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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 48, June 13, 2005

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

 

 

INDIA
PAKISTAN

Punjab: Another 'Module' Implodes
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management

With the arrest of Jagtar Singh Hawara, the Babbar Khalsa International's (BKI) 'operations chief' in India, on June 8, 2005, the curtain has rolled down on another chapter of the long saga of Pakistan's failed attempts to revive Khalistani terrorism in Punjab. Hawara fell quickly into the net as the leader of the circle of conspirators who engineered the Delhi Cinema Hall Blasts on May 22, 2005. The rapidity with which this 'terrorist module' unravelled is an important index of the state of the Khalistani movement and of what was once the most feared terrorist organisation in the Punjab.

Hawara was arrested in the Narela Industrial Area on the outskirts of Delhi, along with two of the accused in the May 22 blasts - Jaspal Singh @ Raja, the prime coordinator in the Cinema Hall bombings - and Vikas Seth. These arrests came after another five conspirators had been arrested from hideouts in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. They included Balwinder Singh, who helped plant the bombs, and Jatinder Singh who were taken in by a joint team of the Delhi and Punjab Police at Nawan Shehar in Punjab on May 30; Jagan Nath, a Hindu originally from a village in the Gorakhpur district of Uttar Pradesh, who was tracked down in Madipur, West Delhi on the same day; and Bahadur Singh and Gurdeep Singh, who were arrested from village Mallpur in Nawan Shehar, on June 5.

The disruption of a single cell would ordinarily not be expected to lead to the arrest of the 'operations chief' of a group such as the BKI - one of the first groups to take to terrorism in the Punjab in the end-Nineteen Seventies, and regarded as the most ideologically driven and violent organisation among the proliferation of gangs that overran Punjab through the Eighties and early Nineties. The operational leadership is normally insulated by significant layers and 'circuit breakers', so that the arrest of one of the 'foot soldiers' cannot lead beyond the immediate cell. Hawara, who had evaded arrest since his sensational escape from the Burail Jail in Chandigarh on January 21, 2004, clearly lacked the organisational depth that could isolate him from the bottom rung of what are evidently mercenary and most unreliable operatives. It is significant that none of the other conspirators in the present case fit the profile of the traditional and deeply conservative BKI activist. Two are Hindus, and the others have an evident taste for the 'good life' and a hankering to go abroad - legally or otherwise. All fit the profile of petty criminals who took to terror for purely mercenary motives. That Hawara was in direct contact with, and exposed to, the likes of these indicates the degree to which the ideologically motivated Khalistani recruitment base has simply vanished from Punjab.

This is despite frenetic efforts by Pakistan to keep the 'defeated rump of Khalistani terrorist organisations', (as I have described them elsewhere) alive; and despite significant flows of funding, support and propaganda from minuscule and increasingly isolated groups among Non Resident Indian (NRI) Sikhs. It was precisely this network of support that had made the Cinema Hall bombings possible. While Hawara and Jaspal Singh 'masterminded' the operation in India, they were functioning under the direct control of Wadhawa Singh, the BKI 'chief', who continues to enjoy Pakistani hospitality ever since he fled the fighting in Punjab in the late 1980s. The group was coordinated through Satnam Singh Satta Mallian, Wadhawa Singh's son-in-law, propped up by his Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) handlers, who is currently taking advantage of the laxity of German law in Stuttgart, to manage the movement and operations of BKI cadres, who have a presence in several European countries, including Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and the United Kingdom. BKI is also active in Canada and USA. It is on the list of terrorist organisations in both the US and UK.

The Cinema Hall Blasts were, in essence, operations of opportunity, seeking to capitalize on a passing ferment and power struggle within the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC, the administrative body that manages Sikh shrines, and that has assumed in some measure the character of a 'state within a state'), which had expressed itself in the controversy over the 'Bollywood' (Hindi) film, Jo Bole So Nihal. Since a faction within the SGPC had challenged the decision of the Akal Takth jathedar (high priest) to allow screening of the film, and had successfully orchestrated a few public demonstrations on this 'sensitive issue', the calculation was that a few well-timed terrorist incidents may have the potential of catalyzing a wider movement and 'reviving' Khalistani passions (they had, in fact, the opposite effect, and the occasional and motivated protests died out). The incidents also coincided with recent developments within the Damdami Taksal - the organisation Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the original architect of Khalistani terrorism, was drawn from - as a result of the installation of a new chief, Baba Harnam Singh Dhuma, and the formal declaration of Bhindranwale's death (the Damdami Taksal had, till now, kept the fiction alive that Bhindranwale had not died in Operation Blue Star in 1984, and would return to lead the Taksal). Combined with the protests organised by a particular faction of the SGPC and some marginal Sikh extremist organisations during the 'Ghallughara Week' (which commemorates Sikh martyrs), and the call to raise a memorial to those who were killed during Operation Blue Star, these events were thought to create opportunities that could be exploited to kick-start the spent Khalistan movement.

Such attempts have a continuous history since the comprehensive defeat of Khalistani terrorism in 1993, with a cycle of two to four years. Punjab Police sources indicate that over 100 civilians have died in terrorist related violence over the past decade (1995-2005), overwhelmingly in bomb attacks on soft targets, such as public transport, markets, cinema halls, etc. The worst year after the collapse of high intensity terrorism was 1997, when 56 civilians were killed in a rash of bomb blasts between March 14 and July 10. The year 2000 saw at least 18 civilians killed; and 2002, five. The past three years have seen no civilian fatalities in Punjab (the single fatality in year 2005 was in the Cinema Hall Blasts, in Delhi), but there has been a continuous pattern of arrests and seizures of arms and explosives, indicating unrelenting efforts to resuscitate the terror, stifled, on each occasion, by the complete absence of public support, and the immensely improved intelligence capabilities of the Punjab Police. Over 1,000 kilograms of explosive materials have been recovered from terrorist cells in the State in this period, along with a large number of sophisticated weapons including assault rifles and grenade launchers, as well as other equipment, and at least 30 Pakistan-backed 'modules' have been neutralized.

These persistent failures can be traced to the fact that the fundamentalist mindset, which the ISI and Pakistan military establishment are themselves a product of, cannot understand the culture and the way of thought that are integral to the Sikh - and indeed, Indian - way of thought. There is a graphic and utter failure of understanding on the part of the Pakistani establishment in this, and, while such efforts can inflict great personal tragedies on hapless innocents, they have little potential to help Pakistan secure its strategic objectives in India.

Past failures and the futility of the enterprise, however, has not prevented Pakistan from continuing to support the tattered survivors of the movement in the hope that circumstances may, eventually change sufficiently to effectively revive the terror in Punjab. In addition to the BKI, its 'chief', Wadhawa Singh, and 'deputy chief', Mehal Singh, and an unspecified number of cadres, Pakistan continues to host the Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) and its 'chief', Ranjit Singh Neeta; a faction of the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and its 'chief' Paramjit Singh Panjawar; the International Sikh Youth Federation - Rode and its 'coordinator', Lakhbir Singh Rode; the Dal Khalsa International, headed by Gajinder Singh 'Hijacker'; and the Council of Khalistan, led by Balbir Singh Sandhu.

In addition, a number of Khalistani groups maintain a significant presence in several Western countries. They include the BKI, KZF, KCF-Panjwar, Khalistan National Army, Kamagata Maru Dal of Khalistan, Sikh Youth of Belgium, ISYF, the Council of Khalistan, Sikh Youth of America, and the Sikh Affairs Committee. Their efforts are closely coordinated by the ISI, and though these groups have not engaged in violence in these countries in recent times, they continue to provide critical support in terms of funding, propaganda, logistical coordination and recruitment. Several young men based in these countries have undergone training in Pakistan in the handling of sophisticated weapons and explosives, with the understanding that their 'services' may be called for at an appropriate time.

In addition to the BKI, among the relatively active of these groups in recent times has been Ranjit Singh Neeta's KZF, which has been responsible for several incidents of explosions in Delhi, Haryana, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). One of the active modules of the KZF was neutralized towards the end of 2004 in district Gurdaspur, leading to a massive recovery of weapons and explosives. The module included two Pakistani nationals - Mohammad Hanif and Abdul Hamid - who had been given Sikh identities.

The ISI has exploited these various groups for a range of other subversive activities as well, including the provision of active assistance to narcotics smuggling and narcotics transportation to various destinations; the distribution of fake currency; and espionage. There have been repeated attempts to forge alliances with Islamist militants active in J&K, but these have, at worst, met with very limited and transient success.

It is abundantly clear that, despite the abject failure of the Khalistan movement, Pakistan continues to maintain and support these various groups in the expectation of future opportunities that may arise out of political circumstances in Punjab, or from predicaments that arise out of transient exigencies, as was the case in the Cinema Hall Blasts in Delhi, which sought to exploit momentary passions whipped up over the film, Jo Bole So Nihal. While the prevailing circumstances in Punjab make any significant revival of the Khalistani terror an extraordinarily remote possibility, a residual capacity to cause local disruption survives, and dovetails with Pakistan's long-term intent in India. As with the many other terrorist, insurgent and subversive movements and groups across India, the Khalistanis can rely on Pakistani support as long as they retain this residual capacity, and as long as Pakistan's dominant political forces remain relentlessly tied to the country's roots in the ideology of religious exclusion, theocratic authoritarianism, communal hatred, and Islamist extremism - ideas in irreducible conflict with India's defining ideologies of secularism, liberalism and democracy.

INDIA

ULFA Wants to Talk - Or Does it?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) wants to talk or at least that's what many people in the State of Assam and outside appear to believe. A chain of events, which started with the issue of a formal letter of invitation by the Prime Minister's office on December 7, 2004, however, has seen little beyond a huge number of press statements by the involved parties reiterating their commitment to the peace process. The anticipation of a 'peace process' has, however, impacted directly on military operations against the rebel group, with a general reduction of pressure following a request to this effect by the negotiator, writer Indira Goswami. Reports suggest, however, that ULFA has found it convenient to use this period of relief to build up its arsenal and extend its activities.

  Also Read
Truce before the Storm? -- Wasbir Hussain
ULFA: Playing Hard to Get -- Bibhu Prasad Routray

ULFA 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah has reportedly endorsed the negotiation process initiated by Goswami, but his statements to the media remain mired in histrionics and follow an escalatory trajectory. There has been a great deal of formalism regarding the character of the formal invitation from the Government, with ULFA insisting that it would not consider an offer of talks unless it received a letter "with official seal and signature". Six months later, after receiving the scanned version of the letter provided by the National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan to mediator Indira Goswami by e-mail on May 24, Baruah said that a letter "sent through the internet" would not suffice, insisting, "The original has not come as yet. We want a letter in the format in which we had sent our offer to the Centre," a position that was reiterated on June 10 by ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa.

Quickly thereafter, ULFA has demanded the release of the group's arrested 'central committee' members on the grounds that a 'quorum' needs to be completed to discuss the Union Government's invitation. Four of ULFA's top leaders, including 'vice chairman' Pradip Gogoi, 'advisor' Bhimkanta Buragohain, 'cultural secretary' Pranati Deka and 'publicity secretary' Mithinga Daimari are presently behind bars.

And while ULFA continues to drag out the preliminaries to the negotiation process, it has never stopped doing what put it on the United States' list of 'Other Selected Terrorist Organisations'. Since December 7, 2004, when the PMO handed over the first letter of invitation to Indira Goswami, the outfit has detonated 50 explosions across the State. The most recent of these, on June 4, targeted a microwave tower in Guwahati city. Even as the mediator asked the security forces (SFs) to stop operations against the group and wrote to the Defence Minister on the same lines, ULFA continued to target civilians and security force personnel. On May 26, two bicycle borne ULFA terrorists killed a leader of the Congress party at the Dhekorgorah Block office in Jorhat district. On May 20, an Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel was killed and four others sustained injuries, when ULFA ambushed a bus transporting the SF personnel, at Borhat in Sibsagar district.

At the same time, ULFA is reorganising its units in its traditional strongholds, forming new 'battalions', and moving into hitherto unexplored territories, both within Assam and in adjoining States. On April 20, the Police demolished a well-equipped camp of ULFA's newly-formed '27th battalion' in Karbi Anglong district, an area where the organisation's traditional influence has been low. The camp was established in the first week of April and was led by a middle level cadre, Dandi Bora. On April 21, six ULFA leaders, including a woman 'sergeant major', were arrested by the Army at Sesupani in Tinsukia District as they descended into Assam from their Changlang camp in neighbouring Arunachal Pradesh. Movements of ULFA cadres drawn from its '28th battalion' have been noticed in the Jonai area of upper Assam's Dhemaji District and also in the Poba reserve forest area spread over a 100 square kilometres along the borders with Arunachal Pradesh. Each of these is a territory that has remained untouched by the group's terror and extortion in the past. Meanwhile, ULFA cadres continue to use the neighbouring State of Meghalaya's Garo Hills area for transit and as an arms dump. On May 14, Police recovered two universal machine guns, three magazines and 60 rounds from an ULFA hideout at Masuk in West Garo Hills district. An estimated 75-100 cadres are reported to be stationed in the District spread over 3,714 square kilometres.

Intelligence sources indicate that several of ULFA's 'commanders', including Lal Deka, 'commander' of the '109th Battalion', and Biju Chakraborty 'Lieutenant' of the '709th Battalion', are moving about their assigned areas in upper Assam, as well as in traditional strongholds like Nalbari and Guwahati city. Movements of several of the outfit's hit-men, including Hira Sarania, Drishti Rajkhowa, Prabhat Roy and Madhav Roy, have been reported from different parts of the State.

To compound the situation, ULFA has called for a plebiscite in Assam through a Press Statement of November 27, 2004; for international intervention on December 13, 2004; and for US mediation to 'end Indian military repression', on June 2, 2005. The ULFA leadership's commitment to the dialogue process is far from clear. This was clearly confirmed by State Governor, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Ajai Singh, who stated, on May 20, "There is a question mark on the genuineness of the ULFA leadership for a dialogue because earlier, whenever it spoke about talks, it did so for buying time to regroup." Obviously, Governor Singh does not have any of Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi's political compulsions. Gogoi, on the other hand, has been insisting that talks with ULFA be initiated on the same lines as those with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), and was, in fact, deeply critical of the US decision to put ULFA on its list of terrorists, arguing that such steps were not conducive to the negotiating process.

Negotiating with the ULFA is an issue with huge political ramifications in Assam where insurgency has claimed 5,445 lives between 1992 and June 10, 2005. With the State going to the polls in 2006, any movement in this direction would be politically rewarding for the ruling Congress party and for Chief Minister Gogoi. That explains Gogoi's eagerness to push forward any kind of process, his willingness to consider releasing the arrested ULFA leaders, and his trips to New Delhi to convince the Prime Minister on the utility of these actions. Indeed, he has made little attempt to hide his game plan, and declared, on June 9, "We do not want to stand between the ULFA and the Centre. We just want to sort out all the issues relating to the State before the Assembly elections."

Apparent movement on the talks with ULFA is, consequently, crucial if the Congress is to cement its prospects in the impending elections. In a State where development and governance have taken a severe beating, gains on the insurgency front are the only 'achievement' the incumbent party can take to the people if it is to seek another term in power. In this, Gogoi has already garnered some advantage, since ceasefire agreements have now been signed with all the significant groups in the State other than ULFA. The United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF) and most recently National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have all been brought to the negotiating table. If ULFA can be brought into any kind of negotiation process, the people's hopes for peace would soar. Gogoi's political compulsions are, consequently, obvious.

It appears that the ULFA leadership is aware of these vulnerabilities, and intends to exploit them.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
June 6-12, 2005

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

0
0
4
4

INDIA

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

8
5
38
51

     Left-wing
     Extremism

5
1
1
7

     Manipur

1
0
0
1

     Meghalaya

1
0
0
1

     Nagaland

4
0
0
4

Total (INDIA)

19
6
39
64

NEPAL

46
25
26
97

SRI LANKA

2
1
4
7
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BHUTAN

Maoists have infiltrated into Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal, says Foreign Minister: While responding to queries in the National Assembly, Bhutanese Foreign Minister, Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk, is reported to have said that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) have infiltrated the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal and added, "The Maoists are intent on spreading their 'revolution' to other parts of the region. We feel that such a (Maoist) regime would almost certainly threaten stability in the region." Further, he told the Assembly that allowing the highly politicised camp people to return to Bhutan would mean importing ready-made radical political parties and terrorists to duplicate the violence, terror, and instability the Maoists had unleashed in Nepal. Some of the main radical parties were the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist Leninist, Maoist), the Bhutan Gorkha Liberation Front, and Bhutan Revolutionary Students Union, he added. Kuensel Online, June 8, 2005.


INDIA

Babbar Khalsa International 'operations chief' Jagtar Singh Hawara arrested in Delhi: Jagtar Singh Hawara, 'operations chief' of the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) in India, who was one of the four inmates who had escaped from Burail Jail in Chandigarh on January 21, 2004, was arrested along with two other accused in the May 22, 2005, theatre blasts from the G.T. Karnal Road of New Delhi on June 8, 2005. Delhi Police Commissioner, K.K. Paul, stated that the arrests followed an encounter with the Inter-State Cell of the Delhi Police and the two other accused were identified as Jaspal aka Raja and Vikas Sehgal. Police also recovered 10.35 kilograms of RDX, four pistols of foreign make, 207 live cartridges, three remote-controlled explosive devices and a hand grenade from the vehicle in which they were traveling. Paul added that "the accused said the BKI was trying to revive militancy in the country, especially in Punjab." The Hindu, June 9, 2005.

473 Naxalites surrendered in Andhra Pradesh in 2005, says Andhra Pradesh Police chief: On June 7, 2005, the Andhra Pradesh Director General of Police, Swaranjit Sen, stated that in 2005, 473 left-wing extremists (also known as Naxalites) belonging to different outfits had surrendered, as against 396 in 2004 and 1035 in 2003. He said 349 Naxalites were arrested this year till date, as against 4,000 in 2004 and 2,000 in 2003. Further, Sen said, this year 69 encounters had taken place and 76 Naxalites had been killed, as against 73 encounters and 52 Naxalites in 2004 and 173 encounters and 175 Naxalites in 2003. He said 14 police personnel had died this year. Further, Sen said, "at least one third of the police stations in the State are unarmed and vulnerable to attacks." Out of 1,585 police stations, 500 do not have weapons and are not armed, according to the police chief. New Indian Press, June 8, 2005.


NEPAL

Landmine blast kills 36 civilians in Chitwan district: At least 36 civilians and three security force personnel were killed and 72 people sustained injuries when a passenger bus hit a landmine at Mudhekhola in the Chitwan district on June 6, 2005. In a statement e-mailed to media organisations on June 7, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, owned responsibility and expressed apology for the landmine explosion. He said the attack was targeted against security personnel and called the loss of civilian lives a "grave mistake." Prachanda added that his party had immediately suspended the cadres responsible for the attack. Nepal News, June 7, 2005.


PAKISTAN

President Musharraf meets APHC leaders in Islamabad: President Pervez Musharraf met the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders in Islamabad on June 7, 2005, and reportedly stated that a permanent settlement of the decades-old Jammu and Kashmir dispute is only possible if it takes into account wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. The APHC leaders who met him were Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat, Maulana Abbas Ansari, Muhammad Abdullah Tari, Bilal Ghani Lone, Fazal-e-Haq Qureshi and Yasin Malik. Gen. Musharraf also said that the status quo was unacceptable to Pakistan and there has to be forward movement so that the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people are realised. Dawn, June 8, 2005.



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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