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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 43, May 9, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Deadlock in Balochistan
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
As part of the continuing efforts to find a 'political solution'
to the Baloch imbroglio, the Parliamentary Committee on
Balochistan chaired by former Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat
Hussain unanimously approved, on May 2, 2005, a report by
its Subcommittee headed by Senator Syed Mushahid Hussain,
proposing various recommendations on clearance of gas royalty
arrears, abolition of the Concurrent List, the National
Finance Commission (NFC) award, provincial autonomy and
the development of gas-rich areas. The Committee has proposed
that the Federal Government form a Task Force in consultation
with it to ensure the implementation of the recommendations
within 90 days.
The Subcommittee
has asked the Federal and Provincial Governments to make
estimates of the arrears of the gas royalty payable to Balochistan
by June 30, and also recommended that these arrears be cleared
before December 2005. The Balochistan Chief Minister Jam
Muhammad Yousaf has reportedly given a figure of Pakistan
Rupees (PKR) Six billion. The Subcommittee recommended,
further, that gas exploration companies spend at least five
per cent of their total investment on the development of
the respective areas of their operation. It also accepted
an up-gradation of gas royalty and gas development surcharge
(GSD) to Balochistan, the actual enhancements to be based
on the Senator Dilawar Abbas 'formula' which is yet to be
presented.
Another of the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee's recommendations
was that the "control of Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) should
vest primarily with the Province of Balochistan." To this
end, the head office of the Authority be shifted from Karachi
to Gwadar and that the province should have maximum representation
in the GPA's board of directors. Recognizing the systematic
exclusion of locals from employment at the Gwadar Port,
the Subcommittee recommends that, people of Gwadar should
be given first preference, the people of Makran second preference,
followed by the people of Balochistan. The Subcommittee
has suggested a special development package of at least
PKR Two billion from the Federal Government for the Social
Sector Development of District Gwadar.
On contentious constitutional issues, the subcommittee,
in general, agrees with the Baloch position that commitments
on provincial autonomy, as envisaged in the 1973 Constitution,
have neither been honoured nor implemented. It recommends
that the "Federal Legislative List is revised in such a
manner that maximum autonomy is ensured to the provinces.
The Concurrent List is ultimately abolished and the Federal
List is limited to the core functions of the Federation,
i.e., Defense and national security, Foreign Relations,
Federal Finance and Currency, Communications and inter-provincial
harmony, coordination and national solidarity."
Many of the Sub-Committee's recommendations militate directly
against General Musharraf's stated policies and intentions
on Balochistan. On December 16, 2004, the President had
appeared to have given primacy to a 'military' solution
to the disturbances in the province, declaring that his
Government would crush all anti-Pakistan movements: "We
are gathering information through intelligence and other
sources that who is doing what in the area and I warn them
because when the Government starts action against them,
they will be crushed." More significantly, on March 31,
2004, the General had declared on the Pakistan Television
"Newsnight" programme, that the problem with Balochistan
was that only 5 per cent of the area was 'A area', while
95 per cent was 'B', where the police did not operate. Soon,
he had stated, the entire 95 per cent 'B area' would be
made into 'A area'.
The Mushahid Hussain Committee, however, has a series of
proposals that would diminish the role of Federal Forces
in Balochistan. Observing that the presence of the Frontier
Constabulary (FC) and Coast Guard in various posts in the
interior are "creating hatred since women and children are
humiliated at check points", and that "Some foolproof system
also needs to be established to check excesses of law enforcement
agencies", it recommends "the retention of Levies Force",
noting:
The
statistics provided to the Committee show that not
only is the expenditure on Levies much less compared
to the Police but also the performance in detecting
and controlling of crime by the Levies is better than
that of the Police. Currently 'B' areas are controlled
by the Levies which present 95% of the land mass of
the Province while 'A' areas are looked after by Police.
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The Subcommittee
has also recommended the abolition of the Special Levy in
the Kohlu Agency, noting that "there is no justification,
in the presence of a traditional Levy Force, to have a Special
Levy."
Once again, clearly contradicting Musharraf's declared intent
to construct three new Cantonments in Balochistan, the Subcommittee
notes:
The
plans of building cantonments by GOP at Gwadar, Dera
Bugti and Kohlu are being agitated by (sic)
political forces of Balochistan. The Committee may
consider to recommend (sic) that till the conclusions
of the dialogues that are under way for resolution
of major current issues of Balochistan, the construction
of cantonments be held in abeyance…
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In the meanwhile,
even as the military regime is over-extended in guarding
vital installations, insurgents continue to target, by rockets
and bomb blasts, the road and railway networks, telephone
towers and grid stations across the length and breadth of
Balochistan. While there have been at least 122 bomb blasts
in the province this year (till May 6), approximately 106
people have died in the insurgency. Interior Minister Aftab
Ahmed Khan Sherpao had disclosed on March 7, 2005, that
1,529 rocket attacks had occurred in the province in the
last two years.
It is useful to recall in this context that a report of
the Balochistan Inspector General of Police in January 2005
had indicated that in 2002 a total of 7 cases of rocket
firing were reported in A areas in which only two persons
were injured, while in the B areas 13 cases of rockets firing
were reported in which two persons were killed and 12 injured.
In 2003, 43 rockets were fired in A areas in which 4 persons
were killed and 8 injured and in B areas, 58 rockets were
fired in which three persons were killed and four injured.
In 2004, 117 cases of rocket attacks were reported in A
areas, in which two persons were injured. In B areas however,
553 cases of rocket attacks were reported killing four and
injuring 17 people.
There is evident ambivalence in Islamabad on how Balochistan
is to be 'quieted', and the acceptance by the Parliamentary
Committee of the Subcommittee report suggests that the military
option has either been postponed or abandoned in favour
of the political, suggesting that Musharraf has realized
that any use of relatively indiscriminate force is not sustainable
within the current international context. This position
also appears to be illustrated in some measure by the 'management'
of the crisis arising out of the encirclement
of some 300 Army troops at Sangsela in the Dera Bugti District
since March 17, 2005, by Bugti loyalists. After initial
threats of harsh military reprisals, a delicate standoff
has been established between the Army and Bugti's Forces.
While continuing violence and the face-off with the Army
impede any easy resolution of the growing unrest in the
province, the implementation of the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee's
recommendation remain problematic on other grounds as well,
most significantly, in view of the near unanimous rejection
of the Report and recommendations by the Baloch leadership.
Nawab Akbar Bugti on May 7, stated that the Balochistan
issue had now been deadlocked for several months and the
dialogue process with the Parliamentary Committee had stopped.
He said opening the roads and dismantling a few trenches
by both the FC and his men was the only progress achieved
so far. Earlier, he had declared that, "Military operation
and negotiations could not continue side by side." And,
Farhan Bokhari writing in The News observed that
Nawab Bugti has chosen to hold out, perhaps knowing well
that Islamabad's resolve to remain tough on Balochistan
has to weaken eventually.
Reacting to the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee recommendations
on May 5, Abdul Raouf Mengal, Balochistan National Party
(BNP) central leader, stated that the province did not need
anyone's charity, that the recommendations were "one- sided",
and that true nationalist parties had boycotted the deliberations.
The Federal Government, Mengal noted, would have to give
'complete sovereignty' to the federating units and should
only control foreign affairs, finance and defense. Echoing
what is generally being seen as the broader Baloch response,
he said the BNP would not accept the subcommittee's decision
unless the Government granted complete autonomy to provinces,
abandoned plans to make cantonments and removed reservations
on mega projects.
Further, BNP-Mengal group Senator, Sanaullah Baloch told
South Asia Intelligence Review on May 5 that, "there
is nothing to protect, and provide constitutional and legal
cover to the rights of people of Balochistan" in the Subcommittee's
recommendations. Earlier, rejecting the proposals, he had
stated on May 3 that they were "juggling of words and nothing
else." "We demanded provincial authority on ports in the
federal legislative list, but the Committee suggested moving
its office from Karachi to Gwadar. We wanted provincial
control on paramilitary troops but the committee stuck to
its previous position giving limited authority to provinces.
The committee turned a deaf ear to our demand for an 80
percent share for provinces in the National Finance Commission,"
he said. He noted that the Committee had lost its mandate
because it failed to submit its report by January 7 and
that all recommendations made after January 7 were illegal
and unconstitutional.
Many in Pakistan believe that the Baloch demand for a uniform
gas rate throughout the country is justified. A long-standing
grievance has been the pittance Balochistan receives as
compensation for its natural resources. Sindh, according
to one report, receives PKR 140 as royalty per million BTU
(British Thermal Unit); Punjab: PKR 80 to 190; while Balochistan
receives just PKR 36. According to one estimate, in 2004-05,
Balochistan, which provides bulk of gas supply to the country,
will receive Rupees 5.9 billion for gas royalty and development
surcharge, while Sindh, which supplies a fraction of these
volumes, would receive Rupees 19 billion. Further, the development
surcharge calculated on the formula worked out by the NFC
for the federal divisible pool is on the basis of population,
a criterion that goes against the sparsely populated Balochistan,
with only six million people.
The Baloch demand for provincial control on paramilitary
troops, moreover, is also not without reason. Providing
startling figures, Air Marshal (Retd) Ayaz Ahmed Khan wrote
in The Nation on April 11, 2005, that federally controlled
law and order institutions like the 33,000-strong Balochistan
Constabulary has 32,100 Pathan soldiers and just 900 Baloch
personnel. While Balochistan Police is overwhelmingly Pashtun,
the 12,000-strong Coast Guard has only 90 Baloch on its
rolls; and there are hardly any Baloch officers or soldiers
in the famous Baloch Regiment of the Pakistan Army. Khan
further states that the Pakistan Petroleum Limited, responsible
for the extraction and distribution of Sui gas, does not
give jobs to Baloch youth as a matter of policy.
Even with the best of intentions, consequently, the implementation
of the Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee report will remain
fraught with difficulties. Compounding these various problems
is the fact that the present provincial Government's record
of implementation is rather poor. The Balochistan Finance
Minister disclosed that, in 2003-04, only 25 per cent of
the annual development plan fund in the province was actually
utilized.
Islamabad's current policy appears to be the considered
use of both carrot and stick. The underlying idea is to
maintain the current military presence and simultaneously
rely on increased financial assistance to dilute resistance
in the province. Raziq Bugti, spokesperson for the provincial
Government, believes that, "If the development pace is hastened,
the resistance will gradually diminish." While a political
approach to the insurgency is now clearly underway, Islamabad
will also look towards isolating what it perceives are recalcitrant
Baloch leaders. Troubled by the incessant insurgent attacks
on vital installations, General Musharraf had noted that
only three of the 78 tribal chiefs in the province were
"troublemakers", though this may fly in the face of the
fact that insurgent attacks have left no part of the province
unaffected.
Evidently, the low-level insurgency in Balochistan can be
expected to continue in the foreseeable future, with the
Baloch leadership becoming even more suspicious of, and
estranged from, Islamabad. The Mushahid Hussain Subcommittee
will have little impact on this trajectory in the near term.
CRT 2004: Return
to Reason
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
Democracies, for all their flaws, do have powerful internal
correctives, and both the form and content of the US Country
Reports on Terrorism 2004 (CRT 2004) is clear evidence
to this fact. After an utterly disastrous Patterns of
Global Terrorism 2003 Report last year, and widespread
and scathing criticism of its contents and orientation [PGT-2003:
A Tale Told by an Idiot; RPGT
2003: Flogging a Dead Horse], a
radical review of the underlying concepts and procedures
has obviously been carried out. The process is evidently
incomplete, as is demonstrated in the fact that the year's
offering comes in the form of a more tentative set of 'country
reports' rather than the more ambitious 'patterns of global
terrorism' format. The most controversial listing of incidents
has been left out this time around, and data included in
CRT 2004 also has a somewhat unsettled quality, relying
more cautiously on categories such as 'over', 'nearly',
and other approximations.
What appears, on first sight, to be 'uncertainty', however,
is in fact a greater realism. For one thing, the sham certitude
of specific numbers can be misleading when dealing with
an issue as complex as terrorism. Indeed, even within the
theatres of conflict, local Government agencies often find
it necessary to continuously review and correct data, as
more information relating to specific incidents is disclosed
during investigations. There are, moreover, substantial
divergences between the estimates of various Governmental
agencies, with local police, paramilitary forces, the Army
and the intelligence agencies often churning out different
numbers. Crucially, however, these variations are within
an acceptable margin of error and result from differences
in definitions, processes and sources of information acquisition
- as would be the case with the US agencies as well.
An encouraging aspect of CRT 2004 is that the numbers given
for all the countries in South Asia (this Assessment deals
only with the Country Reports for this region) are in conformity
with other available open-source and Governmental data (within
an entirely acceptable range of variation), a radical departure
from the past, where the divergence between the PGT numbers
and other sources bordered on the ludicrous. Previous annual
US estimates - and not just the immensely flawed PGT 2003
- had laboured enormously to project the incredible fiction
that the US was the greatest victim of terrorist violence.
Thus PGT 2003 spoke of a total of 190 incidents of terrorism
globally (in fact, India alone had thousands of such incidents
in 2003), in which just 307 persons were supposed to have
been killed. Of these, 82 incidents 'targeted the US', making
America 'the country worst affected by terrorist acts' in
2003 - which was clearly nonsensical.
This time around, however, CRT 2004 has been far more true
to facts. Despite the overwhelming violence directed against
US Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American Administration
has resisted the temptation to portray itself as the 'worst
affected' among various countries, and, indeed, has rightly
excluded all attacks on US Military targets from its assessment
of terrorist violence, adhering strictly to the American
definition of terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents." CRT 2004, moreover, explicitly
acknowledges that, "The overwhelming majority of victims
of terrorist attacks were citizens of countries other than
the United States. Many victims were Muslims."
These are certainly encouraging developments and the descriptions
that go with the numbers - though they tend to be somewhat
elementary in scope - are broadly consistent with assessments
within the region.
If there is a flaw or a deviation from a hard-eyed realism,
however, it is in the treatment of Pakistan, where a selective
blindness appears to have been adopted for reasons political
and diplomatic. The report is repeatedly appreciative of
Pakistan's exemplary role in combating terror: "Few countries
suffered as much from terrorism in 2004 as Pakistan, and
few did as much to combat it." CRT 2004, however, fails
to give even passing mention to the fact that Pakistani
state support to terrorism was - and in substantial measure
remains - at the root of terrorism in South Asia, though
there is some evidence of a systematic dilution (though
not abandonment) of the use of terrorism as an instrument
of state policy by General Pervez Musharraf's regime. Moreover,
while the strong action against Al
Qaeda and affiliated groups, as well
as groups that have targeted General Musharraf in assassination
attempts, has been commended, there is no mention whatsoever
of the systemic neglect of activities of a number of groups
- including several listed in the CRT 2004 as terrorist
organizations - whose activities are largely focused on
the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Pakistan's very
dubious role in nuclear proliferation is also studiously
ignored. This is despite the fact that CRT 2004 clearly
declares that "The United States and its partners must also
continue efforts to defeat non-al-Qa'ida terrorist groups,
discourage state sponsorship of terrorism, and prevent terrorist
access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." The truth
is, the entire leadership of terrorist groups operating
in J&K, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM),
the Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM),
the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
as well as their various front organizations, are headquartered
in Pakistan, and their leaderships have ample freedom of
movement and activity, and, if Indian authorities are to
be believed, substantial - though possibly diminished -
state support, at least in some cases. Further, the limited
state action taken against such leaderships has, at best,
been symbolic. Thus, as CRT 2004 notes, the head of HuM,
Fazlur Rahman Khalil, was arrested and detained "for several
months" (in fact, between August and December 17, 2004),
hardly the 'punishment' that would be imagined for the leader
of one of the bloodiest international terrorist organizations
operating out of Pakistan. The activities - open and unrestrained
- of Syed Salahuddin, the head of the HM, and of other leaders
of this group, are also well documented, and cannot have
been outside the ken of US intelligence. Nor, indeed, has
the LeT amir (Chief), Hafiz Mohammad Saeed been in
hiding over the past years. If nothing else, CRT 2004 should
have taken note of these, as well as of other evidence of
the state tolerance of particular patterns of Islamist extremist
and terrorist activities in Pakistan.
A comparable coyness also afflicts CRT 2004's approach to
Bangladesh. There is, of course, significant expression
of concern regarding "instability and widespread frustration"
in the country that has "provided recruits, support and
safe haven to international terrorist groups." The Report
also notes that, "Bangladesh's long tradition of inclusive,
moderate Islam is increasingly under threat from extremist
alternatives, already offering an attractive breeding ground
for political and sectarian violence." CRT 2004, moreover,
does, for the first time, take cognizance of terrorist movements
in India's Northeast by including one of the most prominent
organizations operating in that region - the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA)
- in its list of "Other Selected Terrorist Organisations".
However, the Report fails to acknowledge the presence of
ULFA's top leadership and a number of camps on Bangladeshi
soil, and overwhelming evidence of state support to this
and other groups in that country. The report speaks, further,
of Bangladeshi support to the global war on terror, but
offers alibis for failure in "weak institutions, porous
borders, limited law enforcement capabilities, and debilitating
in-fighting between the two major political parties." But
porous borders are not Bangladesh's problem - rather, these
are a problem for its neighbour, and Bangladesh has hotly
and often violently contested India's efforts to diminish
this 'porosity' by constructing a border fence. Most of
the growth of terrorism in Bangladesh is the result of the
radicalization of the country's own politics, and many of
the foreign terrorists and arms smugglers operating in the
country are doing so with the active support of local groups
that enjoy significant backing from elements within the
state structure, or that are directly supported by such
elements.
These are, at worst, surviving gaps in a report that has
made obvious efforts to accurately reflect the broad realities
of terrorism in South Asia. The evident intent and effort
that has gone into CRT 2004 needs to be consolidated, and
restored to the wider mandate of the PGT. As the Report
rightly notes, "the tasks confronting the United States
and its partners in the struggle against terrorism remain
formidable." This annual exercise at stock-taking is an
important tool for analysts and policy makers, and the closer
it reflects the realities of the ground, and the greater
the detail it offers, the more effective it will be, both
in its statutory intent and in its impact on the international
community.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
May
2-8, 2005
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
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BANGLADESH
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
14
|
7
|
39
|
60
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
5
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Manipur
|
9
|
0
|
1
|
10
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Total (INDIA)
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25
|
9
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43
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77
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NEPAL
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1
|
2
|
4
|
7
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PAKISTAN
|
7
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0
|
0
|
7
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SRI LANKA
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0
|
0
|
2
|
2
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen confirms
death of 14 cadres in Baramulla district of Jammu and Kashmir:
Even as there was
no official confirmation, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
on May 5 confirmed the death of 14 of its cadres in the 50-hour-long
gun-battle at Lawaypora village in the Bandipore area of Baramulla
district in Jammu and Kashmir on May 4-5, 2005. HM spokesperson,
Junaid-ul-Islam, told the local news agency KNS over
telephone that 14 cadres were killed in the Army operation.
He said that the dead included a number of 'battalion commanders'
and 'company commanders' of the Hizb. According to unnamed official
sources, the Army launched an operation after receiving information
regarding the presence of 18 terrorists at three different houses
in Lawaypora. Daily
Excelsior, May 5, 2005.
NEPAL
Maoist insurgents kill top Hindu
leader in Rupandehi district: A group of five Maoist
insurgents shot dead Narayan Prasad Pokhrel,
chairman of the World Hindu Federation (Nepal chapter), at Dudharachha
village in the Rupandehi district on May 6, 2005. Nepal News,
quoting the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported
that a Maoist-affiliated Dalit Mukti Morcha (Dalit Liberation
Front) leader said that their organisation had decided to 'eliminate'
Pokhrel for allegedly "indulging in various crimes in the disguise
of religion." According to reports, Maoists blamed Pokhrel for
indulging in sexual exploitation, amassing property illegally
and trying to garner popular support in favour of the monarchy.
Nepal
News, May 6, 2005.
PAKISTAN
Enemies 'within' can attack
President Musharraf again, says Minister of State for Religious
Affairs: Aamir Liaqat Hussain, Minister of State for Religious
Affairs, said on May 5, 2005, that President Pervez Musharraf
had a lot of enemies 'within' who could make an attempt on his
life again at any time. "President Musharraf has a number of enemies
who can try to assassinate him," the Minister said in an interview
to Daily Times. "No common people could attack President
Musharraf and certainly there are elements in the Forces who can
launch yet another attack against him," he said. Dr Hussain also
said there was "an ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] within the
ISI, which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating
many eventualities in the country." The Minister added that even
his own life was in danger due to his radical thoughts about religion,
which were unacceptable to many religious forces operating in
the country. Daily
Times, May 6, 2005.
Top Al Qaeda terrorist Abu Faraj Al Libbi arrested: Security
forces have arrested top Al
Qaeda terrorist, Abu Faraj Al Libbi, who was
allegedly behind two assassination attempts against President
Pervez Musharraf in 2003, Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao said
in Islamabad on May 4, 2005. Addressing a press conference, the
Minister said the Libyan national had been arrested a few days
back. However, he declined to give details about how and from
where Abu Faraj had been arrested. "I confirm that Abu Faraj Al
Libbi has been arrested but it is premature to say whether he
would be handed over to the US because during the investigation
process, which is under way, no decision in this regard can be
taken," said Sherpao. According to the Minister, "Besides attempts
on the life of President Musharraf, the Al Qaeda operative was
involved in many other cases of terrorism in Pakistan." Al Libbi,
who is said to be number three in the Al Qaeda hierarchy, carried
a head money of Pakistan Rupees (PKR) 20 million. 40-year-old
Abu Faraj was reportedly once Osama bin Laden's personal assistant.
Dawn,
May 5, 2005.
Parliamentary Committee adopts report on Balochistan: The
Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan met in Islamabad on May
2, 2005, and adopted, with certain amendments, the Mushahid Hussain
sub-committee report comprising eight recommendations, including
payment of gas royalty within a fixed period and a financial package
for the development of Sui, Gwadar and Quetta. The meeting, presided
over by Choudhury Shujaat Hussain, recommended Rupees Three billion
for the development of social service structure of Gwadar, Rupees
Two billion for Sui and Rupees Four billion for the upliftment
of the provincial capital Quetta. Later, speaking in the National
Assembly, Hussain stated that the Committee would complete its
final report in due course of time to be tabled in the House.
Dawn,
May 3, 2005.
Three million Afghans in Pakistan, says census: The Government
on May 2, 2005, announced the results of a countrywide Afghan
census and disclosed that there were 3,047,225 Afghans living
in Pakistan, including refugees and residents. Sajid Hussain Chattha,
States and Frontier Regions Secretary, Najam Hasan, Chief Census
Commissioner and Guenet Guebre-Christos, United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan, told a news conference in Islamabad
that the census carried out between late February and early March
counted a total of 3,047,225 Afghans who had arrived after December
1, 1979. The census determined that there were 1,861,412 Afghans
in North West Frontier Province, 783,545 in Balochistan, 136,780
in Sindh, 207,754 in Punjab, 44,637 in Islamabad and 13,097 in
Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Daily
Times, May 3, 2005.
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The South
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on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
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and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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