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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 35, March 14, 2005

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

 

PAKISTAN

Schooling for Terror
Guest Writer: Amir Mir
Senior Assistant Editor, Monthly Herald, Dawn Group of Newspapers, Karachi

General Pervez Musharraf's much-publicized plans to modernize the country's 10,000 religious seminaries have met with little success primarily because of his administration's failure to enforce the Madrassa Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002, which was meant to reform deeni madaris (religious seminaries) by bringing them into the educational mainstream.

  Also Read
The Jehad Lives On -- Amir Mir
The Kashmir Dialogue -- G. Parthasarathy

Three years after the first commando President of Pakistan promised sweeping reforms to ensure that the religious schools are not used any further to propagate extremist Islam, the country's traditional religious school system that is now rotten to the core, continues to operate as the key breeding ground for the radical Islamist ideology and as the recruitment centre for terrorist networks.

The campaign to reform the country's notorious deeni madaris was launched by General Musharraf in a bid to fight extremism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States. Many of the Pakistanis who fought alongside al-Qaeda and Taliban troops in Afghanistan had been educated in these religious seminaries, which are spread across the country. The privately funded Islamic schools are commonplace throughout Pakistan and a majority of them owe their existence to General Zia's Islamisation drive. The curriculum offered there is undeveloped and pertains mostly to religious instruction. Some of the books taught, including Mathematics, date back hundreds of years. The result is, the madaris graduates simply cannot compete against others for employment. Absent any real understanding of society and social complexities, they want destruction. They seek to bring society onto their own level, and the only thing they identify with is the religion.

Yet these madaris do provide free education along with boarding and lodging, and this attracts the poor. There are no exact figures about how many madaris may be operating in Pakistan, but rough estimates suggest that there are some one million students studying in over 10,000 madaris.

Since the beginning of 2002, General Musharraf has campaigned to reform the religious schools. In a televised address to the nation in January 2002, the General unveiled a new strategy which would see madaris teach Mathematics, Science, English, Economics and even Computer Science alongside their traditional Islamic programme. "My only aim is to help these institutions overcome their weaknesses and providing them with better facilities and more avenues to the poor children at these institutions. These schools are excellent welfare set-ups where the poor get free board and lodge. And very few madaris run by hardliner parties promote negative thinking and propagate hatred and violence instead of inculcating tolerance, patience and fraternity", said Musharraf in his address.

While embarking on several initiatives to combat zealotry and broaden educational offerings, the Musharraf administration announced a number of measures to make deeni madaris participate in the modernization programme. These reforms included a five-year, $1 billion Education Sector Reform Assistance (ESRA) plan to ensure inclusion of secular subjects in syllabi of religious seminaries; a $100 million bilateral agreement to rehabilitate hundreds of public schools by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), besides increasing access to quality education and the enforcement of Madrassa Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 which required deeni madaris to audit their funding and foreign students to register with the Government. At the same time, a Federal Madaris Education Board was established to enable the students at the religious schools to benefit from the national education system by learning Mathematics, English and vocational sciences in addition to the normal madrassa education.

However, three years down the road since Musharraf's historic January 2002 announcement, the so-called modernization campaign has largely failed, and hardly a few cosmetic changes could be introduced in the madrassa system. Most of the religious leaders and Islamist organisations rejected the Government legislation requiring religious seminaries to register and broaden their curricula beyond rote Koranic learning. Under the reform programme, drafted on the advice of the Bush administration and financed by USAID, special Government committees were constituted to supervise and monitor the educational and financial matters and policies of deeni madaris. Most of these schools are sponsored by the country's leading religious parties, be it Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Jamiat Ulema-Pakistan, or Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan, while many others are affiliated with jehadi groups which preach an extremist ideology of religious warfare.

The result is that the deeni madaris are increasingly seen as breeding grounds for the foot-soldiers of the global menace of militant Islam, who are motivated and trained to wage jehad - be it in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, or other parts of the world. Thus the Bush Administration believed that there were madaris in Pakistan that, in addition to religious training, give military training to their students. Probably acting under these very apprehensions, the office of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld leaked in October 2003 a secret memo, perhaps deliberately, to the American media. In the memo, which was actually intended for Rumsfeld's top military and civilian subordinates, the American Defence Secretary wondered: "Is the US capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical Muslim clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against America?"

Three months later in January 2004, the International Crisis Group (ICG) report titled, Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism further strengthened the American fears. The report stated: "The failure to curb rising extremism in Pakistan stems directly from the military Government's own unwillingness to act against its political allies among the religious groups. Having co-opted the religious parties to gain constitutional cover for his military rule, Musharraf is highly reliant on the religious right for his regime's survival." The ICG report observed that Pakistan's failure to close madrassas and to crack down on jehadi networks has resulted in a resurgence of domestic extremism and sectarian violence. "The Government inaction continues to pose a serious threat to domestic, regional and international security… If the US and others continue to restrict their pressure on Musharraf to verbal warnings, the rise of extremism in Pakistan will continue unchecked. By increasing pressure on Pakistan, a major source of jehadis will be shut off and Islamic militancy, as a whole will decrease", the ICG stated in its concluding paragraph.

Almost a year later, in December 2004, a report produced by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) presented to the American Congress pointed out: "Although General Musharraf vowed to begin regulating Pakistan's religious schools, and his Government launched a five-year plan to bring the teaching of formal or secular subjects to 8,000 willing madrassas, no concrete action was taken until June of that year, when 115 madrassas were denied access to Government assistance due to their alleged links to militancy… Despite Musharraf's repeated pledges to crack down on the more extremist madrassas in his country, there is little concrete evidence that he has done so. According to two observers, most madrassas remain unregistered, their finances unregulated, and the Government has yet to remove the jehadist and sectarian content of their curricula. Many speculate that Musharraf's reluctance to enforce reform efforts is rooted in his desire to remain on good terms with Pakistan's Islamist political parties, which are seen to be an important part of his political base."

The Lahore-based Daily Times wrote in its February 25, 2005, editorial titled 'Madrassa registration has become a joke': "The National Security Council, we are being told, is going to discuss the issue of registering the madrassas. Might we ask what has happened to the much-touted madrassa registration ordinance 2002? Apparently nothing! …The facts are interesting. Registration forms were sent out to all the madrassas after which the Government waited for the seminaries to get themselves registered. That did not happen. The number of madrassas that did register was a bit of a joke. What did the Government do? Nothing! Why cannot the all-powerful General Musharraf follow up on an eminently sensible scheme?"

However, a World Bank-sponsored working paper published in February 2005 came up with a new angle, stating that "enrolment in the Pakistani madrassas, that critics believe are misused by militants, has been exaggerated by media and a US 9/11 report." The study claimed that less than one per cent of the school-going children in Pakistan go to madrassas, and the proportion has remained constant in some districts since 2001. The study titled 'Religious School Enrolment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data', conducted by Jishnu Das of the World Bank, Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Tristan Zajonc of Harvard University and Tahir Andrabi of Pomona College, sought to dispel general perceptions that enrolment was on the rise saying: "We find no evidence of a dramatic increase in madrassa enrolment in recent years". The funding for the report was provided by the World Bank through Knowledge for Change Trust Fund.

The World Bank study found western media reports highly exaggerated in terms of number of student and total religious schools. "The figures reported by international newspapers such as the Washington Post, saying there were 10 per cent enrolment in madrassas, and an estimate by the International Crisis Group of 33 per cent, were not correct. It is troubling that none of the reports and articles reviewed based their analysis on publicly available data or established statistical methodologies. Bold assertions have been made in policy reports and popular articles on the high and increasing enrolment in Pakistani religious schools". The study found no evidence of a dramatic increase in madrassa enrolment in recent years, stating that the share of madrassas in total enrolment declined before 1975 and has increased slowly since then. Since 2001, total enrolment in madrassas has remained constant in some districts and increased in others, the report added.

However, the South Asia Director of ICG, Samina Ahmed, has challenged the findings of the World Bank study, which questioned the validity of madrassa enrolment statistics provided by the ICG and other expert analysts. Ahmed was quoted in the Dawn newspaper on March 11, 2005, stating: "The authors (of the World Bank report) have insisted that there are at most 475,000 children in Pakistani madrassas, yet Federal Religious Affairs Minister Ejazul Haq says the country's madrassas impart religious education to 1,000,000 children." She asserted that the World Bank findings were directly at odds with the ministry of education's 2003 directory, which said the number of madrassas had increased from 6,996 in 2001 to 10,430. She added that the madrassa unions themselves had put the figure at 13,000 madaris with the total number of students enrolled at 1.5 to 1.7 million.

Questioning the methodology of the World Bank study, Ahmed said: "The trouble is that the authors based their analysis on three questionable sources: the highly controversial 1998 census; household surveys that were neither designed nor conducted to elicit data on madrassa enrolment, and a limited village-based household educational census conducted by the researchers themselves in only three of 102 districts." She said the 1998 census was not only out of date as the authors themselves admitted, but their 2003 educational census was also of little value because it was based on a representative sample of villages, suggesting madaris were mainly a rural phenomenon. She quoted a 2002 survey conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies which found that a majority of madrassa students came from backward areas. "If the findings of the World Bank study were to be taken at face value, then Pakistan and the international community had little cause to worry about an educational sector that glorified jehad and indoctrinated children in religious intolerance and extremism", the ICG director concluded.

In short, the Musharraf regime's failure to reform the country's 10,000 religious seminaries and to crack down on jehadi networks has resulted in a resurgence of extremism and sectarian violence in the country. The Pakistani military dictator's priority has never been eradicating Islamic extremism, but rather the legitimization and consolidation of his dictatorial rule, for which he seems dependent on the clergy. And the mushroom growth of extremists will continue unabated until and unless the Mullah-Military alliance in Pakistan is effectively put to an end.


INDIA

Manipur: Terrorist Diktats Rule
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

If the first two-odd months of year 2005 are any indication, the militancy-ridden State of Manipur appears to be moving into a more vicious cycle of violence. 74 fatalities have been reported in 132 militancy-related incidents between January 1 and March 10, 2005. Militants account for more than half of the fatalities with a total of 39 deaths, but there was 25 civilian fatalities as well. In comparison, the entire year 2004 - which saw significant escalation as a result of enormous political mismanagement and widespread civil disturbances - was witness to 219 insurgency-related deaths (Civilians-50; Security Forces (SF)-41; Militants-128). Year 2003 had seen198 fatalities (27 civilians, 23 SFs, 148 militants).

  Also Read
Rampaging Militants, Mute State - Bibhu Prasad Routray
Yet another 'final' assault -- Bibhu Prasad Routray

Visibly, the current fatalities within militant ranks have been the result of continuous military operations since September 2004 in a 'synchronised onslaught', for which some successes have been claimed, though 10 SF personnel have already fallen to militant attacks. But the claims of SF 'successes' are ambiguous at best. The Naga-inhabited hill areas have been traditionally free from the militancy perpetrated by the Meitei outfits, and it is mostly the Valley, which witnesses a majority of militant incidents and engagements with the SFs. There appears to be little change in this pattern, and 112 of the 132 incidents this year have taken place in the five districts of Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur, Thoubal and Churachandpur, suggesting little weakening of the insurgent will or ranks. Districts sharing the international border with Myanmar - Chandel and Ukhrul - have been somewhat marginally affected with 10 and 5 reported incidents, respectively. More significant is the 'element of spread' of violence which involves at least 16 outfits. All major as well as many fringe groupings, of the 30 odd outfits in the State, with an estimated 10,000 cadres between them, have been involved in the violence this year.

Crucially, the largest proportion of this violence has been focused on the well protected neighbourhood of the capital city, Imphal. Manipur has a 14,000 strong police force (both armed and civil) - the third strongest in the region behind Assam and Nagaland - four India Reserve Battalions (IRB), as well as very strong contingents of the Army and para-military forces, with a large proportion of this Force dedicated to the protection of the State capital and its inhabitants. However, it is the capital city along with the twin districts of Imphal East and Imphal West that have already witnessed 56 of the 132 militancy related incidents in 2005. Militants of different groups have been able to lob grenades, extort money and shoot at police personnel and civilians in the capital and in its vicinity, and have demonstrated fairly dramatically that not even the 'saturated' capital city is adequately secured; the state's control over the other Valley districts could hardly be better.

Nevertheless, while linking the SF's 'synchronised onslaught' with the United National Liberation Front's (UNLF) February 2, 2005, call for a peace process with the Government of India may not be a good idea, the fact that a militant group known for its obstinate stand against any negotiated resolution of the conflict has finally broken its silence reflects definite shifts in the prevailing scenario. The UNLF has mooted a four-point proposal to bring the 'Indo-Manipur conflict' to a logical conclusion:

  1. A plebiscite under United Nations (UN) supervision to elicit the opinion of the people of the State on the core issue of restoration of Manipur's independence.
  2. Deployment of a UN peace- keeping force in Manipur to ensure the process is free and fair.
  3. Surrender of arms by the UNLF to the UN force, matched with the withdrawal of Indian troops. Handing over of political power by the UN in accordance with the results of the plebiscite.

While these terms make nonsense of the proposal and would be rejected out of hand by Delhi, they are in keeping with a standing convention in the region for militant groups to set out with such extreme demands, and then to barter each element of such an immoderate position against significant advantages for the group and its leadership at the negotiating table. The offer of a negotiated settlement by an obdurately violent group like the UNLF is, consequently, a significant movement forward.

The Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), the 'political wing' of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has also come out with a statement that appeared to suggest qualified approval of the UNLF's move. RPF 'president' Irengbam Chaoren stated, "We will be watching how New Delhi reacts to the UNLF central committee's proposal as well as the latter's next move." Delhi is still to respond, though reports suggest that it is 'examining' the Chief Minister's plea to consider the proposals with urgency.

SF operations and peace offers notwithstanding, militants in Manipur still continue to issue diktats and also appear to be able to secure substantial obedience on their decrees. This is the case, not only with the directives of the better known groups who are known to have perfected the act, such as the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), but even fringe outfits such as the Manipur Human Rights Protection Guild (MHRPG) and the United Socialist Revolutionary Army (USRA). Thus, apart from the continuation of its 'drive' against the 'corrupt' education system, a campaign which has targeted a number of officials, teachers and students, and which enjoys a certain measure of popular support from the people, the KYKL has also put a ban on 'cabin restaurants' which it has described as a 'major factor in the moral degeneration of our society' as they facilitate 'immoral' promiscuity among boys and girls. On at least two occasions, owners and workers in such restaurants have been shot at by the outfit's cadres for violating the order.

Incidents of extortion also remain at an alarmingly high level. Unidentified terrorists shot at and injured Th. Kulachandra, Principal of the Manipur Institute of Technology-Takyelpat, at Mongsangei in the Imphal West district on March 2 after he failed to meet an extortion demand for Rs. 500,000. The MHRPG orchestrated an attack on the Japanese-funded sericulture project office in Bamon Leikai in Imphal East District. Reports suggest that the attack was carried out for the non-payment of 'taxes' which the outfit had imposed on the officials associated with the project. The non-descript People's United Liberation Front (PULF), through a notification on February 18 and a subsequent attack on a vehicle, managed to stop all transport for four consecutive days along the important Imphal-Moreh road, hailed as one of the future trade routes between India's Northeast and South East Asia. The PULF action was the result of the transporters' failure to accede to its repeated 'requests' for 'payment of tax'. The United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF), through a press note on January 15, had demanded that the Irrigation and Flood Control Department to clear their 'annual departmental taxes' before January 23. The response of the department is not known. However, past practices reveal that resistance to such diktats has been infrequent. An insight into an ingenious method of 'taxation' came to light with the arrest of 16 transport agency proprietors by the Imphal West district police, on March 8. These proprietors had purchased Government taxation forms (Sales Tax form no. 35 & 36) from the KYKL, at a price of Rupees 500,000 each and had managed to evade paying tax to the Government. Inquiries revealed that the KYKL had forced two taxation officers to put their signatures on copies of such forms, and these were later 'sold' to the transporters.

Nevertheless, Manipur Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh seems encouraged by recent SF 'successes'. On March 10, on the occasion of the surrender of two militants - an event of great rarity in the State, though commonplace in other conflict theatres in the region - the Chief Minister asked for a better 'rehabilitation package' that could help bring more and more militants back into the mainstream. The Chief Minister said, "The Government's surrender policy has to be revamped so as to make it a more comprehensive one, and to ensure proper rehabilitation of surrendered militants." Previously, on March 7, the Chief Minister also claimed to have received positive signals from two other militant organisations (who he chose not to identify) regarding peace talks with the Government.

Regrettably, however, given current ground realities, the increasing levels of violence in the State, as well as the rising demonstration of public dissatisfaction - both with the political leadership and sections of the SFs - any optimism regarding the resolution of the multiplicity of insurgencies in Manipur in the foreseeable future would be altogether misplaced.

 

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
March 7-13, 2005

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

0
0
7
7

INDIA

     Assam

2
1
2
5

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

5
1
19
25

     Left-wing
     Extremism

9
5
0
14

     Manipur

2
0
1
3

     Nagaland

1
0
1
2

Total (INDIA)

19
7
23
49

NEPAL

1
0
22
23

PAKISTAN

2
0
0
2

SRI LANKA

3
0
0
3
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

Seven persons killed during Naxalite attack in Andhra Pradesh: A group of nearly 40 left-wing extremists (also known as Naxalites) of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), including 15 women, killed five police personnel and two civilians after raiding a police station at Chilakaluripet in the Guntur district of Andhra Pradesh on March 11. The Hindu, March 12, 2005.

Three persons killed during serial bomb blasts in Assam: At least three persons are reported to have died during serial bomb blasts and grenade explosions suspected to have been triggered by the outlawed United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) between March 9-11, 2005. These explosions, primarily targeting Government installations, occurred in capital Guwahati, and the Sivasagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Chirang, Bongaigaon, Nalabari, Kamrup and Dhubri districts. The ULFA 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Barua, while claiming responsibility for the bomb explosions also said that such attacks would continue as long as the 'conflict between India and Assam lingered.' Assam Tibune, Sentinel Assam, March 10-12, 2005.


NEPAL

Former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba among 20 detainees released: The Government on March 11, 2005, released former Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and at least 19 senior political leaders from house arrest. Among the others released include former Home Minister, Purna Bahadur Khadka, spokesperson of the Nepali Congress (Democratic), Minendra Prasad Rijal, former parliamentarian of the Nepali Congress (NC), Hari Bhakta Adhikari, and NC leader Haribol Bhattrai. These leaders were detained on February 1. Nepal News, March 12, 2005.


PAKISTAN

Tribal militant Abdullah Mehsud is dead, indicate reports: Media reports, yet to be confirmed by the authorities, have indicated that the Waziristan-based tribal militant, Abdullah Mehsud, had succumbed to injuries sustained during a military operation on March 5, 2005. An unnamed spokesperson for Mehsud claimed on March 13 that he "died of his wounds" on March 10. The spokesperson told tribal journalist, Sailab Mehsud, who "Abdullah wished to be called first to give the news of his martyrdom." However, military regime spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, said he had no information to confirm Abdullah spokesman's claim. "I am not in a position to say either yes or no. I have no confirmation yet," he told Daily Times. Secretary (Security), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Brig. (Retd) Mahmood Shah, told The News that there was no circumstantial evidence to prove that Mehsud was wounded in the March 5 operation or that he managed to break through the siege by the troops on that occasion. Daily Times, The News , March 14, 2005.


SRI LANKA

No direct funds to the LTTE, says World Bank Country Director: In a statement issued on March 7, 2005, the World Bank Country Director for Sri Lanka, Peter Harrold, said that the bank has no intention of providing funds directly to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Harrold stated this in response to a call by the ruling coalition partner, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), on March 6 to withdraw a statement by the former in an interview to the Sunday Times where he is quoted as recognising the LTTE controlled area as "a kind of unofficial state". Later, Harrold stated that he was misquoted and added that all funding for the North and East, "is disbursed through the official Government channel of the North East Provincial Council." Daily News, March 8, 2005.



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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