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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 38, April 4, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Bus-ride to Uncertainty
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
On March 30, four Jehadi groups gave a call for a
general strike in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on April 7 when
the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service is to be flagged off
by Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and warned that people
boarding it would be branded 'traitors'. "We humbly request
the persons selected to travel on first and second bus to
Muzaffarabad not to enter the coffin (bus) but if they do,
they will find their names in the list of traitors," the
little-known Al-Nasireen, Save Kashmir Movement, Farzandan-e-Millat
and Al-Arifeen said in a joint statement faxed to the local
media. The statement, while describing the bus service as
a "deadly weapon that India wants to use against the jehadi
forces", was accompanied by the list of 40 persons, complete
with residential addresses and application form numbers,
selected to travel on the inaugural bus journey.
Meanwhile,
before the trans-Line of Control bus is flagged off, a marginal
increase in violence has been visible in the State after
a relatively peaceful winter. As the deadline to the journey
approaches, attacks on civilians and security force (SF)
targets have seen an increase in the last two weeks.
Between February 16, 2005, when the two countries announced
the commencement of the bus service, and March 31, a total
of 153 people, including 54 civilians and 13 SF personnel,
have died in J&K. Of these, 24 civilians were killed in
terrorist attacks across the State in the week of March
24-31 alone. On March 31, in what is being seen as a specific
threat to the bus service, the Border Security Force (BSF)
recovered 117 kilograms of powerful explosives hidden in
four scooters on the route. The four explosive-laden vehicles
were recovered on the Arampur-Srinagar and Arampur-Highgam
roads on the Srinagar-Baramulla Highway. Khalid Hussain,
a former Deputy Commissioner of J&K, and his wife, who are
passengers, disclosed on April 1 that "We have received
threatening calls from terror outfit Al-Nasireen. The militant
outfit has threatened us not to travel to Muzaffarabad and
meet relatives." Passenger safety, evidently, is bound to
be paramount for both countries.
While security forces have taken over the Baramulla-Uri
road and installed additional check points on the 45 km
stretch to prevent any terrorist attack on the bus, the
security grid across the State has been tightened in the
light of possible attacks on vital and sensitive installations.
The Army has also cleared landmines along the approximately
six kilometer Uri-Muzaffarabad stretch in J&K till the last
Indian post - the Kaman Post - to ensure that the bus service
rolls out. Terrorist groups could, however, still subvert
the peace process through a spectacular act of terror in
J&K or elsewhere in India. Hard-line separatists in the
State, such as the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat led by Syed Ali Shah
Geelani, have also been quick to reject the bus service
as a sop that avoids the real issue of the territory's status.
The Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus would link up the troubled
Indian province with the area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir
(PoK) referred to as 'Azad Kashmir' - seven districts with
their capital at Muzaffarabad - but excluding the Northern
Areas which were also part of the undivided pre-Partition
principality of Jammu & Kashmir. 'Azad Kashmir' is an area
comprising 13,297 square kilometers, with a population of
about 3.271million. Ironically, there are few Kashmiris
left in 'Azad Kashmir' - 85.4 per cent of residents are
'Punjabi-speaking', while there are substantial numbers
from other Pakistani provinces, significantly including
Pathans from the North West, and only a small population
of ethnic Kashmiris (105,000 in 1993, or 3.21 percent, according
to one source in 'Azad Kashmir'). While authoritative data
is not available on the extent of the systematic 'ethnic
flooding' of the area, reports indicate that the expropriation
of land and residency rights in PoK has been in sharp contrast
to the situation in J&K, where provisions of the Indian
Constitution disallow non-Kashmiris from acquiring property.
'Azad Kashmir' has also provided the base camp for the jehad
in J&K ever since the dramatic escalation of militancy in
1989. Many Pakistan-based jehadi groups are headquartered
in Muzaffarabad or have 'camp offices' in the area. Sources
indicate that, as of January 2005, there were at least 36
jehadi training camps in PoK, housing approximately
3,660 cadre, with a majority of these located in the Muzaffarabad
and Kotli districts. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
maintains, among others, the Danna and Abdul-Bin-Masud camps
in Muzaffarabad and Badli camp in Kotli with almost 500,
300 and 300 jehadis respectively. Similarly, the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
has, among others, the Jangal Mangal camp in Muzaffarabad
and another at Mangla with at least 300 cadres each. On
December 10, 2004, Shazia Ghulam Din, the daughter-in-law
of the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF)
founder, Maqbool Bhatt, told Indian journalists visiting
Muzaffarabad that Pakistan continues to maintain militant
camps in PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan. "The Pakistani establishment
has merged several of these camps and moved them away in
the periphery of Muzaffarabad and other areas in PoK," Ghulam
Din disclosed. She also noted that the presence of foreign
mercenaries in PoK had created major social problems for
the locals, and hoped that the world community would come
to know about the real situation once the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad
bus service was launched. "Life in PoK is worse than death,"
she declared, claiming that the Kashmiri culture and secular
ethos had suffered "constant degradation" due to the presence
of foreign mercenaries.
On both sides of the LoC, terrorist groups and hard-line
separatists, in radical contrast to its overwhelming popularity
among the general Kashmiri populace, have opposed the bus
service, claiming that the 'core issue' of Kashmir would
be eclipsed, and that such measures would only help India
ultimately transform the LoC into a permanent border. While
the jehadis insist that the bus would be "detrimental
to our freedom struggle", the resumption of the road link
between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad for the first time since
1947 is widely seen as a 'people-centric measure' or what
D. P. Dhar, a former Home Minister of J&K, described in
1966 a measure for the "emotional enlistment" of the people.
The jehadis, on the other hand, state unequivocally
that solutions to the Kashmir issue have to be territorial
or land-centric. The bus, consequently, is of no significance
to them, since the Kashmir issue has to be resolved on their
terms, which essentially require a merger of the whole of
Kashmir with Pakistan. Thus the 'Supreme Commander' of the
HM and chairman of the Muzaffarabad-based United Jehad Council
(UJC),
Syed Salahuddin, ridiculed the bus service stating, "Neither
can it hoodwink the world community nor the Kashmiris."
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, chief of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the parent
organisation of the LeT, similarly remarked that initiatives
such as welcoming cultural delegations and starting bus
services could not put an end to 'the mountain of enmity
between India and Pakistan'. And in Srinagar, separatist
leader Geelani asserted: "We have not given the sacrifice
of a lakh (hundred thousand) people for a bus service,
but for the right to self-determination." The fear among
terrorist groups and separatists like Geelani is that such
measures would gradually obliterate their constituencies
and radically undermine the course of the Kashmir jehad,
and disrupting the bus service has emerged as a critical
extremist objective over the past weeks.
The concern that increasing people-to-people contacts could
dilute the 'core issue' of Kashmir in the long run has also
been underscored by others in Pakistan, and General Musharraf
has found it necessary to reiterate, on March 23, that confidence
building measures (CBMs) between the two countries would
not succeed and would, indeed, loose credibility if the
'core issue' of Kashmir was not settled. During his address
at the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad, the President welcomed
the bus service, but made it clear that it was not a solution
to the Kashmir problem. And, while replying to an e-mail
sent by an Indian to his (Musharraf's) website asking his
views on the reunification of India and Pakistan as well
as his 'silence' on the Kargil war, the President held out
a veiled threat: "What is the future? Resolve disputes so
that Siachens, Kargil, Marpola and Chorbatla don't happen
again. Let us resolve Kashmir first and then I am sure it
won't happen again."
One of the Pakistani military regime's major apprehensions
is that allowing people from the Indian side to see the
ground realities in 'Azad Kashmir', a jehadised area
with little evidence of the culture and identity that underlies
their collective consciousness, and where the most basic
rights and amenities are lacking, could result in a dramatic
reassessment of the secessionist quest. The deepening of
non-official linkages between Indian and Pakistani controlled
Kashmir contains inherent risks that Pakistan may lose control
over the anti-India forces in Kashmir, once narratives from
'Azad Kashmir' become part of the open source discourse
on both sides of the border. Pakistan's decision to forbid
politicians from J&K to travel on the inaugural bus reflects
precisely such anxieties. Already, feedback in Islamabad
from recent people-to-people exchanges, including the visit
by journalists, has reportedly indicated that the pro-Pakistan
constituency in Kashmir is much smaller than had been imagined,
a perception that Pakistan's military establishment would
like to reverse.
It must remain clear, however, that steps such as the bus
service, the current cricket-series bonhomie and CBMs in
general, while they may, over time, strengthen processes
of 'emotional enlistment', do not, in any measure, alter
India's and Pakistan's stated positions on the Kashmir issue.
In that sense, they will do little to change the fundamentals
of the conflict in and over Kashmir, which can easily escalate
again if any of the extremist players - or their primary
state sponsor - recovers the capabilities of disruption
or the impunity that they operated under before 9/11.
Nagaland:
Brothers in Blood
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
The National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM)
simply refuses to stay out of the headlines, whether it
is for its peace negotiations with the Union Government
or the internecine clashes with its bete noire, the
NSCN's Khaplang faction (NSCN-K).
On March 24, a total of 10 militants belonging to both the
factions were killed when the IM faction led siege to a
Khaplang camp in Zunheboto district. On March 26, a NSCN-K
cadre was killed near Suruhoto as the NSCN-IM group ambushed
a group of four returning from the nearby Zunheboto town.
Again, on March 29, four Khaplang cadres were killed as
both factions clashed in the Tuensang District's Yakor village.
Already, 21 militants belonging to both factions have been
killed in the current year in Nagaland, 19 of them in the
month of March alone.
Violence
by the Naga groups is also overflowing into neighbouring
Manipur, a substantial part of which is claimed by the NSCN-IM
for its grandiose Nagalim - the proposed unified territory
of areas claimed by the Naga rebels as theirs. On March
25, the NSCN-IM cadres fought with the United National Liberation
Front (UNLF)
in the Ukhrul District's Yangnom area. Two NSCN-IM militants
were killed and another injured in the clash. The UNLF even
charged that the NSCN-IM was helped in this attack by Assam
Rifles (AR) troops posted at nearby Kasom Khullen, a charge,
which has been denied by AR sources. Similar clashes between
the two groups had taken place earlier in the year in the
Tousem sub-division of Tamenglong District in Manipur.
Other than the sudden spike in killings, these are, at best,
routine clashes between the two rival factions, who have
been at war since the night of April 30, 1988, when the
unified NSCN split into two. Both the factions, divided
mostly along tribal loyalties, have signed individual ceasefire
agreements with the Union Government (the NSCN-IM in 1997
and the NSCN-K in 2001), but area domination exercise as
well as efforts to control the abundant finances derived
through extortion have led to frequent skirmishes between
them. Several attempts at reconciliation from various quarters
have ended in failure.
After these long years of confrontation, the NSCN-K, like
the Naga National Council (NNC), the first instigator of
Naga secessionism, appears to be a sinking outfit. Even
four years after its ceasefire agreement, it has not held
a single round of negotiations with the Government. With
the present warming up of ties between India and Myanmar,
the group has come under increased pressure, since most
of its cadres and camps are located in the Sagaing region
of Myanmar. The Myanmarese Army has launched several military
operations against the group in recent past, leading to,
according to the outfit's own admission, a critical loss
of both men and material. Within Nagaland, the Khaplang
group's activity has been enormously circumscribed, limiting
its influence to just three districts: Mon, Tuensang and
Zunheboto. Its domination of the Tirap and Changlang districts
of Arunachal Pradesh has also been ended, as the NSCN-IM
has successfully consolidated its hold on these districts
over the past three years.
Over time, the IM group, which appears to be receiving support
from a seemingly accommodating Democratic Alliance of Nagaland
(DAN) State Government, has been able to outwit and often
browbeat its opponents to submission. This holds true both
for the 'civil society' in the State, most of which now
echoes the IM's position, as well as for the rival armed
factions. The IM faction now dominates at least six of the
State's eleven districts, and has been able to project itself
as the most influential entity in the State. Thus far, it
has also succeeded in preventing the Government in New Delhi
from starting negotiations with the other rebel factions,
the NSCN-K and the NNC, in spite of continuous demands for
such talks.
New Delhi has been accused of acting as a mute spectator
to the recent internecine clashes. One report in the Indian
Express on the NSCN-IM's overrunning of the Khaplang
camp in Suruhoto thus noted: "Despite the fact that three
companies of Assam Rifles and one company of Nagaland Armed
Police were present on the spot, the State and the Central
government chose to look the other way." The State Government
and its Sub-committee for Peace have done little beyond
issuing the customary appeal for peace.
The Sumi Hoho, the apex body of the Sumi (Sema) tribe, which
dominates the district of Zunheboto, has also alleged that
the security forces have turned a blind eye to the recent
clashes. On March 28, Sumi Hoho President H.S. Rotokha accused
the Centre of playing a game of divide and rule by allowing
the factions to fight. He alleged that the Centre's Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (CMG) had been informed about the imminent
clashes on March 10, but did not take any action to prevent
the violence. The Chairman of the CMG in Dimapur, Lt Gen.
(Retd.) R.V. Kulkarni, was reported to be out of the State,
as violence persisted. Similarly, the Konyak Union, the
apex body of the Konyak Nagas, in its statement on March
30, questioned the Nagaland Chief Minister, Neiphiu Rio's
claim that the law and order situation in the State was
satisfactory, arguing that since both factions of the NSCN
were flouting the ceasefire rules, there was a 'total failure
of law and order'.
Indeed, the continuous succession of clashes between the
NSCN-IM and NSCN-K has made a mockery of the ceasefire arrangement
and its paraphernalia, such as the CMG, designated camps
for the militants, and various 'ground rules' of conduct
that the armed groups openly flout. According to the terms
of the Ceasefire, it is binding on the militant groups to
confine their armed cadres to their designated camps. However,
past instances have proved that cadres have not only moved
out of the camps regularly, but have also engaged in activities
such as extortion, attacks on each other and also on civilians.
The sight of NSCN cadres in uniform and bearing arms is
not uncommon in Nagaland's forests and countryside.
Public resentment is now increasingly visible. Nearly 8,000
of Zunheboto's residents marched in a protest rally on March
28, 2005, calling for the removal of designated camps of
both the factions (NSCN-K camps at Suruhoto and NSCN-IM
camp at Ghatashi) from, and restoration of peace in, the
District. They also protested against the security forces'
failure to prevent the clashes despite previous warnings.
A few days earlier, the women of the district had staged
a 'torchlight march' to protest against the recurring factional
clashes in the area.
The IM group has sought to justify the spate of violence
as a consequence of the Khaplang group's frustration at
not being included in the negotiation process. The IM's
'Deputy Kilonser' (minister) for information and publicity,
Kraibo Chawang, was quoted as having stated, on March 29:
"The peace process has entered a very crucial phase now
and the Khaplang group does not want it to succeed. Till
these anti-national elements are there, this will go on."
In another statement on March 30, the IM faction's ministry
of information and publicity declared: "The mandate and
aspirations of the Naga people must be defended at all cost.
We cannot allow this propitious moment (to be) abandoned
and let the nation perish because of a few disgruntled and
desperadoes (sic)."
The Khaplang faction, on the other hand, suggests that the
violence is linked to the IM's 'desperation' over the fact
that the peace talks were not going anywhere. Khaplang leader
Kughalo Mulatonu thus stated on March 24: "The NSCN-IM cadres
are getting increasingly restive and desperate as peace
talks with New Delhi have almost fizzled out and deadlocked".
The Khaplang leadership has also sought to belittle the
ongoing talks by highlighting the absence of the IM 'Chairman',
Isak Swu, from New Delhi. Sepchrem Sangtam, 'deputy minister'
in charge of information and publicity of the NSCN-K said
on March 30, that Isak Chisi Swu had distanced himself from
the talks and Thuingaleng Muivah, 'General Secretary', alone
had participated. Thus, he claimed, the talks were between
the Tangkhul tribe (to which Muivah belongs) and the Indian
Government, and the Nagas were not involved.
With no signs of any basic transformation in the ground
situation, and reports of an elaborate 'itinerary of violence'
drafted by the NSCN-IM, there is reason to believe that
the State will have to brace itself for more violence over
the coming months. Reports quoting NSCN-IM leaders indicate
that the group now plans to attack the Khaplang faction's
ceasefire supervisory board office in Mon town. The IM faction
alleges that the office, which has earlier been attacked
on March 12, was set up on a plot of land that belongs to
Tongmeth Wangnao, a leader of the Khaplang faction who,
since 2003, has changed his loyalties and joined the IM
group. The IM group thus now has a 'benign responsibility'
of expelling the Khaplang faction from the private property
of an 'insider'. In many ways, this reflects the larger
character of militancy in Nagaland, as militant factions
manage to hold the State and its people to ransom over factional
feuds and petty quarrels over private property.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
March
28-April 3, 2005
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
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INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
13
|
3
|
19
|
35
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
1
|
3
|
8
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
Tripura
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
19
|
4
|
31
|
54
|
NEPAL
|
4
|
4
|
26
|
34
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
SRI LANKA
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
India and Bangladesh to
set up new boundary pillars: Bangladesh
and India have reportedly agreed to set up new boundary pillars,
to restore the damaged ones, and resolve amicably the disputes
over illegally-occupied lands along the border. According
to Bangladesh officials, an accord was reached after a three-day
joint border survey in the Tentulia and Sadar sub-districts
concluded on April 3, 2005. "Now, Bangladesh and India are
conducting a survey to resolve the disputes. After finalising
the survey report, the construction and repairing of border
pillars will start," said the joint survey team. The eight-member
team, comprising four members each from both countries, has
been carrying out the survey on the Mohananda river in Tentulia
and Korotoa in Sadar. While the Indian side was led by G.C.
Boiragi, Director, Survey of India, the Bangladesh team was
led by the Director-General of Land Record and Survey, Mohammad
Abu Haider Sarder. The
Hindu, April 4, 2005.
INDIA
Four terrorist groups threaten
to disrupt Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service: On March 30,
2005, four terrorist groups warned the people against traveling
by the April 7 inaugural Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus while describing
it as a 'coffin'. They also called for a complete strike on
April 7, when the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, is scheduled
to flag off the cross border bus. In a joint statement faxed
to newspaper offices by the Al-Arifeen, Al-Nasireen, Farzandan-e-Millat
and Save Kashmir Movement in Srinagar, the groups said that
the bus was "in no way in the interest of Kashmir's freedom
struggle" and warned people against traveling on the same. The
statement claimed that the decision was taken after "an extraordinary
meeting" of the heads of four groups in Srinagar. "It is a friendly
advice to passengers that they should not board this coffin
to Muzaffarabad," the statement further said. The
Hindu, March 31, 2005.
Six NSCN militants killed during internecine clashes in Nagaland:
On March 29, 2005, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak
Muivah (NSCN-IM)
reportedly killed four cadres of the rival Khaplang faction
(NSCN-K)
during an internecine clash at Yakor village in the Tuensang
district of Nagaland. Two days earlier, the NSCN-IM cadres attacked
a camp of the NSCN-K in the Zunheboto district and two militants,
one each belonging to both the outfits, were reported to have
died in the resultant clash. Telegraph
India, March 30, 2005.
NEPAL
Country-wide
Maoist strike affects normal life: A strike called by the
Maoist
insurgents is reported to have severely affected
normal life in most parts of Nepal for a second day on April 4,
2005, even as the troops escorted vehicles to prevent fresh insurgent
attacks. The insurgents called the 11-day strike on April 3 to
protest against King Gyanendra's seizure of power on February
1 and the subsequent arrests of political leaders and suspension
of civil rights. According to Reuters, the countryside
remained closed in response to the strike call. While traffic
was thin on major highways connecting the capital Kathmandu with
outside districts, security escorts, combined with air patrols,
rescued a number of passenger buses and cargo trucks stranded
on these highways despite the blockade, claimed Army sources.
The strike is reported to have had little affect in the capital,
Kathmandu. Daily
Times, April 4, 2005; PTI,
April 3, 2005.
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