of LTTE?
LTTE is also known
for its suicide attacks. Known as Black Tigers, the suicide bombers
are a glorified lot. The glorification of Black Tigers is part of the
process of indoctrination and manipulation of their minds. A variety
of subterfuges are used to manipulate their minds. LTTE considers Prabhakaran
to be a demi-god and to meet him in person is considered a rare honour.
Prabhakaran has very carefully cultivated this image. Before the mission,
a Black Tiger eats his or her "Last Supper" with the leader,
which is considered the greatest honour. But for most independent observers
a sense of abhorrence to this whole drama is inescapable.
The choice of targets
for the suicide bomber reveals the mind of Prabhakaran. One of the first
targets of an LTTE human bomb using the suicide belt was Rajiv Gandhi,
who was assassinated by LTTE suicide bomber Dhanu, flowers in her hair
and all decked up, at Sriperumbudur on 21 May 1991. Rajiv Gandhi more
than any Indian leader, was sympathetic to the legitimate demands of
Sri Lankan Tamils and helped them in their fight to win a place of equality.
And yet, he was assassinated on the eve of Lok Sabha elections in 1991,
because Prabhakaran feared that Rajiv would not be favourably disposed
towards him and the cause of an independent Eelam. Similarly, on the
eve of the 1994 Sri Lankan election, the LTTE assassinated UNP presidential
candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, for fear that a government under him
would receive Indian assistance. Prabhakaran did not hesitate to order
the elimination of Premadasa, with whom he had collaborated to force
the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka. The incumbent Sri Lankan President,
Chandrika Kumaratunga had the good fortune to have survived an attempt
on her life in another perfidious act by an LTTE suicide bomber. Ironically,
Chandrika, amongst the Sri Lankan politicians has shown the greatest
sensitivity to Tamil aspirations.
The LTTE suicide bomber
is motivated by many factors. It will be too simplistic to assume that
motivation comes primarily from commitment to the cause and loyalty
to Prabhakaran. In the last two decades, death and destruction have
ravaged Tamil society. A whole generation of young Tamils have been
scarred by the brutalities of the Sri Lankan security forces on the
one hand, and the fascism of Prabhakaran on the other. Caught as they
are between the devil and the deep sea, many young Tamils see self-destruction
as a form of revenge and martyrdom.
It is not that Prabhakaran
is intolerant of political opponents only; he is equally intolerant
and suspicious of his own comrades. Anyone whose loyalty to him is even
remotely suspect is instantaneously eliminated. The killing of Mahatya,
for long his second-in-command, is an example.
It has been argued that
Prabhakaran is the sole representative of Sri Lankan Tamils. All major
Tamil parties and groups under the banner of Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) openly backed candidates approved by the Tigers in the parliamentary
elections held in December 2001. But the University Teachers Human Right
(UTHR), a respected and independent group of Tamil academics, formerly
of Jaffna University had this to say:7
"The taming of TULF
(Tamil Eelam Liberation Front) has an abject lesson in terror tactics
of LTTE. One cannot play safe with the LTTE. The TULF Members of Parliament
killed by the LTTE thought themselves to be playing safe. They all but
acknowledged its totalitarian claim, never criticised it publicly and
remained obligingly silent when LTTE killers one by one picked off their
own colleagues.8
People are thus driven to be cautious to the point of not risking doing
anything that may be taken amiss by the LTTE. It is a degree of terror
the State cannot match."
The terrorist attack
in the USA on 11 September 2001 by the Al Qaida network of Osama bin
Laden that killed nearly 3,900 people and the consequent international
campaign against terrorism has compelled Prabhakaran to moderate his
style and rhetoric. His recent assertion that the Tamil struggle is
"neither separatism nor terrorism" is only a clever ploy to
gain international sympathy. The hardening of world opinion has forced
Prabhakaran to revise his strategy. The present truce between the LTTE
and the Sri Lankan government has been forced on him by the countries
like the US, the UK, Canada and Australia turning the financial screws
on the LTTE. That the LTTE would be unable to continue its terror in
Sri Lanka without the financial support collected via transnational
regions is quite obvious.
While killings by LTTE
are presently finely targeted to kill or paralyse by fear any person
or group showing signs of independence, it has found newer ways to consolidate
and expand the gains made by terror. Dr Rajini Thiranegama, a senior
lecturer in Jaffna University and a founder member of UTHR, later believed
to be murdered by the LTTE, had this to say about the LTTE:
"The LTTE religion
is hierarchical. The common man counted for little except as devotees.
Militants from other groups, whatever their contribution, were counted
as animals or anti-social elements. Only the LTTE could make sacrifices,
be counted as martyrs and become gods. One should not underestimate
such a religion which has a semblance to the official religion of the
Third Reich."
There is optimism in
the Sri Lankan government circles over the latest truce and the Memorandum
of Understanding the Tigers signed with it in February 2002 as a part
of the peace process brokered by Norway. In the backdrop of past experience
of negotiating with the Tigers, Wickremasinghe is taking a huge risk
in trusting Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran had no faith in the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord of 1987 and he had made up his mind to sabotage it even before
the negotiations were concluded. The rest is history. The LTTE entered
into negotiations with Premadasa with the sole purpose of getting the
IPKF out of Sri Lanka but the honeymoon between the two lasted only
till the IPKF was pulled out from the island. Premadasa was assassinated
by the LTTE after he had served its purpose. Chandrika Kumaratunga would
have met the same fate except that she survived the assassination attempt.
Many analysts have cited
the example of the Oslo peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians
as a way ahead in resolving the Sri Lankan crisis. But where is the
Oslo peace plan today? Writing in an article, "The J&K Peace
Process: Chasing the Chimera" KPS Gill and Ajai Sahni observe,
"Despite popular contemporary rhetoric, unfortunately a sentiment
in favour of peace is insufficient foundation for an effective process
to secure peace. In a context where even a single player considers violence
a legitimate instrument of policy, the resolution of disputes demands
for firmer grounding in facts and the Oslo peace process was as divorced
from such a foundation as could be conceivable.9"
In the context of ethnic war in Sri Lanka, Prabhakaran has not given
up violence as a legitimate means to achieve his goal of an independent
Eelam. The past record of negotiations between the LTTE and the Government
of Sri Lanka leads one to conclude that the Memorandum of Understanding
signed in February this year is only a clever ploy by Prabhakaran to
bid for time and gain international recognition. He also knows that
public memory is short and hopes that the indignation of the Western
countries over the 11 September terrorist attack would peter out sooner
than later.
Notes
1. Dixit JN, 1998;
Assignment Colombo; p 320, New Delhi, Konark
2. Singh, Depinder
(Lt Gen); The IPKF in Sri Lanka; p 121, NOIDA, Trishul Publications
3. Sardeshpande
SC (Lt Gen), 1992, Assignment Jaffna, p IX, New Delhi, Lancers
4. Chandrika Kumaratunga;
In an interview with Shekhar Gupta; India Today, New Delhi
15 May 1995
5. Narayan Swamy
MR; 1994, Tigers of Sri Lanka: Boys to Guerrillas; p 223,
New Delhi, Konark
6. See review article
of Adele Balasingham’s book Women Fighters in Liberation Tigers
by Anna Brenchely titled Lady Macbeth in the Jungles of Eelam;
Frontline (Chennai); Feb 23, 1996
7. Excerpts from
the information Bulletin No 28 of UTHR (Jaffna) published in the
newspaper The Island, Colombo, 2 Feb 2002
8. The reference
is to the killing of Amrithalingam and Yogeshwaran in cold blood
on 13 Jul 1989 in Colombo
9. KPS Gill and
Ajai Sahni; The J&K Peace Process: Chasing the Chimera; Faultline;
Writings on Conflict and Resolution, Vol. 8, Apr 2001, Bulwark
Books, New Delhi
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