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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 40, April 12, 2010

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT


INDIA
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Death by Delusion
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

(There is) no point in… the Home Minister trying to be a Field Marshal. The response has to be in the shape of a small commander’s war. Who fought the war in Punjab? The sub-inspector, the inspector, the havaldar. I only provided the conditions for this.
K.P.S. Gill, Tehelka, October 24, 2009
…a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.
Sun Zu, The Art of War
No ‘solution’ has any relevance whatsoever without a clear detailing of the resource configuration and the objective context within which it is to be applied. Yet, virtually the entire counter-insurgency (CI) discourse in India has remained doctrinaire, with almost no reference to the nuts and bolts of what is available, a coherent strategy into which these capacities are woven, and how this is to be implemented.
"Though the enemy is itching to suppress our Party and movement by deploying a huge force in all our areas, he has severe difficulties in implementing this at present in the immediate context it is quite difficult for the Centre to send the forces required by each state to control our movement. Keeping this in mind, we have to further aggravate the situation and create more difficulties to the enemy forces by expanding our guerrilla war to new areas on the one hand and intensifying the mass resistance in the existing areas so as to disperse the enemy forces over a sufficiently wider area… tactical counter-offensives should be stepped up and also taken up in new areas so as to divert a section of the enemy forces from attacking our guerrilla bases and organs of political power."
CPI-Maoist Politburo’s June 12, 2009 document (emphases added)

And so, in a primitive demonstration of the primordial brutality of war – of cunning, deceit, possibly betrayal, but also of tactical superiority – the Indian State’s germinating illusion of a ‘strategy’ to ‘clear, hold and develop’ areas of Maoist dominance, has been swept aside. In the debris around the 75 dead bodies of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Company and one State Policeman slaughtered by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) at Chintalnad in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada District on April 6, 2010, the remote imaginings of remotely controlled war games from hi-tech National Counter-terrorism Centres must seem, to those who can see, improbable and naïve, at best.

Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram confessed he was "shocked" by the Chintalnad incident. But this was hardly a bolt from the blue, and one must assume that it was the "brutality" and "cruelty" of the Maoists, which he also commented on, that had shocked him. This is also somewhat inexplicable, since Maoist brutality and cruelty are no novelty either. Nor should the Maoist reaction to Chidambaram’s much vaunted ‘coordinated campaign’ have held any surprises – the June 12, 2009, Politburo document made it amply clear that the Maoists were, perhaps, more aware of the State’s vulnerabilities than the State’s ‘strategists’ – if, indeed, they deserve the title.

At a purely psychological level, the only ‘shocking’ thing about Chintalnad was the number of fatalities, the highest, by far, for any single incident of Maoist violence. There is, however, too much of an obsession in the general and political discourse, with ‘watershed events’, such as the ‘largest fatalities’. Before this, Rani Bodli on March 15, 2007, with 55 fatalities, was the ‘worst’ Maoist attack, and the broad character of commentary was exactly the same as it is in the wake of the Chintalnad incident. Even then, SAIR noted, "The cold and harsh reality is that such incidents will continue to take place with numbing regularity." Crucially, however, it is strategically insignificant whether 76 men are killed in a single incident, or cut down in the twos and threes, or the tens and twenties, in a protracted war of attrition. What matters is that these lives are being wasted, thrown away callously, unthinkingly, fruitlessly, without any rational calculus of enduring gain.

Significantly, before Chintalnad, 2010 had seen 24 Security Force personnel killed at Silda in West Bengal on February 15, and 11 in Koraput Distric (Orissa), on April 4. In 2009, similarly, the Maoists took down 30 Policemen, including a Superintendent of Police (SP) in two coordinated incidents in the Rajanandgaon District (Chhattisgarh) on July 12. On June 20, 12 CRPF personnel were killed in a landmine blast at Tonagapali in the Dantewada District (Chhattisgarh). On May 11, 12 Policemen were killed in an ambush near Risgaon village in the Dhamtari District (Chhattisgarh). And on April 10, 10 CRPF personnel were killed at Minta Village in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh.

The Bastar Division, the worst affected region in the country, comprising five densely forested Districts sprawling across 39,114 square kilometers in Chhattisgarh, and including Dantewada, the location of the current attack, has already accounted for five major Maoist attacks (each with three or more fatalities) in 2010. There were 26 such attacks in 2009; 21 in 2008; 29 in 2007; and 41 in 2006 (when Maoist violence against the disastrous state-backed Salwa Judum was peaking).

Bastar and Dantewada, the two worst afflicted Districts in the Division, cover 8,756 square kilometers and 9,046 square kilometers, respectively, (the Kashmir Valley spans 15,530 square kilometers by comparison). About 75 and 65 per cent of this area, respectively, is under forest cover. Yet, the State’s wisdom has seen fit to locate just six to seven battalions (2,400 to 2,800 men) of both the Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs) and the Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF), to ‘fight’ the Maoists across this vast territory. With this sparse deployment, ill-conceived ‘area domination’ exercises are being forced on the hapless troops.

The Centre has, over the past year, augmented CPMF presence in Chhattisgarh from 16 battalions (6,400 men) to all of 23 battalions (9,200 men). This ‘surge’, the Centre has led itself to believe, will give it the wherewithal to ‘clear, hold and build’ areas of present Maoist domination, with an immediate focus on the Rajnandgaon and Kanker Districts of the Bastar Division, even as meager State and CPMFs struggle to contain the Naxalite backlash, and, indeed, the Maoist strategy of diversion, in other areas.

‘Clear, hold and build’ is a staple of counter-insurgency (CI) doctrine. Why, then, is it the wrong ‘strategy’ when Chidambaram adopts it?

The answer lies in the meaning of ‘strategy’ itself. This has been said before, but it bears repetition: The word ‘strategy’ is thrown around cavalierly to describe every potpourri of intentions, aspirations, projections and initiatives. But certain minimal conditions have to be fulfilled before you can legitimately claim that you have a strategy. If there is a fundamental disconnect between objectives, tactics, resources and ground conditions, there is no strategy. Absent necessary capacities to secure objectives, a ‘strategy’ is reduced to the level of a slogan, a pipe dream, or, worse, a lethal delusion.

There are few peoples in the world as muddled in their habits of thought as the contemporary Indian, constantly seduced by borrowed, half-digested notions, too lazy and intellectually dishonest to do the homework that would be necessary to back up passionately advocated opinions. This absence of clarity, of due diligence, and of intellectual honesty stains every aspect of the currently proclaimed anti-Maoist ‘strategy’. Almost all aspects of the recent response to the Maoist challenge have been defined by extraneous considerations – an agenda set by an alternatingly hysterical or fawning mass Media; political pretensions and postures; unsettling events and major attacks; puerile confrontations between individual policy-makers and Maoist leaders (can anyone forget the protracted and childish confrontation between Chidambaram and Koteshwar Rao aka Kishanji?); utterly misplaced priorities; indeed, anything but the realities, the dimensions and the dynamics of the Maoist challenge on the ground.

The most damaging phrase that is rattling around in the corridors of power today is, "Something must be done", or its twin, "the Indian state cannot be seen to be impotent". It is to these shibboleths that 76 lives were sacrificed at Chintalnad, as policy makers explicitly rejected a strategic approach, demanding instant action and a symbolism that could be held up to the public as concrete ‘achievement’ in an arbitrarily defined time frame.

Ignoring the fundamentals of capacity building, the Centre in particular, has focused overwhelmingly on flashy meta-institutional reform, insisting that a National Counter-terrorism Centre, a National Intelligence Grid, a National Database, and Special Forces (such as the unfortunately named Combat Battalion against Resolute Action battalions) would act as ‘force multipliers’ in its campaigns against the Maoists and other extremist and terrorist formations. What was missed out, however, was the reality that the essence of ‘force multipliers’ is the existence and adequacy of ‘force’. With chronic and crippling deficiencies afflicting all Central and State Forces, it was no more than absurd to believe that changes at higher levels of organization would have any significant impact on operational capacities on the ground. And yet, so great is the sway of illusion in the corridors of power, such an idea was easily sold to decision-makers.

Chintalnad is certainly the highest fatality Maoist attack till date – but others will follow. Crucially, however, it is not the case that this attack represented the most destabilizing or tactically complex Maoist operation over the years. The Maoists have overrun District headquarters on more than one occasion; they have looted Police armouries; broken open jails to rescue their comrades; overrun Police and paramilitary camps and Police Stations; and, crucially, interdicted the operation of the state’s agencies of civil governance across vast regions of the country. They have consistently expanded their areas of activity and have been pushed back, in recent years, only in Andhra Pradesh.

Astonishingly, while the Union Ministry of Home Affairs sets about to reinvent the CI wheel, no one seems to have given even half a thought to what was achieved in Andhra Pradesh, and how. Indeed, and this has been emphasized endlessly on SAIR, India has exemplary CI attainments, and the campaigns of Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh – which lie along a single strategic continuum – contain all that could be needed to fight and neutralize the Maoists. Astonishingly, no one at the current centre of the security policy establishment appears to have even a rudimentary familiarity with these consummate models of response.

The avoidable tragedy at Chintalnad dramatically underlines the imperatives of a strategic shift in India’s CI responses. The ‘clear, hold and develop’ catchphrase, and the objectives of ‘territorial dominance’ (or recovery, as the MHA expresses) reflect fantasies, not strategies, within the framework of current national and State capacities. The Centre and the States must now evolve a strategic response that can be reconciled with existing and evolving capacities.

An inquiry, headed by an outstanding Police officer, E. N. Rammohan, has been instituted into the incident, and will shortly submit its report. By its very terms of reference, however, it will be bound to focus on local shortcomings and errors of judgment or leadership that culminated in the debacle. It is necessary to remember, however, that these local failings arise within an enveloping strategic failure. Unless it is accepted that strategic infirmities forced the tactical errors at Chintalnad, the future will bring more such incidents, and, inevitably, at some point, Chintalnad will no longer account for the ‘largest fatalities’ inflicted by the Maoists in a single attack.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
April 5-11, 2010

 

Civilian

Security Force Personnel

Terrorist/Insurgent

Total

Bangladesh

 

Left-wing Extremism

0
0
3
3

INDIA

 

Assam

0
1
1
2

Jammu and Kashmir

0
1
2
3

Manipur

0
0
1
1

Meghalaya

0
0
1
1

Tripura

0
0
1
1

Left-wing Extremism

 

Bihar

2
0
0
2

Chhattisgarh

0
76
8
84

Orissa

0
2
0
2

West Bengal

2
0
0
2

Total (INDIA)

4
80
14
98

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

3
0
0
3

FATA

11
4
136
151

NWFP

65
1
35
101

Total (PAKISTAN)

79
5
171
255
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

75 CRPF personnel and a Policeman killed in Maoist attack in Chhattisgarh: 75 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and a State Policeman were killed in an attack by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in Dantewada District early on April 6. The incident took place near Chintalnad -Tarmetla village in the District when a CRPF patrol party was returning from a road opening duty in the Naxalite-infested Mukrana forest between 6 to 7 am. The team had been camping in interiors of Tarmetla forest for the last three days as part of a combing operation.

Meanwhile, the Dandakaranya special zonal committee of the CPI-Maoist admitted that they lost eight of their cadres in the Dantewada attack. The statement, signed by three office-bearers of the committee, claimed that the Maoists made away with 21 AK-47s, seven SLRs, six LMGs, one stengun and other arms after the operation. The attack was to mark the centenary of the Bhumkal Adivasi rebellion and was to send a message to Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram to stop ‘Operation Green Hunt’. The Bhumkal uprising was the largest Adivasi rebellion that took place in Bastar in 1910. Times of India; PTI News; <Indian Express, April 6-10, 2010.

Manipur is hotbed of insurgency in Northeast followed by Assam, indicates MHA report: Manipur continues to be the hotbed of insurgency followed by Assam as 150 violent incidents have been reported in the two States in last three months, claiming 100 lives. According to Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), those killed included 77 militants, 20 civilians and three Security Force (SF) personnel. The MHA report stated that Nagaland has become relatively peaceful. Though there were 12 incidents of violence in the first three months of 2010 in Nagaland, there was no report of any casualty. In Meghalaya, four persons were killed in 2010 in five different incidents while one person was killed in Arunachal Pradesh. Though, there were nine incidents in Tripura in 2010, no report of any casualty has come from the State. Mizoram had no major insurgency and was comparatively a peaceful State. Altogether, 105 persons were killed in six North-eastern States — Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh —in 174 incidents till March. Overall, there were 1297 incidents of violence that claimed 877 lives, including 571 militants and 264 civilians, in 2009 in the entire Northeast. There were 1,561 incidents in the region in 2008 in which 1,152 people, including 466 civilians, lost their lives.

Meanwhile, the Union Government on April 8 said it will not enter into any kind of dialogue with splinter militant groups operating in the Northeast nor accept their laying down of arms in a public function. Security Forces shall take concerted action against such splinter groups, a Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) spokesman said. The Shillong Times; The Sangai Express, April 7-9, 2010.

Over 20 militant camps still exist in Bangladesh, says Tripura Chief Minister: Addressing a public rally on April 4, Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar said more than 20 militant camps still exist in Bangladesh. Sarkar said, "Around four years back we noticed a change in the situation; they (militants) have become and have been cornered, but not uprooted. Still today around 20 to 25 camps of Tripura militants exist in Bangladesh and they are trying to increase their strength eyeing the Autonomous District Council poll." Sentinel Assam, April 7, 2010.

Lashkar-e-Toiba eyes India's core sector, warns US think tank: A US Defence Department think tank warned that India’s transportation, economic infrastructure and political establishment are on the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s (LeT) radar. It has also confirmed India’s charge that the militant outfit still enjoys funding from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The think tank found the close links between LeT and Karachi-based D-Company of underworld gangster Dawood Ibrahim. The think tank associated with the US Army War College said that the LeT, though having a close relationship with al Qaeda, will continue to evolve into a distinctive South Asia-centric terrorist actor while still receiving aid from fringe elements in Pakistan’s security and intelligence apparatus and elsewhere. "This will not only allow LeT to continue to plan future Mumbai-style terrorist attacks in India from safe havens in Pakistan, but will also enable it to guide and assist the predominantly indigenous Indian Mujahideen (IM)," it added.

According to the think tank, LeT collects donations from the overseas Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and the UK, Islamic non-Governmental organisations, Pakistani/Kashmiri business people and through its parent organisation Jama'at-ud-Da'awa (JuD). The militant outfit also counts on donations from sympathetic Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Islamist-leaning ISI leaders. "In addition, LeT maintains relations with extremist and/ or terrorist groups across the globe ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya by means of the JuD network," the report said. Economic Times, April 7, 2010.

Filipino insurgents in league with Maoists: The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is getting ready to raise their urban guerrilla force and for that they are getting help from their Filipino comrades, according to Indian intelligence agencies. The CPI-Maoist is turning into a global threat because it is playing a crucial role in unifying communist rebels across the globe, intelligence sources say. Indian intelligence agencies claimed that the link between the Maoists and their Filipino comrades came to light during the interrogation of two Maoist rebels arrested from Gujarat in March this year. On March 31, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency of Philippines, too, corroborated this lead. Some members of the Communist Party of Philippines (CPP), one of the major communist insurgent outfits of the world, had met Indian Maoist leaders in Chhattisgarh, reports indicate. Times of India, April 11, 2010.

Maoists trying to forge links with militant outfits in Northeast, says Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on April 8 said that Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) may be trying to forge links with militant outfits in the Northeast to gain access to the arms market in neighbouring countries. According to reports, Maoists have already established contacts with United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur. In 2008, the Maoist leader had signed an agreement with PLA leaders for strategic and logistic support. The PLA had later formally announced to take on the Government together with the Maoists as a common enemy. PLA had stated, "Maoists are fighting for the poor people and we are fostering a fast relationship with them."Assam Tribune, April 9, 2010.

All options against Maoists open, says Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on April 7 said the Government reviewed all options in the fight against the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) such as use of air power from time to time but no decision has yet been taken on it. He said: "All these options are kept open and continuously reviewed. As of now, we have not taken any view in this direction.''

Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram also said while the Government had refrained from using air power against Maoists, the situation could change. "At present there is no mandate to use the air force or any aircraft. But, if necessary, we will have to revisit the mandate to make some changes," he added. He insisted that there was no "Operation Green Hunt" against Maoists as has been widely reported. Chhattisgarh Police officials say they had coined the term for one successful drive against the Maoists in the State.

Meanwhile, the Union Government will deploy spy drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance of Naxal (Left Wing Extremist) hideouts at the tri-junction of Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh over the next few days, indicate reports. These Israeli drones, controlled through ground stations several miles away, will give the security forces real-time intelligence and imagery to track the movement of ultras even through thick jungles. "They will make the battle zone transparent for us," said an unnamed official. Times of India, April 8-9, 2010.


PAKISTAN

136 militants and 11 civilians among 151 persons killed during the week in FATA: The Security Forces (SFs) backed by helicopter gunships killed 19 Taliban militants in the Lower Orakzai Agency of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) on April 11. 10 militants were killed in a clash in Shireen Dara area of Lower Orakzai while nine were killed in another clash between the Taliban and troops in Saam and Kangra areas of the Agency.

At least 45 Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militants were killed in air strikes in the Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency in FATA on April 10. Three SFs personnel and 10 militants were killed in clashes in Sararogha District of South Waziristan Agency.

The SFs killed 30 Taliban militants in clashes during the Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (I will see you) in the Lower Orakzai and Kurram Agencies on April 9.

At least 10 abducted persons and two LI militants were killed as the fighter aircraft bombed a private prison of the LI outfit in the Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency on April 8.

At least 14 Taliban militants were killed when SFs backed by fighter jets bombed various areas of Orakzai Agency during the Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham on April 6. Six militant hideouts were also destroyed in the air strikes.

The SFs killed 15 Taliban militants and destroyed four of their hideouts during the Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham in various areas of the Orakzai Agency on April 5. Dawn; Daily Times; The News, April 6-12, 2010.

65 civilians and 35 militants among 101 persons killed during the week in NWFP: The Security Forces (SFs) killed at least 24 Taliban militants and arrested 21 others during fresh clashes in the Swat and Lower Dir Districts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) on April 8.

At least three persons, including a pro-Government lashkar (tribal militia) leader, were killed in a shootout in the Shahi Khel area of Hangu on April 7. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Orakzai chapter claimed responsibility for Sakhi’s killing. Three militants were killed in separate clashes with SFs in Matta tehsil (revenue unit) of Swat District.

At least 45 persons were killed and over 100 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a public meeting of the Awami National Party (ANP) at the Timergara Rest House in Lower Dir District on April 5.

A series of three powerful blasts followed by heavy gunfight in a brazen suicide mission, apparently planned to target the US Consulate in Peshawar, left eight persons dead and 18 others injured in Peshawar in the afternoon of April 5. Meanwhile, the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was in reaction to the US drone attacks. Dawn; Daily Times; The News, April 6-12, 2010.


SRI LANKA

Ruling UPFA secures almost two-thirds majority in Parliament: The ruling United Peoples' Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won a huge majority close to almost two-thirds in the 14th Parliament of Sri Lanka at the General election held on April 8. The UPFA secured majorities over 100, 000 in six electoral Districts while its majority in the electoral District of Kurunegala exceeded 200,000. The highest majority of 322,953 votes were recorded in the Gampaha District. The results for Kandy and Trincomalee Districts have not been released. They will be released only after a re-poll is held by the Elections Commissioner in electorates where counting has been suspended on account of alleged malpractices. Of the results of 180 seats declared so far, the UPFA has won in 120 constituencies.

The main Opposition grouping, led by the United National Party (UNP), has so far won only 47 seats. The Democratic National Alliance (DNA), the third front led by the defeated common consensus Presidential candidate and the former Army Chief General (retired) Sarath Fonseka, has fared poorly, securing less than half-a-dozen seats. The pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) bagged a dozen of the 20 seats for which the results have been declared so far in the provinces of north and east.

Meanwhile, the official final tally of the new Parliament is expected to be delayed for at least two weeks, as the Election Commission has withheld the results of 12 seats in the Kandy District following complaints of irregularities in some polling booths. The Election Commission is to release the voting data only after all the results are officially announced and the independent election monitors have estimated the voter turnout to be between 50 and 55 per cent. Polling in the war-ravaged Northern Province appears to be very low. Daily News; The Hindu, April 10, 2010.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


A Project of the
Institute For Conflict Management



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