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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 43, May 9, 2005

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

 

 

PAKISTAN

Deadlock in Balochistan
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

As part of the continuing efforts to find a 'political solution' to the Baloch imbroglio, the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan chaired by former Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain unanimously approved, on May 2, 2005, a report by its Subcommittee headed by Senator Syed Mushahid Hussain, proposing various recommendations on clearance of gas royalty arrears, abolition of the Concurrent List, the National Finance Commission (NFC) award, provincial autonomy and the development of gas-rich areas. The Committee has proposed that the Federal Government form a Task Force in consultation with it to ensure the implementation of the recommendations within 90 days.

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The Subcommittee has asked the Federal and Provincial Governments to make estimates of the arrears of the gas royalty payable to Balochistan by June 30, and also recommended that these arrears be cleared before December 2005. The Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yousaf has reportedly given a figure of Pakistan Rupees (PKR) Six billion. The Subcommittee recommended, further, that gas exploration companies spend at least five per cent of their total investment on the development of the respective areas of their operation. It also accepted an up-gradation of gas royalty and gas development surcharge (GSD) to Balochistan, the actual enhancements to be based on the Senator Dilawar Abbas 'formula' which is yet to be presented.

Another of the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee's recommendations was that the "control of Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) should vest primarily with the Province of Balochistan." To this end, the head office of the Authority be shifted from Karachi to Gwadar and that the province should have maximum representation in the GPA's board of directors. Recognizing the systematic exclusion of locals from employment at the Gwadar Port, the Subcommittee recommends that, people of Gwadar should be given first preference, the people of Makran second preference, followed by the people of Balochistan. The Subcommittee has suggested a special development package of at least PKR Two billion from the Federal Government for the Social Sector Development of District Gwadar.

On contentious constitutional issues, the subcommittee, in general, agrees with the Baloch position that commitments on provincial autonomy, as envisaged in the 1973 Constitution, have neither been honoured nor implemented. It recommends that the "Federal Legislative List is revised in such a manner that maximum autonomy is ensured to the provinces. The Concurrent List is ultimately abolished and the Federal List is limited to the core functions of the Federation, i.e., Defense and national security, Foreign Relations, Federal Finance and Currency, Communications and inter-provincial harmony, coordination and national solidarity."

Many of the Sub-Committee's recommendations militate directly against General Musharraf's stated policies and intentions on Balochistan. On December 16, 2004, the President had appeared to have given primacy to a 'military' solution to the disturbances in the province, declaring that his Government would crush all anti-Pakistan movements: "We are gathering information through intelligence and other sources that who is doing what in the area and I warn them because when the Government starts action against them, they will be crushed." More significantly, on March 31, 2004, the General had declared on the Pakistan Television "Newsnight" programme, that the problem with Balochistan was that only 5 per cent of the area was 'A area', while 95 per cent was 'B', where the police did not operate. Soon, he had stated, the entire 95 per cent 'B area' would be made into 'A area'.

The Mushahid Hussain Committee, however, has a series of proposals that would diminish the role of Federal Forces in Balochistan. Observing that the presence of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Coast Guard in various posts in the interior are "creating hatred since women and children are humiliated at check points", and that "Some foolproof system also needs to be established to check excesses of law enforcement agencies", it recommends "the retention of Levies Force", noting:

The statistics provided to the Committee show that not only is the expenditure on Levies much less compared to the Police but also the performance in detecting and controlling of crime by the Levies is better than that of the Police. Currently 'B' areas are controlled by the Levies which present 95% of the land mass of the Province while 'A' areas are looked after by Police.

The Subcommittee has also recommended the abolition of the Special Levy in the Kohlu Agency, noting that "there is no justification, in the presence of a traditional Levy Force, to have a Special Levy."

Once again, clearly contradicting Musharraf's declared intent to construct three new Cantonments in Balochistan, the Subcommittee notes:

The plans of building cantonments by GOP at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu are being agitated by (sic) political forces of Balochistan. The Committee may consider to recommend (sic) that till the conclusions of the dialogues that are under way for resolution of major current issues of Balochistan, the construction of cantonments be held in abeyance…

In the meanwhile, even as the military regime is over-extended in guarding vital installations, insurgents continue to target, by rockets and bomb blasts, the road and railway networks, telephone towers and grid stations across the length and breadth of Balochistan. While there have been at least 122 bomb blasts in the province this year (till May 6), approximately 106 people have died in the insurgency. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao had disclosed on March 7, 2005, that 1,529 rocket attacks had occurred in the province in the last two years.

It is useful to recall in this context that a report of the Balochistan Inspector General of Police in January 2005 had indicated that in 2002 a total of 7 cases of rocket firing were reported in A areas in which only two persons were injured, while in the B areas 13 cases of rockets firing were reported in which two persons were killed and 12 injured. In 2003, 43 rockets were fired in A areas in which 4 persons were killed and 8 injured and in B areas, 58 rockets were fired in which three persons were killed and four injured. In 2004, 117 cases of rocket attacks were reported in A areas, in which two persons were injured. In B areas however, 553 cases of rocket attacks were reported killing four and injuring 17 people.

There is evident ambivalence in Islamabad on how Balochistan is to be 'quieted', and the acceptance by the Parliamentary Committee of the Subcommittee report suggests that the military option has either been postponed or abandoned in favour of the political, suggesting that Musharraf has realized that any use of relatively indiscriminate force is not sustainable within the current international context. This position also appears to be illustrated in some measure by the 'management' of the crisis arising out of the encirclement of some 300 Army troops at Sangsela in the Dera Bugti District since March 17, 2005, by Bugti loyalists. After initial threats of harsh military reprisals, a delicate standoff has been established between the Army and Bugti's Forces.

While continuing violence and the face-off with the Army impede any easy resolution of the growing unrest in the province, the implementation of the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee's recommendation remain problematic on other grounds as well, most significantly, in view of the near unanimous rejection of the Report and recommendations by the Baloch leadership. Nawab Akbar Bugti on May 7, stated that the Balochistan issue had now been deadlocked for several months and the dialogue process with the Parliamentary Committee had stopped. He said opening the roads and dismantling a few trenches by both the FC and his men was the only progress achieved so far. Earlier, he had declared that, "Military operation and negotiations could not continue side by side." And, Farhan Bokhari writing in The News observed that Nawab Bugti has chosen to hold out, perhaps knowing well that Islamabad's resolve to remain tough on Balochistan has to weaken eventually.

Reacting to the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee recommendations on May 5, Abdul Raouf Mengal, Balochistan National Party (BNP) central leader, stated that the province did not need anyone's charity, that the recommendations were "one- sided", and that true nationalist parties had boycotted the deliberations. The Federal Government, Mengal noted, would have to give 'complete sovereignty' to the federating units and should only control foreign affairs, finance and defense. Echoing what is generally being seen as the broader Baloch response, he said the BNP would not accept the subcommittee's decision unless the Government granted complete autonomy to provinces, abandoned plans to make cantonments and removed reservations on mega projects.

Further, BNP-Mengal group Senator, Sanaullah Baloch told South Asia Intelligence Review on May 5 that, "there is nothing to protect, and provide constitutional and legal cover to the rights of people of Balochistan" in the Subcommittee's recommendations. Earlier, rejecting the proposals, he had stated on May 3 that they were "juggling of words and nothing else." "We demanded provincial authority on ports in the federal legislative list, but the Committee suggested moving its office from Karachi to Gwadar. We wanted provincial control on paramilitary troops but the committee stuck to its previous position giving limited authority to provinces. The committee turned a deaf ear to our demand for an 80 percent share for provinces in the National Finance Commission," he said. He noted that the Committee had lost its mandate because it failed to submit its report by January 7 and that all recommendations made after January 7 were illegal and unconstitutional.

Many in Pakistan believe that the Baloch demand for a uniform gas rate throughout the country is justified. A long-standing grievance has been the pittance Balochistan receives as compensation for its natural resources. Sindh, according to one report, receives PKR 140 as royalty per million BTU (British Thermal Unit); Punjab: PKR 80 to 190; while Balochistan receives just PKR 36. According to one estimate, in 2004-05, Balochistan, which provides bulk of gas supply to the country, will receive Rupees 5.9 billion for gas royalty and development surcharge, while Sindh, which supplies a fraction of these volumes, would receive Rupees 19 billion. Further, the development surcharge calculated on the formula worked out by the NFC for the federal divisible pool is on the basis of population, a criterion that goes against the sparsely populated Balochistan, with only six million people.

The Baloch demand for provincial control on paramilitary troops, moreover, is also not without reason. Providing startling figures, Air Marshal (Retd) Ayaz Ahmed Khan wrote in The Nation on April 11, 2005, that federally controlled law and order institutions like the 33,000-strong Balochistan Constabulary has 32,100 Pathan soldiers and just 900 Baloch personnel. While Balochistan Police is overwhelmingly Pashtun, the 12,000-strong Coast Guard has only 90 Baloch on its rolls; and there are hardly any Baloch officers or soldiers in the famous Baloch Regiment of the Pakistan Army. Khan further states that the Pakistan Petroleum Limited, responsible for the extraction and distribution of Sui gas, does not give jobs to Baloch youth as a matter of policy.

Even with the best of intentions, consequently, the implementation of the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee report will remain fraught with difficulties. Compounding these various problems is the fact that the present provincial Government's record of implementation is rather poor. The Balochistan Finance Minister disclosed that, in 2003-04, only 25 per cent of the annual development plan fund in the province was actually utilized.

Islamabad's current policy appears to be the considered use of both carrot and stick. The underlying idea is to maintain the current military presence and simultaneously rely on increased financial assistance to dilute resistance in the province. Raziq Bugti, spokesperson for the provincial Government, believes that, "If the development pace is hastened, the resistance will gradually diminish." While a political approach to the insurgency is now clearly underway, Islamabad will also look towards isolating what it perceives are recalcitrant Baloch leaders. Troubled by the incessant insurgent attacks on vital installations, General Musharraf had noted that only three of the 78 tribal chiefs in the province were "troublemakers", though this may fly in the face of the fact that insurgent attacks have left no part of the province unaffected.

Evidently, the low-level insurgency in Balochistan can be expected to continue in the foreseeable future, with the Baloch leadership becoming even more suspicious of, and estranged from, Islamabad. The Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee will have little impact on this trajectory in the near term.

USA
SOUTH ASIA

CRT 2004: Return to Reason
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

Democracies, for all their flaws, do have powerful internal correctives, and both the form and content of the US Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 (CRT 2004) is clear evidence to this fact. After an utterly disastrous Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 Report last year, and widespread and scathing criticism of its contents and orientation [PGT-2003: A Tale Told by an Idiot; RPGT 2003: Flogging a Dead Horse], a radical review of the underlying concepts and procedures has obviously been carried out. The process is evidently incomplete, as is demonstrated in the fact that the year's offering comes in the form of a more tentative set of 'country reports' rather than the more ambitious 'patterns of global terrorism' format. The most controversial listing of incidents has been left out this time around, and data included in CRT 2004 also has a somewhat unsettled quality, relying more cautiously on categories such as 'over', 'nearly', and other approximations.

What appears, on first sight, to be 'uncertainty', however, is in fact a greater realism. For one thing, the sham certitude of specific numbers can be misleading when dealing with an issue as complex as terrorism. Indeed, even within the theatres of conflict, local Government agencies often find it necessary to continuously review and correct data, as more information relating to specific incidents is disclosed during investigations. There are, moreover, substantial divergences between the estimates of various Governmental agencies, with local police, paramilitary forces, the Army and the intelligence agencies often churning out different numbers. Crucially, however, these variations are within an acceptable margin of error and result from differences in definitions, processes and sources of information acquisition - as would be the case with the US agencies as well.

An encouraging aspect of CRT 2004 is that the numbers given for all the countries in South Asia (this Assessment deals only with the Country Reports for this region) are in conformity with other available open-source and Governmental data (within an entirely acceptable range of variation), a radical departure from the past, where the divergence between the PGT numbers and other sources bordered on the ludicrous. Previous annual US estimates - and not just the immensely flawed PGT 2003 - had laboured enormously to project the incredible fiction that the US was the greatest victim of terrorist violence. Thus PGT 2003 spoke of a total of 190 incidents of terrorism globally (in fact, India alone had thousands of such incidents in 2003), in which just 307 persons were supposed to have been killed. Of these, 82 incidents 'targeted the US', making America 'the country worst affected by terrorist acts' in 2003 - which was clearly nonsensical.

This time around, however, CRT 2004 has been far more true to facts. Despite the overwhelming violence directed against US Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American Administration has resisted the temptation to portray itself as the 'worst affected' among various countries, and, indeed, has rightly excluded all attacks on US Military targets from its assessment of terrorist violence, adhering strictly to the American definition of terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." CRT 2004, moreover, explicitly acknowledges that, "The overwhelming majority of victims of terrorist attacks were citizens of countries other than the United States. Many victims were Muslims."

These are certainly encouraging developments and the descriptions that go with the numbers - though they tend to be somewhat elementary in scope - are broadly consistent with assessments within the region.

If there is a flaw or a deviation from a hard-eyed realism, however, it is in the treatment of Pakistan, where a selective blindness appears to have been adopted for reasons political and diplomatic. The report is repeatedly appreciative of Pakistan's exemplary role in combating terror: "Few countries suffered as much from terrorism in 2004 as Pakistan, and few did as much to combat it." CRT 2004, however, fails to give even passing mention to the fact that Pakistani state support to terrorism was - and in substantial measure remains - at the root of terrorism in South Asia, though there is some evidence of a systematic dilution (though not abandonment) of the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy by General Pervez Musharraf's regime. Moreover, while the strong action against Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, as well as groups that have targeted General Musharraf in assassination attempts, has been commended, there is no mention whatsoever of the systemic neglect of activities of a number of groups - including several listed in the CRT 2004 as terrorist organizations - whose activities are largely focused on the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Pakistan's very dubious role in nuclear proliferation is also studiously ignored. This is despite the fact that CRT 2004 clearly declares that "The United States and its partners must also continue efforts to defeat non-al-Qa'ida terrorist groups, discourage state sponsorship of terrorism, and prevent terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." The truth is, the entire leadership of terrorist groups operating in J&K, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM), the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), as well as their various front organizations, are headquartered in Pakistan, and their leaderships have ample freedom of movement and activity, and, if Indian authorities are to be believed, substantial - though possibly diminished - state support, at least in some cases. Further, the limited state action taken against such leaderships has, at best, been symbolic. Thus, as CRT 2004 notes, the head of HuM, Fazlur Rahman Khalil, was arrested and detained "for several months" (in fact, between August and December 17, 2004), hardly the 'punishment' that would be imagined for the leader of one of the bloodiest international terrorist organizations operating out of Pakistan. The activities - open and unrestrained - of Syed Salahuddin, the head of the HM, and of other leaders of this group, are also well documented, and cannot have been outside the ken of US intelligence. Nor, indeed, has the LeT amir (Chief), Hafiz Mohammad Saeed been in hiding over the past years. If nothing else, CRT 2004 should have taken note of these, as well as of other evidence of the state tolerance of particular patterns of Islamist extremist and terrorist activities in Pakistan.

A comparable coyness also afflicts CRT 2004's approach to Bangladesh. There is, of course, significant expression of concern regarding "instability and widespread frustration" in the country that has "provided recruits, support and safe haven to international terrorist groups." The Report also notes that, "Bangladesh's long tradition of inclusive, moderate Islam is increasingly under threat from extremist alternatives, already offering an attractive breeding ground for political and sectarian violence." CRT 2004, moreover, does, for the first time, take cognizance of terrorist movements in India's Northeast by including one of the most prominent organizations operating in that region - the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) - in its list of "Other Selected Terrorist Organisations". However, the Report fails to acknowledge the presence of ULFA's top leadership and a number of camps on Bangladeshi soil, and overwhelming evidence of state support to this and other groups in that country. The report speaks, further, of Bangladeshi support to the global war on terror, but offers alibis for failure in "weak institutions, porous borders, limited law enforcement capabilities, and debilitating in-fighting between the two major political parties." But porous borders are not Bangladesh's problem - rather, these are a problem for its neighbour, and Bangladesh has hotly and often violently contested India's efforts to diminish this 'porosity' by constructing a border fence. Most of the growth of terrorism in Bangladesh is the result of the radicalization of the country's own politics, and many of the foreign terrorists and arms smugglers operating in the country are doing so with the active support of local groups that enjoy significant backing from elements within the state structure, or that are directly supported by such elements.

These are, at worst, surviving gaps in a report that has made obvious efforts to accurately reflect the broad realities of terrorism in South Asia. The evident intent and effort that has gone into CRT 2004 needs to be consolidated, and restored to the wider mandate of the PGT. As the Report rightly notes, "the tasks confronting the United States and its partners in the struggle against terrorism remain formidable." This annual exercise at stock-taking is an important tool for analysts and policy makers, and the closer it reflects the realities of the ground, and the greater the detail it offers, the more effective it will be, both in its statutory intent and in its impact on the international community.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
May 2-8, 2005

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

1
0
1
2

INDIA

     Assam

0
0
2
2

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

14
7
39
60

     Left-wing
     Extremism

2
2
1
5

     Manipur

9
0
1
10

Total (INDIA)

25
9
43
77

NEPAL

1
2
4
7

PAKISTAN

7
0
0
7

SRI LANKA

0
0
2
2
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen confirms death of 14 cadres in Baramulla district of Jammu and Kashmir: Even as there was no official confirmation, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) on May 5 confirmed the death of 14 of its cadres in the 50-hour-long gun-battle at Lawaypora village in the Bandipore area of Baramulla district in Jammu and Kashmir on May 4-5, 2005. HM spokesperson, Junaid-ul-Islam, told the local news agency KNS over telephone that 14 cadres were killed in the Army operation. He said that the dead included a number of 'battalion commanders' and 'company commanders' of the Hizb. According to unnamed official sources, the Army launched an operation after receiving information regarding the presence of 18 terrorists at three different houses in Lawaypora. Daily Excelsior, May 5, 2005.


NEPAL

Maoist insurgents kill top Hindu leader in Rupandehi district: A group of five Maoist insurgents shot dead Narayan Prasad Pokhrel, chairman of the World Hindu Federation (Nepal chapter), at Dudharachha village in the Rupandehi district on May 6, 2005. Nepal News, quoting the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported that a Maoist-affiliated Dalit Mukti Morcha (Dalit Liberation Front) leader said that their organisation had decided to 'eliminate' Pokhrel for allegedly "indulging in various crimes in the disguise of religion." According to reports, Maoists blamed Pokhrel for indulging in sexual exploitation, amassing property illegally and trying to garner popular support in favour of the monarchy. Nepal News, May 6, 2005.


PAKISTAN

Enemies 'within' can attack President Musharraf again, says Minister of State for Religious Affairs: Aamir Liaqat Hussain, Minister of State for Religious Affairs, said on May 5, 2005, that President Pervez Musharraf had a lot of enemies 'within' who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. "President Musharraf has a number of enemies who can try to assassinate him," the Minister said in an interview to Daily Times. "No common people could attack President Musharraf and certainly there are elements in the Forces who can launch yet another attack against him," he said. Dr Hussain also said there was "an ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] within the ISI, which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country." The Minister added that even his own life was in danger due to his radical thoughts about religion, which were unacceptable to many religious forces operating in the country. Daily Times, May 6, 2005.

Top Al Qaeda terrorist Abu Faraj Al Libbi arrested: Security forces have arrested top Al Qaeda terrorist, Abu Faraj Al Libbi, who was allegedly behind two assassination attempts against President Pervez Musharraf in 2003, Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao said in Islamabad on May 4, 2005. Addressing a press conference, the Minister said the Libyan national had been arrested a few days back. However, he declined to give details about how and from where Abu Faraj had been arrested. "I confirm that Abu Faraj Al Libbi has been arrested but it is premature to say whether he would be handed over to the US because during the investigation process, which is under way, no decision in this regard can be taken," said Sherpao. According to the Minister, "Besides attempts on the life of President Musharraf, the Al Qaeda operative was involved in many other cases of terrorism in Pakistan." Al Libbi, who is said to be number three in the Al Qaeda hierarchy, carried a head money of Pakistan Rupees (PKR) 20 million. 40-year-old Abu Faraj was reportedly once Osama bin Laden's personal assistant. Dawn, May 5, 2005.

Parliamentary Committee adopts report on Balochistan: The Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan met in Islamabad on May 2, 2005, and adopted, with certain amendments, the Mushahid Hussain sub-committee report comprising eight recommendations, including payment of gas royalty within a fixed period and a financial package for the development of Sui, Gwadar and Quetta. The meeting, presided over by Choudhury Shujaat Hussain, recommended Rupees Three billion for the development of social service structure of Gwadar, Rupees Two billion for Sui and Rupees Four billion for the upliftment of the provincial capital Quetta. Later, speaking in the National Assembly, Hussain stated that the Committee would complete its final report in due course of time to be tabled in the House. Dawn, May 3, 2005.

Three million Afghans in Pakistan, says census: The Government on May 2, 2005, announced the results of a countrywide Afghan census and disclosed that there were 3,047,225 Afghans living in Pakistan, including refugees and residents. Sajid Hussain Chattha, States and Frontier Regions Secretary, Najam Hasan, Chief Census Commissioner and Guenet Guebre-Christos, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan, told a news conference in Islamabad that the census carried out between late February and early March counted a total of 3,047,225 Afghans who had arrived after December 1, 1979. The census determined that there were 1,861,412 Afghans in North West Frontier Province, 783,545 in Balochistan, 136,780 in Sindh, 207,754 in Punjab, 44,637 in Islamabad and 13,097 in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Daily Times, May 3, 2005.



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

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K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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