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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 10, September 13, 2011
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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See
no evil, hear no evil, do no good
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management & SATP
On September
7, 2011, a reception area outside gate No. 5 of the Delhi
High Court was targeted by a terrorist bombing, which
killed 13 and injured some 89 persons. This incident comes,
not as is widely being projected in the media and political
discourse, as a reminder of India’s extraordinary vulnerabilities
to terrorist violence (which remain unchanged), but rather
of the persistence of remarkable incoherence in the discourse
on terrorism, and in the design and execution of the country’s
counter-terrorism (CT) responses.
The real
political response to the challenge of terrorism in India
has been posturing, diversion and deception. The approach
has never been pragmatic, seeking, in good faith, to solve
a problem which has been assessed within realistic parameters.
Rather, the effort has been to politically exploit both
the problem and its purported resolution, or to deflect
criticism however this may be possible, in the event of
visible failures.
The response
to the Delhi High Court bombing on September 7, 2011,
was no exception. Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram immediately
sought to pin blame on the Delhi Police. However, the
Home Minister has, since the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks,
repeatedly gone on record to state that all of India’s
cities remained vulnerable. What, then, was the basis
of the conclusion that the High Court bombing was a consequence,
not of this vulnerability, but of specific failures on
the part of the Delhi Police? There is an added irony
here: the Delhi Police is directly under the Home Ministry’s
control, so any failure on its part would, eventually,
place the responsibility at the Union Home Minister’s
doorstep.
Spokespersons
for the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) have
also sought to argue that terrorism can only be prevented
if ‘citizens’ involve themselves in the various purportedly
related tasks; and that Delhi’s vulnerabilities were increased
because of the disruptive protraction of Anna Hazare’s
organized protests and fast against corruption and for
the Lok Pak Bill (anti-corruption legislation) between
August 16 and August 28, 2011. On the other hand, critics
of the Government, indeed, of the entire political class,
have earned applause on the argument that common citizens
have been left unprotected because an unacceptable proportion
of the state’s security resources is consumed by VIP security.
All this
is arrant, dishonest or misconceived nonsense.
It is not
the citizen’s job to fight terrorism – though state agencies
may seek citizens’ cooperation; such cooperation would
be eagerly extended if the credibility of and faith in
the Police and Government existed in sufficient measure.
In any event, it is the primary, indeed, primal, duty
of the state to protect its citizens, all other functions
only follow. The state cannot shift any fraction of the
blame for its own failures onto citizens.
The argument
that the Police can only provide security against terrorism,
or to VIPs, or to public agitations, at any one time,
is also sheer garbage. The security apparatus must protect
the common man against terrorism even while it shields
VIPs and guarantees the constitutional freedoms of democratic
protest. There is no either-or here; the state is required
to do all these simultaneously.
Opposition
parties have been quick to sense the susceptibilities
of the ruling alliance, and have drummed up a shrill campaign
to highlight the ‘failure’ to send a ‘tough message’ by
hanging terrorists, or by taking ‘strong steps’ against
Pakistan. This is another stream of unmitigated nonsense.
The US has done everything possible, with its far greater
power, down to bombing and carrying out ground operations
on Pakistani soil, with or without Islamabad’s consent,
to destroy the terrorist infrastructure that is inflicting
daily fatalities on US, International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Afghan troops, across the border in Afghanistan,
but has failed to end even what is now openly recognized
as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
support to various Taliban formations operating from Pakistan.
India, with its spectrum of policy options never broadening
beyond the option of talks or no talks, has no ‘messages’
to deliver to Pakistani state sponsors of terrorism. As
for hanging a few convicted terrorists in India – while
there is certainly a strong argument for this in view
of the fact that the judicial process has been exhausted
and its sentences need to be implemented if any sense
of the rule of law is to be maintained – there is little
reason to believe that this would make potential terrorists
cower with unprecedented fear. The truth is that terrorism
cannot be ended by ‘sending messages’ – however strong.
It will end only with a dismantling and eventual destruction
of all Pakistan backed Islamist terrorist and subversive
networks on Indian soil.
Little
has been done over the past years since commitments to
this end were made at the highest level in the wake of
the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008. Acknowledging the
probable ‘external linkages’ of these attacks, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh had promised, at that time, that his Government
would “go after these individuals and organisations and
make sure that every perpetrator, organiser and supporter
of terror, whatever his affiliation or religion may be,
pays a heavy price for these cowardly and horrific acts
against our people.” Further, he assured the nation, “We
will take the strongest possible measures to ensure that
there is no repetition of such terrorist acts.”
Since then,
however, what we have seen in terms of augmentation of
purported CT capabilities has been no more than a focus
on imitative, meta-institutional and big-budget projects
– the National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Counter
Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the National Intelligence Grid
(NATGRID), metropolitan National Security Guards (NSG)
hubs, among others – which tend to create the illusion
of power in agencies centralized at North Block, or in
State capitals. The progress on these initiatives has,
itself, been plagued by bureaucratic delays and a lackadaisical
political rhythm. On the other hand, the even more urgent
task of building fundamental capabilities of response
at the level of the thana, the police constable,
or the field intelligence operative, has substantially
been ignored, or has been pursued within a time perspective
that has no relevance whatsoever to the imperatives of
CT.
To take
an example, the former Union Home Secretary, G.K. Pillai,
who has been vocal in defence of the state’s policies
and response, noted, in the wake of the High Court bombing,
that current deficits in the Police across the country
totalled 1.8 million personnel, and, rather astonishingly,
that it would take nine years to recruit these numbers.
For one thing, over the coming nine years, requirements
would certainly rise very substantially, creating a significant
and new cumulative deficit. More importantly, however,
it is not clear in which Holy Book it is written that
1.8 million personnel cannot be recruited in less than
nine years. There is, of course, the perpetual lament
about a deficit of training facilities, and even – perhaps
more importantly – of suitable candidates for officer
cadres and for an improved human resource profile in the
constabulary. There is no reason why these deficiencies
cannot be addressed on a war footing, creating the necessary
trainers and facilities, and, where necessary, extending,
intensifying and improving training programmes and curricula
to create appropriate profiles, even if recruitment standards
need to be diluted. There is no reason to believe that
resources for these cannot be provided in a country where
INR 34 billion are being sought for the proposed NATGRID,
which would provide nothing more than a clearing house
to 21 existing databases, most of them – including banking,
credit card, visa, immigration, etc., – with peripheral
relevance to terrorist operations or significant violent
crime, though also including information available on
Police records. The last category, however, is also the
subject of a proposed Crime and Criminal Tracking Network
& Systems (CCTNS) project and the national intelligence
database to be created under the Multi Agency Centre (MAC)
within the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Evidently, the country
has money to throw on multiple and overlapping projects,
and there should certainly be no insurmountable obstacle
to allocating budgets for accelerated recruitment and
training to the Police so that existing and emerging deficits
can be met on a war footing.
Numbers,
moreover, are not everything. There is tremendous waste,
mis-utilisation and mis-direction of human resources in
the Police across the country, and remarkable gains can
be secured even through improved allocation, retraining,
reorientation and reequipping of existing forces. To take
an example, Andhra Pradesh, in 2005, was among the States
worst afflicted by Naxalite violence, with all 23 of its
Districts in acute crisis. A focused campaign through
2006 and 2007 decimated the Maoists, reducing the insurgency
to a marginal irritant in just eight border Districts,
where Maoists continue to launch occasional attacks, principally
against civilian targets (there has been no Security Force
fatality in the State after May 29, 2008). Crucially,
the Andhra Pradesh Police-population ratio in 2006 was
just 98 per 100,000, and, in 2007 had fallen to 96 per
100,000, as against an all-India average of 126 and 125,
in these years, respectively. An undermanned system cannot,
of course, maintain exceptional levels of efficiency indefinitely,
but the Andhra Police has demonstrated what can be achieved
even with severely limited manpower.
Another
example helps illustrate the sleepy pace of state responses.
The use of ammonium nitrate as an explosive by terrorists
was noticed as far back as 1997-98, when Delhi was subjected
to a succession of bomb blasts. Since then, ammonium nitrate
fuel oil (ANFO) devices have been used in numberless terrorist
attacks – including the Delhi High Court bombing (though
traces of military grade PETN were also detected in this
last case). It was only after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks,
that, in December 2008, the Home Ministry notified ammonium
nitrate as a “special category explosive substance” under
the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. On July 21, 2011,
the Commerce Ministry issued a further notification that
“ammonium nitrate or any combination containing more than
45% of ammonium nitrate by weight including emulsions,
suspensions, melts or gels, shall be deemed to be an explosive.”
Ammonium nitrate fertilizers and products with higher
concentrations continue to be freely available across
the country, and there is no report suggesting even that
their manufacture has been brought under effective regulation.
As far
as Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorism is concerned, India
has secured a high measure of unearned relief over the
past years, as a result of Pakistan’s rising internal
crises, external pressures, and preoccupations with more
urgent strategic ambitions in Afghanistan. Islamist terrorist
related fatalities outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)
have fallen from peaks of 262 and 367 in 2006 and 2008,
respectively, to 20 in 2010 and 40 in 2011 (till September
11). Even in J&K, fatalities have declined dramatically,
from a peak of 4,507 in 2001, to 375 in 2010.
This is
an opportunity to secure an extraordinary consolidation
in India’s CT capabilities at the grassroots level. Policing
in India, today, is a “broken system” reflecting high
degrees of “dysfunction, abuse and impunity”. The country’s
security apparatus fails to reflect her pretensions as
an emerging global power. Technical and technological
inputs are, of course, critical to any modern systems
of intelligence and enforcement, but these will never
be the outcome of technologies alone. It is the Policeman
and the field intelligence operative – his training, orientation,
capabilities and, crucially, mindset – that makes the
difference between a modern and an obsolete enforcement
apparatus. It is, consequently, the profile of these personnel
– their education, training, skills and orientation, of
course, but also their welfare and status in society –
which must undergo comprehensive transformation. The task
of this transformation has been emphasized ad nauseum
by successive Government agencies, Police Commissions
and independent commentaries. However, no Government,
at the Centre or in most States, appears to have the will,
or even the desire – given the potency and persistence
of the politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus the N.N. Vohra
Committee documented as far back as in 1993 – to create
a modern, efficient and empowered security apparatus,
answerable to the law.
In the
cacophony of partisan recriminations that has followed
the Delhi High Court bombing, not a single constructive
policy perspective emerges. Confusion, directionless rage,
opportunism and, above all, ignorance – these exhaust
the spectrum of the political discourse.
For all
the hysteria expended in the wake of the present attack,
and those that have preceded it over the years, the reality
is that, at our present state of capabilities, we can
neither prevent every possible attack (if this is ever
possible), nor resolve every case that occurs. Our exclusive
focus on and obsession with the terrorist incidents themselves
is, in fact, part of the problem. These incidents are,
and will always be tragic, irrespective of their frequency
or the number of fatalities. More important, in terms
of our CT policy, strategy and capabilities of response,
is what is done, or, more likely, not done, between incidents.
It is in this respect that Governments in India continue
to fail, comprehensively.
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Quetta:
The Price of Sheltering Terror
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
At least
28 persons were killed and another 60 injured in twin
suicide attacks in the Civil Lines area of Quetta, the
Provincial capital of Balochistan, on September 7, 2011.
At 8.58 AM, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a vehicle
packed with explosives near the Deputy Inspector General
(DIG) of the Frontier Corps (FC, Balochistan), Brigadier
Farrukh Shehzad’s car. Five minutes later, another suicide
bomber entered the DIG’s house and detonated his device.
According to a Civil Defense official, about 100 kilograms
of explosives were used in the twin blasts. Significant
gunfire was also reported from the site of the blast.
The attacks targeted the DIG, and the dead included Colonel
Khalid Masood of the FC and the wife of the DIG. Shehzad
was injured, but survived.
Earlier,
on April 7, 2011, a suicide attack at the house of DIG
(Investigations), Wazir Nasir Khan, in Quetta, killed
two persons – the bomber and a Police Constable. The attacker
entered the residential Police colony in an explosive
laden car and rammed it into the DIG’s house. A Police
constable posted at the gate died, and nine others, including
the DIG and several children, were injured.
Claiming
responsibility for the September 7 attacks, the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan stated, “Our
fidayeen (suicide bombers) have carried out this
attack. It is revenge for the arrests of our brothers
in Quetta. If they make more arrests then the reaction
will be much more forceful.” On September 5, 2011, Inter
Services Public Relations (ISPR) disclosed that FC personnel
had arrested senior al
Qaeda leader, Younis al-Mauritani,
believed to have been responsible for planning attacks
on the US, Europe and Australia, in Quetta on an unspecified
date. He was arrested along with two other high-ranking
al Qaeda operatives, Abdul Ghaffar Al Shami aka
Bachar Chama and Messara Al Shami aka Mujahid Amino.
On September 7, 2011, the US had imposed financial sanctions
on three al Qaeda militants based in Pakistan, including
al-Mauritani, as well as the Libya-born propaganda chief,
Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Mustafa Hajji Muhammad Khan, responsible
for logistical support to al Qaeda.
Quetta
witnesses high levels of violence, both by Islamist extremists
and Baloch nationalists. There have already been at least
79 militancy-related incidents in Quetta in 2011 (till
September 12), as against 101 in 2010, 73 in 2009, 81
in 2008, 72 in 2007, 75 in 2006, 61 in 2005, 51 in 2004
and 32 in 2003, according to the partial data compiled
by the Institute for Conflict Management. At least
136 persons, including 113 civilians, 12 Security Force
(SF) personnel and 11 militants, had been killed in the
current year (till September 12). Fatalities in 2010 stood
at 177, including 152 civilians 20 SFs and five militants.
The Balochistan Province accounted for at least 502 and
347 terrorism / militancy related fatalities in 2011 and
2010, respectively.
Terrorist
violence in Quetta has had a significant sectarian overlay.
In a prominent attack, at least 11 Shias were killed and
another three were injured when their vehicle was attacked
near a bus stop on Spiny Road in Quetta on July 30, 2011.
In another attack, a suicide car bomb killed at least
11 Shias and injured 22, while they were celebrating Eid-ul-Fitr
in Quetta on August 31, 2011. The bomber was apparently
targeting a Shiite mosque, but could not get close enough
because the road was blocked. Significantly, Federal Minister
of Interior Rehman Malik on July 13 said over the past
three years, 134 Punjabi-speaking people had been killed,
while another 45 were killed in sectarian violence in
Balochistan.
The relatively
small proportion of SF fatalities, however, indicates
that frontal engagements with the militants occur infrequently,
suggesting a tacit understanding between the two apparently
warring sides. Significantly, where a succession of major
military operations have been launched (no doubt with
very uncertain outcomes) in other provinces, including
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and even in the Baloch rebel areas of
South Balochistan, the Taliban dominated North Balochistan,
including Quetta and its environs see little by way of
concerted military effort to defeat the extremists. The
reason is obvious, and increasingly acknowledged by security
observers: as is the case in the North Waziristan agency
in FATA, where the presence of the Jalaluddin Haqqani
Network has prevented Pakistani Forces from even thinking
of launching operations, the existence of the Mullah Mohammad
Omar dominated Quetta Shura, and of senior al Qaeda leaders
in Quetta, explain Islamabad’s reluctance to launch operations
in this region.
The Quetta
Shura, as the name suggests is a Shura (council) based
in Balochistan’s provincial capital. It was formed by
Taliban militants, under the leadership of Mullah Omar,
who fled Afghanistan after US Forces attacked the Taliban
in Afghanistan in November 2001. After long denying the
existence of this group, the Pakistan Government, on December
10, 2009, conceded the existence of the Shura. Defense
Minister Chaudhary Ahmad Mukhtar claimed, in a media interview,
that the SFs had “taken on” the Quetta Shura and had inflicted
considerable damage, adding, “It no longer poses any threat.”
Evidently, both the operational success claimed was vastly
exaggerated, and all indicators suggest that the Quetta
Shura is alive, well and quite active, even as the policy
of denial has been restored. In the latest assertion to
this effect, for instance, Balochistan Chief Minister
Nawab Muhammad Aslam Raisani on August 4, 2011, denied
media reports about the existence of Quetta Shura or the
presence of Mullah Omar or al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri
in Balochistan.
Nevertheless,
on May 16, 2011, SFs did kill five suspected al Qaeda
linked militants, foiling an alleged attempt to carry
out a suicide bombing in Quetta. Earlier, a person suspected
of having links with the Afghan Taliban was arrested along
with explosives during a search of the Quetta-bound Chaman
passenger train at the Chaman Railway Station on April
8, 2011. The September 5, 2011, arrest of Younis al-Mauritani
and two of his associates from the city demonstrated
the presence of some top al Qaeda operatives in Quetta.
Worryingly, the extremists also have a huge popular support
base, and hundreds took to the streets in Quetta on May
2, 2011, to pay homage to Osama bin Laden, chanting “Death
to America” and setting the US flag ablaze. The demonstrations
were led by Maulvi Asmatullah, an independent Member of
the National Assembly.
Meanwhile,
Interior Minister Malik, in a Press Conference on September
10, 2011, disclosed information that suggested that the
situation in Quetta was decidedly likely to worsen. He
claimed that, “The Tehreek-e-Taliban [Pakistan, TTP] leaders,
who were based in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA), are facing defeat at the hand of the Pakistan
Army and have now moved to Quetta.”
The Quetta
Shura-al Qaeda combine has plagued US-led forces fighting
in Afghanistan. In one of the deadliest recent attacks,
on August 6, 2011, Afghan Taliban militants, working under
the guidance of the Quetta Shura shot down a Chinook Transport
Helicopter in the Wardak Province of eastern Afghanistan,
killing 30 US troops, including 22 Navy SEAL’s from the
elite Team 6 – the unit that neutralised Osama bin Laden
in the Abbottabad raid – six Afghan National Army (ANA)
commandos, and one civilian interpreter. Reiterating Islamabad’s
support to terrorist formations in Afghanistan, US Republican
Senator Mark Kirk, on September 6, 2011, stated, "Let
me be clear: many Americans died in Afghanistan because
of Pakistan's ISI
[Inter Services Intelligence]… Pakistan's intelligence
service is the biggest danger to the Afghan Government.
It is also a tremendous threat to the lives of American
troops.”
Pakistan
has also utilized the militant combine’s services in carrying
out attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan. 79
persons have been killed in at least 16 attacks on Indian
interests in Afghanistan since 2003. In the latest of
such attacks, two Indian nationals were killed in a missile
strike launched by Taliban militants on an Indian Non
Governmental Organisation’s (NGO's) office in Kunar Province
of Afghanistan on October 11, 2010. Earlier, on February
26, 2010, Taliban militants carried out coordinated suicide
attacks at two hotels in Kabul, killing at least nine
Indians, including two Major-rank Army officers. At least
10 others, including five Indian Army officers, were injured
in the strike, which killed eight others, including locals
and nationals from other countries. The bombers, believed
to be three in number, struck at the guest houses, particularly
at Park Residence, rented out by the Indian Embassy for
its staffers and those linked to India’s developmental
work in Afghanistan. These attacks are believed to have
been directed by the Quetta Shura.
The Pakistan
establishment believes that its relations
with Afghanistan under the incumbent President Hamid Karzai
are at odds and its perceived need for ‘strategic depth’
in the country. Consequently, Islamabad has supported
Taliban formations in Afghanistan, including the Quetta
Shura, believing that these will help drive its strategic
interests forward in the event of a premature US withdrawal.
There is
visible reluctance in the Government and the Army to take
on the Quetta Shura and al Qaeda elements in and around
Quetta, even as Pakistan’s SFs execute a brutal ‘kill
and dump’ policy against Baloch nationalist rebels. Voice
for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) Chairman Nasrullah Baloch
on August 18, 2011, claimed that more than 190 bullet-riddled
dead bodies had been found during the preceding 11 months.
Earlier on June 29, 2011, describing lawlessness in the
Province, Zohra Yusuf, Chairperson, Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan, confirmed that at least 140 mutilated bodies
of people who had gone ‘missing’, had been recovered over
the preceding year. "A very dangerous trend has emerged
that those who disappeared were now found dead on roadsides.
The bodies have torture marks," she noted. The
disappearances and killings are widely believed to have
been engineered by the Pakistan Army and its intelligence
services. Meanwhile, on August 16, 2011,
former Balochistan Chief Minister Mir Humayun Marri alleged
that the SFs, backed by the Police, had planted arms and
ammunition at his farmhouse as a part of bigger plot to
kill him.
As in its
other provinces, Pakistan’s dual game of targeting one
set of militants / extremists, while protecting and even
supporting others who are deemed to serve the country’s
purported ‘strategic interests’, continues in Balochistan
as well. Indeed, in order to appease the Quetta Shura-al
Qaeda combine, Pakistan has even asked the US to vacate
the Shamsi Air Base in the Kharan District of North West
Balochistan, as it overlooks the Quetta region, and is
used by the US to execute Drone operations against these
groups within and outside Balochistan.
Quetta
Shura and al Qaeda linked terrorists are bringing increasing
chaos into the city in particular, and the Balochistan
Province and the country at large. The ambivalence of
the Pakistani establishment has fed, and continues to
feed, their power both within the country, and across
the border into Afghanistan, where they have wreaked devastation
in eight Provinces, including Helmand and Kandahar, where
some of the highest International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Afghan fatalities have been recorded.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in
South Asia
September 5-11, 2011
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Delhi
|
13
|
0
|
0
|
13
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Jharkhand
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Odisha
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
17
|
0
|
0
|
17
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
18
|
11
|
2
|
31
|
FATA
|
3
|
0
|
6
|
9
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
Sindh
|
9
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
30
|
12
|
9
|
51
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh
and India agrees to draft
Extradition Treaty:
India and Bangladesh on
September 7 agreed to draft
an Extradition Treaty that
will allow Bangladesh to
deport Indian insurgents
being held in its jails.
Bangladeshi Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, who met in Dhaka,
said both countries would
cooperate in the area of
counterterrorism. Monstersandcritics,
September 8, 2011.
INDIA
13
persons killed in bomb blast
in Delhi: 11 persons
were killed and 91 persons
got injured in Delhi in
a bomb blast near Gate Number
5 of the Delhi High Court
on September 7. Two of the
injured persons died later.
Times
of India,
September 7-9, 2011.
ULFA
and NSCN-K planning to shift
their camps in Myanmar following
Army operation: The
United Liberation Front
of Asom (ULFA) and National
Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K) are planning to
shift their camps in Myanmar
amid reports of a crackdown
by the Myanmarese army on
them. The NSCN-K claimed
that about 400 Myanmarese
soldiers had moved into
the area where its headquarters
were located. Times
of India,
September 11, 2011.
LeT
had planned Mumbai-style
attacks in Himachal and
Punjab, Wikileaks
reveals: Secret intelligence
reports that have come to
light in leaked US diplomatic
cables pointed to efforts
by "Kashmiri terrorists"
to conduct November 26,
2008 Mumbai (26/11)-style
attacks in Himachal Pradesh
and Punjab after the 26/11
attack. A classified intelligence
report sent out by Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton
in March 2009 details efforts
by terrorists to "set off
explosions and carry out
terrorist attacks" in the
two States and speculates
that a terror team might
have already arrived in
Himachal Pradesh to carry
out the attack. Indian
Express,
September 8, 2011.
More
than 350 militants operating
in Jammu and Kashmir:
More than 350 militants,
many of them Pakistanis,
are operating in Jammu and
Kashmir, the Lok Sabha (Lower
House of Parliament) was
informed on September 6.
"With regard to terrorist
organisations in Jammu and
Kashmir, presently about
350-370 are assessed to
be operating in Jammu and
Kashmir. Out of which approximately
38 per cent are foreign
militants, primarily Pakistani,"
Minister of State in the
Ministry of Home Affairs,
Jitendra Singh, said in
a written reply. Zee
News,
September 7, 2011.
CPI-Maoist
recruited 1,505 cadres during
2010 and 1,458 during current
year: Informing the
Lok Sabha about the Left
Wing Extremism (LWE) organisations,
Minister of State in the
Ministry of Home Affairs,
Jitendra Singh, on September
6 said, that LWE groups
particularly the Communist
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
in the recent past have
been indulging in recruitment
of cadre in their strongholds.
"As per available inputs,
the CPI (Maoist) has recruited
1,505 cadre during 2010
and 1,458 during current
year," he said. Zee
News,
September 7, 2011.
ISI
created Jammu and Kashmir
Islamic Front, reveals Wikileaks:
The US officials knew for
a very long time that Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI)
had created various terrorist
groups, including those
based out from Nepal, to
carry out attacks in India,
according to the latest
US cables released by Wikileaks.
The US cables clearly show
that Americans also knew
that Tiger Memon, the prime
accused in 1993 Mumbai blast
case and an aide of global
terrorist Dawood Ibrahim,
had tied up with the ISI.
Indian
Express,
September 8, 2011.
ISI
used Nepal as a hub for
terror inside India, says
Wikileaks: The
Inter services Intelligence
(ISI) had made Nepal a hub
of anti-India terror activities
from where it pushed huge
quantities of RDX into the
country, latest US cables
released by the Wikileaks
revealed. In these cables,
US officials had conceded
that it was the ISI which
created various terrorist
fronts to carry out terrorist
activities in India, including
the bomb blasts in the busy
areas of Connaught Place,
Lajpat Nagar in New Delhi
and several cities across
the country. Times
of India,
September 7, 2011.
816
Naxalites surrendered from
2008 to 2010, says Union
Minister of State in MHA
Jitendra Singh: Minister
of State in the Ministry
of Home Affairs, Jitendra
Singh, in a written reply
to a question in the Lok
Sabha (Lower House of Parliament)
informed on September 6
that a total of 816 Naxalites
[Left-Wing Extremists (LWEs)]
have surrendered from 2008
to 2010. While 400 LWEs
surrendered in 2008, 150
and 266 LWEs surrendered
in 2009 and 2010 respectively.
PIB,
September 6, 2011.
Chhattisgarh
passes Auxiliary Armed Police
Force Act: Two months
after the Supreme Court
held that the deployment
of Special Police Officers
(SPOs) in the fight against
Naxalites [Left-Wing Extremists
(LWEs)] was illegal, the
Chhattisgarh Assembly on
September 8 passed an Act
authorising an "auxiliary
armed force" to "assist
security forces in dealing
with Maoist/Naxal violence"
and legalising existing
SPOs by inducting them as
members. The Chhattisgarh
Auxiliary Armed Police Force
Act came into force with
retrospective effect from
July 5, the day the apex
court passed its order.
Indian
Express,
September 10, 2011.
NEPAL
Nepali Congress unveils
14-pt document on peace
process: The Nepali
Congress (NC), which unveiled
its official and latest
stand on peace process on
September 7, said it is
seriously doubtful over
the commitment of Unified
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
(UCPN-M) to implementing
the past pacts concerning
peace and statute, especially
given the "controversial"
four-point deal with United
Democratic Madhesh Front
(UDMF). eKantipur,
September 8, 2011.
PAKISTAN
28
persons killed in twin suicide
attacks in Balochistan:
At least 28 people were
killed and over 60 injured
in two suicide attacks targeting
the residence of the Deputy
Inspector-General (DIG)
of Frontier Corps (FC) Brigadier
Farrukh Shehzad in Quetta
on September 7. The dead
included a Colonel of the
FC and the DIG's wife.
Dawn;
Daily
Times;
The
News;
Tribune,
September 6-12, 2011.
US
sanctions three al Qaeda
leaders in Pakistan:
US officials on September
7 imposed financial sanctions
on three al Qaeda leaders
based in Pakistan, including
Libya-born propaganda chief,
Abu Yahya al-Libi. The two
others named by the US Treasury
Department were Younis al-Mauritani,
who was arrested in Quetta
on September 5, and Mustafa
Hajji Muhammad Khan, who
was identified by Treasury
as a logistical supporter
of al Qaeda. Dawn,
September 8, 2011.
12,020
persons arrested during
eight months, says Karachi
Police press release:
Karachi Police press release
said that have arrested
12,020 accused from January
1 to September 8, 2011,
during actions against criminal
elements, while 26 Police
Officers and Constables
embraced martyrdom and 65
others injured during encounters.
12,020 accused including
5,239 dacoits, 6,427 absconders
and 354 wanted accused.
Police recovered 4,194 illegal
weapons, including 38 SMGs,
LMGs; 11 shotguns, 54 rifles,
82 repeaters, 3,648 pistols,
210 revolvers, four carbines,
22 mousers, four RPGs and
20 hand grenades from their
possession. Daily
Times,
September 12, 2011.
30
percent of Karachi Policemen
are terrorist sympathisers,
says Sindh Police Chief
IGP Wajid Ali Durrani:
Alluding to the Supreme
Court's criticism of inherent
weaknesses in Police investigations,
the Sindh Police Chief Inspector-General
of Police (IGP) Wajid Ali
Durrani confessed on September
9 that an incomplete FIR
had led to exoneration of
alleged attackers. IGP Wajid
Ali Durrani said, "Thirty
per cent of the police force
sympathises with them [criminals],"
he claimed. Tribune,
September 10, 2011.
All
political parties have armed
groups, says Chief Justice
of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry: Chief Justice
of Pakistan (CJP) Justice
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry
on September 8 remarked
that "all the political
parties have formed armed
groups and the current situation
is very critical". The CJP
further said, "If the criminal
factor is eliminated from
political parties, a peaceful
atmosphere can be restored
across Sindh, especially
in Karachi." Daily
Times,
September 9, 2011.
ISI
responsible for death of
Americans in Afghanistan,
says US Senator Mark Kirk:
Terming Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) as the
biggest danger to the Afghanistan
Government, US Senator Mark
Kirk on September 8 said
that ISI was responsible
for the death of several
Americans inside war-ravaged
Afghanistan. "Pakistan has
become the main threat to
Afghanistan. Pakistan's
intelligence service is
the biggest danger to the
Afghan government. It is
also a tremendous threat
to the lives of American
troops," Senator Mark Kirk
said. Indain
Express,
September 9, 2011.
SRI LANKA
Resettlement
of IDPs almost complete,
says Government: The
Government said that Welfare
camps in the Eastern and
Northern provinces had been
closed with over 95 percent
of the quarter million internally
displaced persons (IDPs)
in them having returned
to their homes. Resettlement
Ministry officials said
on September 5 that the
Government was set to provide
them with permanent houses.
Daily
News,
September 6, 2011.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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