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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 38, April 4, 2005

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

 

INDIA
PAKISTAN

A Bus-ride to Uncertainty
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

On March 30, four Jehadi groups gave a call for a general strike in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on April 7 when the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service is to be flagged off by Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and warned that people boarding it would be branded 'traitors'. "We humbly request the persons selected to travel on first and second bus to Muzaffarabad not to enter the coffin (bus) but if they do, they will find their names in the list of traitors," the little-known Al-Nasireen, Save Kashmir Movement, Farzandan-e-Millat and Al-Arifeen said in a joint statement faxed to the local media. The statement, while describing the bus service as a "deadly weapon that India wants to use against the jehadi forces", was accompanied by the list of 40 persons, complete with residential addresses and application form numbers, selected to travel on the inaugural bus journey.

Meanwhile, before the trans-Line of Control bus is flagged off, a marginal increase in violence has been visible in the State after a relatively peaceful winter. As the deadline to the journey approaches, attacks on civilians and security force (SF) targets have seen an increase in the last two weeks.

Between February 16, 2005, when the two countries announced the commencement of the bus service, and March 31, a total of 153 people, including 54 civilians and 13 SF personnel, have died in J&K. Of these, 24 civilians were killed in terrorist attacks across the State in the week of March 24-31 alone. On March 31, in what is being seen as a specific threat to the bus service, the Border Security Force (BSF) recovered 117 kilograms of powerful explosives hidden in four scooters on the route. The four explosive-laden vehicles were recovered on the Arampur-Srinagar and Arampur-Highgam roads on the Srinagar-Baramulla Highway. Khalid Hussain, a former Deputy Commissioner of J&K, and his wife, who are passengers, disclosed on April 1 that "We have received threatening calls from terror outfit Al-Nasireen. The militant outfit has threatened us not to travel to Muzaffarabad and meet relatives." Passenger safety, evidently, is bound to be paramount for both countries.

While security forces have taken over the Baramulla-Uri road and installed additional check points on the 45 km stretch to prevent any terrorist attack on the bus, the security grid across the State has been tightened in the light of possible attacks on vital and sensitive installations. The Army has also cleared landmines along the approximately six kilometer Uri-Muzaffarabad stretch in J&K till the last Indian post - the Kaman Post - to ensure that the bus service rolls out. Terrorist groups could, however, still subvert the peace process through a spectacular act of terror in J&K or elsewhere in India. Hard-line separatists in the State, such as the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, have also been quick to reject the bus service as a sop that avoids the real issue of the territory's status.

The Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus would link up the troubled Indian province with the area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) referred to as 'Azad Kashmir' - seven districts with their capital at Muzaffarabad - but excluding the Northern Areas which were also part of the undivided pre-Partition principality of Jammu & Kashmir. 'Azad Kashmir' is an area comprising 13,297 square kilometers, with a population of about 3.271million. Ironically, there are few Kashmiris left in 'Azad Kashmir' - 85.4 per cent of residents are 'Punjabi-speaking', while there are substantial numbers from other Pakistani provinces, significantly including Pathans from the North West, and only a small population of ethnic Kashmiris (105,000 in 1993, or 3.21 percent, according to one source in 'Azad Kashmir'). While authoritative data is not available on the extent of the systematic 'ethnic flooding' of the area, reports indicate that the expropriation of land and residency rights in PoK has been in sharp contrast to the situation in J&K, where provisions of the Indian Constitution disallow non-Kashmiris from acquiring property.

'Azad Kashmir' has also provided the base camp for the jehad in J&K ever since the dramatic escalation of militancy in 1989. Many Pakistan-based jehadi groups are headquartered in Muzaffarabad or have 'camp offices' in the area. Sources indicate that, as of January 2005, there were at least 36 jehadi training camps in PoK, housing approximately 3,660 cadre, with a majority of these located in the Muzaffarabad and Kotli districts. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) maintains, among others, the Danna and Abdul-Bin-Masud camps in Muzaffarabad and Badli camp in Kotli with almost 500, 300 and 300 jehadis respectively. Similarly, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) has, among others, the Jangal Mangal camp in Muzaffarabad and another at Mangla with at least 300 cadres each. On December 10, 2004, Shazia Ghulam Din, the daughter-in-law of the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF) founder, Maqbool Bhatt, told Indian journalists visiting Muzaffarabad that Pakistan continues to maintain militant camps in PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan. "The Pakistani establishment has merged several of these camps and moved them away in the periphery of Muzaffarabad and other areas in PoK," Ghulam Din disclosed. She also noted that the presence of foreign mercenaries in PoK had created major social problems for the locals, and hoped that the world community would come to know about the real situation once the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was launched. "Life in PoK is worse than death," she declared, claiming that the Kashmiri culture and secular ethos had suffered "constant degradation" due to the presence of foreign mercenaries.

On both sides of the LoC, terrorist groups and hard-line separatists, in radical contrast to its overwhelming popularity among the general Kashmiri populace, have opposed the bus service, claiming that the 'core issue' of Kashmir would be eclipsed, and that such measures would only help India ultimately transform the LoC into a permanent border. While the jehadis insist that the bus would be "detrimental to our freedom struggle", the resumption of the road link between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad for the first time since 1947 is widely seen as a 'people-centric measure' or what D. P. Dhar, a former Home Minister of J&K, described in 1966 a measure for the "emotional enlistment" of the people.

The jehadis, on the other hand, state unequivocally that solutions to the Kashmir issue have to be territorial or land-centric. The bus, consequently, is of no significance to them, since the Kashmir issue has to be resolved on their terms, which essentially require a merger of the whole of Kashmir with Pakistan. Thus the 'Supreme Commander' of the HM and chairman of the Muzaffarabad-based United Jehad Council (UJC), Syed Salahuddin, ridiculed the bus service stating, "Neither can it hoodwink the world community nor the Kashmiris." Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, chief of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the parent organisation of the LeT, similarly remarked that initiatives such as welcoming cultural delegations and starting bus services could not put an end to 'the mountain of enmity between India and Pakistan'. And in Srinagar, separatist leader Geelani asserted: "We have not given the sacrifice of a lakh (hundred thousand) people for a bus service, but for the right to self-determination." The fear among terrorist groups and separatists like Geelani is that such measures would gradually obliterate their constituencies and radically undermine the course of the Kashmir jehad, and disrupting the bus service has emerged as a critical extremist objective over the past weeks.

The concern that increasing people-to-people contacts could dilute the 'core issue' of Kashmir in the long run has also been underscored by others in Pakistan, and General Musharraf has found it necessary to reiterate, on March 23, that confidence building measures (CBMs) between the two countries would not succeed and would, indeed, loose credibility if the 'core issue' of Kashmir was not settled. During his address at the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad, the President welcomed the bus service, but made it clear that it was not a solution to the Kashmir problem. And, while replying to an e-mail sent by an Indian to his (Musharraf's) website asking his views on the reunification of India and Pakistan as well as his 'silence' on the Kargil war, the President held out a veiled threat: "What is the future? Resolve disputes so that Siachens, Kargil, Marpola and Chorbatla don't happen again. Let us resolve Kashmir first and then I am sure it won't happen again."

One of the Pakistani military regime's major apprehensions is that allowing people from the Indian side to see the ground realities in 'Azad Kashmir', a jehadised area with little evidence of the culture and identity that underlies their collective consciousness, and where the most basic rights and amenities are lacking, could result in a dramatic reassessment of the secessionist quest. The deepening of non-official linkages between Indian and Pakistani controlled Kashmir contains inherent risks that Pakistan may lose control over the anti-India forces in Kashmir, once narratives from 'Azad Kashmir' become part of the open source discourse on both sides of the border. Pakistan's decision to forbid politicians from J&K to travel on the inaugural bus reflects precisely such anxieties. Already, feedback in Islamabad from recent people-to-people exchanges, including the visit by journalists, has reportedly indicated that the pro-Pakistan constituency in Kashmir is much smaller than had been imagined, a perception that Pakistan's military establishment would like to reverse.

It must remain clear, however, that steps such as the bus service, the current cricket-series bonhomie and CBMs in general, while they may, over time, strengthen processes of 'emotional enlistment', do not, in any measure, alter India's and Pakistan's stated positions on the Kashmir issue. In that sense, they will do little to change the fundamentals of the conflict in and over Kashmir, which can easily escalate again if any of the extremist players - or their primary state sponsor - recovers the capabilities of disruption or the impunity that they operated under before 9/11.



INDIA

Nagaland: Brothers in Blood
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

The National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) simply refuses to stay out of the headlines, whether it is for its peace negotiations with the Union Government or the internecine clashes with its bete noire, the NSCN's Khaplang faction (NSCN-K). On March 24, a total of 10 militants belonging to both the factions were killed when the IM faction led siege to a Khaplang camp in Zunheboto district. On March 26, a NSCN-K cadre was killed near Suruhoto as the NSCN-IM group ambushed a group of four returning from the nearby Zunheboto town. Again, on March 29, four Khaplang cadres were killed as both factions clashed in the Tuensang District's Yakor village. Already, 21 militants belonging to both factions have been killed in the current year in Nagaland, 19 of them in the month of March alone.

  Also Read
Naga Talks: Jeopardizing the Peace -- Wasbir Hussain
Naga Peace Overtures -- Ajai Sahni

Violence by the Naga groups is also overflowing into neighbouring Manipur, a substantial part of which is claimed by the NSCN-IM for its grandiose Nagalim - the proposed unified territory of areas claimed by the Naga rebels as theirs. On March 25, the NSCN-IM cadres fought with the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in the Ukhrul District's Yangnom area. Two NSCN-IM militants were killed and another injured in the clash. The UNLF even charged that the NSCN-IM was helped in this attack by Assam Rifles (AR) troops posted at nearby Kasom Khullen, a charge, which has been denied by AR sources. Similar clashes between the two groups had taken place earlier in the year in the Tousem sub-division of Tamenglong District in Manipur.

Other than the sudden spike in killings, these are, at best, routine clashes between the two rival factions, who have been at war since the night of April 30, 1988, when the unified NSCN split into two. Both the factions, divided mostly along tribal loyalties, have signed individual ceasefire agreements with the Union Government (the NSCN-IM in 1997 and the NSCN-K in 2001), but area domination exercise as well as efforts to control the abundant finances derived through extortion have led to frequent skirmishes between them. Several attempts at reconciliation from various quarters have ended in failure.

After these long years of confrontation, the NSCN-K, like the Naga National Council (NNC), the first instigator of Naga secessionism, appears to be a sinking outfit. Even four years after its ceasefire agreement, it has not held a single round of negotiations with the Government. With the present warming up of ties between India and Myanmar, the group has come under increased pressure, since most of its cadres and camps are located in the Sagaing region of Myanmar. The Myanmarese Army has launched several military operations against the group in recent past, leading to, according to the outfit's own admission, a critical loss of both men and material. Within Nagaland, the Khaplang group's activity has been enormously circumscribed, limiting its influence to just three districts: Mon, Tuensang and Zunheboto. Its domination of the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh has also been ended, as the NSCN-IM has successfully consolidated its hold on these districts over the past three years.

Over time, the IM group, which appears to be receiving support from a seemingly accommodating Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) State Government, has been able to outwit and often browbeat its opponents to submission. This holds true both for the 'civil society' in the State, most of which now echoes the IM's position, as well as for the rival armed factions. The IM faction now dominates at least six of the State's eleven districts, and has been able to project itself as the most influential entity in the State. Thus far, it has also succeeded in preventing the Government in New Delhi from starting negotiations with the other rebel factions, the NSCN-K and the NNC, in spite of continuous demands for such talks.

New Delhi has been accused of acting as a mute spectator to the recent internecine clashes. One report in the Indian Express on the NSCN-IM's overrunning of the Khaplang camp in Suruhoto thus noted: "Despite the fact that three companies of Assam Rifles and one company of Nagaland Armed Police were present on the spot, the State and the Central government chose to look the other way." The State Government and its Sub-committee for Peace have done little beyond issuing the customary appeal for peace.

The Sumi Hoho, the apex body of the Sumi (Sema) tribe, which dominates the district of Zunheboto, has also alleged that the security forces have turned a blind eye to the recent clashes. On March 28, Sumi Hoho President H.S. Rotokha accused the Centre of playing a game of divide and rule by allowing the factions to fight. He alleged that the Centre's Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CMG) had been informed about the imminent clashes on March 10, but did not take any action to prevent the violence. The Chairman of the CMG in Dimapur, Lt Gen. (Retd.) R.V. Kulkarni, was reported to be out of the State, as violence persisted. Similarly, the Konyak Union, the apex body of the Konyak Nagas, in its statement on March 30, questioned the Nagaland Chief Minister, Neiphiu Rio's claim that the law and order situation in the State was satisfactory, arguing that since both factions of the NSCN were flouting the ceasefire rules, there was a 'total failure of law and order'.

Indeed, the continuous succession of clashes between the NSCN-IM and NSCN-K has made a mockery of the ceasefire arrangement and its paraphernalia, such as the CMG, designated camps for the militants, and various 'ground rules' of conduct that the armed groups openly flout. According to the terms of the Ceasefire, it is binding on the militant groups to confine their armed cadres to their designated camps. However, past instances have proved that cadres have not only moved out of the camps regularly, but have also engaged in activities such as extortion, attacks on each other and also on civilians. The sight of NSCN cadres in uniform and bearing arms is not uncommon in Nagaland's forests and countryside.

Public resentment is now increasingly visible. Nearly 8,000 of Zunheboto's residents marched in a protest rally on March 28, 2005, calling for the removal of designated camps of both the factions (NSCN-K camps at Suruhoto and NSCN-IM camp at Ghatashi) from, and restoration of peace in, the District. They also protested against the security forces' failure to prevent the clashes despite previous warnings. A few days earlier, the women of the district had staged a 'torchlight march' to protest against the recurring factional clashes in the area.

The IM group has sought to justify the spate of violence as a consequence of the Khaplang group's frustration at not being included in the negotiation process. The IM's 'Deputy Kilonser' (minister) for information and publicity, Kraibo Chawang, was quoted as having stated, on March 29: "The peace process has entered a very crucial phase now and the Khaplang group does not want it to succeed. Till these anti-national elements are there, this will go on." In another statement on March 30, the IM faction's ministry of information and publicity declared: "The mandate and aspirations of the Naga people must be defended at all cost. We cannot allow this propitious moment (to be) abandoned and let the nation perish because of a few disgruntled and desperadoes (sic)."

The Khaplang faction, on the other hand, suggests that the violence is linked to the IM's 'desperation' over the fact that the peace talks were not going anywhere. Khaplang leader Kughalo Mulatonu thus stated on March 24: "The NSCN-IM cadres are getting increasingly restive and desperate as peace talks with New Delhi have almost fizzled out and deadlocked". The Khaplang leadership has also sought to belittle the ongoing talks by highlighting the absence of the IM 'Chairman', Isak Swu, from New Delhi. Sepchrem Sangtam, 'deputy minister' in charge of information and publicity of the NSCN-K said on March 30, that Isak Chisi Swu had distanced himself from the talks and Thuingaleng Muivah, 'General Secretary', alone had participated. Thus, he claimed, the talks were between the Tangkhul tribe (to which Muivah belongs) and the Indian Government, and the Nagas were not involved.

With no signs of any basic transformation in the ground situation, and reports of an elaborate 'itinerary of violence' drafted by the NSCN-IM, there is reason to believe that the State will have to brace itself for more violence over the coming months. Reports quoting NSCN-IM leaders indicate that the group now plans to attack the Khaplang faction's ceasefire supervisory board office in Mon town. The IM faction alleges that the office, which has earlier been attacked on March 12, was set up on a plot of land that belongs to Tongmeth Wangnao, a leader of the Khaplang faction who, since 2003, has changed his loyalties and joined the IM group. The IM group thus now has a 'benign responsibility' of expelling the Khaplang faction from the private property of an 'insider'. In many ways, this reflects the larger character of militancy in Nagaland, as militant factions manage to hold the State and its people to ransom over factional feuds and petty quarrels over private property.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
March 28-April 3, 2005

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

INDIA

     Assam

0
0
3
3

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

13
3
19
35

     Left-wing
     Extremism

4
1
3
8

     Manipur

1
0
0
1

     Nagaland

0
0
6
6

     Tripura

1
0
0
1

Total (INDIA)

19
4
31
54

NEPAL

4
4
26
34

PAKISTAN

1
1
0
2

SRI LANKA

1
0
0
1
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

India and Bangladesh to set up new boundary pillars: Bangladesh and India have reportedly agreed to set up new boundary pillars, to restore the damaged ones, and resolve amicably the disputes over illegally-occupied lands along the border. According to Bangladesh officials, an accord was reached after a three-day joint border survey in the Tentulia and Sadar sub-districts concluded on April 3, 2005. "Now, Bangladesh and India are conducting a survey to resolve the disputes. After finalising the survey report, the construction and repairing of border pillars will start," said the joint survey team. The eight-member team, comprising four members each from both countries, has been carrying out the survey on the Mohananda river in Tentulia and Korotoa in Sadar. While the Indian side was led by G.C. Boiragi, Director, Survey of India, the Bangladesh team was led by the Director-General of Land Record and Survey, Mohammad Abu Haider Sarder. The Hindu, April 4, 2005.


INDIA

Four terrorist groups threaten to disrupt Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service: On March 30, 2005, four terrorist groups warned the people against traveling by the April 7 inaugural Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus while describing it as a 'coffin'. They also called for a complete strike on April 7, when the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, is scheduled to flag off the cross border bus. In a joint statement faxed to newspaper offices by the Al-Arifeen, Al-Nasireen, Farzandan-e-Millat and Save Kashmir Movement in Srinagar, the groups said that the bus was "in no way in the interest of Kashmir's freedom struggle" and warned people against traveling on the same. The statement claimed that the decision was taken after "an extraordinary meeting" of the heads of four groups in Srinagar. "It is a friendly advice to passengers that they should not board this coffin to Muzaffarabad," the statement further said. The Hindu, March 31, 2005.

Six NSCN militants killed during internecine clashes in Nagaland: On March 29, 2005, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) reportedly killed four cadres of the rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) during an internecine clash at Yakor village in the Tuensang district of Nagaland. Two days earlier, the NSCN-IM cadres attacked a camp of the NSCN-K in the Zunheboto district and two militants, one each belonging to both the outfits, were reported to have died in the resultant clash. Telegraph India, March 30, 2005.


NEPAL

Country-wide Maoist strike affects normal life: A strike called by the Maoist insurgents is reported to have severely affected normal life in most parts of Nepal for a second day on April 4, 2005, even as the troops escorted vehicles to prevent fresh insurgent attacks. The insurgents called the 11-day strike on April 3 to protest against King Gyanendra's seizure of power on February 1 and the subsequent arrests of political leaders and suspension of civil rights. According to Reuters, the countryside remained closed in response to the strike call. While traffic was thin on major highways connecting the capital Kathmandu with outside districts, security escorts, combined with air patrols, rescued a number of passenger buses and cargo trucks stranded on these highways despite the blockade, claimed Army sources. The strike is reported to have had little affect in the capital, Kathmandu. Daily Times, April 4, 2005; PTI, April 3, 2005.



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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