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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 35, March 5, 2012
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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The
Maoists: Dance of the Tarantula
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management & SATP
The trajectory
of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
movement across India demonstrates conflicting trends
which give, at once, great relief to the state and to
affected populations across wide areas, even as assessments
of the Maoist threat allow little scope for any measure
of complacence.
There has,
over the years 2010-2011, been an abrupt geographical
and operational contraction of the movement, resulting
in a dramatic drop in fatalities, declining incidents
of Maoist violence, and a retraction from a number of
areas, principally in regions where the Maoists sought
to make new inroads in the execution of their decision
to “extend the people’s war throughout the country”. There
has, nevertheless, been a troubling extension in some
new areas, most prominently in India’s troubled Northeast,
where a multiplicity of ethnicity-based insurgencies have
collapsed, creating new spaces for radical expansion by
the Maoists.
In 2008,
the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) had indicated
that a total of 223 Districts across 20 States were variously
affected by the Maoist movement. By 2011, this assessment
had dropped to just 182 Districts (as on October 31, 2011)
in 20 States – though a breakdown of the intensity of
the movement in these Districts is not available. Partial
data compiled from the open source by the South Asia Terrorism
Portal (SATP) confirms these broad trends, with total
affected Districts dropping from 194 in 2008 to just 141
in 2011. Significantly, SATP enumerates just 48 of these
Districts in the Highly Affected category in 2011, down
from 58 in 2008; another 47 and 46 Districts, respectively,
were listed in the moderately and marginally affected
categories in 2011, as against 54 and 83 Districts in
these categories in 2008.
State-wise
Distribution of Maoist-affected Districts - 2008 and 2011
States
|
2008
|
2011
|
SATP
|
UMHA
|
SATP
|
UMHA
|
Andhra
Pradesh
|
23
|
22
|
12
|
11
|
Bihar
|
32
|
33
|
27
|
29
|
Jharkhand
|
23
|
24
|
20
|
23
|
Madhya
Pradesh
|
06
|
07
|
06
|
03
|
Uttar
Pradesh
|
06
|
09
|
05
|
08
|
Odisha
|
22
|
20
|
18
|
19
|
Maharashtra
|
07
|
06
|
11
|
07
|
West
Bengal
|
17
|
18
|
08
|
12
|
Chhattisgarh
|
14
|
16
|
13
|
14
|
Delhi
|
0
|
03
|
02
|
07
|
Haryana
|
07
|
03
|
0
|
02
|
Karnataka
|
12
|
09
|
03
|
08
|
Kerala
|
03
|
14
|
0
|
08
|
Tamil
Nadu
|
08
|
09
|
01
|
04
|
Uttarakhand
|
09
|
12
|
0
|
04
|
Punjab
|
0
|
08
|
0
|
09
|
Tripura
|
0
|
02
|
0
|
02
|
Assam
|
0
|
04
|
11
|
10
|
Rajasthan
|
03
|
01
|
0
|
01
|
Arunachal
Pradesh
|
0
|
0
|
02
|
01
|
Gujarat
|
02
|
03
|
0
|
0
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
01
|
0
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
01
|
0
|
Total
|
194
|
223
|
141
|
182
|
Significantly,
all the Red Corridor States have recorded a decline in
the number of affected Districts, even as reverses have
been registered in several of the newer ‘extension’ areas.
Andhra Pradesh – which was already significantly on the
mend in 2008 – has seen the most dramatic recovery, with
affected Districts down from 22 (23. All data in brackets
from SATP) to 11 (12). SATP data indicates that just two
– Khammam and Vishakapatnam – of 12 affected Districts
in the State are currently in the ‘highly affected’ category.
Uttarakhand has seen a drop from 12 (9) affected District
to just four (0).
There is
troubling news from the Northeast, with Assam registering
a rise from four (0) to 10 (11) affected Districts; Arunachal
Pradesh has one (two) new entrant; and Tripura maintains
two (0) Districts affected by Maoist activities. Nagaland
also records one affected District in 2011 on SATP data,
though UMHA data records no Maoist activities in the State.
Far afield
from their traditional areas of dominance, the Maoists
have also registered noticeable activities in Punjab,
with nine (0) affected Districts, up from eight (0); and
Delhi, with seven (two) affected Districts, up from three
(0).
Harayana,
Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Gujarat,
again, lying outside traditional areas of Maoist activity,
have registered a decline in the numbers of Districts
affected. Intelligence sources indicate that the Maoists
are exerting particular efforts to set up bases on the
tri-junction of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
Fatalities
data also reflects remarkable shifts. From a peak of 1,005
Maoist-related fatalities in 2010 according to MHA data
(1,180 according to SATP), total fatalities in 2011 had
dropped sharply to 606 (602). The most dramatic decline
was recorded in West Bengal, which had emerged, abruptly,
as the State with the highest number of incidents and
fatalities in 2010, according to SATP data, with killings
dropping from 258 (425) in 2010 to just 41 (53) in 2011.
The spike in fatalities in West Bengal in 2009-10 was,
of course, the consequence of the pre-election scenario,
with an alliance of opportunity forming between the Trinamool
Congress and the Maoists in a range of widespread populist
mass
mobilisations, backed by Maoist violence,
intended to unseat the entrenched Communist Party of India
– Marxist (CPI-M) Government that had ruled the State
for the 34 years, before it was routed in the elections
of April-May 2011. With the installation of the TC Government
in Kolkata, a ceasefire – part of the pre-election deal
between the Maoists and the TC – brought violence down
to a trickle, though a upward trend was again visible
towards the end of the year, as the unprincipled deal
between the TC and the Maoists collapsed,
as expected, with TC cadres and leaders increasingly targeted
by the rebels. Significantly, West Bengal recorded just
three Maoist-linked fatalities in 2007, 26 in 2008, and
158 in 2009.
MHA data
indicates that Chhattisgarh has consistently remained
the worst affected State, in terms of fatalities, over
the past years – though SATP data suggests that this position
of pre-eminence was briefly relinquished to West Bengal
in 2010. Chhattisgarh recorded 202 (176) fatalities in
2011, down from 343 (327) in 2010. 2011 also recorded
182 fatalities in Jharkhand; 64 in Bihar, 54 in Maharashtra,
and 53 in Odisha.
SF fatalities
in Maoist-related violence dropped from 285 (277) in 2010
to 142 (128) in 2011; while civilian fatalities fell from
720 (626) to 464 (275) over the same period.
The number
of major incidents (involving three or more fatalities)
also registered a significant decline, from 60 such incidents
in 2010, to 47 in 2011. Of the latter, four incidents
in 2011 saw double-digit fatalities, as against 11 in
2010. Incidents which saw double-digit fatalities in 2011
included:
December
3-4: 11 persons, including 10 Policemen, were killed when
CPI-Maoist cadres attacked the convoy of Member of Parliament
and former Jharkhand Speaker Inder Singh Namdhari, in
Latehar District in Jharkhand. Namdhari, however, escaped
unhurt. The Maoists looted 10 weapons, 2,000 rounds of
ammunition and one wireless set in this incident.
August
19: 11 Policemen and a civilian were killed, and three
sustained injuries, in an ambush set by CPI-Maoist cadres
in the forest near Metlaperu village under the Bhadrakali
Police Station area of Bijapur District in Chhattisgarh.
A force of about 70 Policemen had set out from Bhadrakali
for operational and logistical operations. The Police
claimed ‘four or five Maoists’ were also killed.
June 10:
The CPI-Maoist cadres blew up an anti-landmine vehicle
and opened fire on the survivors, killing 10 Security
Force (SF) personnel – seven SPOs and three Police constables
– and injuring another three at a bridge near Gatan village
in Katekalyan area in Dantewada District in Chhattisgarh.
May 3:
11 SF personnel were killed and nearly 40 injured when
CPI-Maoist cadres set off landmines in a trap laid out
in the Lohardaga District in Jharkhand. After a tip off
about Maoists having assembled there, the SF personnel
drawn from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Jharkhand
Jaguars, Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP) and the District
Armed Police (DAP) went to Urumuru village, but returned
after failing to find any Maoists. On their return, they
were ambushed in the Dhardhariya Hills under the Senha
Police Station. The Maoists had planted improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) across an area of two kilometres, each
at a distance of 1.5 to 2 feet, according to the Police.
The most
significant reverses suffered by the Maoists, however,
were in the neutralization (arrest or killing) of their
top leadership cadres. While total Maoist fatalities have
registered significant declines, from 219 (294) in 2009,
through 172 (277) in 2010, to 99 (199) in 2011, the attrition
at the top has been devastating. SATP data indicates that,
of the 16-member Politburo of 2007, two have been killed,
while another seven are in custody. This has left just
Muppala Lakshman Rao aka Ganapathy, the party General
Secretary, Prashant Bose aka Kishan Da, Nambala Keshavarao
aka Ganganna, Mallojula Venugopal Rao aka Bhupathi, Katakam
Sudershan aka Anand, Malla Raji Reddy aka Sathenna and
Misir Besra aka Sunirmal, still underground and
active out of the Politburo members.
Of the
39 member Central Committee (including the Politburo),
eighteen have been neutralized – with five killed, and
13 in custody. Comparable attrition has been recorded
in the Regional, State and District level leaderships,
sending the movement into a defensive tailspin. As many
as 1,972 Maoists have been arrested in 2011, adding to
2,916 in 2010 and 1,981 in 2009; and another 393 surrendered
in 2011, as against 266 in 2010 and 150 in 2009. Significantly,
an overwhelming proportion of top leadership cadres have
been neutralized across the country as a result of intelligence
based-operations led by the Andhra Pradesh Police and,
in particular, the State’s Special Intelligence Branch.
In the
meanwhile, state responses have also shifted track, with
the vaunting ‘clear, hold and develop’ strategies aggressively
advocated by the UMHA, and enthusiastically embraced by
some States – particularly including Chhattisgarh – having
been entirely abandoned. Indeed, after the Chintalnad
incident of April 2010, in which 76
SF personnel were killed, the aggressive ‘area domination’
approach was abruptly discarded, as the disconnect between
objectives and capabilities became obvious even to those
who had deliberately blinded themselves to the realities
of the ground. The UMHA has, since, shifted its rhetoric
to a ‘holistic’ approach, increasingly emphasising development,
on the one hand, and the responsibility of the States
for ‘law and order’ operations, and emphasising ‘capacity
building’ and the ‘containment of violence’ rather than
any ambitious campaigns to wipe out the Maoists in their
heartland areas. The UMHA’s reports increasingly emphasise
financial allocations to the States under the Integrated
Action Plan (with an outlay of INR 15 billion in 2010-11,
and INR 18 billion in 2011-12), as well as Central support
to the States for various modernization and capacity building
projects. In addition, the UMHA has emphasised a range
of capacity building measures for Central Paramilitary
Forces, including the sanction of 116 additional battalions,
of which 36 had been raised, and another 21 were in the
‘process of being raised’. The States have enthusiastically
embraced this approach, shifting the emphasis from operational
successes and ‘kills’, to the more leisurely rhythm of
purported developmental interventions under various ‘integrated
action plans’. Regrettably, anecdotal evidence from most
of the States suggests that implementation of these plans
is riddled with corruption and irregularities, and only
a tiny proportion of the very considerable allocations
actually reach intended beneficiaries in the Maoist-affected
areas, and at least a significant fraction of these actually
flows into Maoist coffers.
Most of
the Red Corridor States have substantially increased Police
recruitment, and have improved Police-population ratios.
According to data compiled annually by the National Crime
Records Bureau, the Indian average remained static at
133 between end-2009 and end-2010 (the UMHA claimed, at
different points in 2011, ratios of 160 and 176 per 100,000
population, but these claims are, likely, based on a fudging
of data, since the sheer quantum of recruitment that would
be required to secure these ratios has simply and visibly
not occurred). However, several of the Red Corridor States
improved their ratios significantly between 2009 and 2010.
Andhra Pradesh recorded an increase from 128 per 100,000
to 131; Chhattisgarh from 164 to 170; and Jharkhand, from
139 to 151. However, Bihar, with the worst ratio in the
country, went up from an abysmal 62 to just 64; and West
Bengal, from 93 to 95. Maharashtra actually dropped from
166 to 164; and Orissa from 108 to 106.
Nevertheless,
while significant – though still far from adequate – transformations
have occurred in the strength at the level of the constabulary
in many afflicted States, these have not resulted in proportionate
increases in State Forces deployed for counter-insurgency
duties, and there is also an acute and persistent crisis
at leadership level. At the apex, the Indian Police Service
registered a shortfall of over 28 per cent against a sanctioned
strength of 4,720, despite an accelerated intake, up from
135 in 2010 to 150 in 2011. In Chhattisgarh, for instance,
the Police population ratio has gone up from 103 in 2005,
through 164 in 2009 to as much as 170 in 2010. Further,
more than 18,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel and officers
have been trained for counter-insurgency at the Counter-insurgency
and Jungle Warfare School at Kanker. Yet, the operational
counter-insurgency deployment of State Police Forces remains
at barely 3,000. Significant improvements in capacity
in terms of Police modernization, fortification of Police
Stations, and training are yet to create a decisive operational
impact.
The Maoists
have, in essence, suffered tremendously as a result of
their strategic overreach, to extend their people’s war
into areas where conditions were far from favourable for
radical and armed mobilisation, even as the state has
been forced to dilute its ‘massive and coordinated’ offensive
operations after the dramatic losses suffered by SFs in
a succession of high profile incidents through end-2009
and early 2010. On both sides, there is some evidence,
both, of disarray, and of a more concerted, coherent,
effort towards consolidation and towards reconciling strategies
and tactics with capacities and capabilities. The visible
decline in a range of parameters of Maoist activities
coincides with a frenzied effort behind the scenes to
recover from the reverses of the recent past, and there
is little reason to believe that the next cycle of overt
and aggressive confrontation between the rebels and the
state will be less bloody than the last.
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Gilgit-Baltistan:
Murder most Foul
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
.…The
Shias and Sunnis have always peacefully coexisted
in Gilgit-Baltistan. Even today they do not consciously
take up fights with each other, unless pushed. The
history of violence here is old. It goes back to
the days when Pakistan established a fake autonomy
over us. It is since the last 40 years that our
lives have been plagued by the ever present Pakistan
military here.”
Spokesman
of a Gilgit-Baltistan nationalist organization,
on condition of anonymity, in an interview to SAIR,
March 2, 2012.
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At least
18 Shias from Gilgit-Baltistan were killed on February
28, 2012, by armed assailants in military uniforms on
the Karakoram Highway in the Kohistan District of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, while they were returning in a convoy from
a pilgrimage to Iran. According to the Police, the assailants
flagged down four buses, boarded them, and asked the passengers
whether they were Shia or Sunni. They then asked the Shias
to step out of the buses and checked their identity cards
before pumping bullets into them. All those killed were
men, while the eight injured included women and children.
Soon after,
tension started brewing in Gilgit. In a clash with law
enforcement agencies in Gilgit District on February 29,
a man, identified as Naveed was killed and two others
were injured. The Police also recovered a dead body from
a mountain in the Napur area of Gilgit on March 1. Earlier,
on February 28, the Gilgit District Administration had
imposed Section 144, prohibiting public assemblies or
demonstrations and the display of arms, in Gilgit city,
and had closed all private and Government organisations
for three days.
Meanwhile,
the anti-Shia outfit Jandullah ‘commander’ Ahmed Marwat
claimed responsibility for the attack, declaring, “they
were Shias and our mujahideen shot them dead”.
However, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly Member, Mehboob Khan,
in a bizarre statement, blamed the people of Gilgit-Baltistan
for carrying out the attacks in Kohistan to settle ‘personal
scores’. Abdul Sattar Khan, Member Provincial Assembly
(MPA) from Kohistan’s Dassu tehsil (revenue unit)
in an attempt to give credence to the theory, noted that
two persons belonging to the Sunni-populated Chilas area
had earlier been killed in sectarian clashes in Gilgit-Baltistan,
and the people of Chilas had vowed to avenge the two deaths.
He claimed that the killings could be the result of the
sectarian strife within Gilgit-Baltistan.
The MPAs’
observations appear to be misplaced. Despite a fear of
the revival of sectarian skirmishes in Gilgit-Baltistan
on the day of fateful incident, a media report from The
Express Tribune on March 2, 2012, stated that the
elders of the Shia dominated Nagar Valley in Hunza Nagar
District took at least 35 Sunni labourers working in the
area into protective custody and handed them over to the
Police, who escorted them safely to Gilgit, the next day.
Quoting this incident during his telephonic interview,
the spokesman of a Gilgit-Baltistan nationalist organisation
observed,
.A
sense of belonging to this region is inherent in
the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and binds them together
across sectarian lines. Faith based killings, or
killing for one's identity is not common among the
people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan’s brutal encroachment
and the eventual fanning of the Shia-Sunni divide
by the military and corrupt officialdom installed
by Islamabad has sometimes led to some stray acts
of sectarian killings. The general perception of
a low level of sectarian violence in Gilgit, compared
to other ‘explosive regions’ of Pakistan, is correct,
because people here are not divided on any sectarian
or ethnic lines; in fact, they are united on a common
goal of attaining their rightful political autonomy
and achieving their basic rights.
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Gilgit-Baltistan
has historically remained a peaceful region, with occasional
cycles of orchestrated tension and violence. Shias were
a majority in the region until the Government of Pakistan
breached the State Subject Rules (SSR) promulgated in
1927 by the last Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh, in a massive
effort at demographic re-engineering. According to the
State Subject Rules, no non-local could take up permanent
residence or acquire property in the Gilgit-Baltistan
region. The rule, however, was suspended and violated
when the Pakistan Government in the 1970’s, during the
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto era, settled thousands of people from
the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa)
in Gilgit-Baltistan, converting the local majority into
a minority. The first reported sectarian clash took place
during Bhutto’s regime in the mid-1970s, when Bhutto prohibited
the Shias from setting up stages on the streets. The consequent
Shia resentment resulted in firing by the Police, injuring
many.
Later,
in May 1988, military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, in
an attempted massive sectarian attack, sent a Lashkar
(army) of militants, comprising natives of Afghanistan
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to attack the Shias living there.
The fire of sectarianism was lit by Zia during the last
days of his rule.
In the
words of International Crisis Group’s (ICG) report
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas:
.…Sunni
zealots, predominantly from NWFP’s tribal areas,
assisted by local Sunnis from Chilas, Darel and
Tangir, [on May 17, 1988] attacked several Shia
villages on the outskirts of Gilgit. For three days,
they killed, looted and pillaged with impunity while
the authorities sat back and watched. Although contingents
of the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary (FC) were
eventually sent in, they too looked the other way
while Sunni attackers wreaked havoc. By the time
army units were sent in to quell the violence, at
least 150 people were killed, several hundred injured
and property worth millions of rupees destroyed.
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The brunt
of the radical Islamisation policy of General Zia-ul-Haq
in this region focused on settling outsiders in the area,
impacting directly and adversely on the local people.
The policy of Islamization, the Afghan crisis in the 1980s,
the revolution in Iran in 1979, each had a cumulative
impact on sectarian turmoil. Even after these events subsided
and the General Pervez Musharraf regime announced a policy
of ‘enlightened moderation,’ nothing spectacular happened
to assuage the wounds of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
Gilgit
had come under the firm grip of sectarian violence in
1992 following the assassination of Gayyasuddin, a Sunni
leader, on May 30 that year, leading to at least 30 killings.
The subsequent conciliatory peace talks ended when Latif
Hassan, a Shia leader, was shot dead on August 4, 1993,
again leading to clashes that claimed more than two dozen
lives. Also, the year 2003 saw trouble brewing in the
Northern Areas over the Islamic textbooks that the Pakistan
Ministry of Education had issued as part of the curriculum
for the schools in the region. According to Shia community
leaders, the textbooks promote Sunni thought and values
and are an attempt to promote sectarian hatred between
the two sects.
Apart from
cycles of violence and sustained oppression from above,
a low literacy rate and acute poverty act as powerful
deterrents to any movement to further the region’s democratic
demands, and contribute directly to the growth of sectarian
fanaticism. The Zia era witnessed the creation of extremist
groups like the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
and, in response, the Shia Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria.
In 1996, the SSP created an armed wing, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ). At the other end, the Shias formed their own armed
outfit, the Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP). The aggressive
Sunni Islamisation drive initiated by General Zia impacted
substantially on Shia-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan, with
the Pakistan Army and politicians in Islamabad seeking
to divide the region along sectarian lines to retain tight
control over this strategically important area.
On December
7, 2005, for instance, a Daily Times editorial
noted that intelligence agents had discovered that the
LeJ and SSP were planning to use suicide-bombers to target
Shia members of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Council.
Earlier in October
2005, hired Sunni militants had attacked
a group of Shias in Basen, 58 kilometres from Gilgit Town
on the Ghezer road, killing two and wounding others. Two
of the gunmen escaped, but a third was injured and thereafter
arrested by the local police, and taken to the District
Hospital, Gilgit. Some documents recovered from his possession
indicated that he came from Kohistan in the NWFP. Shortly
thereafter, however, the Pakistani Rangers, on orders
from the ‘highest quarters’, forcibly removed the perpetrator
from the hospital, apparently to avoid his identification
and interrogation by the local police, which, sources
in Gilgit indicate, would have exposed a larger conspiracy.
A majority of those killed have been demonstrators who
have fallen to the bullets of the state’s paramilitary
force, the Pakistan Rangers, and sources in Gilgit claim
that, contrary to the official position, there is no tension
between local Shias and Sunnis, but rather a deliberate
effort from the outside, part of a long-drawn campaign,
to create mischief in the region.
A report
by Freedom House in 2010, noted, further:
A
number of Islamist militant groups, including those
that receive patronage from the Pakistani military,
operate from bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
Militant groups that have traditionally focused
on attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir are reportedly
expanding their influence and activities in Pakistani
Kashmir, including the establishment of new madrassas
(religious schools) in the area. They have also
increased cooperation with other militants based
in Pakistan's tribal areas, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP)…… In August (2010), the Pakistani
Government banned 25 militant groups operating within
the country, including those focused on Kashmir.
Although the Government claimed to have raided and
sealed off the Muzaffarabad headquarters of the
LeT, also known as the Jama’at-ud-Dawa, other reports
indicated that the group continued to operate training
camps in the region.
|
Though
the changed demographic nature of the region and continuous
Pakistani attempt to foster sectarian strife to divide
the people and thus deprive them of a ‘united formation’
has led to some sectarian strife, the local culture has
remained substantially resistant to violence. Significantly,
media reports indicate that five people were killed and
another eight were injured in sectarian-motivated killings
in the month of November 2011. However, with little media
presence in the region, and tremendous manipulation of
reports, suspicions persist that these killings may have
been orchestrated by the Pakistani establishment, rather
than motivated by local sectarian sentiment.
Moreover,
Security Forces (SFs) are accused of barging into the
houses without search and arrest warrants. Islamabad and
its “state apparatus” have been accused of engineering
‘disappearances’ and illegal detentions in the region.
In one glaring incident of excesses, Manzoor Parwana,
a leading politician in Gilgit-Baltistan, was abducted
by Pakistan’s SFs on July 28, 2011, for demanding the
rights of the more than ten thousand Ladakhi refugees,
who reside in different parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, and
desire reunification with their relatives in India. He
is yet to be released.
In September
2011, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) expressed
alarm at the arrest of over two dozen political activists
in Gilgit-Baltistan and reports of maltreatment of some
of them in detention. In connection with the August 11,
2011 protests over non-payment of compensation to the
victims of the Attabad landslide, an HRCP statement observed,
The
Commission takes serious exception to the manner
in which the authorities have chosen to deal with
public resentment following the August 11 killings.
The Policemen accused of the killings have yet to
be arrested but many political and civil society
activists have been held in a crackdown against
the protesters. HRCP has noted with concern reports
of mistreatment of some of the activists.
|
The population
of Gilgit-Baltistan is silenced by an overwhelming military
and intelligence presence, arbitrary
detentions and ‘disappearances’. A
devastating report by the European Union Rapporteur, Baroness
Emma Nicholson, while deploring “documented human rights
violations by Pakistan” declared unambiguously that “the
people of Gilgit and Baltistan are under the direct rule
of the military and enjoy no democracy”. Nicholson’s report
was scathing on the sheer oppression of the people, on
the complete absence of legal and human rights and a Constitutional
status, as well as on the enveloping backwardness that
had evidently been engineered as a matter of state policy
in the region.
The President
of Pakistan ‘selects’ the Chief Ministers of Gilgit-Baltistan,
and they are not, consequently, answerable to the local
people. They remain subject to military and bureaucratic
pressures from Islamabad. Not surprisingly, Chief Minister
Mehdi Shah of Pakistan People’s Party, in a startling
revelation, disclosed that he had been forbidden to take
action against corrupt officials in the past by sitting
Assembly Members, on political and sectarian grounds.
However, the speaker of Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly,
Wazir Baig, of Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarian
(PPPP), an electoral extension of PPP in Gilgit-Baltistan,
accused the Chief Minister of orchestrating recent extra
judicial killings and the arrest of dozens of innocent
local youth.
Despite
a fitful focus on the more extreme developments in the
region, Gilgit-Baltistan has largely been ignored by the
international media and community, substantially as a
result of its remoteness and intentional isolation by
Islamabad. The denial of basic rights is a quotidian reality
in the region, with periodic escalation of orchestrated
excesses by state agencies or Islamist extremist proxies.
Despite clear directives from the Supreme Court of Pakistan,
the ambiguity of the region’s constitutional status –
and hence the denial of legal and constitutional protection
to the population – persists. Islamabad has combined the
military jackboot with the instrumentalisation of extremist
majoritarian Islam as its principal strategy of political
management in Gilgit-Baltistan, and the population continues
to despair for any proximate relief in a situation where
every dissenting voice is immediately and effectively
suffocated.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
February 27-March
4, 2012
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
5
|
NEPAL
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
8
|
3
|
3
|
14
|
FATA
|
3
|
10
|
92
|
105
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
28
|
3
|
2
|
33
|
Sindh
|
9
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
Gilgit-Baltistan
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
49
|
16
|
97
|
162
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
US
Special Forces are in Bangladesh, says USPACOM
chief Admiral Robert William: US Pacific
Command (USPACOM) chief Admiral Robert Willard
told lawmakers at a Congressional hearing
on March 1 that US Special Forces teams
are currently stationed in five South Asian
countries, including Bangladesh, as part
of the counter-terrorism co-operation with
these nations. He stated, "We have currently
special forces assist teams laid down in
Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives and
India as part of the effort to enhance their
counter-terrorism capabilities." bdnews24,
March 3, 2012.
INDIA
MEA
and MoD deny presence of US Special Forces
in India: The Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
on March 2 denied US Pacific Command (USPACOM)
chief Admiral Willard's statement that crack
US military troops were based in India besides
Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives
to counter threats from organizations such
as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Both Ministries
dismissed the claim as "factually incorrect
so far as the reference to India is concerned'',
sources said. The
Hindu, March 3,
2012.
Centre
may soon approve increased military presence
across Naxal belt in east and central India,
says report:The Central Government is
finalizing a series of decisions to increase
military presence across the Naxal [left-wing
extremist] belt in east and central India.
Among them is a plan to raise the first
Territorial Army battalion comprising of
local tribals.
Times of
India, March 2,
2012.
Three
CRPF battalions de-inducted and 39 CPMFs
bunkers removed from Srinagar: The Jammu
and Kashmir Government de-inducted three
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalions
and removed 39 Central Paramilitary Forces
(CPMFs) bunkers from Srinagar. "The foot
prints of security forces are being reduced.
As many as three CRPF battalions have been
de-linked, 39 security bunkers removed in
Srinagar city and 52 buildings vacated from
forces occupation," Chief Minister Omar
Abdullah said on February 29.
DNA,
March 1, 2012.
NEPAL
13
PLA cantonments to be closed down by March
10: Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai
led Special Committee on February 29 decided
to shut down 13 People's Liberation Army
(PLA) cantonments and relocate Unified Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) combatants
opting for integration to the remaining
15 cantonments within the next 10 days.
The move follows a petition to the Prime
Minister on February 28 by Nepali Congress
(NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified
Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) members of the
committee, calling for immediate progress
on the stalled peace process. ekantipur,
March 1, 2012.
PAKISTAN
92
militants and 10 SFs among 105 persons killed
during the week in FATA: Four militants
were killed and two others received injuries
in clashes between two rival outfits in
Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency in Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on March
3.
25
Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militants were killed
in a suicide attack carried out by a rival
group, targeting a mosque after Friday prayers
on March 2 in Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency.
23
LI militants and 10 Army personnel were
killed in fresh clashes in Lakaro Baba area
of Tirah Valley.
17
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants,
including two key 'commanders', were killed
and 13 injured, while five of their hideouts
were destroyed after jetfighters pounded
their hideouts in Akhun Kot, Bilrass and
Chappar areas of Manozai areas of Upper
Orakzai Agency.
At
least 20 militants were killed and their
five hideouts were destroyed by Security
Forces (SFs) in different areas of Orakzai
Agency on March 1.
Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News; Tribune,
February 28 - March 5, 2012.
Islamabad
denies WikiLeaks claim on links between
its intelligence and Army officials and
Osama bin Laden: Pakistan on February
29 rubbished WikiLeaks disclosure
that some of its intelligence and Army officers
were in touch with slain al Qaeda chief
Osama bin Laden and knew his whereabouts
before his killing in Abbottabad on May
1-2, 2011. "These kinds of charges are not
new… far from the truth," said Pakistan
military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas.
Tribune,
February 28, 2012.
SC
petitioned again to permanently end the
political wing of ISI: Another petition
filed on February 29 before Pakistan Supreme
Court by Chairman of Al-Jihad Trust,
Habib Wahabul Khairi, asking it to shut
the political wing of Inter-Service Intelligence
(ISI). The petitioner, Khairi, accused former
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of forming
the ISI's political cell for his personal
interests in 1975. Indian
Express, March 1,
2012.
ATA
to be amended to check money-laundering
in Pakistan, informs SBP Governor Yasin
Anwar: The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)
on February 27 informed Senate Committee
on Finance that Pakistan would amend its
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). It said it is
working on a draft legislation to ensure
enforcement of ATA provisions in financial
services sector for conviction of persons
found involved in money-laundering. Daily
Times, February
28, 2012.
US
express concern over Pakistan diverting
aid money for other purposes: United
States (US) Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and lawmakers on February 28 expressed concern
over diversion of its aide money by Pakistan
for other purposes, even as the US has tried
to build a firewall in this regard. "Well,
we certainly have constructed one," Clinton
told lawmakers. Indian
Express; Dawn,
February 29, 2012.
Time
to get rid of 'strategic depth' hangover,
says Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar:
Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar on March
2 said that it is time to get rid of 'strategic
depth' hangover. She hoped for a relationship
with Afghanistan based on trust and called
for leaving behind the past associated with
interference in that country and support
for Taliban. Dawn,
March 3, 2012.
SRI LANKA
Army
to scale down its presence in North and
East: Army Commander Lieutenant General
Jagath Jayasuriya said that the Army is
to scale down its presence in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces. The Army is now completely
ready for far-reaching reforms in its structural
composition regarding ground realities,
security and needs of island-wide ongoing
development projects, he added. Colombo
Page, March 3, 2012.
Terrorism
countered without any racial discrimination,
says President Mahinda Rajapaksa: President
Mahinda Rajapaksa on February 28 said that
the Protest in North and East along with
other parts of country on February 27, irrespective
of all differences, against a resolution
before the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva
against Sri Lanka proved that ruthless terrorism
was defeated without rousing racist passions
by the State. The President also stated
that the international community does not
have a genuine desire to build unity among
peoples of this country. Daily
News, February 29,
2012.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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