SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 6, August 12, 2013

INDIA	PAKISTAN

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Renewed Misadventures
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

In the early hours of August 6, 2013, personnel of Pakistan Army’s Border Action Team (BAT) along with a group of 20 heavily armed terrorists entered 450-metres deep into the Indian Territory along the Line of Control (LoC) in the Poonch sector (Poonch District) of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The intruders ambushed an Indian Army patrol consisting of six soldiers, killing five of them and injuring another. Confirming the Pakistan Army’s role in the August 6, 2013, incident, the Army said, “The ambush was carried out by approximately 20 heavily armed terrorists along with soldiers of the Pak Army”.

Prior to this incident, on January 8, 2013, Pakistani troopers and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)-backed terrorists breached the LoC in the Mankot sector of Mendhar tehsil (revenue unit) in Poonch District, ambushed an Indian Army patrol, and killed and mutilated two Indian troopers, identified as Lance Naik Hem Raj and Lance Naik Sudhakar Singh. Lance Naik Hem Raj was decapitated and his head was carried away by the attackers, while fleeing back into Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) territory.

Giving details of the January 8, 2013, incident, India’s Military Intelligence disclosed that the beheading was done by one Anwar Khan, a local guide who runs a shop in Barmoch Gali in PoK. Anwar was rewarded with PKR 500,000 by ISI Colonel Siddiqui, and was part of a group of 15 terrorists, 10 from Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and five from Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Though investigations into the August 6 incident have just begun, some reports suggest that the same Anwar Khan may have been involved in this attack as well. Reports also indicate that, on both occasions, the LeT founder and Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JUD) chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, who is very close to the ISI and Pakistani civilian Government, had visited the territory on the Pakistani side.

There appears to be a clear intention on the Pakistani side to disrupt the deepening peace in J&K, with continuous violations of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) along the LoC and the International Border. According to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), while Pakistani Forces violated the CFA with India on 44 occasions in 2010, 51 such incidents were recorded in 2011 and 93 in 2012. The current year (till August 12, 2013) has already witnessed 65 CFA violations. More worryingly, while three Army personnel were killed during these violations between 2010 and 12 (two were killed in 2010 and another in 2012), the current year has already recorded nine fatalities. Apart from January 8 and August 6 incidents, Pakistani troops on resorted to ceasefire violation at Sabjian along the LoC in the Mandi sub sector of Poonch District June 7, 2013, resulting in the death of a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) of the Indian Army. A Border Security Force Head Constable, who was injured in firing by Pakistani Army in the Ramgarh Sector of Samba District on August 5, 2013, succumbed to his injuries on August 11, 2013.

Infiltration bids by ISI-backed terrorists have also been increasing. According to Army sources, while there were 49 infiltration attempts, including 13 successful ones, until the end of June 2012, the number increased to 69, including 30 successful, in 2013 (till June). The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) has recorded at least 15 infiltration attempts resulting in 19 fatalities (18 terrorists and one SF trooper) since July 1, 2013. The database shows that a total of 21 infiltration bids have been made through 2013, resulting in 25 fatalities (23 terrorists and two SF personnel).

The calibrated Pakistani Army actions at the border have helped Pakistan-based terrorists infiltrate into J&K. According to Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) data, while 52 terrorists entered Indian territory in 2011, the number increased considerably in 2012, with 121 terrorists entering J&K. The number of terrorists confirmed to have entered the State in current year is not currently available. However, given the broad trend in supportive Pakistan Army action across the border and LoC, it is likely that a larger number of terrorists would have successfully infiltrated in the current year. Significantly, the Intelligence Bureau, in a comprehensive report, noted that at least six terrorists managed to successfully sneak into Indian territory under cover of the August 6, 2013, attack.

Unsurprisingly, escalating efforts by the Pakistani Army and its terrorist proxies have resulted in a rise in the level of terrorist violence in J&K. The State had witnessed 57 terrorism-related fatalities, including nine civilians, eight SF personnel and 40 terrorists, in 2012; till August 11, fatalities recorded in the current year have already risen to 108 (including 14 civilians, 42 SF personnel and 52 terrorists). More worryingly, during the current year, the State witnessed the deadliest attack [on June 24, 2013, when militants killed eight Army personnel] as well as a suicide attack [on March 13, 2013, which killed five Central Reserve Police Force troopers] in a long time. 

In fact, the deadliest attack this year, on June 24, 2013, took place well after Nawaz Sharif had been sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan for his third tenure on June 5, 2013. Since Sharif assumed power, J&K has recorded at least 64 fatalities (including four civilians, 23 SF personnel and 37 terrorists. Similarly, the number of CFA violations and infiltration bids has increased considerably since Sharif’s ascent to power. Pakistani Forces have violated the CFA on at least 19 occasions since Sharif was sworn in, killing seven Indian soldiers. Moreover, ISI-backed terrorists have made at least 16 infiltration bids, in which 22 terrorists and a soldier have been killed. Indian intelligence assessments suggest that the ISI is ‘increasing pressure’ on the Nawaz Sharif Government to act on Kashmir. The Pakistani PM has reportedly cleared a new ‘Kashmir strategy’ and has set up a Kashmir Cell in his office, to ‘keep track’ of developments on Kashmir.

The escalation in J&K appears connected to the Pakistani objective of forcing India out of Afghanistan as well. Significantly, nine Afghans, including at least eight children, were killed, and another 24 were wounded on August 3, 2013, in a suicide attack intended to target the Indian Consulate at Jalalabad, the capital of the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan. The three attackers were also killed. However, all Indian officials in the Consulate remained unharmed. Nangarhar Province Police Chief General Sharifullah Amin confirmed that the Consulate was the intended target of the blast. Reports now confirm that the attackers were residents of Punjab Province in Pakistan, from where LeT recruits most of its cadres.

Sharif’s rhetoric on improving relations with India clearly fails to match up with developments on the ground. In this context, it is useful to re-examine his past misadventures as well as present overtures towards terrorist formations. Advocates of an intensifying ‘peace process’ between New Delhi and Islamabad have wilfully ignored the subterfuge of Pakistan’s assertion that it is not the Government, but the ‘non state actors’, who are behind various ‘adverse developments’.

Despite mounting evidence of intentional Pakistani malfeasance, however, the Indian Government appears to be in an unseemly hurry to engage with Pakistan. This, perhaps, was the reason behind Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s failure to confirm the role of the Pakistani Army in the August 6 attack in his first address to the Indian Parliament on the same date. Better sense was, however, forced on the Government, both by the growing ire within the Indian Army and families of the personnel killed, as well as by strident criticism in the media, with Antony conceding in Parliament on August 8, 2013,

It is now clear that the specialist troops of Pakistan Army were involved in this attack when a group from the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) side crossed the LC and killed our brave jawans. We all know that nothing happens from Pakistan side of the Line of Control without support, assistance, facilitation and often, direct involvement of the Pakistan Army. Those in Pakistan who are responsible for this tragedy and the brutal killing of two soldiers earlier this year should not go unpunished. Pakistan should also show determined action to dismantle the terrorist networks, organizations and infrastructure and show tangible movement on bringing those responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008 to justice quickly. Naturally, this incident will have consequences on our behaviour on the Line of Control and for our relations with Pakistan. Our restraint should not be taken for granted; nor should the capacity of our Armed Forces and resolve of the Government to uphold the sanctity of the LoC ever be doubted.

The desperate farce of India’s talks with Pakistan has been entirely exposed by the Pakistani military and terrorist misadventures of the recent past, demonstrating, once again, that a criminalized state in Islamabad cannot be relied upon to act within established norms of a civilized relationship, and that terrorism and brinkmanship remain the principal instrumentalities of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

PAKISTAN

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Gilgit Baltistan: Terror Thrives
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 6, 2013, terrorists killed Diamer District Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Muhammad Hilal Khan, and two Army officers, Colonel Ghulam Mustafa and Captain Ashfaq Aziz, in an ambush at Rohni in the Chilas District of Gilgit Baltistan (GB) in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The officials were involved in the investigation of the June 23, 2013, massacre of foreign climbers at Nanga Parbat and were returning after a meeting in Diamer.

Significantly, 10 foreign mountaineers were among 11 persons killed, when terrorists wearing uniforms of the GB Scouts (a Paramilitary Force) attacked the Nanga Parbat base camp in the Bonar area of Diamer District and shot the climbers and a Pakistani guide at point-blank range. The victims included an American with dual Chinese citizenship, three Ukrainians, two Slovakians, two others from China, a Lithuanian and a climber from Nepal. One Chinese climber reportedly survived by fleeing the scene.

Claiming responsibility of the August 6, 2013, attack, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had declared that its affiliate, Janood-e-Hafsa [JeH, Army of the Lioness (Hafsa: also the name of one of the Prophet Mohammad’s wives)], was behind the attack. JeH was also behind the June 23, 2013, Nanga Parbat attack. TTP’s then spokesperson, Ehsanullah Ehsan, had stated that this new faction of the TTP had carried out the attack to avenge the killing of Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the TTP ‘second-in-command’, who was killed in a US drone strike in the Chashma area of Miranshah, the main town of the North Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), on May 29, 2013. 

On June 25, 2013, the Chief Minister of GB, Syed Mehdi Shah, had disclosed that 37 suspects detained after the gruesome attack on the climbers were being interrogated and significant progress was expected over the following ‘two days’. Gilgit Inspector General of Police Usman Zakria then claimed, on June 26, 2013, that 15 terrorists involved in the attack had been identified. However, no further action has been taken and, with the killing of the investigating officials, the probe appears to have hit a wall.

Local analysts observe that TTP has extended its influence deep into GB and its local networks have been involved in several terrorist activities. Sher Ali, a Hunza valley-based political activist thus notes, "Like in the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the TTP has opened a new front in GB and their terrorists have been found in the region, among banned sectarian and Jihadi groups." Wazir Baig, the speaker of the GB Assembly, confirmed, separately, "The TTP's claim of responsibility indicates that they have entered the region," and added that stern action should be taken against any terrorist taking refuge in Diamer.

The Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (ASWJ), the front organisation of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a banned sectarian formation, has a strong presence in the region. It has made a pledge to ensure that "Gilgit-Baltistan remains a Sunni province" [GB is, in fact, Pakistan’s only Shia majority region, under tremendous pressure of an Islamabad-backed effort of demographic re-engineering].

As SAIR has noted, Islamabad has turned Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) – including both Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and GB – into a hub of Islamist extremism and terrorism since the 1990s. Terrorist groups including Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and many others, have been facilitated in creating bases and training camps in the region. These terror camps are ‘global in nature’ – including terrorist formations that have an international agenda. India maintains that “42 terror training camps were very much alive and kicking in PoK”. On April 6, 2012, China – Pakistan’s ‘all weather ally’ – indirectly – confirmed the existence of these terrorist camps, alleging that insurgents of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) had been trained at camps in PoK.

All the terrorist groups operating in GB have primarily been engaged in state sponsored sectarian violence. According to partial data compiled by SATP, GB has recorded at least 115 fatalities, including 89 civilians, 14 SF personnel and 12 terrorists since 2000. Most of these killings have been sectarian in nature. The year 2013 has, thus far, registered 16 killings (11 civilians and five SF personnel).

Indeed, attempts by the political and administrative class to deepen the sectarian divide in GB have vitiated the security environment in the region and have provided ample opportunity for the terrorists to thrive. According to a March 12, 2012, media report, for instance, large amounts of illegal arms and ammunition had reached GB, traversing three-hundred kilometers of heavily securitized territory, passing through numerous check posts and pickets set up by the law enforcement agencies. The report also highlighted that a large number of locals from various areas of GB had been trained for terrorist activities in camps at Diamer and Mansehra. Past reports had also indicated that terrorist training camps had been established, or had been run at different points of time, in various locations within GB, including Tangir and Darel, Astore, Darul-Uloom, Juglote, Gilgit, Madrasa Nusratul-Islam, Konodas, Skardu city, and Ghowadi village near Skardu. 

The spaces created by the ISI for state-backed terrorist formations are now being exploited vigorously by the anti-state TTP as well. This was, in fact, confirmed by former Federal Minister of the Interior Rehman Malik, who, on August 28, 2012, claimed that ‘criminals’ had been running towards Gilgit Baltistan as they feared military operation in Waziristan in FATA. The statement was in conformity with the widely perceived notion that GB had emerged as a safe haven for terrorist outfits. On August 2, 2013, Gilgit Town SSP Ali Zia disclosed that law enforcement agencies had launched an operation to arrest suspects believed to have entered Gilgit Baltistan after being trained in Miranshah to carry out terrorist attacks. These fitful and selective efforts, however, have done little to alter the broad trends towards radicalization and state-backed sectarian extremism in the region.

In an apparent effort to deal with the ‘alarming situation’, Chief Minister Shah, on June 6, 2012, handed over 2,000 weapons and 200,000 rounds to the Police. The weapons included a total of 700 G3-rifles with 70,000 rounds, 300 7.62mm sub-machine guns with 30,000 rounds, and 1,000 9mm MP5 sub-machine guns with 100,000 rounds. GB presently has a total of 5,500 police personnel, including support staff, such as drivers and cooks, yielding just 7.37 Policemen per 100 square kilometres in this volatile region and its harsh terrain.

Earlier, on May 28, 2012, the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) had enacted a Code of Conduct (CoC) in order to curb the ‘sectarian menace’, becoming the first provincial legislature to have enacted a law dealing with sectarianism. GB Chief Secretary Saifullah Chatha, while addressing lawmakers, observed, “I’m hopeful that the rest of (the) Assemblies would also emulate GBLA in order to root out religious extremism from their respective regions.” Indeed, sectarian violence has engulfed the region in the aftermath of the August 16, 2012, targeted attack, in which 25 Shias from GB were killed at Babusar Top, which connects GB to the rest of the country, in the Naran Valley of Mansehra District of neighbouring KP.

Such initiatives, however, remain cosmetic and, in continuing attempts to deepen the sectarian divide, the GB Government suspended 60 Shia Government officers [48 on July 25, 2012 and another 12 on August 2, 2012], to ‘punish’ them for allegedly attending a function of the Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), a Shia Muslim religio-political party in Pakistan. Chief Allama Nasir Abbas Jaffri. Allama Aijaz Behishti, head of MWM Youth Affairs, claimed that the Government was trying to intimidate Shia officials and warned that the community was aware of this ‘conspiracy’. This order evoked instant reaction from all parts of Pakistan, with thousands of people thronging Gilgit Baltistan’s streets in protest. According to an unconfirmed August 12, 2012, report, the Government has reinstated 59 of these officers.

Islamabad’s intentions to radicalize and demographically re-engineer the GB region remain unchanged, though its Forces have suffered some losses as a result of the ‘blowback’ of renegade terrorist formations targeting them as well. There is, nevertheless, no evidence of any change in the devious strategy to push this Shia majority region into Sunni domination, both through demographic transformations and terrorist action.

PAKISTAN

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Quetta: Unending Bloodbath
Anurag Tripathi
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 8, 2013, at least 38 persons, including 21 Policemen, were killed and another 40 were injured in a suicide bombing at a funeral in the Police Lines area of Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan. Among those killed were Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Operations, Fayyaz Ahmed Sumbal; Superintendent of Police (SP), Headquarters, Mehrullah; Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Shamsur Rehman; SP Traffic, Mohammad Anwer Khilji; Inspector Shakeel Akbar; and five personnel of the Anti-Terrorist Force (ATF). The majority of the injured personnel were from the Balochistan Constabulary, ATF, and Police.

According to sources, Inspector General (IG) Balochistan, Mustahq Ahmed Shukera and Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Mir Zubair Mehmood were the prime targets of the attack. However, they escaped the blast since they arrived at the location just minutes later.

The bomber struck when the officers and personnel had gathered to pay their last respects to the Station House Officer (SHO) of the City Police Station, Mohibullah, who had been killed by terrorists in the Killi Almo area of Quetta earlier in the day. The terrorists had opened indiscriminate fire on a Police van, killing the SHO and injuring six others.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for both incidents.

A day later, on August 9, 2013, eight persons were killed and several others were injured when terrorists opened fire targeting former Provincial Minister Ali Madad Jattak, in the Eastern bypass area of Quetta, during Eid prayers. Jattak, however, survived in the attack.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Quetta alone has recorded at least 1,325 fatalities [1,091 civilians, 189 Security Force (SF) personnel, and 45 terrorists] out of a total of 4,217 fatalities (2,813 civilians, 787 SF personnel and 617 terrorists) in the Balochistan Province, since 2004 (all data till August 11, 2013). The Province has already recorded 702 fatalities (537civilians, 105 SF personnel and 60 terrorists) in 2013, of which 369 fatalities (309 civilians, 43 SF personnel, and 17 terrorists) were killed in Quetta alone. The current year has already recorded the highest fatalities in Quetta.

Some of the major incidents (involving three or more killings) in Quetta in 2013 include:

June 30: At least 28 Shias were killed and 60 were injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up near the Abu Talib Imambargah (Shia place of worship) in the Aliabad area of Hazara Town in Quetta.

June 15: At least 14 female students, four nurses and four SF personnel, including Quetta Deputy Commissioner of Police Abdul Mansur Khan, were killed and another 27 sustained injuries when unidentified terrorists first blew up a bus of the Sardar Bahadur Khan (SBK) Women’s University in Quetta, and subsequently carried out a blast inside the Bolan Medical College’s teaching hospital in the city, where the injured were admitted.

May 23: 13 persons, including 12 Balochistan Constabulary (BC) personnel, were killed and another 17 sustained injuries in an explosion near Link Badini Road in Quetta.

May 12: Balochistan Inspector General of Police Mushtaq Sukhera narrowly escaped a suicide attack in the high security zone on Zarghoon Road in Quetta that killed at least six persons and injured 46.

February 16, 2013: A remote-controlled bomb targeting Shias killed 84 persons, including women and children, and wounded another 200 in Quetta.

January 10: At least 117 persons were killed and over 216 were injured in three separate bomb blasts in Quetta. At 8.30 pm, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a snooker club on Alamdar Road, which has two Shia prayer halls. Within 10 minutes, as Police, rescuers and media persons rushed to the site, another bomb fixed to a vehicle parked nearby went off. The twin blasts killed 105 persons and injured another 169. Earlier in the day, at 3.50 pm, a powerful bomb exploded under a Frontier Corps (FC) vehicle near a public plaza and crowded food market at the busy Bacha Khan Chowk, killing 12 persons and injuring 47.

Anti-Shia extremist formations including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) are the principal perpetrator of violence in Quetta. In 2013 five incidents resulting in 239 fatalities have been claimed by the LeJ, and another two incidents, resulting in 39 fatalities, were claimed by the TTP. Separately, Baloch nationalist groups have claimed responsibility for six killings in two incidents. The remaining the fatalities remain unclaimed.

Significantly, Northern Balochistan, of which Quetta is a part, is dominated by Islamist terrorist outfits and Sunni sectarian formations such as the TTP and the LeJ. A multiplicity of Baloch nationalist groupings operate principally in South Balochistan. According to the SATP database, since 2004, the Baloch insurgency-affected regions of South Balochistan have accounted for at least 1,684 fatalities, including 940 civilians, 413 SF personnel and 331 terrorists. The Northern areas of the Province, under the influence of Islamist and Sunni sectarian terrorist formations, LeJ and TTP, recorded 2,533 fatalities, including 1,981 civilians, 403 SF personnel and 149 terrorists, over the same period.

Since 2004, 243 civilian killings (141 in the South and 102 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations such as the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). The Islamist extremist formations, primarily LeJ and TTP, claimed responsibility for the killing of 422 civilians, all in North, mostly in Quetta. The remaining 2,103 civilian fatalities remain unattributed. As SAIR has noted, a large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities, particularly in the Southern region, are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies, or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). Sectarian violence orchestrated by Islamabad-backed Islamist formations is also responsible for a significant proportion of civilian fatalities.

Evidently, the Islamist terrorist formations have created havoc in Quetta in particular and Balochistan at large, with Government failing to respond. On July 2, 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during his visit to Quetta, indirectly conceded the failure of an adequate state response, “The administration here needs to bring improvement in their governance and the authorities in police need to realize their duty.” Sharif pointed out that Quetta was a ‘small city of around 20 lanes’ and that it should not be too hard to secure such a place.

As in other areas of Pakistan, it is the collusion and complicity of elements within the state establishment that have created spaces for the proliferation of terrorist groupings, and have inhibited effective state responses against the terrorists. It is significant that Quetta has long been the operational base of a number of terrorist formations operating in Afghanistan with the backing of the Inter Services Intelligence. Given Islamabad’s unchanged game plan to continue with its mischief in Afghanistan, and to use Sunni extremist mobilization and terror as an instrument for domestic political management, the present crisis can only deepen.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Extremism

Left-wing Extremism

Total (BANGLADESH)

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Meghalaya

Nagaland

Left-wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

PoK

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Punjab

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)